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Abstract 
This thesis argues that it is important to distinguish between two different 
phenomena in cyberpolitical spaces: First of all, between ethnic or religious 
groups fighting over in cyberspace, as they do in real life (Ethnoreligious 
cyberconflict) and second, between a social movement and its antagonistic 
institution (Sociopolitical cyberconflict). These different kinds of cyberconflict 
can be explained in the context of international conflict analysis for ethnoreligious 
cyberconflict and social movement theory for sociopolitical cyberconflict, while 
keeping in mind that this takes place in a media environment by using media 
theory. By combining elements of these approaches and justifying the link to 
cyberconflict, it is possible to use them as a theoretical light to look at the 
environment of Cyberconflict (CC) and analysis of incidents of CC. 
Consequently, this work looks at the leading groups using the internet either as 
weapon or a resource against governments, while also looking at networks, 
international organisations and new social movements. Searching for a 
satisfactory theoretical framework, I propose the following parameters to be 
looked at while analysing cyberconflicts: 
1. Environment of Conflict and Conflict Mapping (real and virtual). The world 
system generates an arborescent apparatus, which is haunted by lines of flight, 
emerging through underground networks connected horizontally and lacking a 
4 
hierarchic centre (Deleuze and Guattari). The structure of the internet is ideal 
for network groups, (a global network with no central authority) has offered 
another experience of governance (no governance), time and space 
(compression), ideology (freedom of information and access to it), identity 
(multiplicity) and fundamentally an opposition to surveillance and control, 
boundaries and apparatuses. 
2. Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts: The impact of ICTs on: a. Mobilising structures 
(network style of movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, 
tactics, goals), b. Framing Processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of 
the internet on these processes), c. Political opportunity structure (the internet 
as a component of this structure), d. hacktivism. 
3. Ethnoreligious Cyberconflicts: a. Ethnic/religious affiliation, chauvinism, 
national identity, b. Discourses of inclusion and exclusion, c. Information 
warfare, the use of the internet as a weapon, propaganda and mobilisational 
resource d. Conflict resolution depends on legal, organisational framework, 
number of parties issues, distribution of power, values and beliefs. 
4. The internet as a medium: a. Analysing discourses (representations of the 
world, constructions of social identities and social relations), b. Control of 
information, level of censorship, alternative sources, c. Wolsfeld: Political 
contest model among antagonists: the ability to initiate and control events, 
dominate political discourse, mobilise supporters, d. Media effects on policy 
(strategic, tactical, and representational). 
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Glossary 
Avatar: Among people working on virtual reality and cyberspace interfaces, an 
avatar is an icon or representation of a user in a shared virtual reality. 
Authentication: Verifying that a person is known to you. 
BBS: Bulletin Board Systems 
Blogs: Short for a weblog, an online journal that can turn anyone with Internet 
connection into a mini-media outlet. 
CMC: Computer Mediated Communication 
Cracker: One who breaks security of a system. Coined in 1985 by hackers in 
defence against journalistic misuse of hacker. *
Cyberattacks: Attacks in cyberspace like defacements, worms and viruses. 
Cyberconflict: Political conflict in computer mediated environments. Takes two 
forms: ethnoreligious (two ethnic or religious groups fighting it out in cyberspace 
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as they do in real life) and sociopolitical (social movements against antagonistic 
institutions). 
Cyberdemocracy: The promise of nearly unlimited information delivered to your 
monitor in mere seconds is the promise of a better democracy. 
Cyberdissidents: Dissidents fighting against authoritarian governments online 
using emails, file-trading, BBS and spamming e-magazines. 
Cyberjihad or e jihad: The online equivalent of Islamic fundamentalist jihad. 
Cybernation: A nation whose communication of commonly held beliefs and 
philosophies is affected by the Internet or similar mechanisms. 
Cyberpower: It is the form of power that structures culture and politics in 
cyberspace. 
Cyberpunks: A movement or fashion trend associated especially with the 
rave/techno subculture. * 
Cyberspace: Notional `information space' loaded with visual cues and navigable 
with brain computer-interfaces. * 
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Cyberterrorism: Computer-based attacks intended to intimidate or coerce 
governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, religious or 
ideological. 
Cyberwar: Refers to a more `heavy' mode of new military conflict like 
destruction of the enemy's infrastructure through information technology. 
C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 
Defacement: The destruction of a web page on the Internet. 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS): DDoS attacks employ armies of 
`zombie' machines (insecure server compromised by a hacker who places 
software on it that can launch an overwhelming number of requests, rendering the 
site inoperable). 
Domain Name Service attacks (DNS): Domain name servers are the `Yellow 
Pages' that computers consult in order to obtain the mapping between the name of 
a system and the numerical adress of the system. If the DNS provides an incorrect 
numerical adress for a website then the user's system will connect to the incorrect 
server. An attacker can disseminate false information this way and prevent acces 
to the original site (Vatis, 2001). 
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E government: Government initiatives to provide online government services and 
civic information. 
Email petitions: Petitions that contribute to electronic activism in their capacity 
for getting the word out of dates and times of organised protests, demonstrations 
and co-ordinated activities. 
Flaming: To post an email message intended to insult and provoke. * 
Gopher or archie servers: Gopher presents a menuing interface to a tree or graph 
of links; the link can be to documents, runnable programmes or other gopher 
menus arbitrarily far across the net. * 
Hacker: Connotes a computer virtuoso who enjoys exploring the details of 
programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, one who programs 
enthusiastically, even obsessively. * 
Hacktivism, online activism or electronic activism: Takes two forms: When 
hackers attack virtually chosen political targets and when persons organise 
through the Internet or carry through email a political message. 
IVDA: Individual Virtual Direct Action. 
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ICT. " Information Communication Technologies 
Information warfare or cyberwarfare: sustained terrorist information warfare 
strategies are the ongoing deliberate efforts of an organised political group against 
the military, industrial, civilian, and government economic information 
infrastructures or activities of a nation, region, organisation of states, population 
or corporate entity (Erbschloe). 
Internet Filtering: Preventing viewers from viewing certain web content. 
IRC: Internet Relay Chat. 
Malware: Malicious code programmes. 
MVDA: Mass Virtual Direct Action. 
Netwar: Refers to information age conflict at the less military, low intensity, more 
social end of the spectrum conflict. 
Network-centric warfare: platforms are the eyes, ears and fists of a broader entity. 
ISP: Internet Service Provider. 
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Ping saturation: Denial of service attacks where a target computer is 
overwhelmed with ping requests. 
Proxy Server: A server that sits between a client application, such as a web 
browser and a real server. It is used to improve performance or filter requests. In 
cyberconflict, it allows a user to access blocked sites, not through a system 
controlled by the government. 
Script kiddies: They do mischief with scripts and programs written by others, 
often without understanding the exploit 
Spamming: To mass email unrequested identical email messages, particularly 
advertising; to crash a program by overwhelming a fixed size buffer with 
excessively large input data. * 
SPIN: Segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated network. 
Swarming: Occurs actors spread over great distance, electronically converge a 
target from multiple directions, a tactic different from the traditional form of 
attack in waves, which delivers a knock out blow from a single direction on the 
Internet. 
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UNIX. " Refers to the Unix operating system, an interactive timesharing system. 
Unix has become the most widely used multi-user general purpose operating 
system and since 1996 the variant Linux has been at the cutting edge of the open 
source movement. * 
USENET: From Users' Network: A Distributed bulletin board system supported 
mainly by Unix machines. * 
Virtual Community or cybercommunity: An online community with common 
beliefs who never meet each other that will move them to fight, believe or even 
love their cyebrcommunity. 
Virtual March: When protesters bombard the switchboard of an organisation with 
calls and emails. 
Virtual Sit-In: Activists download a page aiming to flood the server. 
Virus: Most viruses are worms, which are enabled by `buffer overflows'. Buffer 
overflow is an event in which more data is put into a buffer (computer holding 
area) than the buffer has been allocated. 
Asterisks (*) indicate that the definition is taken from The online hacker Jargon 
File 4.1.0, last updated 27/10/03 
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Introduction 
The thrust of this analysis is to disclose the extent to which the internet 
has 
affected politics and political conflict in particular (cyberconflict) and provide a 
theoretical framework for explaining this phenomenon. The aim of the thesis is to 
first theoretically and then empirically locate and introduce the new issues 
confronting global politics today due to the impact of new communication 
technologies. 
The structure of the thesis reflects this strategy. In the first chapter I feel my way 
into some of the main features of internet politics (social movements, power, 
participation, democracy, globalisation) in a form of a literature review, with the 
central argument that the political game remains traditional, despite of the use of a 
postmodern medium. Since the literature did not examine political conflicts 
manifest on the" internet, I thought such study was urgently required to come to 
grips with the consequences of the use of this technology by political actors and 
groups. This leads to chapter 2, where in order to explain the empirical evidence 
of `cyberconflict', I propose the integration of elements of social movement, 
conflict and media theories to a single analytical framework for cyberconflict. To 
understand cyberconflict we must examine the technical environment where this 
takes place (internet security, information warfare) and its sociopolitical 
implications. This I do in chapter 3. 
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Searching for a satisfactory description of empirical cases of cyberconflict led to 
the use of a classification between two types of cyberconflict: sociopolitical and 
ethnoreligious. In the following three chapters I examine cases of different types 
of this classification. Chapter 4 looks at the sociopolitical cyberconflicts: social 
movements, dissidents against governments and internet censorship in different 
countries. Chapter 5 examines examples of ethnoreligious cyberconflicts and the 
possibility of conflict resolution. I then turn to my last empirical chapter 6, where 
I discuss and analyse the internet's role in the organisation of anti-war protests 
during the Iraq 2003 conflict, its effect on media coverage and the impact of the 
war on the internet itself. In the conclusion of all the empirical chapters, I single 
out which of the variables mentioned in the integrated theoretical framework can 
be linked to the empirical examples outlined. In the concluding chapter 7, I 
summarise the most important arguments and findings this thesis brings forward. 
In terms of methodology, the research is conducted on the following levels: 
Textual: Review of internet political literature and main political concepts, social 
movement, conflict, media theory literatures and information warfare and internet 
security texts. 
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Theoretical: The use of the three theories is justified theoretically and the 
elements considered being crucial for cyberconflict analysis are integrated to a 
single theoretical framework. 
Empirical: The study uses more than 300 articles and web sources (secondary 
sources) to locate examples of cyberconflict. 
Analytical: Components of the proposed integrated theoretical framework are 
linked with the empirical evidence while examining these examples, attempting to 
prove the applicability of it to cyberconflict. 
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Chapter 1: How traditional concepts and issues fit into a global postmodern 
medium. 
Faces of Israelis and Saudis and Iraqis, detailed charts of military hardware, 
reports from over decorated generals, from people with strange accents and from 
points all over the world, a barrage of images and information, packaged in easy- 
to take portions, punctuated by commercial breaks where powerful fantasies flow 
by too quickly 
-the world has truly been faxed, cabled, express delivered! 
The field of my research is politics on the internet and more precisely how 
political conflict manifests itself on the internet. In the face of different 
approaches on internet politics, my aim is to analyse these approaches, indicate 
what the problems are and outline how my work fits into this background. The 
problem in politics this chapter will address is how new social movements use a 
postmodern medium like the internet to achieve traditional political goals, such as 
democracy, power and participation in an era of globalisation. 
In political terms, the internet is viewed as a vehicle for educating individuals, 
stimulating citizen participation, measuring public opinion, easing citizen access 
to government officials, offering a public forum, simplifying voter registration 
1 Poster, M: (1995) The Second Media Age, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 159 
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and even facilitating actual voting. It has been termed a powerful technology for 
grass roots democracy and one that by facilitating discussion and collective action 
by citizens, strengthens democracy. It also has been called potentially the most 
powerful tool for political organising in the past fifty years. The underlying 
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that while the demands of the groups 
using the internet remain traditional and modem in their characteristics, the 
medium itself is postmodern serving modernist ends. 
It is important to understand what the central political aims of groups using 
communication technologies are, why and how they use them and to what effect. 
With this in mind, in this chapter we navigate through the literature, building a 
platform from which to embark on a study of cyberconflict and its meaning for 
new communication politics. 
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1.1 Political movements and their use of the internet 
Social movement theory is particularly relevant to this research, because many of 
the groups using the internet have social movement characteristics, 
for example 
the Zapatistas movement in Mexico. The internet is much cheaper than other 
broadcasting media, is not sufficiently censored yet to impede its use by diverse 
grooups and has a potential worldwide audience, facilitating a successful new way 
for social movements to carry their message to a much greater audience. 
However, the issue is that what these groups struggle for, in the final analysis, are 
traditional modernist concepts like democracy, participation and above all power, 
which are going to be examined in that order in the next sections, in order to 
understand if these concepts remain traditional, when they are linked to a 
postmodern medium, such as the internet. Characteristically, Daniel Nugent asks 
of the Zapatista movement: `How can the EZLN move beyond the politics of 
modernity when their vocabulary is so patently modernist and their practical 
organization so emphatically premodern? '3 Taylor and Jordan in their work 
Hacktivism distinguish between two kinks of rights sought after by the Zapatistas: 
2 For more information see Ronfeldt, D, Arquilla J, Fuller, G. E, Fuller, M: (1998) The Zapatista 
Social Netwar in Mexico, Rand Corp: California. An exciting quote is the following : `Meanwhile, 
the EZLN called on Mexican civil socieity 
- 
not other armed guerillas, but peaceful activists 
- 
to 
join with it in a nationwide struggle for social, economic, and political change, without necessarily 
taking up arms. The EZLN also called on international organizations (notably, the Red Cross) and 
civil actors (notably, human rights groups) to come to Chiapas to monitor the conflict. This was 
not at all a conventional way to mount the insurrection' (pp. 2-3). 
3 Daniel Nugent (1995) in Ronfeldt, D, Arquilla J, Fuller, G. E, Fuller, M: (1998) The Zapatista 
Social Netwar in Mexico, Rand Corp: California 
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The primary demands of the Zapatistas are for health, welfare and citizenship 
rights... In this struggle, the Internet functions as a medium through which the 
demands for these rights and the struggles around these rights can be 
communicated. Information rights appear here as almost a second political order, 
serving the `first order' rights to health, welfare and full citizenship! 
When basic interaction and networking is primarily conducted via the net, time 
and space no longer restrain individual engagement. In this respect, the density of 
a movement's targeted social group which has been portrayed as the major 
element in fabricating organised action has to be redefined. Politics outside 
governmental boundaries in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or more 
broadly in social movements will also be restructured by shifts in information 
commodification. Most commonly discussed in this context is the Zapatista revolt 
in Mexico, where what initially looked like a guerrilla war quickly became a 
media war. Instead of fighting in the jungles, though there has been fighting and 
deaths, the Zapatistas used their weapons to create media events. On the day that 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which was signed by 
Mexico, Canada and the USA came into effect as a free trade zone, the Zapatistas 
occupied an area of the Chiapas region in Mexico. When the army arrived, they 
withdrew to the rainforests. They successfully created such a media event that 
they were able to force the Mexican government into negotiation and avoid a full- 
4 Taylor, P. A and Jordan, T: (2004) Hacklivism and Cyberwars: Rebels with a cause?, Routlege: London, p. 97 
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scale war. They did this by full use of the new possibilities for information flow 
including the internet. 5 
Cyberspace offers a medium in which people can interact and coordinate their 
actions without relying on a face-to-face contact. 6 A thriving example of this is 
the anti-globalisation movement whose participants organise heavily through the 
net. Dissident political groups can now have a voice that is very difficult for 
governments to silence. Such groups have been able to mobilise support, in order 
to facilitate dialogue between such groups and their governments, such as 
happened for example between the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the 
Peruvian government. 7 Everard mentions that the lead-up to recent Indonesian 
elections and the subsequent overthrow of the Suharto regime saw the internet 
become an active player as Indonesians sought alternative sources of information, 
while the authorities tightened media controls. The left-wing People's Democratic 
Party went underground after they were blamed by Indonesian authorities for a 
riot in Jakarta in July 1996. They continued to respond to accusations in internet 
discussion lists. Activist groups are increasingly turning to the internet and other 
electronic media to provide information on their activities and on the activities of 
the opposite side. A similar thing happened in 1997 in Sri Lanka, when the 
government launched a national website to counter the Tamil Tigers, who have 
been fighting a long civil war to establish a' homeland for Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
Jordan, T: (1999) Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet, Routledge: London, p. 166. 6 Tsagarousianou, R, Tambini, D and Bryan, C (eds. ): (1998) Cyberdemocracy: Technology, Cities 
and Civic Networks, Routledge: London, p. 8. 
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The Tamil Tigers had set up their own website giving their side of the dispute. Sri 
Lanka officials said their website will `help in countering anti-Sri Lanka 
propaganda by enabling Internet surfers worldwide to have access through a 
single window to authentic news and information on Sri Lanka'. 8 In the 
Philippines in the late 1990s, media and political history was made by using SMS 
technology or texting in helping bring down former president Estrada. 
Nevertheless, such political implications of the internet were not the first to be 
picked up by researchers. Early internet literature focused on issues of hacking, 
encryption and the use of the internet by extremist groups. It is nonetheless 
important to mention some of the main concerns expressed, if we are to 
understand the issues arising from the application of the internet in our every day 
lives. 
Denning and Baugh commented on the international issue of encryption: 
Law enforcement agencies have encountered encrypted email and files in 
investigations of pedophiles and child pornography, including the FBI's Innocent 
Images national child pornography investigation. In many cases the subjects were 
using Pretty Good Privacy to encrypt files and email... We were told of another 
7 Everard, J: (2000) Virtual States, Routledge: London, p. 158 & Margolis, M and Resnick, D: (2000) Politics As Usual, Sage: London, p. 20 
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case in which a terrorist group that was attacking business and state officials used 
encryption to conceal their messages 9 
To this effect, Barrett brings a good point to our attention, when he asserts that the 
internet can support global chains of pyramid letters, anonymous hate mail, 
offensive graffiti and a range of other `anti-social' activities: 
Just as fraudulent traders are provided with the potential to operate from `data 
havens', so too are political agitators and even terrorists afforded havens from 
which to criticise government policies - either our own or our allies' - from 
within the shelter of the UK, protected by anonymous ftp servers, by complicated 
cross-posting articles, or by the use of dial in access to some other country's 
machines. In early 1996 for example, plans of the British Army's establishment 
in Northern Ireland were published on the Internet10 
On the extremists' use of the internet, Rathmell argues that the most remarked 
upon users of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been 
right wing militias in the USA, Islamist opposition movements originating in the 
Middle East and single-issue pressure groups such as environmental activists or 
human rights campaigners. " However they may differ in aims, membership or 
ideology, all of these groups have been quick to exploit ICTs for propaganda and 
psychological operations. Many insurgents, from the provisional IRA through 
9 Denning and Baugh in Thomas, D and Loader, B (eds. ): (2000) Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, 
Security and Surveillance in the Information Age, Routledge: London, p. 108. 
10 Barrett, N: (1996) The State of the Cybernation, Kogan Page: London, p. 203. 
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Mexico's Zapatistas to Lebanon's Hizbollah, have incorporated ICTs into their 
more traditional propaganda and fund-raising activities. They have websites as 
well as newspapers. But they do not appear to have supplemented their kinetic 
attacks, using bullets and bombs, with cyberattacks. Whine writes as follows: 
`The German authorities express increasing concern about the Internet. They have 
noted the growth of far right home pages, from 30 in 1996 to 90 in 1997 and the 
manner in which football hooligans were mobilised during the 1998 football 
World Cup series by German Nazis via their websites'. 12 
Also in July 2002 right-wing extremists looking for converts appeared to be trying 
to subvert the anti-globalisation movement, using at least one intentionally 
confusing website and even showing up at major protests to recruit activists 
directly. In response to this move the Anti-Defamation League went on the 
offensive against a site of the `Anti-Globalism Action Network' (g8activist. com), 
which could easily be accessed by mistake by those intending to visit the G8 
Activist Network. 13 In December of the same year, the North Rhine-Westphalia 
state in Germany required internet providers to block two US-based neo-Nazi 
websites after a court ruled the measure did not violate the provider's rights. The 
providers were to appeal to a higher state court and threatened to leave the state 
for other German states that do not have limiting regulations. 14 A tough approach 
on net hate speech has also been taken by the Council of Europe, which has 
11 Rathmell in Thomas, D and Loader, B (eds. ): (2000) Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security 
and Surveillance in the Information Age, Routledge: London, p. 230. 
12 Whine in Thomas, D and Loader, B (eds. ): (2000) Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and 
Surveillance in the Information Age, Routledge: London, p. 237. 
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passed a provision which updates the European Convention on Cybercrime, 
criminalising internet hate speech, including hyperlinks to pages that contain 
offensive content. In contrast with the Americans - the council cited a report 
finding that 2,500 out of 4,000 racist sites were created in the US - many 
European countries have existing laws outlawing internet racism. 
15 European 
States have also set up the European Network and Information Security Agency 
set to begin in January 2004 and last until Dec 2008, with a budget of $28.7 
million. The agency would work on problems such as preventing network 
failures, computer crashes, viruses and unauthorised interception on 
communications, advising the EU institutions on information security matters. 16 
Extremist groups use the internet because it is cheap. For the price of a computer 
and a modem an extremist can become a player in national and world events. 
ICTs lower the threshold for participating in illegal acts and without state or other 
backing extremists will look for cost-effective instruments. Furthermore, ICTs act 
as a force multiplier, enhancing power and enabling extremists to punch above 
their weight. They can now have a reach and influence that was previously denied 
to them. Tragically, Helsinki experienced a transfer of activities on the net to real 
life late 2002, when a 17-year old boy in an internet chat room dealing with 
explosives was held for questioning in a deadly bombing at a suburban shopping 
13 Kettman, S: ` Make hate not globalization', wired, 13/7/02 
14 Associated Press: `Frankfurt: Nein to neo-Nazi sites', 20/12/02 
's Scheeres, J: `Europeans outlaw Net hate speech', wired, 9/11/02 
16 Pruitt, S: ` EU approves creation of cybersecurity agency', IDG News service, London Bureau, 
9/10/2003 
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mall. The teenager had contacts with a 19-year old, Peri Gerdt, suspected of 
making and planting the explosive device that killed him and six others. 
To sum up, some political actors are denied access to traditional political means. 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) provide new opportunities. 
The question is how do these new technological possibilities affect the political 
situation. With the emergence of this new technology, political actors 
have 
unlimited access to easier and cheaper means of political communication, such as 
the internet. Instead of using traditional means like election campaigns or public 
relations, the groups that use the internet are able to communicate messages to a 
wider audience than that reached by more traditional means of political 
communication. These new technological opportunities affect the political 
situation in various ways. Political communication becomes more mechanised, it 
is instant and cheaper and new groups previously excluded can take part in a 
political situation without feeling excluded through the new technology. The 
groups that use ICTs affect the political situation in that they put forward new 
rules of the game, the rules of new technology. As a result, traditional political 
means are less effective and need to adjust to these new technological 
possibilities. The use of ICTs and the internet in particular, provide endless 
opportunities to groups that are otherwise excluded from traditional political 
communication. This does not mean, however, that new social movements, like 
anti-globalisation, anti-capitalist or antiwar movements, when using the Internet 
to communicate political goals ask for anything that is not traditionally modem in 
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character like participation, democracy or power. The nature of the medium does 
not appear to affect the essentially modernist nature of the game. Lastly, what this 
first impression points to is that two types of actors use the internet for political 
purposes: sociopolitical movements and extremist or ethnoreligious groups like 
the ones mentioned above. 
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1.2 Internet politics: Democracy, participation, power 
Democracy in internet politics 
In order to discuss the connection between democracy and the internet, it would 
be useful to include a conceptualisation of the term `democracy', before we apply 
a political theory of democracy to our internet research. The internet brings forth 
new types of participation in government, thus challenging the traditional type of 
democracy, where new forms of power configurations can exist between 
communicating individuals. Arguably, information is the lifeblood of democracy. 
Keeping this in mind, can we speak of a new politics on the internet or is 
democracy a traditional term left unaltered by the postmodern realities of the new 
medium? 
In the contemporary world democracy can only be fully sustained by ensuring the 
accountability of all related and interconnected power systems, from economics to 
politics. These systems involve agencies and organisations, which form an 
element of and yet often cut across the territorial boundaries of nation-states. This 
is how Held views it: `The possibility of democracy must, accordingly, be linked 
to an expanding framework of democratic institutions and procedures 
- 
to what I 
have called the cosmopolitan model of democracy'. 17 
17 Held, D: (1995) Democracy and the Global Order, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 267 
28 
Held makes three important points: First, the way processes of economic, 
political, legal, military and cultural interconnectedness are changing the nature, 
scope and capacity of the sovereign state from above, as its regulatory ability is 
challenged and reduced in some spheres; secondly, the way regional and global 
interconnectedness creates chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes 
among states and their citizens, altering the nature and dynamics of national 
political systems themselves; and thirdly, the way local groups, movements and 
nationalisms are questioning the nation-state from below as a representative and 
accountable power system (see also the following discussion on social movement 
theory in 2.1). Democracy, as Held argues, has to come to terms with all three of 
these developments and their implications for national and international power 
centres. 
In the same context, the hierarchical structure of the state system itself has been 
disrupted by the emergence of the global economy, the rapid expansion of 
transnational relations and communication, the economic growth of international 
organisations and regimes, and the development of transnational movements and 
actors 
- 
all of which challenge its efficacy. With the spread of the internet, there is 
scope for a newly international localism that is finding expression in `virtual' 
communities, with some people going so far as to suggest that a new global 
cyberstate is forming-18 There also signs that online communities will offer further 
" See the concept of cybernation in Barrett, N: (1996) The State of the Cybernation, Kogan Page: 
London. 
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dimensions to personal identity within an already complex world. The problem 
with this, is that it is extremely doubtful that these changes will ultimately 
undermine the notion of sovereignty. According to Everard, people still live 
within a physical location and the idea of cybersovereignty falters, as it fails to 
think through the place of the body in cyberspace. 19 However, it can be argued 
that his view is rather limited considering more recent challenges facing states 
particularly undemocratic ones, which I discuss in section 4.2 and 4.3 below. 
To continue with Held, the cosmopolitan model would seek the creation of an 
effective transnational legislative and executive, at regional and global levels, 
bound by and operating within the terms of the basic democratic law. 20 This 
would involve the creation of regional parliaments (for example, in Latin America 
and Africa) and the enhancement of the role of such bodies where they already 
exist (the European Parliament), so that their decisions become recognised in 
principle as legitimate independent sources of regional and international 
regulation. Accordingly, Held writes: 
Those seeking to advance greater equity throughout the world's regions, peaceful 
dispute settlement and demilitarization, the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedom, sustainability across generations, the mutual 
acknowledgement of cultures, the reciprocal recognition of political and religious 
19 Everard, J: (2000) Virtual States, Routledge: London, p. 63 20 Held, D: (1995) Democracy and the Global Order, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 272 
30 
identities, and political stability across political institutions are all laying down 
elements essential to a cosmopolitan democratic community. 1 
In conjunction, Held is right to argue that democracy has an appeal as the `grand' 
or `meta-political' narrative in the contemporary world, because it offers a 
legitimate way of framing and delimiting the competing `narratives' of the good. 
This is particularly important, because it holds out the prospect of the constitution 
of the political good as the democratic good - the pursuit of the ` good life' defined 
under free and equal conditions of participation. 
Commensurate with his argument, Held engages in what he calls `the democratic 
thought experiment'. At its core, the democratic thought experiment is concerned 
to describe the obligations people would accept as necessary for the status to be 
met as equally free members of their political community. In his own words: 
It is an enquiry which aims to abstract from existing power relations, in order to 
disclose the fundamental enabling condition for possible political participation 
and therefore for legitimate rule. It is thus, an analytical mechanism, which helps 
discriminate among forms of acceptance or compliance to political arrangements 
and outcomes 22 
But, what is the role of citizens in Held's democracy? Citizens, he says, can enjoy 
liberty only if the power of the state is circumscribed by law; that is, 
21 ibid., p. 281 
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circumscribed by rules which specify limits on the scope of political activity 
- 
limits based on the rights of individuals to develop their own views and tastes to 
pursue their own ends and to fulfill their own talents and gifts. The stratification 
of autonomy produced by modem corporate capitalism goes beyond the 
immediate impact of economic inequalities on the capacities of citizens to 
participate as equals in their collective associations, for the very capacity of 
governments to act in ways that interest groups may legitimately desire is 
constrained. 23 
According to Held, democratic theory and practice are faced with a major 
challenge. The business corporation or multinational bank exercises a 
disproportionate `structural influence' over the polity and, therefore over the 
nature of democratic outcomes. Political representatives would find it extremely 
difficult to carry out the wishes of an electorate committed to reducing the 
adverse effects on democracy and political equality of corporate capitalism. 
Democracy is embedded in a socio-economic system that grants a `privileged 
position' to certain interests. For these reasons, individuals and interest groups 
cannot be treated as necessarily equal, and the state cannot be regarded as a 
neutral arbiter among all interests. 24 
A final point of interest highlighted by Held is that democracy is challenged by 
powerful sets of economic relations and organisations, which can 
- 
by virtue of 
22 ibid., p. 161 
23 ibid., p. 246 
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the bases of their operation 
- 
systematically distort democratic processes and 
outcomes. There is a case that if democracy is to prevail, the key groups and 
associations of the economy will have to be rearticulated with political institutions 
so that they become part of the democratic process 
- 
adopting within their very 
modus operandi a structure of rules, principles and practices compatible with 
democracy. 25 
When we test Held's hypothesis on our own research concern, namely the 
internet, we come up with two responses. The first one is that new media increase 
the scale and speed of information provision and give citizens more control over 
their information diet. Thereby, they better arm citizens with the information they 
need in order to participate. 26 In this respect, new media help reduce some of the 
inequalities in the capacities of citizens to participate that Held is referring to. As 
Tsagarousianou mentions for utopian visionaries, the promise of nearly unlimited 
information delivered to your monitor in mere seconds is the promise of a better 
democracy. The internet can help to make all of us more active and more 
knowledgeable about government, even if `the state cannot be regarded as a 
neutral arbiter among all interests'. 7 The second response is the most common 
one among internet researchers, which states that the internet will not make a 
great difference or as Margolis and Resnick put it politics will continue as usual 
because ` in the tradition of American capitalism, the Information Highway is 
24 ibid., p. 247 25 ibid., p. 251 26 Tsagarousianou, R, Tambini, D and Bryan, C (eds. ): (1998) Cyberdemocracy: Technology, Cities and Civic Networks, Routledge: London, p. 6. 
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increasingly here to advertise and sell products and services, not to improve the 
democratic quality of American politics and civic life'28 Margolis and Resnick 
seem to disagree with potential claims about the power of the internet in relation 
to democracy. They intimately take the view that 
what has occurred is the normalization of cyberspace. Cyberspace has not 
become the locus of a new politics that spills out of the computer screen and 
revitalises citizenship and democracy. If anything ordinary politics and 
commercial activity in all their complexity and vitality, have invaded and 
captured cyberspace. Virtual reality has grown to resemble the real world 29 
They back this up by saying that political life on the internet has moved away 
from cyber-communities, in which civic life centers around free discussion and 
debate. It has entered an era of organised civil society and structured group 
pluralism with a relatively passive citizenry. Nevertheless, Margolis and Resnick 
realise that the Web is a wonderful vehicle for citizens who are already interested 
in politics. `If they choose ordinary citizens can acquire a plethora of data and 
gain access to the public face of the democratic political process. It has functioned 
well as a tool for citizen awareness campaigns, although so far these have mostly 
concerned politics that affect the net' 30 
27 Held, D: (1995) Democracy and the Global Order, Polity Press: Cambridge 28 Margolis, M and Resnick, D: (2000) Politics As Usual, Sage: London, p. 73 29 ibid., p. 2 
30 ibid., p. 22 
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What they also recognise is that to realise democratic control, it is necessary to 
restore the balance among branches of government. Computer-mediated 
communication, they believe, could be the vehicle for this, because among other 
things it can provide citizens with access to the same documentary information as 
bureaucrats. Nevertheless, such an account denies the effect of the internet and 
ICTs on the political process, which is empirically evident in countless ways in 
current communication practices. 
Interestingly, the same authors see a way that the internet will help spread 
democracy; but not because more people will conduct more of their politics 
online. Rather, information being at the centre of new forms of economic growth 
will facilitate the spread of that wealth. Margolis and Resnick write: 
Areas of the world lacking old-fashioned sources of wealth rooted in natural 
resources such as vast tracts of arable land or scarce minerals can now complete 
with nations more abundantly endowed. Because the information spread via the 
Internet will contribute to general world economic growth and because economic 
growth facilitates the rise of democratic government, the Internet will contribute 
to the spread of democracy. 31 
Respectively, its is very dubious to assert that for two reasons; first the authors do 
not provide evidence for their claim, namely that economic growth facilitates the 
rise of democratic government, which is problematic, especially if we look at rich 
31 ibid., p. 210 
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states in the Middle East. Second, there is no guarantee that this new economic 
wealth will not end up again in the already rich North. 
However, one has to agree with Margolis and Resnick that one of the hardest 
things to predict is whether the internet will improve the quality of democracy by 
creating a more informed citizenry. On the one hand, the internet offers instant 
and almost cost free information, which could enable the ordinary citizen to be 
fully informed about all policy areas and follow government activity that was 
never possible in the past. On the other hand, one has to remain sceptical, since 
the availability of unlimited information might inspire those who are already 
politically active, but it does not mean that the internet itself will increase the 
attentive public. Unfortunately, those who are uninterested and remain uninvolved 
in politics will continue to be so, whether the internet exists or not. Also, As 
Gerodimos argues, `[t]he leveling of the playing field can liberate long-oppressed 
voices, but it can also create an alternative public sphere that suffers from a lack 
of transparency, accountability and regulation that resembles the deficit of the 
mass-mediated public sphere' 32 
One element of Held's hypothesis, that democracy is challenged by powerful sets 
of economic relations and organisations which can 
- 
by virtue of the bases of their 
operation 
- 
systematically distort democratic processes and outcomes comes true, 
when we discuss the relationship between the internet and politics. The internet 
32 Gerodimos, R: `Social movements and online civic engagement', 2°d International Conference 
Imaging Social Movements, 1-3 July 2004, Edge Hill College. 
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does now and will continue to discriminate economically. Internet use requires 
internet access, which costs money many people cannot pay. As Richard Davis's 
evidence suggests regarding internet use in the US, `[p]eople making over 
$75,000 annually are far more likely to own a computer, have access to the 
Internet, and use the Internet to visit political sites than those who made under 
$40,000. In contrast the average income nationally is approximately $32,000'. 33 
Manuel Castells also provides us with evidence to support the notion that the 
Internet is not as democratic as one might think, offering an insight on the social, 
racial, gender, age and spatial inequality in internet access: 
Worldwide, 30 per cent of Internet users had a university degree, and the 
proportion increased to 55 per cent in Russia, 67 per cent in Mexico and 90 per 
cent in China. In Latin America, 90 per cent of Internet users came from upper 
income groups. In China only 7 per cent of Internet users were women. Age was 
a major discriminating factor. The average age of Internet users in the US was 36 
years, and in the UK and in China was below 30. In Russia, only 15 per cent of 
Internet users were older than 45. In the US households with income of $75,000 
and higher were 20 times more likely to have Internet access than those at the 
lowest level of income 34 
f 
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A more recent EU report titled `A sustainable eEurope: Can ICT create economic, 
social and environment value? ' dated August 2003 found that 88 per cent of all 
33 Davis, R: (1999) The Web of Politics, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p. 182 
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internet users account for only 15 per cent of the world's population in the 
industrialised world, while countries as digitally advanced as Finland, have more 
internet users than the whole of Latin America. There are also big differences 
within the developed world. In 2002, some 58 per cent of all Americans 
had 
internet access at home, compared to only 38 per cent in Europe. Within the EU 
the percentage varies between 60 per cent in the Netherlands and 10 per cent in 
Greece. The report also suggests that not enough research has been done to 
understand social problems caused by the digital divide. 
5 Moreover, the future of 
cyberdemocracy is seen as deferred `given the heavy handy involvement of 
untrammeled economic and commercial interests in deciding the fate of 
technologies putatively valuable from the point of view of extending opportunities 
for political involvement to a larger segment of US society' 36 
In addition, Slevin in his work The Internet and Society has anticipated that the 
increasing influence of big business on the internet brings with it at least two fears 
for regulators and internet users: 
First, there is concern that if builders of network applications hold a monopoly, 
they may be in a position to determine license fees for the use of their products. 
Second, there is the worry that those who build applications and control the 
34 Castells, M: (2000) The Rise of the Network Society, vol. 1 of The Information Age: Economy, 
Society and Culture, 2°d edn, Blackwell: Oxford, p. 377 35 http: //europa. eu. int/comm/enterprise/ict/policy/ict-sust/final-report. pdf 36 Loader, B (ed. ): (1997) The Governance of Cyberspace, Routledge: London, p. 113 
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interfaces may gain a considerable say over the content of the information 
communicated and accessed by way of the net. 7 
Yet, this fear of monopoly and the existent monopolies in communication be them 
on computer software or the more traditional media (for example Bill Gates or 
Rupert Murdoch) has not stopped the use of ICTs in remarkable ways. Network 
technologies are increasingly used in public and political debates and 
communications, thus promoting dialogue between opposing parties, one of the 
elements of true democracy. Frissen writes that several `freenets' have been 
developed in the Netherlands. They are called `Digital cities', use the internet and 
are organised by private actors supported by government. But the government is 
also using the internet to organise political debates. In his own words: 
In 1995 we have been running an Internet discussion for the Netherlands' 
Ministry of Home Affairs regarding a new White Paper on information in public 
administration. One of the research questions in this project was whether the 
style and participation in a digital debate differed from ordinary political 
debates. 8 
Other crucial elements of a democratic polity are privacy and surveillance as 
scrutinised by Raab 39 The claim that democracy and privacy reinforce each other 
means that the information-openness of democracy is not necessarily achieved at 
37 Slevin, J: (2000) The Internet and Society, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 39 38 Frissen in Loader, B (ed. ): (1997) The Governance of Cyberspace, Routledge: London, p. 117 39 Raab in Loader, B (ed. ): (1997) The Governance of Cyberspace, Routledge: London, p. 156. 
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the expense of privacy's information-restriction. The development of accountable 
democratic institutions and privacy-protecting processes cannot take place in 
separate compartments, for each is an important condition of the other. Intruding 
upon privacy, surveillance may impede democratic liberties, due to its `chilling' 
effect on communication or expression. Surveillance thrives in authoritarian 
regimes that are not exposed to public debate and criticism. ICTs can promote 
communication, political expression and action amongst citizens who cannot meet 
in person, provided that they can trust the security of electronic media and their 
integrity against surveillance. It appears, however, that when participants with 
unorthodox opinions are being monitored by authorities, then the Information 
Superhighway's (ISH) potential as a reliable democratic tool is damaged. In this 
respect Raab claims that: 
There is much debate, through these channels on the questions of free speech, 
censorship, pornography, the accessibility of officials and politicians through 
electronic mail, intellectual property rights, the legal position and liabilities of 
anonymous remailers, the ability to dispose of secure encryption, and the 
facilities afforded by secure ISH networks to drug-traffickers and money- 
launderers ao 
The risk of new technologies such as the internet becoming rampant features of 
information exchange and communication produces the fear of push-button 
democracy becoming the norm in the twentieth-first century, not so much as a 
40 ibid., p. 166. 
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formal process of national referenda, but as a bastardized version of manufactured 
consent, generated by public relations experts and entrenched political 
machines 41 
To continue, in their work Cyberpolitics, Hill and Hughes suggest that for any 
democracy, information is an essential resource. They point out that one of the 
major failings of democracy is that so few people take part in the democratic 
process. In 1996, less than one half of the eligible adult population voted in the 
US presidential elections, and far fewer are involved in such activities as 
campaigning, writing letters, or circulating petitions. Hill and Hughes examined 
both Usenet and chatrooms and came up with various conclusions. One of the 
important ones is that internet messages about less-democratic nations are far 
more likely to be anti-government than the messages about more-democratic 
governments: ' [n]ot only is the relationship between country democracy and the 
probability that a message will be anti-government strong, but it is the only 
significant, consistent predictor of anti-government statements in the Usenet'. 2 
In the same line of argument, they examined the ideological balance in chat rooms 
and they found that right-wing threads not only dominate, but that these threads 
have more chatters and more messages. This might imply that right-wingers are 
more numerous, more active or both. 3 Or it might reflect the marginality of right- 
wingers, who feel unrepresented by parties and formal systems. Not surprisingly, 
41 Wilhelm, A (2000) Democracy in the Digital Age, Routledge: London, p. 139. 42 Hill, K and Hughes, J: (1998) Cyberpolitics, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, p. 107 
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they concluded that chat rooms are a difficult format for thoughtful discussion, 
because of the short line space and the fast pace, which require people to make 
snap comments, not thoughtful ones. The level of information is low and there is a 
small amount of issue discussion. Most chat room conversations focus on the 
actions of people rather than the government and its role in society. Thus, Hill and 
Hughes counteract that the Usenet is a better format than chat rooms for political 
discussions. As they explain: 
The Usenet is slow and more thoughtful and so has more potential for 
deliberation. We saw that Usenet threads tend to be more informative and they 
are more ideologically balanced. In general, we think electronic political 
discussion works better in a format as the Usenet, as opposed to a chat room 
style. It is not perfect, but we think it offers a better hope for deliberative 
democracy. 44 
One gets the same feeling when using similar more recent facilities like the 
Microsoft Network (MSN) or I Seek You (ICQ). 
In Cyberdemocracy written by Tsagarousianou and colleagues, the writers 
examine several attempts by local authorities to provide access to their citizens 
electronically. As Tsagarousianou describes them, Amsterdam's Digital City, for 
example, combines a number of different communicative and civic functions, 
such as deliberation, public information, and some degree of support of grass root 
43 ibid., p. 129 
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groups. The IperBole project of the commune of Bologna supports citizens' 
deliberation, public information provision and to a lesser extent, supports 
grassroots groups. The Santa Monica Pen project enables deliberation and public 
information provision. The Manchester Information City initiative provides 
economic regeneration-related information dissemination as well as deliberation 
and civic information provision. In contrast, the official city of Berlin project is 
geared towards the provision of local authority and local area information, while 
Network Pericles in Athens has plebiscitary and deliberative aspects, and allows 
for limited information mainly. 5 These efforts by local governments connect very 
closely to Held's argument that regional and global interconnectedness can alter 
the nature and dynamics of national political systems, since local initiatives could 
be seen as a challenge to the national government. 
I would mention one of the networks, namely, the Santa Monica' Public 
Electronic network (PEN), since it is one of the longest running and most 
innovative experiments in electronic democracy. The PEN system is an 
exceptionally valuable study, because Santa Monica was one of the first cities to 
offer its citizens access to an interactive public electronic network. Docter and 
Dutton have alluded to the problem: 
Santa Monica's experience indicates that the Internet and the multimedia 
revolution will not short-circuit such major dilemmas of democratic participation 
44 ibid., p. 131 
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as public apathy. Most of the public in Santa Monica and other American cities 
are not very interested in either real or virtual participation. Nevertheless, 
technological change in the household and government, illustrated by burgeoning 
interest in the Internet, suggests that electronic participation is likely further to be 
developed by governments throughout the US! ' 
Moreover, as Tsagarousianou explains most, although not all, experiments in 
electronic democracy share a number of common characteristics. First, they are 
perceived by the social actors initiating or participating in them as means of 
reviving and invigorating democratic politics, which for a variety of reasons is 
perceived to have lost its appeal and dynamism. Second, they have been local or 
regional in their character, being related to more or less territorially bounded 
urban and suburban communities. Lastly, they have been based on broadly similar 
technological infrastructures. 47 
Graham Browning in his work Electronic Democracy is more concerned with the 
actual effects of the internet on political practice. He sets forth a very good 
example of the potential political power of the internet. Richard Hartman, a 
computer software engineer from Spokane, Washington, and his wife Mary 
helped bring about the surprise defeat of then Speaker of the House Thomas S. 
Foley through an anti-Foley political action committee they almost entirely 
45 Tsagarousianou, R in Tsagarousianou et. al: (1998) Cyberdemocracy: Technology, Cities and Civic Networks, Routledge: London, p. 169 46 ibid., p. 145 
47 ibid., p. 168 
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organised through the net 48 Also, Browning mentions that online activists claim 
some of the credit for the election in January 1996 of Senator Ron Wyden, D-Ore, 
an enthusiastic supporter of free speech online. Wyden won his race by less than 
18,000 votes, a measurable proportion of them supplied by voters attracted to 
Wyden's candidacy through his internet appeals, activists believe. Another 
example cited by Browning occurred in late September and early October 
1994. 
This is how Browning (1996) describes it: 
On September 29 of that year the House of Representatives passed a lobbying 
reform bill that many organisations feared would require them to reveal the 
names of their members and the amount of fees they paid lobbyists to represent 
them in Congress. After the vote, the Christian Coalition posted emergency alerts 
to the Internet and CompuServe, asking members to contact Congress 
immediately and register their opposition to the bill. In the 24-hour period before 
the lobbying reform bill reached the Senate on the following Friday, almost 
250,000 people responded to those alerts. The bill died on the floor of the 
Senate 49 
More recently, we had the phenomenon of `blogs': short for a weblog, an online 
journal that can turn anyone with an internet connection into a mini-media outlet. 
Blogs are easy to create, cheap to set up, and commonplace on the web. They can 
draw thousands of readers per day and dozens of posted comments, similar to talk 
radio for the wired. An example of a famous weblog is Salam Pax from Baghdad 
48 Browning, G: (1996) Electronic Democracy, Wilton: London, p. 2 
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included later in the discussion, who influenced the media coverage during the 
March 2003 Iraq conflict. In relation to democratic politics, there is the example 
of Oliver Willis, 25, who has a political platform of his own despite the fact that 
he is not a rich man or a player in democratic politics. He ran a website called 
oliverwillis. com, where he posted an essay promoting Vermont Governor Howard 
Dean for democratic nominee, drawing comments from people he had never met. 
`Blogs are the harbingers of a new, interactive culture that could potentially 
change how democracy works, turning voters into active participants rather than 
passive consumers, limiting the traditional media's role as a gate keeper, and 
giving the rank-and-file voter unparalleled influence'. 50 
Among the wired, there is a debate over whether blogs are a new form of 
discourse or simply an endless feedback loop, a self-enclosed circle of political 
junkies echoing and challenging each other. However, Willis and other bloggers 
say that their work has a way of spilling into the offline world, as blogs can often 
focus attention on issues the traditional media ignores. Due to the fact that official 
websites can be boring, blogs can lend an aura of authenticity to a campaign. 
During the presidential primaries of 2003-4, the Web was filled with unofficial 
blogs in support of Howard Dean, John Kerry, Richard Gephardt, Dennis 
Kucinich and President Bush. There was also a movement to draft retired Army 
General Wesley Clark for a presidential run, which drew much of its energy from 
49 ibid., p. 3 
50 Weiss, J: ` "Slogs" shake the political discourse', Globe Staff, 23/7/03 
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blogs. 51 Nevertheless, the use of blogs is not seen as transforming the way 
presidential campaigns communicate, according to a report from Johns Hopkins 
University's CampaignsOnline. org project. The report found that while there has 
been much media attention concerning campaign blogs, only four of the nine 
Democratic candidates for president currently utilise blogs as part of their 
communication strategy. 52 
A stark example of e-democracy and internet politics is MoveOn. org, which 
played an influential role in the US 2003-4 primaries and in recent years has 
proven the ability to raise money - $3.2 million in 2000 and $4.1 million in 2002 
- 
with a membership list of 1.4 million activists. The number of volunteers for 
MoveOn is ten times larger than any existing presidential candidate developed. In 
the future, a campaign's Internet strategy will become central to the campaign: 
As the example of MoveOn is duplicated by other organizations from the 
national to the local level, the power and the impact of online organizing and 
campaigning will be greatly magnified. Any politician with sense enough to fill 
out qualifying papers will understand that the Internet must be central to their 
campaign and not an afterthought S3 
Dean raised more than $40 million through online donations. John Kerry in three 
months brought in almost $50 million from 400,000 online donations. However, 
S' ibid. 
52 `Howard Dean blogs, Gen. Clark and President Bush follow', AlwaysOn, 18/11/03 53 `The Moveon primary: what it means', politicsonline. com, 26/7/03 
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both Kerry and President Bush are eager to translate online support into actual 
votes. 54 
To sum up, there are two camps on the question of whether the internet enhances 
democracy. The optimist view is that the internet increases the scale and speed of 
information and gives more control over the information diet, so that the promise 
of unlimited information is the promise of a better democracy; projects like those 
cited here by local authorities to provide access to their citizens electronically can 
prove to be a tool for a better democracy and as examples of awareness 
campaigns have shown the internet can be a useful way to organise politically. On 
the other side of the coin, there are the arguments that those who are uninterested 
in politics and remain uninvolved will continue to be so, that the internet 
discriminates economically with social, gender, race, age and spatial inequality 
and that at the end the internet is dominated by economic interests and seems to 
be resembling more and more the real world. Both arguments have their merits 
and deserve detailed appraisal. It would be thus safer to assert that the internet 
might not yet be ready to take on the responsibility of a democratising tool; 
nevertheless its potential for helping to create a better democracy is undeniable. 
From the evidence presented so far, it does not seem that democracy is radically 
influenced much by the internet and it remains a traditional concept unaffected by 
the postmodern nature of the medium. The internet has provided improved access 
to the political system for outsiders and mechanisms for spontaneous expression 
34 Witt, L: `Kerry net strategy now on voters', wired. com, 2/7/04. 
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of public attitudes, presenting a very powerful way of harnessing the political 
moment. Yet, even as they exploit the web, political professionals are somewhat 
mindful of its anarchic cultural heritage. 
Participation in internet politics 
Another issue linked to my research is participation, because the groups that are 
availed with the internet use it to promote greater participation in their respective 
political agendas. Nevertheless, participation is not always linked to democracy. 
Carole Pateman 55 suggests that the collapse of the Weimar Republic, with its high 
rates of mass participation, into fascism, and the post-war establishment of 
totalitarian regimes based on mass participation, albeit participation backed by 
intimidation and coercion, underlay the tendency for `participation' to become 
linked to the concept of totalitarianism rather than that of democracy. 
Pateman refers to Dahl's view about the possible dangers inherent in an increase 
in participation on the part of the ordinary citizen. The lower socio-economic 
groups are the least politically active and it is also among this group that 
`authoritarian' personalities are most frequently found. To the extent that a rise in 
political activity brought this group into the political arena, the consensus on 
norms might decline and hence polyarchy declines. Therefore, an increase in the 
ss gateman, C: (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, p. 2. 
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existing amount of participation could prove to be dangerous to the stability of the 
democratic system. 
However, this analysis seems to amount to something akin to elitism and it is 
quite disturbing to think that lower socio-economic groups should be excluded 
from the democratic process because they lower the `quality' of democracy. In 
relation to the internet, which can potentially involve mass participation in 
democratic politics, such an argument would be difficult to swallow. 
Further, Pateman deems that certain conditions are necessary if the democratic 
system is to remain stable. The level of participation by the majority should not 
rise much above the minimum necessary to keep the democratic method (electoral 
machinery) working; that is, it should remain at about the level that exists at 
present in the Anglo-American democracies. The fact that non-democratic 
attitudes are relatively more common among the inactive means that any increase 
in participation by the apathetic would weaken the consensus on the norms of the 
democratic method, which is a further necessary condition. In her own words: 
As we have seen, the formulators of the contemporary theory of democracy also 
regard participation exclusively as a protective device. In their view the 
`democratic' nature of the system rests primarily on the form of the national 
`institutional arrangements', specifically on the competition of leaders (potential 
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representatives) for votes, so that theorists who hold this view of the role of 
participation are first and foremost theorists of representative government 56 
Again, keeping the level of participation to the minimum necessary to avoid 
weakening consensus, although valid as an argument, is a technical and cynical 
view of participatory politics and limits prospects of greater participation caused 
potentially by new ICTs. 
Rousseau, Pateman writes, might be called the theorist par excellence of 
participation, and an understanding of the nature of the political system that he 
describes in the Social Contract is vital for the theory of participatory democracy. 
Rousseau's entire political theory hinges on the individual participation of each 
citizen in political decision making and in his theory participation is very much 
more than a protective adjunct to a set of institutional arrangements. It also has a 
psychological effect on the participants, ensuring that there is a continuing 
interrelationship between the working of institutions and the psychological 
qualities and attitudes of individuals interacting with them. 
The analysis of the operation of Rousseau's participatory system makes two 
points clear: first, that `participation' for Rousseau is participation in the making 
of decisions and second, that it is, as in theories of representative government, a 
way of protecting private interests and ensuring good government. Rousseau's 
56 ibid., p. 20 
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ideal system is designed to develop responsible, individual, social and political 
action through the effect of the participatory process. Rousseau also suggests that 
participation has an additional integrative function; it increases the feeling among 
individual citizens that they belong in their community. More important is the 
experience of participation in decision-making itself, and the complex totality of 
results to which it is seen to lead, both for the individual and for the whole 
political system; this experience attaches the individual to her/his society and is 
instrumental in developing it into a true community. 
Moreover, Pateman believes that the theory of participatory democracy is built 
round the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be 
considered in isolation from one another. 57 The existence of representative 
institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum 
participation by all people at that level, socialisation, or `social training' for 
democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual 
attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. The major function of 
participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative 
one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect 
and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures. Pateman puts it 
this way: 
No longer is democratic theory centered on the participation of `the people', on 
the participation of the ordinary man or the prime virtue of a democratic political 
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system seen as the development of politically relevant and necessary qualities in 
the ordinary individual; in the contemporary theory of democracy it is the 
participation of the minority elite that is crucial and the non-participation of the 
apathetic, ordinary man lacking in the feeling of political efficacy, that is 
regarded as the main bulwark against instability. 58 
The final observation made by Pateman I want to include here is that when the 
problem of participation and its role in democratic theory is placed in a wider 
context than that provided by the contemporary theory of democracy, and the 
relevant empirical material is related to the theoretical issues, it becomes clear 
that neither the demands for more participation, nor the theory of participatory 
democracy itself, are based, as is so frequently claimed, on dangerous illusions or 
on an outmoded and unrealistic theoretical foundation. 59 Thus, Pateman suggests 
that we can still have a modern viable theory of democracy which retains the 
notion of participation at its heart. 
Having said that, new technology, such as the internet can be harnessed to 
measure citizens' preferences in representative democracies, and may make it 
easier for citizens to respond, thus making political participation (access to 
information, deliberation, debate and voting) easier, and thereby resolving the 
perceived crisis of participation (citizen alienation, abstention and apathy) in 
57 ibid., p. 42 
58 ibid., p. 104 59 ibid., p. 111 
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liberal democracies. 60 As earlier Tsagarousianou notes that since the early 1990s a 
number of European local authorities such as Amsterdam, Bologna, Manchester 
and civil society actors rather than central government have been engaged in 
experiments in electronic democracy, as have several cities in the UK and the 
U. S. The organisers of these initiatives frequently argued that by embracing 
information and communications technologies, they could resuscitate declining 
citizen participation and give new vigour to local politics. 1 Margolis and 
Resnick62 also suggest that for optimists, political participation in cyberspace 
approximates an ideal type of communitarian democracy that emphasises 
mutuality. The time needed to become informed about any topic drops 
substantially when citizens can employ `gopher' or `archie' servers to locate and 
retrieve desired information on a vast variety of topics, including matters of 
public policy that comprise the formal business of government. 
Nevertheless, there is another side to this story. Even if there has been a 
tremendous increase in the number of people now on the internet, there is no 
indication that their presence will inaugurate a new era in politics. The internet 
has become a mass medium, but the numbers tallied by those who estimate the 
growth of the internet have not been translated into comparable growth in political 
participation. Providing greater choice and opportunity only solves part of the 
problem of participation 
- 
for example, that related to reducing the cost of 
60 Tsagarousianou et. al: (1998) Cyberdemocracy: Technology, Cities and Civic Networks, 
Routledge: London, p. 6 
61 ibid., p. 168 
62 Margolis and Resnick: (2000), Politics As Usual, p. 100. 
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involvement 
- 
but it does not get to the heart of what motivates citizens to move 
from the state of disengagement to one of salutary involvement in civic life 
63 
Wilhelm writes that while many communications researchers suggest that 
anonymity may liberate the individual and equalise participation in a forum where 
power is asymmetrically distributed, others argue that the individual's isolation 
coupled with invisible surveillance and hierarchical observation from the outside 
may lead to the veritable incarceration of the user. 
M Promoting a diversity of 
voices, while imperative, does not eo ipso guarantee deliberation, negotiation, and 
the contestation of viewpoints. Universal access is not sufficient, Wilhelm thinks, 
for realizing a discursive, democratic polity. Instead he argues that `deliberation 
or critical-rational reflection is a necessary condition of salutary political 
conversation online, without which digital democracy may follow the lead of 
"mature" media and fail to meet expectations'. 65 
Another interesting point on the internet' s potential for participation is made by 
Richard Davis. 6 He did a content analysis of three Usenet groups, an analysis of 
one week's worth of messages between June 14 and June 20,1997. Davis, 
similarly to Hill and Hughes67, argues that Usenet `possesses certain 
disadvantages as a forum for public discussion of political issues. Those include 
opinion reinforcement, flaming and under-representativeness'. 8 As Davis 
63 Margolis and Resnick: (2000), Politics As Usual, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
p. 207; Wilhelm, A: (2000) Democracy in the Digital Age, Routledge: London, p. 87. 
65 Wilhelm, A: (2000) Democracy in the Digital Age, Routledge: London, p. 46 65 ibid., p. 86 
66 Davis, R: (1999) The Web of Politics, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 67 Hill, K and Hughes, J: (1998) Cyberpolitics, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham. 68 ibid., p. 161 
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suggests `Usenet political discussion groups tends to favor the loudest and most 
aggressive individuals. Those who are less aggressive risk rigorous attack and 
humiliation' 69 Also, over the past decade has been consistent support in the 
literature for the hypothesis that in the absence of social context cues the level of 
uninhibited verbal behaviour in CMC rises. 70 
Nevertheless, as a two-way mass communications medium that allows users to 
receive news and information, inasmuch as they participate in information, 
transmission and public discussion, the internet potentially diffuses power over 
information dissemination and public debate. The growth of the internet raises the 
prospect that the traditional groups who dominate American politics will become 
anachronistic, Davis argues, like organizational dinosaurs in the cyberspace age. 
In his own words: 
They will be displaced by new organisations or by citizens who no longer need 
groups at all. They will become mediators in an era of unmediated 
communication. When citizens will be able to interact with elected 
representatives without the necessity of intermediary organisations, what then is 
the role of interest groups? 71 
69 Davis, R: (1999) The Web of Politics, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p. 163 
70 Collins, M: `Flaming: The relationship between social context cues and uninhibited verbal 
behavior in computer-mediated communication', Fall 1992, 
www. emoderaters. com/paapers/flames. html. See for example: Kiesler, S, Siegel, J and McGuire, T: (1984) `Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication', American 
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Furthermore, the internet is not a panacea for local apathy or loss of community 
nor is it the curse of atomisation. Rather, it is a tool that to the extent that it has 
effects at all, is most likely to maintain the status quo. Information at the local 
level will be more readily available, but again, whether average citizens will be 
inclined to utilise it is debatable. That is because Americans (or anybody else for 
that matter) will not be much different people, just because there are resources at 
their disposal to follow politics quite closely. Computer-assisted politics will not 
be radically different from today's politics. The argument here is that the internet 
is creating social fragmentation and an increase in both intolerance and incivility, 
as people end up seeing their fellow citizens as stupid or malicious. According to 
Davis, this is not healthy for democracy, because it encourages people to choose 
teams, rather than to think issues through. 72 
Nevertheless, the good news is that internet access is not limited to these hugely 
successful commercial gateways. The free-net phenomena, along with the 
explosion of homespun Bulletin Board (BBS) networks, ensure that access to 
information need not be `filtered' by corporate or government interests. Free-nets, 
such as the Seattle Community Network, are a combination of electronic bulletin 
board and online service centred around a specific community. They generally 
operate on a nonprofit basis, gathering operating overheads through donations and 
community support. One item of interest to organisers, both social and otherwise, 
is that the National Public Telecomputing Network will help any community 
72 ibid., p. 63 
72 ibid. 
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center set up a free-net, and will provide assistance in maintaining the computers 
and databases essential for its use. Lack of technical expertise no longer need be a 
barrier to modest startups such as these. One cannot help feeling this when a day's 
email may contain messages from both local colleagues and from others in far- 
flung exotic places. The commonality of interest expressed in that interaction 
attests to the empowering nature of the medium. 73 Wellman and Gulia point out 
that `[t]he architecture of the Net facilitates weak and strong ties that cut across 
social milieus, be they interest groups, localities, organizations or nations, so that 
the cyberlinks between people become social links between groups that otherwise 
would be socially and physically dispersed'. 74 However, it is important to note 
that these virtual connective structures do not necessarily produce collective 
identity or ideological cleavage among the people involved and do not always 
create communities. 
Borrowing Fisher and Kling's words, the inhabitants of these structures are a 
`transclass grouping of constituencies and cultural identities'75, who recognise 
that `there is a critical interaction between organizing efforts, national politics, 
and nationwide social movements'. 76 Building on these ideas, Fisher and Kling 
state that `because community problems almost always originate beyond local 
73 Scott March: `Community organizing on the Internet: Implications for social work 
practitioners', M. S. W 
4 Wellman and Gulia, 1995, p. 15 as quoted in Scott March, M. S. W: `Community organizing on 
the Internet: Implications for social work practitioners', 
http: //www. interweb. com/nsmnet/docs/march 
's Fisher and Kling, 1994, p. 17 as quoted in Scott March, M. S. W: `Community organizing on the Internet: Implications for social work practitioners', http: //www. interweb. com/nsmnet/docs/march 76 Fisher and Kling, p. 223 
58 
borders, the ability to effect change depends to a great extent upon building 
coalitions, alliances, networks, and progressive political parties'. 77 
In synopsis, the evidence of the local authorities' initiative in European cities 
suggests that the internet has the potential to resolve the perceived crisis of 
participation in liberal democracies, however two points are important to note. 
First, that the growth of the internet has not translated into comparable growth in 
political participation and second, that universal access 
- 
if such a thing exists 
- 
is 
not sufficient for realising a discursive democratic polity. 
Nevertheless, while this research was taking place, quite a lot seems to have 
changed. In stark contrast with these arguments and findings, I should include 
here evidence of the US primary elections, during which a lot of voter-action 
groups sprung up online, showing that the American public can be mobilised and 
show a strong online presence, although this does not necessarily translate into a 
`real' voting presence. A series of democratic voter-action groups, starting with 
Howard Dean's supporters as well as John Kerry's, hoped to help their candidates 
win every possible vote to reach the White House. The Dean campaign, with Joe 
Trippi at the helm, shattered traditional top-down campaign models by allowing 
its supporters to act on their own. The campaign broke Democratic fund-raising 
records by collecting $40 million from 280,000 individuals in 2003. Dean also 
mobilised 163,000 individuals to attend locally organised Meetups and drew 
77 ibid., p. 17 
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millions to the campaign's official and unofficial blogs. Simon Rosenberg, who as 
president of the New Democrat Network counts as a Washington insider, says 
politics has changed forever: 
2003 was the first year of the Internet age of political communications, and the 
end of the broadcast era. From 1960 to 2003, political communications was 
dominated by the broadcast model where you spoke out and people consumed it 
as passive consumers. The Internet age is characterized by the medium, which is 
participatory, it is interactive, it is one-to-one. 8 
`To me, what this election is about is a test. A test of the questions of whether a 
spontaneously self-organizing group of activists on the left can outperform the 
hierarchically organized, centrally directed political organization on the right', 
said David Lytel of ReDefeatBush. com, a website run by The Committee to Re 
Deafeat the President. Driving Votes is another online effort that uses the internet 
to organise Democrats. This group uses its website as an information post where 
people nationwide can organise voter-registration road trips to various swing 
states. `What's been interesting for me' says Lerner, `is that there are a lot of 
people out there who want to do something bigger than they have done in the past. 
What is exciting to me about the Internet is just that it doesn't cost (much) money 
to make (our) website, and now lots of people are getting motivated, and I feel we 
will have a voice'. Lytel feels that while Republicans have integrated online and 
offline fundraising and voter-registration efforts, a great divide exists between 
79 Singel, R: `Net politics down but not out', wired, 2/2/04 
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Democratic postal and electronic camps, with both sides feverishly protecting 
their turf. Another organiser, Khoe, explains that Run Against Bush has utilised 
the internet to sign up more than 2,000 members in 40 states. The group gets 
together people all over the country for literal anti-Bush running events called 
Jogs against Bush, or Jabs. Members check the website to find their local jabs, 
come together, and put on Run Against Bush T-shirts. Sites like these can 
mobilise the party's often lethargic members. `Our typical member may be 
somebody who grumbles about the adminstration and about national security and 
fiscal policy, but they haven't felt comfortable, for whatever reason, doing 
something about it' said Khoe. And the other anti-Bush grass-roots groups are 
having similar experiences. Democrats were counting on the internet to help them 
build a base that would push Kerry over the top on election day. `It appears that 
this sort of technique seems to be working well with a progressive mind-set or 
progressive people... because of the two way nature of true online grass-roots 
participation... The users are the ones who choose issues... It's a very back-and- 
forth, multiparticipant sort of thing', said ActBlue's Matt DeBergalis. 79 
A panel in May 2004 at the University of California at Berkeley Graduate School 
of Journalism concentrated on political activism in online communities. Their 
assessment was that the Web has been particularly effective in engaging 
politically apathetic people and motivating them to take politics back to the 
grassroots level. The Howard Dean campaign successfully attracted millions of 
79 quotes are extracted from Terdiman, D: `Dems hold the high ground online', wired, 23/4/04 
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grassroots dollars because it worked counter to the traditional ways campaigns 
work, said Markos Moulitsas Zuniga, publisher of the Democratic activists blog 
Daily Kos80. Typically, consultants and political parties try to suppress voter 
turnout, but now activists are using the web specifically, in the form of activism 
networks and blogs, to fight back and reengage people, Moulitsas said. When 
Moulitsas launched his blog in early 2002, `it was really difficult to be a 
progressive liberal. We were essentially nobodies. But people were taking us 
seriously. They reasoned that if they could build a large community without 
possessing any credentials, then they could possibly move that community to 
accomplish change'. 81 Joe Trippi, campaign manager for Howard Dean, contacted 
Moulitsas and his partner to become consultants. Moulitsas asserted that the 
campaign grew because people felt they were participating in a cause rather than 
following one. `Blog audiences want to be part of the discussion. They don't want 
to be told what to do'. Perhaps that is why Moulitas doubts that the internet could 
get a candidate elected on its own. `You still need the grass-roots activities. You 
still need the traditional media'. 82 This is also the opinion of Craig Newmark, of 
craigslist, who has commented that the challenge for blogs and social-networking 
sites, is to find a way to get the millions of people they attract to go beyond the 
echo chamber of the internet. 83 
80 Zetter, K: `Blogs counter political plottings', wired, 5/5/04 81 ibid. 
82 ibid. 
83 ibid. 
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This section focused on issues of participation and the internet. The following 
section continues the discussion of what new political movements are looking for 
when using the internet by looking at the issue of power in internet politics. 
Power in internet politics 
Power is an important element in internet politics, as in all realms of politics, 
since internet groups are interested in the accumulation of power. Apart from 
participation, the point to be highlighted is what they fight for. Particularly, my 
aim is to focus on the way opposing groups attempt to accumulate enough power 
to resolve a conflict in a way that suits them and to promote their own version of 
the truth. Despite this obvious connection between power and internet politics, the 
key issues can be complicated. More substantially, in this section I will try to 
apply a theory of power to my own internet research. The concept of power is a 
very traditional political concept, and it has been argued that it is what politics is 
about. 
Steven Lukes in his work Power: A Radical View84 identifies three views of 
power: the one-dimensional view, the two-dimensional view and the three- 
dimensional view. Firstly, in the one-dimensional view we find writers like Dahl, 
who in his early article, The Concept of Power, describes his intuitive idea of 
power as follows: A has power over B to the extent that s/he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do. In short, as Polsby writes, in the 
63 
pluralist approach an attempt is made to study specific outcomes in order to 
determine who actually prevails in community decision-making. Thus, the 
pluralist methodology, Lukes contends, in Merelman's words `studied actual 
behaviour, stressed operational definitions and turned up evidence. Most 
important, it seemed to produce reliable conclusions, which met the canons of 
science'. 85 Thus, Lukes concludes that this first one-dimensional view of power 
involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions over which there is an 
observable conflict of `subjective' interests, observably expressed in policy 
preferences and revealed by political participation. 86 This focus on behaviour and 
decision-making on the part of the pluralists would not be entirely useful when 
applying a theory of power to internet politics. This is firstly, because power can 
have other, more complicated dimensions such as ideology, knowledge and social 
forces, and secondly, because the internet involves a much more networked form 
of power relationships, which the pluralist model is insufficient to explain. 
The two-dimensional view of power is a critique of the pluralist view. In their 
critique, Bachrach and Baratz denoted that it is restrictive, and in virtue of that 
fact, gives a misleading and sanguine pluralist picture of American politics. 87 
Power, they claim, has two faces. Their central point is this: to the extent that a 
person or group 
- 
consciously or unconsciously 
- 
creates or reinforces barriers to 
the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power. A 
84 Lukes, S: (1970) Power: A Radical View, Macmillan: London. 
85 ibid., p. 13 
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satisfactory analysis of the two-dimensional power involves examining both 
decision-making and non-decision-making. A decision is a choice among 
alternative modes of action; a non-decision is a decision that results in 
suppression of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the 
decision-maker. As a result, non-decision-making is a means by which demands 
for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community 
can be suffocated before they are even voiced. The two-dimensional view of 
power involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view and it 
allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being 
taken on potential issues, over which there is an observable conflict of 
`subjective' interests, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub- 
political grievances. 
Lukes is criticising both views: 
The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists 
supposed that because power, as they conceptualise it, only shows up in cases of 
actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to 
ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to 
prevent such conflict from arising in the first place. 8 
So, Lukes offers a third view of power, the three-dimensional view, which 
involves a thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus of the first two views 
88 ibid., p. 23 
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as too individualistic and outlines the many ways in which potential issues are 
kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and 
institutional practices or through individuals' decisions. Lukes defines the 
concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B, when A affects B in a 
manner contrary to B's interests. His suggestion is that the one-dimensional view 
of power presupposes a liberal conception of interests, the two-dimensional view 
a reformist conception and the three-dimensional view a radical conception. 
Lukes criticises the one-dimensional view by saying that pluralists, by studying 
the making of important decisions within the community, were simply taking over 
and reproducing the bias of the system they were studying. The one-dimensional 
view of power cannot reveal the less visible ways in which a pluralist system may 
be biased in favour of certain groups and against others. The two-dimensional 
view goes some way to revealing this, but it confines itself to studying situations 
where the mobilisation of bias can be attributed to individuals' decisions that have 
the effect of preventing currently observable grievances, `covert or overt', from 
becoming issues within the political process. This would not be a approach to 
internet conflict, which involves the use of the internet by opposing groups, 
because the two-dimensional view is restrictive, in the sense that it does not study 
power as exercised by collectivities. This suggests that Lukes's three-dimensional 
view of power is a better fit for our research concern, especially since it looks at 
collectivities: 
66 
How is one to identify the process or mechanism of an alleged exercise of power, 
on the three-dimensional view?... There are three features distinctive of the three- 
dimensional view, which pose peculiarly acute problems for the researcher. As I 
have argued such an exercise may in the first place involve inaction rather than 
observable action. In the second place it may be unconscious. And in the third 
place power may be exercised by collectivities, such as groups or institutions 89 
Closely related to Lukes's radical view of power, although much more 
interestingly elaborated, is Foucault's conception of power and his concept of 
power/knowledge. These begin to achieve prominence in his work with the 
appearance of Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. The twin term 
arises out of Foucault's analyses, as a result of his disciplinary theory, where 
surveillance enables the structures of domination to operate. To illustrate the 
notion of disciplinary power and surveillance, Foucault uses Bentham's 
Panopticon, a circular architectural structure in which cells are arranged around a 
central viewing tower in such a way as to ensure permanent surveillance, which 
ensures control of and discipline over the incarcerated bodies. In the two books 
mentioned above, systems of knowledge are defined as bound up with regimes of 
power and truth. Systems of power bring forth different types of knowledge. 
Foucault thinks that power and knowledge directly imply one another and that 
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor a knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations. 
89 ibid., p. 50 
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Consequently, recognised forms of knowledge always bring power and power in 
turn justifies the formation of specific kinds of knowledge. The subjects or objects 
to be known are all integral elements of power/knowledge strategies. Foucault 
saw these techniques of power undergoing a two-stage development. Initially, 
they were instituted as means of control or neutralisation of dangerous social 
elements and evolved into techniques of enhancing the utility and productivity of 
these subjected to them. The connection, he proposes, between power and 
knowledge is not just a particular institutional use of knowledge as means to 
domination. Foucault objects to the very idea of knowledge outside the network 
of power relations. He proposed these remarks about power and knowledge, first 
and foremost, to make sense of how the observation and classification of 
individuals and populations contributed to newly emerging strategies of 
domination and how their applications came to constitute knowledge 90 In 
Poster's understanding of this process, the individual subject is interpellated by 
the super-panopticon through technologies of power, through the discourse of 
databases that have very little to do with modern conceptions of rational 
autonomy. The super-panopticon, as a perfect writing machine, constitutes 
subjects as decentred from their ideologically determined entity 91 
Foucault is opposed to approaches to knowledge that privilege a `sovereign 
subject' anterior to discourse. Discourse becomes meaningful not because of the 
90 Foucault, M: (1980) Power/Knowledge, Harvester Wheatsheaf: New York and London 91 Poster, M: (1995) The Second Media Age, Polity Press: Cambridge., p. 87 
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individual, but because of the discursive formation, providing subject-positions 
which the individual can occupy. 92 In this way Foucault argues that there cannot 
exist a subject prior to language. This is an illusion. Consequently, Foucault 
totally rejects of any notion of the subject. What he is interested in is to analyse 
the play of discontinuities in the history of discourses. He does not care about the 
meaning or the truth of a statement, but rather, is concerned with the rules of 
formation that determine the objects, concepts, operations and options of a 
particular discourse. 3 While Foucault does not recognise the system of dispersion 
as a tool to distinguish one discursive formation from another, he identifies four 
sets of rules of formation, such that if one or more is found in the analysis of 
dispersed statements, then we can identify a particular discursive formation. 
These are: the formation of objects, the formation of enunciative modalities, the 
formation of strategies and the formation of concepts 94 Another principle he 
brings in is rarefaction, in order to explain why in a particular era everything that 
can be said is never said. This happens according to Foucault because of the 
reproduction of relations of social domination through the control of meaning. 
Discourses and meaning are the sites of social struggle. 
In sum, Foucault's archaeological project is to examine statements by particular 
societies that make serious claims to truth and to describe the relation between 
statements and their historical transformation. One of the criticisms against his 
archaeological approach is that while he explains the construction of discrete 
92 McNay, L: (1994) Foucault: A Critical Introduction, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 68 93 Torfmg, J: (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, Ziiek, Blackwell: Oxford, p. 90 
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subject-positions within discourse, he offers no explanation of the social context 
in which these positions are embedded and which governs how they are filled, nor 
does he consider the issues of power that are inevitably vital when considering the 
social context of discourse 95 
After being heavily criticised for treating discourses as autonomous systems of 
scientific statements whilst investigating madness, the clinic and scientific 
discourses in his Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault took his revenge by turning 
philosophy on its head in his later genealogical accounts of power/knowledge, 
where discourses are related to non-discursive practices and processes, such as 
economic and political changes. Foucault now moves away from a mere 
description of the historical rules of discourse to investigate how social practices 
shape discourses and vice versa. His view of power is new. He sees it as not only 
a negative, but also a positive force (bio-power), where discipline aims not only to 
constrain those over whom it is exercised, but also to make use of their 
capacities. 6 In essence, what Foucault did was to articulate a vital aspect of 
social relations: discourses are products of power. Power relations and scientific 
discourses mutually constitute one another. However, Foucault does not abandon 
the archaeological perspective. It becomes an internal element of his genealogical 
approach with the two models brought together in what he calls problematisation. 
Nevertheless, as Howarth points out: 
94 McNay, L: (1994) Foucault: A Critical Introduction, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 67 95 ibid., p. 84 
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We are thus confronted with four main difficulties in Foucault's conception of 
discourse. These are his failure to formalise satisfactorily his theory of discourse; 
his inadequate conceptualisation of power/resistance; his lack of concrete 
analyses of resistances to power; and his inability (or refusal) to examine the 
`macro' strategies and outcomes of power/resistance struggles 
97 
Like Howarth, Simons comments that Foucault does not attempt to systematically 
break down the elements of power/knowledge. Rather, his accounts are a delicate 
entanglement of power and truth: `Power/Knowledge is a knot that is not meant to 
98 be unraveled'. 
But let Foucault explain: 
Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society. 
That is why nothing irritates me as much as these inquiries 
- 
which are by 
definition metaphysical 
- 
on the foundations of power in a society or the self- 
institution of a society, etc. These are not fundamental phenomena. There are 
only reciprocal relations, and the perpetual gaps between intentions in relation to 
one another. 99 
The rise of the social and the atrophy of the political through the internet are 
making Foucault's writings increasingly relevant to this analysis. Perhaps we can 
96 Hindess (1999), p. 113 
"Howarth, D: (2000) Discourse, Open University Press: Buckingham and Philadelphia, p. 84 
98 Simons, J: (1995) Foucault and the Political, Routledge: London and NY, p. 27 99 as quoted in Moss, J (ed. ): The Later Foucault, Sage: London, p. 119 
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use Foucault's toolkit to confront our electronic world. As power has spread and 
broadly diffused, escaping the confines of states, it is everywhere, very much as 
Foucault thought. His disciplinary theory and his biopolitics seem to explain the 
internet as simply another form of social control through the control of 
information. Elimination of public space, reducing publics to masses of atomised 
social agents, connects to Foucault's conception of the institution of hierarchical 
communication in prisons. '00 Moreover, when we accept that power and 
knowledge are so tightly linked, then the internet could be viewed as a potential 
source of knowledge and information. It could be viewed as a powerful tool to 
those who are able to use it or more importantly to control it. 
The reason I am interested in discourse theory is that in this research project 
different types of discourses are analysed (ethnoreligious, sociopolitical, media) 
and discourse analysis is part of the parameters used in my integrated theoretical 
framework, as deployed in section 2.4 below. 
In response to Foucault's writings on discourse, Laclau and Mouffe wrote 
extensively on discourse theory. In contrast to Foucault who maintains a 
distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices, Laclau and Mouffe 
reject the distinction. They affirm that a) every object is constituted as an object 
of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of 
emergence, and b) that any distinction between what are usually called the 
100 Foucault, M: (1979) Discipline and Punish, Prentice Hall: London, p. 238 
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linguistic and behavioural aspects of social practice is either an incorrect 
distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social 
production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive 
totalities. '0' 
Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe introduce four basic categories when they analyse 
identity: articulation, elements, moments and nodal points. Identity emerges 
through the articulation or rearticulation of signifying elements and articulation is 
`any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is 
modified as a result of the articulatory practice'. 
102 Every discourse is constituted 
as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity by expanding signifying chains 
which partially fix the meaning of the floating signifier. The privileged discursive 
points that partially fix meaning within signifying chains are called nodal points 
or as in Lacan, points de capiton. The nodal point creates and sustains the identity 
of a certain discourse by constructing a knot of definite meanings. Torfing 
explains that according to Lilek, this does not imply that it is simply the `richest' 
word, the word in which is condensed all the richness of meaning of the field it 
6quilts'103. The point de capiton is rather the word which, as a word, on the level 
of the signifier itself unifies a given field and constitutes its identity. Discourse is 
`the structured totality resulting from this practice'; `moments are the differential 
positions' that `appear articulated within a discourse' when elements are those 
101 Laclau, E and Mouffe, C: (1985) Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, Verso: London and New York, p. 107 
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differences that are `not discursively articulated' because of the `floating' 
character they acquire in periods of social crisis and dislocation104. When Laclau 
and Mouffe consider the material character of discourse they argue that it cannot 
be found in the experience of a founding subject and that diverse subject-positions 
appear dispersed within a discursive formation. `The practice of articulation, as 
fixation/dislocation of a system of differences, cannot consist of purely linguistic 
phenomena; but instead pierce the entire material density of the multifarious 
institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive formation is 
structured'. '05 
Also, these two theorists present us with two useful concepts: equivalence and 
difference. Equivalence divides social space by condensing meaning around two 
antagonistic poles; on the contrary, difference weakens a sharp antagonistic 
polarity, in order to relegate that division to the margins of society. Another 
significant contribution of Laclau and Mouffe is to the concept of hegemony. 
After they analyse Gramsci's notion of hegemony, which asserts that political 
subjects are complex collective wills and that the collective will is a result of the 
politico-ideological articulation of dispersed and fragmented historical forces, and 
also other Marxist conceptions, they go on to argue that the two conditions of a 
102 Howarth, D, Norval, J and Stavrakakis, Y (eds): (2000) Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, Manchester University Press: Manchester 
and New York, p. 9 
tos Torfing, J: (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, lifek, Blackwell: Oxford, p. 98 
104 Howarth, D, Norval, J and Stavrakakis, Y (eds): (2000) Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, Manchester University Press: Manchester 
and New York, p. 7 
105 Laclau, E and Mouffe, C: (1985) Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, Verso: London and New York, p. 109 
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hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability 
of the frontiers that separate them: 
... 
in order to speak of hegemony, the articulatory moment is not sufficient. It is 
also necessary that the articulation should take place through a confrontation with 
antagonistic articulatory practices 
- 
in other words, that the hegemony should 
emerge in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms and therefore suppose phenomena 
of equivalence and frontier effects. 106 
To continue, Mouffe in her own work argues it is impossible to speak of the social 
agent as if we are dealing with a unified, homogeneous entity. Rather, the social 
agent is constituted by an ensemble of `subject-positions' that can never be totally 
fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses 
among which there is no necessary relation, but rather, a constant movement of 
overdetermination and displacement. 107 She also agrees with Derrida that the 
constitution of identity is always based on exclusionary practices and the 
establishment of a violent hierarchy between the resultant two poles. Lastly, in her 
most recent work, The Democratic Paradox, she follows Lacan in depicting 
discourse as inherently authoritarian, in the sense that only through a master- 
signifier can a consistent field of meaning emerge. This is how she puts it: 
For Lacan, the status of the master signifier, the signifier of symbolic authority 
founded only in itself (in its own act of enunciation), is strictly transcendental: 
106 ibid., p. 135 
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the gesture that `distorts' a symbolic field, that `curves' its space by introducing a 
non-founded violence, is stricto senso correlative of its very establishment. This 
means that if we were to subtract from a discursive field its distortion, the field 
108 
could disintegrate, ` de-quilt'. 
Laclau and Mouffe offer a useful way of thinking about discourse and ideology, 
especially since it does not demand a strict mode of thinking by way of 
methodology, so you can do the research incorporating the thinking of other 
writers as well, without falling out of their own logic. If we accept the 
proposition that the social agent is constituted by an ensemble of `subject- 
positions', it is far easier to understand the subject in virtual environments like the 
ones this thesis addresses. 
Following the writers mentioned above, especially in politics and international 
relations, many writers have used discourse analysis in their work, with 
interesting results. The reason for this, in my opinion, has a lot to do with a point 
made by Freeden, 109 when he writes that the text as a pattern of words remains an 
objective constant, whereas all ideologies - because they are constructed from 
many texts 
- 
are in a continuous process of restatement. Bowman for instance 
argues, particularly in relation to the nation, that political identities are 
discursively constructed. He writes that a wide range of persons and collectivities 
can identify themselves as constituent parts of the nation without having their 
107 Mouffe, C: (2000) The Democratic Paradox, Verso: London and New York, p. 77 108 ibid., p. 137 
l 
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readings and their allegiances to it challenged or denied by particular and 
exclusionary definitions. This unfixity can only be maintained, however, as long 
as the persistence of the nation is taken for granted; as soon as the nation is 
discursively posited as endangered, battle lines are drawn and processes of 
selective exclusion/inclusion are set in play. 
tto This is particularly relevant to 
elements in the ethnoreligious cyberconflict component of my proposed 
theoretical framework. 
For example, deploying Laclauian and 2i2ekian concepts, Renata Salecl uses 
discourse analysis and a theory of identity politics to account for the way Serbians 
create exclusionary identities for their enemies. Salecl writes that all images of the 
enemy are based on specific fantasies: 
In Serbian mythology, the Albanians are understood as pure evil, the 
unimaginable: that which cannot be subjectivised 
- 
beings who cannot be made 
into people because they are so radically Other. The Serbs describe their conflict 
with the Albanians as a struggle of `people with no-people'... The Croats are 
portrayed as the heirs of Goebbels, that is, as a brutal Ustashi butchers who 
torment the suffering Serbian nation 
-a nation whose fate is compared to that of 
Kurds. "' 
109 Freeden, M: (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, p. 113 
10 Bowman in Laclau, E: (ed): ( 1994) The Making of Political Identities, Verso: London and 
New York, p. 144 
11 Salecl in Laclau, E: (ed): (1994) The Making of Political Identities, Verso: London and New 
York, p. 212 
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David Campbell on his part urges us to abandon the realist discourse with respect 
to the Bosnian conflict and consider a range of political options offered by a 
deconstructive reading of the conflict. '12 Vivienne Jabri writing on discourses on 
violence argues that in recognising the constructive element of language, 
`discourse analysis goes some way towards contributing to an understanding of 
conflict as an exclusionist discourse reifying a singular way of knowing. 
Discourses which reify ethnonationalist identity assume a uniformity in human 
experience which denies a pluralism of identities'. 113 
The way Jabri formulates her theory on discourses on violence is very important 
to my research, especially when combined with Campbell's actual analysis of 
conflicts and Stavrakakis's way of analysing ideologies. Like Roland Barthes, 
Michel Foucault conceives of textuality in terms of networks and links. In 
Archaeology of Knowledge, he points out that the frontiers of a book are never 
clear-cut, because the book `is caught up in a system of references to other books, 
other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network... [a] network of 
references'. 114 
The political significance of CMC (Computer-Mediated Communication) lies in 
its capacity to challenge the existing political hierarchy's monopoly on powerful 
communications media and perhaps thus revitalise citizen-based democracy. The 
112 Campbell, D (1998) National Reconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia, 
University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, p. 34 
113 Jabri, V: (1996) Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester 
University Press: Manchester, p. 140 
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vision of a citizen-designed, citizen-controlled worldwide communications 
network is a version of technological utopianism that could be called the vision of 
the `electronic agora'. "5 Jordan asserts that the politics of cyberspace is strung 
along the two axes of access to cyberspace and rights within cyberspace. 116 
Access is a key area of cyberpolitical debate because demographics show that use 
of cyberspace (up to 1998) was largely confined to a small and privileged section 
of the offline population. Rights are a key area of cyberpolitics because the rights 
of avatars are unclear and subject to revision by offline interests. The politics of 
online rights has developed chiefly around the areas of censorship, privacy, 
intellectual property and encryption. To elaborate on the process, cyberspace can 
alter problems such as the broadening and democratisation of decision-making 
procedures by removing the constraint of physical presence. Discussions carried 
on through email or by asynchronous posting, as used on Usenet, open possible 
avenues for greater group participation. Cyberspace offers opportunities for 
breaking down hierarchies within institutions. The global nature of cyberspace is 
important here, as it only requires one country connected to the net to allow the 
publication of some information for that information to be let loose in cyberspace. 
Information restricted in an offline nation-state will then be available in 
cyberspace, subverting the national boundaries that have helped in the past to 
control access to information. Jordan puts it this way: 
114 Foucault, M: (1973) The Order of Things, Vintage: New York. 115 Margolis, M and Resnick, D: (2000) Politics As Usual, Sage: Thousand Oaks, London and New York, p. 1 
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Cyberspace appears as a place in which individuals can put aside many of the 
inequalities of offline life, simply because nobody knows if they are `really' 
female, old or disabled.... Cyberspace appears to be a place that undermines the 
hierarchies of offline life, in which different hierarchies that come to exist 
depend on the quality of thought and writing -a place where even the destructive 
behavior that is peculiar to it, flaming, is still only words. "? 
Jordan also writes on the role of elites. Particular structures and pressures in 
cyberspace feed into the creation of technology according to values and its use or 
appearance as inert things. These pressures point towards growing control of 
cyberspace by elites who are defined by their technical expertise, i. e. their ability 
to alter the `thingness' of technology that constructs online life. If cyberspace is 
crucial to areas of offline life, then those that control or manage these areas will 
understandably seek for some reassurance that cyberspace will continue to 
provide its services. Producers, consumers and others will all in different ways 
and through different representatives endeavor to ensure that the space they 
depend on is reliable and secured. To do this, governments will legislate about 
cyberspace, corporations will build and rebuild it to their design, politicians will 
apply it to electioneering and consumers will demand its support. 
Another question to be asked is: Who uses or has the new power offered by the 
internet? The United States Commerce Department released a report titled 
116 Jordan, T: (1999) Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet, Routledge: London and New York. 1 17 ibid., p. 87 
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`Falling Through the Net 11,118 which was requested by then-Vice President Al 
Gore. It examined telephone and computer penetration rates to determine who is 
and who is not connected to the information infrastructure, in other words who 
has the power which internet knowledge can provide. The study concluded that 
the gap between the digital haves and the digital have-nots has been growing. 
There is a significant gap between key groups. Whites are more than twice as 
likely to own computers than African-Americans or Latinos. Among the least 
connected are the rural poor, rural and central city minorities, young households 
and single-parent female-headed households. 
119 
Manuel Castells, in The Rise of the Network Society, stresses that internet-related 
firms are, and will increasingly be in the twenty-first century, at the heart of new 
information-technology industries. This is how he justifies it: 
First, because of their potential dramatic influence on the way business is 
conducted. An often-cited projection by Forrester Research in 1998 put the 
extended value of electronic business transactions in 2003 at about $1.3 trillion 
up from $43 billion in 1998. But, secondly, the Internet industry has also become 
a major force on its own ground because of its exponential growth in revenue 
employment, and market capitalization value. 120 
"g National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 1998 
119 Margolis, M and Resnick, D: (2000) Politics As Usual, Sage: Thousand Oaks, London and 
New York, p. 144 
120 Castells, M: (2000) The Rise of the Network Society, vol.! of the Information Age: Economy, 
Society and Culture, 2 ad edn, Blackwell: Oxford, p. 149 
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As for the impact of the internet industries on the economy as a whole, Castells 
informs us that in the U. S, internet-related jobs increased from 1.6 million in the 
first quarter of 1998 to 2.3 million in the first quarter of 1999. E-commerce 
represented the fastest growing sector. According to Castells, 
the speed of development of the new industry was without precedent: one-third 
of 3,400 companies surveyed in 1999 did not exist in 1996. The growth of 
revenue in Internet industries in 1999 was projected to account for $200 billion- 
this in contrast to total growth in revenue in the US economy of about $340 
billion. By the turn of the century, the Internet economy, and the information 
technology industries, had become the core of the US economy 
- 
not only 
qualitatively but quantitatively. 12' 
An example of the potential impact of the 'internet on the economy is when in 
November 1999, the city of Pittsburgh handed down the opportunity of electronic 
disintermediation by offering $55 billion worth of municipal bond directly to 
institutional investors over the internet, thus bypassing Wall Street. As Castells 
believes, this was the first time municipal bonds were directly sold electronically 
and the entry of electronic trading into the $13.7 trillion bond market is even 
likely to affect financial markets. 122 Nevertheless, it could be argued due to the 
collapse of e-companies and e-stock that this bubble is bound to burst (again). 
121 ibid., p. 151. 122 ibid., p. 154. 
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To return to political issues, Jordan provides us with a definition of 
cyberpower. 123 Cyberpower, in his view, is the form of power that structures 
culture and politics in cyberspace and on the internet. It consists of three 
interrelated regions: the individual, the social and the imaginary. Cyberpower of 
the individual comprises avatars, virtual hierarchies and informational space and 
results in cyberpolitics. Power here appears to be exercised by individuals. 
Cyberpower of the social is structured by the technopower spiral and the 
informational space of flows and results in the virtual elite. Power, at this point, 
appears as forms of domination. Cyberpower of the imaginary consists of the 
utopia and dystopia that make up to the virtual imaginary. Power in this respect 
appears as the constituent of social order. All three regions are needed to map 
cyberpower in total and no region is dominant over any other. 
Lyon, on the other hand, argues that the governance of the new social 
polarization and the new virtual culture is governance founded upon new 
matrices of power. State power seeps towards individuals 
- 
the new global 
citizens wired up to the Internet who, through the unintended consequences of 
their actions, are busily forming new patterns of sociality, new virtual 
communities and thus new bases for power. 124 
In the final analysis, internet politics, like any other politics, are closely related to 
power, because individuals or groups using the medium are inevitably involved in 
123 Jordan, T: (1999) Cyberpower. The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet, Routledge: London and New York, p. 208 124 Loader, B (ed. ): (1997) The Governance of Cyberspace, p. 44 
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power relations. The problem is that not all people have the power of knowledge 
the internet can provide, since the medium as yet is mostly used by white, middle- 
class males, a trend that is starting to change slowly, as in our non-virtual social 
sphere. To explain, the internet offers opportunities for breaking down political 
hierarchies within institutions, while subverting the national boundaries that have 
helped in the past to control access to information. Social movements, in 
particular, might still be asking for traditional forms of political power; however, 
the new power they have because of the internet could be characterised as 
somewhat non-traditional, in the sense of giving them access to mass audiences 
they were previously denied. 
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1.3 The globalisation-internet connection. 
Another issue identified in my research is that of globalisation. The reason for this 
is that the internet can be seen as a global phenomenon, very much 
contemporaneous to globalisation, to the extent that, among its other effects, it has 
a globalising influence, allowing differing cultures the chance to co-exist. It is 
necessary, I think, to look briefly at the debate on globalisation, in order to place 
internet politics in their political environment, especially when the internet is seen 
by many as a tool of this process. 
Processes of globalisation are challenging the bases of order in profound ways: 
First, by exacerbating inequalities both with and among states; and second, by 
eroding the capacity of traditional institutions to manage the new threats. 
Globalisation transforms the processes, the actors and capabilities, and the agenda 
of world politics, necessitating more effective international institutions of 
management. In more contemporary terms, institutions need to probe deeply into 
domestic politics, ensuring compliance with agreements on issues ranging from 
the environment to trade and arms control. The concept of globalisation describes 
dramatic changes in the transactions and interactions taking place among states, 
firms and peoples in the world. It describes both an increase in cross-border 
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transactions of goods and services and an increase in the flow of images, ideas, 
people and behaviour. Woods puts it this way: 
Economistic views treat the process as technologically driven. Yet, globalization 
has also been driven by deregulation, privatization and political choices made by 
governments... In other words the impact of globalization has been strongly 
shaped by those with the power to make and enforce the rules of global 
economy. '25 
Globalisation is cementing old economic inequalities between `haves' and 'have- 
nots' 
- 
not just in the sense of having technology or not, but also in the sense of 
having the capacity to make rules or not. Yet, at the same time, globalisation is 
creating a new set of requirements for regulation and enforcement which requires 
the cooperation of the so-called `have-nots'. 
Currently, there is a debate between globalists and sceptics in theoretical terms. 
Empirical examples of these two camps are found in the discussion of 
cyberpolitical dimensions in conflicts. 126 This debate involves fundamental 
considerations about the nature of world order 
- 
as it is and as it may be. 
Disagreements can range over at least three separate dimensions: First, the 
philosophical concern with conceptual and normative tools for analysing world 
order; second, the empirical-analytical concern with the problems of 
125 Woods in Held, D and McGrew, A: (2000) The Global Transformation Reader, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 389 
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understanding and explaining world order; and third, the strategic concern, which 
focuses on an assessment of the feasibility of moving from where we are to where 
we might like to be. 127 
Globalists seek to review the nature and meaning of the modem polity in its 
global setting. They reject the assumption that one can understand the nature and 
possibilities of political life by referring primarily to national structures and 
procedures. The transnational and global scale of contemporary economic and 
social problems presents, globalists contend, a unique challenge to the modem 
state. This challenge involves, in the first instance, the recognition of the way 
globalisation generates a serious `political deficit' -a deficit which encompasses 
democracy, regulation and justice. Second, reexamining the changing context of 
the modem state entails recognising the way globalisation stimulates new political 
energies and forces, which are providing an impetus to the reconfiguration of 
political power. These include the numerous transnational movements, agencies 
and NGOs pursuing greater coordination and accountability in regional and global 
settings. Third, globalists affirm that a shift is and ought to be taking place 
between political and ethical frameworks based on the national political 
community and those based on a wider set of considerations. 
"Z6 Introduction in Held, D and McGrew, A: (2000) The Global Transformation Reader, Polity 
Press: Cambridge. 
127 McGrew in Held, D and McGrew, A: (2000) The Global Transformation Reader, Polity Press: 
Cambridge, p. 401 
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In stark contrast, sceptics hold that the modem theory of the state presupposes a 
community, which rightly governs itself. The modern theory of the sovereign 
democratic state, they contend, upholds the idea of a national community of fate 
- 
a community which properly governs itself and determines its own future. For the 
sceptics, particularly those who subscribe to the communitarian outlook, the 
values of the community take precedence over all universal requirements. 
According to McGrew, globalisation presents modem democratic theory with a 
daunting task: how to reconcile the principle of rule by the people with a world in 
which power is exercised increasingly on a transnational or even global scale. 128 
Today, McGrew believes, the fate of democratic communities across the globe is 
becoming ever more tightly interwoven by patterns of contemporary globalisation 
with the result that established territorial models of liberal democracy appear 
increasingly hollow. In his own words: 
A new agenda for democratic theory is called for: one which breaks with 
conventional accounts of democracy in which the nation-state is conceived as the 
only proper incubator of democratic political life. Central to this new agenda is a 
critical enquiry into the necessity, desirability and possibility of `global 
democracy' 
- 
that is of democracy beyond borders. 129 
Furthermore, Held argues that contemporary globalisation is transforming state 
power and the nature of political community, but any description of this as a 
128 ibid., p. 405 
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simple loss or diminution of national power distorts what has happened. For 
although globalisation is changing the relationship between states and markets, 
this is not straightforwardly at the expense of states. Held puts it this way: 
States and public authorities initiated many of the fundamental changes - for 
example, the deregulation of capital in the 1980s and early 1990s. In other 
spheres of activity as well, states have become central in initiating new kinds of 
transnational collaboration, from the emergence of different forms of military 
alliances to the advancement of human rights regimes. 130 
Contemporary globalisation has contributed to the transformation of the nature 
and prospects of democratic political community in a number of distinctive 
ways 131. First, the locus of effective political power is shared by diverse forces 
and agencies at national, regional and international levels. Second, the idea of a 
political community of fate - of a self-determining collectivity - can no longer be 
meaningfully located within the boundaries of a single nation-state alone, as it 
could more reasonably be when nation-states were being forged. Third, national 
sovereignty today, even in regions with intensive overlapping and divided 
political structures, has not been wholly undermined 
- 
far from it. Regarding the 
internet, it seems that a new form of nation has developed. It is what Barrett calls 
the `cybernation' 132. As the internet has been used by more and more people 
129 ibid., p. 405 
130 Held in Held, D and McGrew, A: (2000) The Global Transformation Reader, Polity Press: 
Cambridge, p. 421 
131 ibid., p. 423 132 Barrett, N: (1996) The State of the Cybernation, Kogan Page: London. 
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throughout the world, Barrett argues it has carved a unique cultural niche. The 
initial subculture of internet users evolved a set of acceptable behaviours, a 
common history and arguably a common identity of beliefs: free speech, 
protection of civil rights, impatience with naive questions from the newly 
initiated, etc. So, Barrett suggests that 
a cybernation 
-a nation whose communication of commonly held beliefs and 
philosophies is effected by the Internet or similar mechanisms-already exists. 
This initial subculture has been added to and developed further as ever more 
people around the world find their way into `cyberspace', creating an evolving 
and essentially self-organizing community. '33 
Another theme that usually comes up in discussions of globalisation, is that of 
world government. The classical argument for world government is that order 
among states is best established by the same means, whereby it is established 
among individual men within the state that is by a supreme authority, which 
perhaps too freely equates states to individuals. As Bull asserts: 
It is often argued today for example that a world government could best achieve 
the goal of economic justice for all individual men, or the goal of sound 
management of the human environment. The argument against world government 
has been that, while it may achieve order, it is destructive of liberty or freedom: it 
infringes the liberties of states and nations and also checks the liberties of 
133 ibid., p. 15 
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individuals who if the world government is tyrannical, cannot seek political 
asylum under an alternative government. 134 
An argument entertained in the area of internet research, in relation to the issue of 
world government, is that with the spread of the internet, there is scope for a 
newly international localism; that is, finding expression in `virtual' communities, 
with some people going so far as to suggest that a new global cyberstate is 
forming. There also signs that online communities will offer further dimensions to 
personal identity within an already complex world. 
In the course of the ongoing discussion, one of the most prominent new tools of 
globalisation is the internet. The problem connected to the internet in terms of its 
globalisation potential is that of cultural homogenisation. Some countries on the 
receiving end of information are concerned that humanity is becoming 
homogenised, and that they will lose their cultural identity in the rush to become 
Anglo-Western. This is one of the main reasons cited by Singapore for enacting 
its draconian internet censorship legislation in 1996.135 Malaysia, too, has noted 
this aspect of unfettered information flows and has expressed concern that images 
and lifestyles presented on the internet may offend, for example, Muslim 
sensibilities. Burma and Cambodia are not noted for their tolerance of opposition 
political groups. Their government have both expressed concern at the 
134 Bull in Held, D and McGrew, A: (2000) The Global Transformation Reader, Polity Press: 
Cambridge, p. 445. 
135 ibid., p. 32 
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consequences of open and unfettered access to the internet, as all the while they 
come under increasing pressure to connect. 
Another issue concerning internet and globalisation is that the internet for all its 
rhetoric of globalisation is conducted mostly in English. Those who want to 
access the internet must have a good knowledge of English, which presupposes a 
western-influenced education. Only the elites within developing countries can get 
that sort of education, which marginalises others, especially in rural areas. 
Moreover, few people in the South have access to the internet and not all speak 
the internet language English, and even post-colonially, information about the 
South is primarily written from information and research produced in the North. 
As Everard puts it, `[t]his can lead to erosion of cultural identity, national values 
and cultural integrity, through what Holderness describes as the homogenisation 
of humanity'. 136 More interestingly, while internet uptake is growing among those 
outside North America and Western Europe, internet-based communication 
within and between anti-capitalist movements continues to be dominated by 
English language users. 137 
The one area where cyberspace has undoubtedly brought political change is the 
emergence of a global system that restructures the power of the nation-state. 
Jordan explains: `Finances flowing across national borders show little regard for 
136 ibid., p. 37 
137 Wright, S: 'Informing, communicating and ICTs in contemporary anti-capitalist movements' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 92 
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the interests of the nation-state they flow through. Information spreading instantly 
throughout cyberspace evades controls that are more easily put in place on 
nationally based, centralised broadcast media'. 138 
An example of this is when emails came out of Russia describing the attempted 
coup against Gorbachev, providing a commentary `as it happened' that eroded 
state censorship. Again in Russia, more than a decade later, text messages 
broadcast on the internet were sent during the notorious Moscow theatre incident, 
while the audience was held hostage by Chechen autonomist rebels. 
Another point that deserves attention is that of cultural imperialism on the net. In 
`The Harvard Conference on Internet and Society' several people expressed their 
views on the subject. 139 An obvious one came from Anne-Marie Slaughter, a 
lawyer at Harvard School, who championed the idea that it is not cultural 
imperialism we should be worried about, but rather, the divide between those who 
are privileged and online, and the rest of the world. The second came from Izumi 
Aizu, an intercultural communications specialist in Japan, who maintained that 
the internet creates a global arena for `seemingly minor culture... that the mass 
economy cannot pay attention to. In some developing countries people are now 
jumping into use the net, not only to absorb knowledge and information from the 
advanced countries, but to share their own with others'. 140 
138 Jordan, T: (1999) Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet, 
Routledge: London and New York, p. 162 
139 Slevin, J: (2000) The Internet and Society, Polity Press: Cambridge, pp. 208-210. 140 ibid., p. 209 
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To sum up, the internet is one of the most prominent new tools of a globalised 
world. Despite the global rhetoric, there is a divide between those who are 
privileged and online and the rest of the world, with the appearance of the 
problems of cultural homogenisation and cultural imperialism, since internet 
traffic at the moment is mostly conducted in English. Moreover, information 
spreads instantly throughout cyberspace and so evades controls over it, even by 
the powerful states. The fact that the internet is part of the globalisation process 
could be used as a platform to argue that it does go beyond traditional politics of 
sovereignty and therefore is postmodern in nature. 
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1.4 A postmodern medium? 
One reason for dwelling on the question of whether the internet is a postmodern 
medium is that the answer one gives is likely to determine one's assessment of the 
implications and effects of the internet on society, politics and culture. The central 
issues identified here concerning postmodernity and the internet are community, 
identity, discourse and structure. Let us examine these in turn. However, let me 
start with the lay out of the general approaches and issues on the subject first. 
The use of ICTs, being an intellectual activity, has far-reaching implications for 
our notions of autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination. The individual in 
cyberspace is fragmented in databases and networks. As a result of this 
fragmentation, the individual as a meaningful entity becomes decentred and 
multiplied. Does this mean that we become postmodern? 
The postmodern refers to a condition of disunity and the fragmentation of 
knowledge. Postmodernism involves an epistemological shift from the perceived 
wholeness of knowledge to a realisation that information is by its very nature 
fragmented. According to Chapman there are two views taken on the internet. The 
first is the transmission view, where the internet is viewed as simply a mechanism 
for the instantaneous distribution of information at the global level, and the 
second is the view of internet use as ritual, linked to terms such as sharing, 
participation, association, fellowship and the possession of common faith, 
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rendering the internet more than the transmission of signals and messages. 141 Or 
as Poster argues, modernity or the mode of production signifies patterned 
practices that elicit identities as autonomous and rational, whereas postmodernity 
or the mode of information indicates communication practices which constitute 
subjects as unstable, multiple and diffuse, where one gets a sense of fragmentation 
and decentred self, multiple and conflicting identities and a subverted order. The 
first view, essentially a modernist perspective, tends to reduce the internet to a 
hammer. `In the grand narrative of modernity, the internet is an efficient tool of 
communication, advancing the goals of its users who are understood as 
preconstituted instrumental identities'. 142 In contrast, the second view takes 
account of the social dynamics of online culture, and cyberspace becomes the 
realm of pure possibility. Reason (the `modern' Enlightenment catchphrase) 
becomes a space of possibility. Also, postmodernism is a viewpoint that 
emphasises the horizontal over the hierarchical, and the internet is a rhizomatic 
structure: 
Cyberspace is a `smooth space' whose potential for expansion is infinite. One 
rides a `flux' and a `flow' of information. One wanders. As a holding 
environment, cyberspace is rhizomatic (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). It is like a 
subterranean stem that grows and spreads horizontally. In cyberspace thought is 
pushed to the level of the formal operational mind where the rules of thought are 
141 Chapman, R: `Hyperlinks and HyperProtestantism: The Internet as a postmodern 
epistemological shift', Lincoln Trail College, Robinson, Illinois, undated 142 Poster, M: `Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the public sphere', University of California, Irvine, 
www. humanities. uci. edu/monster/writinp-s/dem___oc html 
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themselves transcended and where reason, as a consequence, becomes a space of 
possib111ty, 143 
This shift to a decentralised network of communication makes senders receivers, 
producers consumers, and rulers ruled, upsetting the logic of the first media age. 
This is why Poster is calling for a poststructuralist analysis of the modes of 
subject constitution. 144 Such an account would avoid the continued, limiting 
exclusive repetition of the logics of modernity, `[f]or the chief characteristics of 
subjecthood, the resistance of the new media to modernity lie in their 
complication of subjecthood, their denaturalizing the process of subject 
formation, their putting into question the interiority of the subject and its 
coherence'. 145 
Another characteristic of postmodernism is the simulation of reality. People lose 
touch with reality and replace it with symbols of reality. Due to the seeming 
weightlessness of the online environment, the reality of its production is hidden, 
negating its value and rendering its product an experience. 146 What exists in 
cyberspace, hyper-reality, image saturation, and simulacra, seem more powerful 
than the real and the cyborgian mixing of organic and inorganic, human and 
machine follows a postmodern logic: 
143 Emery, E: `The postmodern desert: Solitude and community in cyberspace', Preconvention 
papers, The American Benedictine Academy, www. osb. org/aba/aba2000/emery html, p. 4 as Poster, M: `Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the public sphere', University of California, Irvine, 
www. humanities. uci. edu/mposter/writines/democ. htmi 143 ibid., p. 41. 
146 Thiel, S: ` The online newspaper: A postmodern medium', The Journal of Electronic Publishing, University of Michigan Press, 4/01. 
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Just as we represent the hardware of human existence, so we express through 
these machines a collective consciousness 
- 
the software of human existence 
-a 
consciousness increasingly fragmented and eclectic 
- 
and we call that 
fundamentally postmodern embodiment, expressed on that representation of the 
postmodern body 
- 
The internet! 147 
Community in Cyberspace 
Prominent in Jordan's work is the idea that an imagined community exists in 
cyberspace. Anderson defined a nation as an imagined political community 
- 
and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. 148 It is imagined because it is 
impossible for all members of the community to meet; they must hypothesise their 
commonality. It is limited because there are always borders and beyond those 
borders there are other nations. It is sovereign because it creates its own rules 
within its borders. Finally, it is a community because regardless of actual 
inequalities between members of a nation, it is always conceived as a deep 
`horizontal comradeship' in which all are equal as members of the nation. Though 
Anderson uses this definition to explore the nature of the nation state, something 
cyberspace helps to undermine, a similar community exists in cyberspace. Jordan 
comments: 
147 Poster, M: `Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the public sphere', University of California, Irvine, 
www. humanities uci edu/mposter/writings/demos html. 148 Anderson, B: (1991) Imagined Communities, 2"d edn, Verso: London, p. 6. 
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There seems little doubt that alongside the virtual lives that individuals construct 
and the virtual societies technopower conditions, another layer of cyberpower 
exists on the fantasies and nightmares that collectively constitute the imagination 
of cyberspace. Here will be found the common beliefs of individuals who never 
meet each other that will move them to fight for their cybercommunity, believe in 
their cybercommunity and even love their cybercommunity. 149 
Similarly, Castells asks: `So, in the end are virtual communities real 
communities? "50 His answer is that virtual communities are communities but not 
physical ones, and they do not follow the same patterns of communication and 
interaction as physical communities do. For him, virtual communities are not 
`unreal'; they just work in a different plane of reality. They are interpersonal 
social networks, most of them based on weak ties, highly diversified and 
specialised, still able to generate reciprocity and support by the dynamics of 
sustained interaction. 
Slevin accepts that technologies such as the internet are opening up opportunities 
for new forms of communication, when he argues that the production and 
reproduction of social reality is becoming re-embedded in local communal life in 
ways which were largely unavailable in previous modern settings. lie writes as 
follows: 
149 Jordan, T: (1999) Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet, Routledge: London and New York, p. 183. 
"' ibid., p. 155 
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The possibilities of virtual reality are boosting to the extreme the dynamism of 
modern everyday life by heightening the process which Giddens describes as 
tearing `space away from place by fostering relations between absent others'; 
`the severing of time from space' he continues, `provides a basis for their 
combination in relation to social activity 
... 
This phenomenon serves to open up 
manifold possibilities of change by breaking free from restraints of local habits 
and practices'. '5' 
Identity in cyberspace 
In order to understand the impact of the internet on the individual, Slevin draws 
upon the work of Rheingold'52 who indicates that America has lost a needed sense 
of social commons and that, in the face of such loss, `virtual communities' just 
happen to fulfil this need. In this fashion, internet users, Slevin argues, tend to 
appear as what Giddens describes as `cultural dopes', not as actors who are highly 
knowledgeable ` discursively and facitly' about the institutions they produce and 
reproduce in and through their actions. 153 However, in Between Facts, Habermas 
had rejected much of the `cultural dope' approach to media studies, arguing 
instead that citizens adopt strategies of interpretation against media messages. '54 
151 Slevin, J: (2000) The Internet and Society, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 106. ist Reingold, H: (1994) The Virtual Community: Surfing the Internet, Minerva: London. 153 Slevin, J: (2000) The Internet and Society, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 107. 154 Salter, L: (2003): `Democracy, social movements, and the Internet' in McCaughey, M and Ayers, M: Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice, Routledge: New York and London, p. 125. 
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But what are the direct effects of the internet on individuals? Slevin comments 
that people who work at home or on the move, with no real place in the 
organisation which they can call their own, may feel alienated. They no longer 
have a fixed `place' of work where they can develop shared experiences and a 
sense of belonging. '55 
To illustrate the point that the internet has a negative impact on the individual, 
Slevin refers to the HomeNet project. The families in the study came from eight 
diverse neighborhoods in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. According to the study, 
greater use of the internet was associated with subsequent declines in family 
communication. Greater use of the internet to communicate was also associated 
with declines in the size of both the local and the distant social circle. Individuals 
who made greater use of the internet also reported larger increases in loneliness. 
Remarkably, the researchers write that greater use of the internet was associated 
with increased depression and disengagement from real life. 156 Nonetheless, this 
writer is not sure of the validity of these findings, when brought under more 
empirical scrutiny. 
Moreover, Everard's analysis focuses on identity issues when examining the 
internet. He cites Turkle who suggests that the use of multiple identities in 
cyberspace merely extends the range of selves available, thus making the 
individual in a sense more complete, and more comfortable to try out a range of 
Iss Slevin, p. 132. 156 ibid., p. 167. 
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points of view. The point is that the modern notion of individuals being unitary is 
itself an illusion. The self of language and of symbolic order at large is always 
virtual 
-a simulation. 
157 In addition, the internet allows individuals to expand 
beyond identities based on geographical territories, towards identities based more 
on the cultural terrain of cyberspace. 
On the other hand, the issue of identity is not merely one of philosophical 
importance, but also as one of immense practical importance for the conduct of 
states 
- 
not to mention identifying the lines of flight from the status quo: 
For example, the issue of the `authentic' author is an aspect not only of 
intellectual property rights, but also of authentication for business transaction. 
Am I the purchaser that I am presenting myself as? Are you a genuine business to 
whom I can submit my credit card number? Will a third party intercept my credit 
card details? All these are questions of identity! " 
Discourse in cyberspace 
At the core of the digital zone, moreover, is rapid access to the global, 
informational archive that simultaneously delights and overwhelms any user who 
turns to it only for empirical certainty, historical veracity, and subjective 
validation. In the zones of the internet and digital installation artwork, the graphic 
certitude of the factual is entwined in the figural play of the fictional, the privacy 
'57 ibid., p. 125 
158 ibid., p. 159 
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of the personal erodes with the interactivity of the social, the patient quietude of 
reading is interlaced with the jumpy quickness of surfing, and the quasi-religious 
contemplation of textuality and high art becomes newly energised by the flashy 
multi-media quacking of art in the electrifying zone of the digital. 
159 
In postmodernism we also find a suspicion and an ironic deconstruction of master 
narratives, and a trust and investment in micropolitics, identity and local political 
struggles. In information technology, writing/speech distinctions lose some of 
their meaning. The written word takes on a more immediate nature and begins to 
function as if it were speech. Writing thus achieves a `transcendence' on the 
internet, as a third-order simulation of speech. This perspective helps to explain 
how power relations are constructed through discourse and how ideological work 
is done. This issue is addressed in Loader's The Governance of Cyberspace. In 
his own words: 
It is precisely these postmodernist little narratives which may be characteristic of 
discourse in cyberspace. As Poster remarks `the Internet seems to encourage the 
proliferation of stories, local narratives, without any totalising gestures and it 
places senders and addressees in symmetrical relations'. Moreover, these stories 
and the performance consolidate the "social bond" of the Internet community. 160 
Jordan also comments on the effects of cyberpunk culture on cyberspace: 
1s9 Murray, T: (2004) `New media art and rhizomatic in-securities', Ctheory. net. 
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While it is clear that cyberpunk was a movement, its ideas have had a much 
broader effect than on just science fiction. Two ideas in particular were 
prefigured in cyberpunk science fiction that have had a lasting effect on 
cyberspace: the organisation of information as virtual spaces and the nature of 
virtual bodies... The first is the most significant, because it attempts to directly 
describe, picture, dissect and understand cyberspace. 161 
Cyberspace has been conceptualised as a net, a matrix, a metaverse and 
universally as a place constructed out of information. That is why it is not merely 
a medium easily controlled, but another place altogether: `The performativity of 
an utterance... increases proportionally to the amount of information about its 
referent one has at one's disposal. Thus the growth of power, and its self- 
legitimisation, are now taking the route of data storage and accessibility, and the 
operativity of information'. 162 
Castells brings forward the actual form of language on the internet. He argues: 
To some analysts CMC, and particularly email represents the revenge of the 
written medium, the return to the typographic mind and the recuperation of the 
constructed, rational discourse. For others, on the contrary, the informality, 
160 Loader, B (ed. ): (1997) The Governance of Cyberspace, Routledge: London and New York, p. 
8. 
161 Jordan, T: (1999) Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet, 
Routledge: London and New York, p. 25 
162 ibid., p. 37 quotes Lyotard J-F, The Post-modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
University of Minnesota press: Minneapolis, 1984: 47 
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spontaneity, and anonymity of the medium stimulates what they call a new form 
of `orality', expressed by an electronic text. 163 
When electronic communications are a factor in the theorist's understanding of 
the subject, language is understood as performative and rhetorical, and as an 
active figuring and positioning of the subject. With the spread of this regime of 
communications, the subject can only be understood as partially stable, as 
repeatedly reconfigured at different points of time and space, as non-self-identical 
and therefore as always partly Other. '" 
The internet is a loose, decentered network of mainframes and personal computers 
that sustains global connections among its users. Internet discourse is routinely 
off-topic, repetitive, inane or obscene. It is not too much to say that an ethic of 
anarchy, with disparate voices raised in electronic cacophony, often prevails. 
Perhaps more so than any other contemporary theorist, Jean Baudrillard provides 
a provocative direction for `navigating' this hyperreal terrain. Although he has not 
addressed worldwide networking and the internet specifically in his writing, his 
comments on telematics, along with more general critiques of modernity, provide 
an interesting means for exploring the internet. From a Baudrillardian perspective, 
this figuration of the internet as a kind of cybernetic terrain works to undermine 
163 ibid., p. 389 
164 Poster, M: (1995) The Second Media Age, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 59. 
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the symbolic distance between the metaphorical and the real. 165 Baudrillard's 
reading can be used to move internet studies beyond its modern closures. 
Replacing the one world with multiple possible worlds, the interet ultimately 
offers both the seductions and subductions of a postmodern world. 
The postmodern argument 
When Nicholas Negroponte introduces us to his digital world, we find out that the 
impact of digital technology is great, and explore what being digital means and 
how our lives may be enhanced. Negroponte supports the view that even if 
nobody has a clear idea of who pays what on the internet, it appears to be free to 
most users. Even if this changes in the future and some rational economic model 
is laid on top of the internet, it may cost a penny or two to distribute a million bits 
to a million people. In Negroponte's view, computing no longer falls within the 
exclusive realm of military government and big business. It is being channelled 
directly into the hands of very creative individuals at all levels of society, thereby 
becoming the means for creative expression in both its use and development. In 
Negroponte's words: 
The agent of change will be the Internet, both literally and as a model or 
metaphor. The Internet is interesting not only as a massive and pervasive global 
network, but also as an example of something that has evolved with no apparent 
165 Nunes, M: (1995) `Baudrillard in cyberspace: Internet, virtuality, and postmodernity', Style 29, 
p. 314. 
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designer in charge, keeping its shape very much like the formation of a flock of 
ducks. Nobody is the boss, and all the pieces are so far scaling admirably. 166 
For Baudrillard, the shift from the real to hyperreal occurs when we move from 
mere representation to simulation, a movement already existing in our virtual 
world. According to Baudrillard the screen represents an example of the 
`satellisation of the real' by achieving the escape velocity of hyperreality: `[t]hat 
which was previously mentally projected, which was lived as a metaphor in the 
terrestrial habitat is from now on projected entirely without metaphor, into the 
absolute space of simulation'. 167 
Another characteristic of the internet, which gives it a postmodern character, is 
that it becomes a hyperreal vehicle for travelling across a simulated world. The 
image of `cybertravel' offers a metaphorical world beyond a computer screen, a 
`globe' of nomads that no longer stands for the world, because it has become the 
`world'. The Microsoft question that pops on the screen `Where do you want to 
go today? ' creates the simulation of a form of power and the creation of a virtual 
world which destroys the conceptual possibility of distance. This is why 
Baudrilland writes that ` [t]he Telecomputer Man experiences a very special kind 
of distance which can only be described as unbridgeable by the body 
... 
The screen 
is merely virtual and hence unbridgeable'. 168 
'66 Negroponte, N: (1995) Being Digital, Hodder and Stoughton: London, p. 181 167 Baudrillard, J: (1988) The Ecstasy of Communication, Semiotext: New York, p. 16. 
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Moreover, the internet does not simply annihilate distance; it creates its own 
simulated world in place of the physical world of spatial distances. Once the 
internet moves closer to total connectivity, this metaphorical `cyberspace' could 
become the hyperreal 
- 
more real than the real place it once simulated 
. 
169 
Baudrillard refers to this moment as the `precession of simulacra', when the 
globe/model defines the world it once approximated. 170 Carrying this 
Baudrillardian reading to its further limits, one might conclude that what occurs is 
`the end of space through cyberspace, the end of knowledge through information 
171 
and the end of the imaginary through the hyperreal'. 
For millions of netters, cyberspace is a real place, more egalitarian than elitist and 
more decentered than hierarchical. Rheingold asks: `[h]ow are relationships and 
commitments as we know them even possible in a place where identities are 
fluid7'12 We reduce and encode our identities as words on a screen, decode and 
unpack the identity of others. The fact that many people believe virtual 
communities to be real places in which they live real experiences, makes this 
blurring of the real and the unreal close to Baudrillard's postmodern moment of 
the hyperreal. The following abstract is telling: 
168 Baudrillard, J: (1993) The Transparency of Evil, Verso: New York, p. 55 169 Nunes, M: (1995) `Baudrillard in cyberspace: Internet, virtuality, and postmodernity', Style 29, 
316. 
170 Baudrillard, J: (1983) Simulations, Semiotext: New York, p. 2. 
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Cyberspace is not real! Hacking takes place on a screen. Words aren't physical, 
numbers... aren't physical... Computers simulate reality, such as computer games 
that simulate tank battles or dogfights or spaceships. Simulations are just make- 
believe, and the stuff in computers is not real. Consider this: If `hacking' is 
supposed to be so serious and real-life and dangerous then how come nine-year- 
old kids have computers and modems? You wouldn't give a nine-year-old his 
own car, or his own rifle, or his own chainsaw - those things are 'real'. 173 
Finally, the promise of unlimited information and the threat of this information 
being controlled leads to the realisation that sophistication in technology produces 
more convincing simulations of information and more convincing strategies of 
deterrence. With the fascination of unlimited information what we are not 
realising is that in fact despite all this information we have nothing to learn: 
The addiction we have for the media, the impossibility of doing without them... 
is not a result of a desire of culture, communication and information, but of this 
perversion of truth and falsehood, of this destruction of meaning in the operation 
of the medium. The desire for a show, the desire for simulation... is a 
spontaneous, total resistance to the ultimatum of historical and political reason. 17' 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that Poster does not fail to criticise Baudrillard's 
work, which remains infused with a sense of the media as unidirectional, and 
173 Sterling, B: (1992) The Hacking Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier, 
Viking: London, p. 84. 
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therefore does not `anticipate the imminent appearance of bidirectional, 
decentralised media, such as the Internet, with its new opportunities for 
reconstructing the mechanisms of subject constitution'. 175 However, if we follow 
Baudrillard all the way, it seems as if the audiences comprise of helpless and 
gullible idiots who are incapable of interpreting or reinterpreting images of 
violence. Signs are made possible by the new technologies of the media in which 
signifiers flash past potential consumers. Once signifiers have been separated and 
abstracted in this way, floating free so to speak, in communicational space they 
can be attached to particular commodities by the arbitrary whim of advertisers. 
According to Baudrillard, individuals consume meanings rather than products, 
176 
resulting in symbolic exchange. As Poster argues: 
Electronically mediated communication opens the prospect of understanding the 
subject as constituted in historically concrete configurations of discourse and 
practice.... [I]n turn such a prospect challenges all those discourses and practices 
that would restrict this process, would fix and stabilise identity, whether these be 
fascist ones which rely on essentialist theories of race, liberal ones which rely on 
reason, or socialist ones, which rely on labor. 177 
A poststructuralist approach to communication theory analyses the way 
electronically mediated communication (what Poster calls `the mode of 
14 Poster, M: (1995): The Second Media age, Polity Press: Cambridge, p. 16, quotes Baudrillard: (1988) Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster 
, 
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information') both challenges and reinforces systems of domination that are 
emerging in a postmodern society and culture: `the figure of the self, fixed in time 
and place, capable of exercising cognitive control over surrounding objects may 
no longer be sustained... [E]lectronic communications systematically remove the 
fixed points, the grounds, the foundations that were essential to modem theory'. 179 
Continuing from Derrida, Poster writes that both deconstruction and electronic 
writing understand the volatility of written language, its instability and uncertain 
authorship. Both see language as affecting a destabilisation of the subject, a 
dispersal of the individual, a fracturing of the illusion of unity and fixity of the 
self. 179 
Karim in `Diasporas and their communication networks: Exploring the broader 
context of transnational narrowcasting' addresses the question of the postmodern, 
when he mentions Arjun Appadurai180, who sees the global cultural economy as 
characterised by fundamental disjunctures between what he identifies as five 
dimensions or `scapes' of `global cultural flow': ethnoscapes (people), 
mediascapes (media content), technoscapes (technology), finanscapes (capital) 
and ideoscapes (ideologies). ' 81 The diasporic site becomes the cultural border 
between the country of origin and the country of residence 
- 
Eiomi Uhabha's 
178 ibid., p. 60. 
179 ibid., p. 72. 
180 Appadurai, A: (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, University of 
Minnesota: Minneapolis. 
18' Karim, ILK: 'Diasporas and their communication networks: Exploring the broader context of 
transnational narrowcasting' (Draft), School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton 
University, Ottawa. 
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`third space'. 182 Hall views this process as operating `on the terrain of the global 
postmodern', which `is an extremely contradictory space'. 193 These global 
networks are allowing for relatively easy connections for members of 
communities residing on various continents. In opposition to the broadcast model 
of communication, which apart from offering limited access to minority groups, is 
linear, hierarchical, and capital intensive, on-line media allow easier access and 
are non-linear, largely non-hierarchical, and relatively cheap. 184 As governments 
seek to prevent terrorism by more tightly sealing national borders, transnational 
movement is becoming problematic for potential emigrants from non-western 
states. Additionally, the loyalty of minority ethnic groups living in western 
countries is becoming suspect and their transnational connections and 
relationships are coming under scrutiny. The multiple and hybrid identities of 
diasporic members are under renewed pressure to conform to the mythical notion 
of a monolithic populace of the traditional nation-state. 
The homo politicus, le citoyen, is no longer the dominant actor. Systems are 
becoming more and more intelligent and at a growing pace are better at several 
things. ICT, being and intellectual technology has far-reaching implications for 
our notions of autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination. Reality is the 
unintended result of decisions which are increasingly taken by machines, and the 
individual in cyberspace is fragmented in databases and networks. As a result of 
182 Bhabha, II: (1994) The Location of Culture, Routledge: New York. 183 Hall, S: (1997) `The Local and the Global' in A. McClintock et. al: Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives, University of Minnesota: Minneapolis. 184 Karim, cites Karim, Smeltzer and Loucheur, 1998 
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this fragmentation, the individual as a meaningful entity becomes decentred and 
multiplied. Thus we become postmodern. '85 
In pursuit of similar answers, albeit in a more philosophical mode, Deleuze and 
Guattari in their work A Thousand Plateaus provide us with a detailed analysis of 
the subject's multiplicities and dimensions. 186 They formulate the concept of the 
rhizome, which has the characteristics of connection and heterogeneity: any point 
of a network of rhizomes can be connected to anything else in the network, and 
must form such connections. This is very different from the tree or root, which 
plots a point and fixes an order. The linguistic tree on the Chomskian model still 
begins at a point S and proceeds by dichotomy. On the contrary, Deleuze and 
Guattari assert that not every trait in a rhizome is necessarily linked to a linguistic 
feature; semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of 
coding (biological, political, economic, etc. ) that bring into play not only different 
regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status. There the subject is 
no longer a subject, but a rhizome, a Body without Organs. In other words, what 
these writers argue is that a rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between 
semiotic chains and organisations of power. 187 Multiplicities cease to have any 
relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual entity; rather, they are 
rhizomatic, they are flat, a plane of consistency of multiplicities, defined by the 
outside: 
gas Frissen in Loader, B: (1997) The Governance of Cyberspace, Routledge: London and New 
York, p. 125. 
186 Deleuze, G and Guattari, F: (1987) A Thousand Plateaus, Athlone Press: London 
197 ibid., PP"6-7. 
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by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which 
they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The line of flight 
marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity 
effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the 
multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of 
flattening all of the multiplicities on a single place of consistency or exteriority, 
regardless of their number of dimensions. 188 
Deleuze and Guattari use the example of a map to explain the rhizome. What 
distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented towards an 
experimentation in contact with the real. It fosters connections between fields, the 
removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies 
without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome: `[t]he 
map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, 
susceptible to constant modification'. 189 This resembles the world of the internet, 
where we get connections between fields, bodies without organs, lines of flight 
and maps of planes of consistencies. 
In contrast, arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centres of 
significance and subjectification, controlled by central automata like organised 
memories. An element only receives information from a higher unit, and only 
receives a subjective affection along preestablished paths. Deleuze and Guattari 
188 ibid., p. 9 
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point to problems in information and computer science, when these sciences grant 
all power to a memory or central organ. The writers cite Pierre Rosenstiehl and 
Jean Petitot: `accepting the primacy of hierarchical structures amounts to giving 
arborescent structures privileged status.. 
. 
In a hierarchical system an individual 
has only one neighbor, his or her hierarchical superior... The channels of 
transmission are preestablished: the arborescent system preexists the individual, 
who is integrated into it at an alloted place'. 190 
In contrast to these centred systems, the authors set forth acentred systems, finite 
networks of automata, in which communication runs from any neighbor to any 
other, channels do not preexist, and individuals are interchangeable, defined only 
by their state at a given moment; local operations are coordinated and the final, 
global result synchronised without a central agency. 191 That is also what happens 
when `mass' movements or molecular flows are constantly escaping, inventing 
connections that jump from tree to tree and uproot them: a whole smoothing of 
space, which in turn reacts back upon striated space. 192 Or as Hardt and Negri put 
it, `a world that knows no outside. It knows only an inside, a vital and ineluctable 
participation in the set of social structures, with no possibility of transcending 
them. This inside is the productive cooperation of mass intellectuality and 
affective networks, the productivity of postmodern biopolitics'. 193 
1ß9 ibid., p. 12 
10 Rosenstiehl, P and Petitot, J: ` Automate asocial et systemes acentres', Communications, no 22 (1974), pp. 45-62 cited in Deleuze and Guattari, p. 16. 191 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 17. 
192 ibid., p. 506. 
"' Hardt, M and Negri, A: (2000) Empire, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA and London, p. 413. 
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This again resembles the way new movements and cultures rely on new 
communication technologies and specifically the internet: 
Little could this philosopher of the rhizome have foreseen the intensification of 
cross-global identity that has been catalyzed by digital culture. An aspect of 
Deleuze's notion of collective agency that bears noting, particularly in the 
context of current international politics, is its global positionality, one balanced 
always-between South and North, not to mention East and West, a positionality 
whose decisiveness to gesture no doubt varies depending on one's specific place 
on the global vector and the digital divide. Indeed the machinery of the digital 
divide now invades and erodes the beingness of always-between at almost every 
turn. 194 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how traditional concepts and issues fit into a global 
postmodern medium. It looked at early social movements and their use of the 
internet, addressed the question of whether the internet enhances democracy, 
analysed how issues of power and participation relate to the internet, examined 
the globalisation-internet connection and discussed the postmodern nature of the 
medium. 
194 Murray, T: (2004) `New media art and rhizomatic in-securities', Ctheory. net. 
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The section on political movements on the internet provides examples of 
ethnoreligious and socopolitical cyberconflict, looking at early movements on the 
internet such as the Zapatistas in Mexico, nationalist opposition groups, right- 
wing extremist and Islamist opposition movements. The groups that use 
information communication technologies affect the political situation in that they 
put forward new rules of the game, the rules of new technology. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that new social movements like the anti-globalisation, anti- 
capitalist and anti-war movements, when using the internet to communicate 
political goals, ask for anything that is not traditionally modem in character such 
as power, participation or democracy. 
While questioning if the internet enhances democracy, I considered David Held's 
theory of democracy in relation to my own research concern: the internet. My 
conclusion is that there are two responses to the question about democracy. The 
optimist states that the internet, by increasing the scale and speed of information, 
promises unlimited information, which heralds the promise of a better democracy. 
Initiatives by local authorities in Europe are said to support this thesis. The 
pessimistic view is that those uninterested in politics will remain so and that the 
internet is dominated by economic interests, discriminating on grounds of social, 
gender, race, age and spatial inequality. Both views have limited applicability. 
Nevertheless, the internet has provided access to the political system for outsiders. 
This indicates that it enhances democracy now and can do so in the future. 
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Two other issues discussed in this chapter are participation and power. As far as 
participation is concerned, Pateman's theory suggests that we can still have a 
modern theory of democracy which retains the notion of participation at its heart. 
The problem of participation in relation to the internet emanates from the fact that 
providing greater choice and opportunity only solves part of the problem of 
participation and does not get to the heart of what motivates citizens to move from 
the state of disengagement to one of salutary involvement in civic life. 195 On the 
other hand, the architecture of the net facilitates weak and strong ties that cut 
across social milieus, so that the cyberlinks between people become social links 
between groups that otherwise would be socially and physically dispersed. 196 An 
example of participation hitting record numbers has been the Howard Dean web 
campaign for the U. S. primary elections. In other words, political participation 
can be enhanced by uses of the internet. 
On the question of power in virtual politics, Lukes's radical view on power and 
the Foucauldian conception of power/knowledge and disciplinary power have 
relevance. A discussion of these theories led to a focus on discourse and an 
attempt to explain how discourse constructs power relations. Internet politics, like 
any other politics, are embedded in power relations. The internet offers 
opportunities for breaking down political hierarchies and subverting national 
boundaries. The new power experienced by social movements, because of the 
195 Margolis and Resnick, p. 207; Wilhem, p. 87. 196 Wellman and Gulia, p. 15. 
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new medium, comes from this access to mass audiences previously denied, either 
through cost, time, physical or political restraints. 
To continue, the consideration of globalisation and the internet led to the 
conclusion that there is a divide between those who are online and the rest of the 
world, with attendant problems of cultural homogenisation and cultural 
imperialism. Since the internet is part of the globalisation process, and patently 
goes beyond the traditional politics of sovereignty, this finding suggests it could 
be postmodern in nature. 
This last point on the post-modem character of the internet is also taken up when 
addressing questions of identity and community, discourse and structure in 
cyberspace. An imagined community can be said to exist in cyberspace with 
common beliefs of individuals who never meet each other that will move them to 
fight for, believe in, and even love their cybercommunity. An element of the 
internet, which gives it a postmodem character, is that it becomes a hyperreal 
vehicle for travelling across a simulated world. Electronic communications 
systematically remove the fixed points, the grounds and the foundations that were 
essential to modem theory. Information technology thus has far-reaching 
implications for our notions of sovereignty, autonomy and self-determination. The 
individual in cyberspace is fragmented in databases and networks resulting in the 
`self becoming decentred and multiple. Thus, we become postmodern in the 
conduct of internet politics, while remaining modernist in our ambitions. 
119 
Finally, the problems this kind of literature creates for my research are various. In 
the first place, none of the literature addresses the phenomenon of cyberconflict 
(political conflict in computer mediated environments) in a direct way. Instead, it 
furnishes us with a more general understanding of cyberpower and cyberspace. 
My work will expand on this background in the existing literature by taking its 
concerns in a previously unexplored direction. It will not only examine the 
various groups using the internet in more depth, but also analyse the way in which 
opposing parties in a conflict use the internet, something missing from this 
literature. More broadly, the difficulty with this literature is that the internet is a 
rapidly-developing medium with the result that it is sometimes hard for the 
literature (and me! ) to keep up with it. 
There are various examples of this. One is that Negroponte is somewhat outdated 
when in 1995, he refers to the internet `as a formation of a flock of ducks that 
nobody is the boss' since more recent evidence by Margolis and Resnick suggest 
there occurs a normalisation of cyberspace, which comes to more and more the 
real world. 197 To prove the point, in an interview in Wired magazine in 2002, 
Negroponte characterised our digital world as lilies in a pond. 198 A second 
example is Manuel Castells's use of economic data of the years 1998 and 1999, to 
state that the internet economy has become the core of the US economy with the 
Forrester estimation of $1.3 trillion up in 2003 from $43 billion in 1998, an 
197 Margolis, M and Resnick, D: (2000) Politics As Usual, Sage: Thousand Oaks, London and New York. 
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estimation that proved to be wildly optimistic. Keeping in mind that the most 
serious work on the internet was written in the last six years and that the medium 
has dramatically changed during these years, it is natural to expect that some of it 
might be outdated and that the more the internet grows and evolves, the better the 
literature develops. For instance, as the literature develops, we see a shift from the 
first years in which writers were concerned mainly with explaining more technical 
and more everyday life aspects of the medium, while in the past few years there is 
more of an emphasis on cultural issues, democracy, politics, identity and 
community, signifying that researchers are searching the subject more deeply and 
widely as internet use intensifies. Inevitably, therefore, internet politics has also 
developed in new and unexpected ways. This means that it is not feasible to 
examine the politics of cyberconflict using just one analytical approach. 
The following chapter introduces the three theories deemed relevant when 
examining the phenomenon of cyberconflict and proposes an integrated 
theoretical framework. Social movement theory is analysed in order to advance 
our understanding of sociopolitical cyberconflicts, conflict theory is discussed in 
relation to ethnoreligious cyberconflicts and media theoretical perspectives are 
included to shed light on the media aspects of these conflicts. 
198 
`Being wireless', Wired magazine, issue 10.10, Oct. 2002. 
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Chapter 2: The Three Theories 
2.1 Social Movement Theory. 
This section looks firstly at the general themes of how the study of social 
movements evolved, how `new' social movements are, if they are a shift to post- 
industrial society, and the middle-class orientation argument. Then more 
analytically, I use the classical resource mobilisation model of mobilising 
structures, framing processes and the political opportunity structure to analyse 
how these are affected by the use of the internet by new social movements. 
The problem with social movement theories, as even a casual reader would 
immediately notice, is that most analyses make empirical generalisations rather 
than providing useful analytical concepts. 199 The result is that in the need of a 
theory to support their case studies, theorists pick and mix from their predecessors 
and come up with a theory of their own to explain their empirical findings. This 
means that an examination of thirty different social movements could easily lead 
to thirty different explanations of social movements. This is because theorists aim 
at getting a global explanation, despite the fact that the field of social movements 
is elusive and there are differences for instance between movements (as forms of 
199 Melucci, A: (1989) Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, edited by John Keane and Paul Mier, Temple University Press: 
Philadelphia, p. 23 
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mass opinion), protest organisations (as forms of social organisation) and protest 
events (as forms of action)? oo 
Traditional approaches to collective action usually formulate several fundamental 
questions: Through which processes do actors construct collective action? How is 
the unity of the various elements of collective actions produced? Through which 
processes and relationships do individuals become involved in, or defect from, 
collective action? 201 Two forms of explanation recur. As in social theory in 
general, there is the agent/structure divide, so in social movement theory the 
explanation is usually based either on structural conditions and dysfunctions of 
the social system, or on the differences in values and the psychological 
differences between individuals. 
This dualistic thinking is highly problematic. As far as collective action is 
concerned, it has been explained in terms of breakdown/solidarity models as 
pointed out by Tilly. 202 Breakdown theories view collective action as the result of 
economic crisis and social disintegration, while solidarity models see collective 
action as an expression of shared interests within a common structural location. 
The former reduces collective action to reaction and marginality, the latter fails to 
explain the transition from social conditions to collective action203 In a similar 
vein, the structure/motivation dualism is also problematic, as Webb points out, 
200 Tarrow, S: ` National politics and collective action', Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 14 (1988), pp. 421-440. 
201 Melucci, p. 20. 
202 Tilly, C: (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution, Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA. 
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because within this dualism, collective action is either a product of the logic of the 
system or a result of personal beliefs. 204 
The response to this problematic dualism was equally dual, meaning it was 
different in Europe than it was in the United States, with theorists formulating two 
different ways to deal with the 1970s social movements. In Europe, for example, 
Touraine205 and Habermas206 tried to move beyond the structure-agency 
dichotomy by emphasizing the need for a systemic approach that links new forms 
of social conflict to post-industrial capitalis, while other theorists emphasised the 
identity-oriented paradigm. In the United States theorists focused on resource 
mobilisation. 07 Their theory analysed how a movement is formed, how it persists 
through time, and how it relates to its environment. 
To continue, the Weberian term `closure' describes the processes by which groups 
come to be formed through strategies of inclusion and exclusion. The activity of 
social movements, though they also include processes of closure in this sense, 
typically represent the opposite side of this process: they are attempts by groups 
thus excluded to insert themselves into closed groups and into closed processes of 
negotiation between groups, and by so doing to gain access to new resources and 
opportunities. New social movements are typically either predominantly 
203 Melucci, p. 21. 
204 Webb, K et. al: (1983) `Etiology and outcomes of protest: new European perspectives', 
American Behaviour Science, 26: cpp. 311-31. 
pos Tonraine, A: (1985) `An introduction to the study of social movements', Soc. Res. 52: pp. 749- 
88. 
206 Haberman, 1976 
207 McCarthy and Zald, 1973,1977,1979, Gamson, 1975, Tilly, 1978. 
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movements of the educated middle class, especially the `new middle class', or of 
the most educated/privileged section of generally less privileged groups. Scott 
makes a further point: 
Social movements typically bring about change or attempt to bring it about not 
by challenging society as a whole, though they may appear to do so, but by 
opposing specific forms of social closure and exclusion. They do so by 
thematising issues excluded from normal societal and political decision-making, 
and by articulating the grievances of groups who are themselves excluded. These 
two aspects 
- 
the exclusion of issues and exclusion of groups 
- 
are not separate 
spheres of social movement activity. 208 
Furthermore, in his work Ideology and the New Social Movements, Alan Scott 
considers how social movement networks bind the individual to the movement by 
creating primary bonds in which interpersonal sanction and commitment can 
operate. The interpersonal character of these networks minimises problems of 
free-riding. More importantly, they create self-identification with the movement. 
Processes of reformation of the individual will are simultaneously formations of a 
collective will. Group identity, not merely individual identity, is formed by the 
movement at the level of its loose networks. By providing individuals with 
alternative lifestyles and identities, social movements break down barriers to 
collective action, challenge `civil privatism' and substitute values of solidarity for 
instrumental rationality. 
208 ibid., p. 150 
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An analysis of social movements, Scott suggests, in terms of social closure and 
interest intermediation treats the integration of issues and groups into the polity as 
the criterion of social movement success. It thus implies that the continued 
existence of the movement is not an end in itself, because social movement 
activity can only be understood in the context of other forms of political 
expression, both institutionalised and non-institutionalised. 
The study of social movements raises various issues. Firstly, there is the 
question: how new are the new social movements? `The question is whether their 
meaning and place they occupy in the system of social relations can be considered 
to be the same'. 209 Also, Melucci claims that `those who argue for the newness of 
social movements have simply mistaken an early phase of movement 
development for a new historical age of collective action'. 210 The same argument 
is made by Offe who argues that the values advocated and defended by the NSMs 
are not new but part and parcel of the dominant modem culture, which makes it 
difficult to think of movements as flowing either from `pre-modem' or 
`postmodern' subcultures. 211 The interesting question here would be: if the 
internet is influencing the formation of NSMs, does that qualify them as new 
types of movement? On the other hand, if NSMs are already established, they are 
just using the internet as a new way of doing the old thing. For example, the 
209 Melucci, p. 105. 
zoo Tarrow, S: ` Aiming at a moving target: Social science and the recent rebellion in Eastern Europe', Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, nol (Mar. 1991), pp. 12-20. 
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Independent Media Center (IMC) movement has drawn on a legacy of 
organisational skills developed by earlier social movements. The IMC was able to 
surmount some of the barriers of similar earlier efforts by building on the 
experience of earlier networks, inviting many of the activists from the 
independent video, community radio, and open source movements to participate 
very early on in the planning, fund-raising, and gathering of production 
equipment. `The four-hundred-strong crew also used all the old and new media 
from pens to laptops, and from inexpensive audio tape and cam-recorders to the 
latest in digital recording technologies'. 212 The IMC is now a collective of over 
150 independent media outlets around the world, with hundreds of volunteer 
journalists offering grassroots noncorporate coverage. Their success is not mainly 
due to new communication technologies, but also stems from the fact that they 
carefully built a relationship with social movement activists rather than distancing 
themselves from political organising. A similar argument is made by Simon 
Tormey who writes that the internet did not create anti-capitalist activism; rather, 
anti-capitalist activities used the internet as a means of connecting to others. 213 
Another question to answer is: Are NSMs a product of a shift to a post-industrial 
economy? This is debatable, as `cultural revolutionary activities of (NSMs) can be 
articulated with very different politico-ideological formations, social groups and 
211 Offe, C: (1985) `New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutionalist 
p1olitics', Sociol. Res, 52, p. 848. 2 Kidd, D: 'Indymedia. org. ' in McCaughey, M and Ayers, M (eds. ) (2003) Cyberactivism: 
Online Activism in Theory and Practice, Routledge: New York and London, p. 61 213 Tormey, S: (2004) Anti-capitalism: A Beginner's Guide, Oneworld: Oxford, p. 159. 
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classes'. 214 The mere presence of NSMs in non-western nations provides evidence 
against both hypotheses of state intrusion (a change to a post-industrial economy) 
as well as the hypotheses of value changes discussed below (since the new "post- 
materialist" values are theorised as a product of the economic and physical 
security of a country's population which also is not characteristic of Latin 
American nations, for example). 215 What seems unique according to Richardo is 
their ideological (identity) characteristic that seems to break from the past 216 
Nevertheless, new social and political movements use the internet for protests 
against the post-industrial economy. The anti-World Bank protests used the 
internet mainly for internal and external communication, education and 
mobilisation, sharing activist resources and discussing logistical matters such as 
transportation and provisions at protest sites. 217 The anti-globalisation movement 
has made its voice heard at major demonstrations, for instance in Geneva (WTO, 
5/98), Birmingham (G8,5/98), Koln (G8,6/99), Seattle (WTO, 11/99), Davos 
(WEF, 9/00), Washington (WB/IMF, 4/00), Melbourne (WEF, 9/00), Prague 
(WB/IMF, 9/00), Quebec (FTAA, 4/00), and Genoa (G7,7/0 1)218 
214 Olofsson, G: (1988) `After the working-class movement? An essay on what's "new" and 
what's "social" in the new social movements', Acta, 31: pp. 15-34. 
215 Richardo, N: (1997) `New social movements: a critical review', Annual Review of Sociology, 
vol. 23, pp. 411-430. 
216 ibid., p. 425 
217 Vegh, S: 'Classifying forms of online activism' in McCaughey, M and Ayers, M (eds. ) (2003) Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice, Routledge: New York and London, p. 85. 218 ibid., p. 88. 
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To continue, there is the new middle-class orientation of NSMs argument, which 
maintains that new social movements are an outgrowth of this new social class. 219 
Eder writes that the struggle to overcome a fear of the non-realisation of universal 
moral concepts such as justice, peace or the good life is the reason for collective 
protest where `the petit bourgeoisie fills a role which it has rehearsed throughout 
history: it plays the role of the guardian of the moral virtues of modernity, a role 
22° 
which has learned how to play since its birth'. In addition, an explanation based 
on value-shift is given by Jenkins, who argues that the middle-class `participation 
revolution' was rooted in the shift towards post-materialist values, emphasising 
self-fulfillment, supporting demands for direct participation and moral concern for 
the plight of others. `When elites challenged these values by manipulative acts 
and outright rejection, the middle class rallied around the movements'. 21 
Such theories involve an exaggeration of the levels of dissent found in the new 
middle class 222 Kriesi, looking at new social movements in Netherlands, found 
that the thesis of middle-class support for NSMs can be too narrow, because he 
found the working class to have an unexpectedly high support for these 
movements, and too broad, because only a part of the new middle class seems to 
219 Klandermans, B: (1994) `Transient identities? Membership patterns in the Dutch peace 
movement' in Larana et. al: New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, Temple University 
Press: Philadelphia. 
220 Eder, K: (1985) `The "new" social movements: moral crusades, political pressure groups or 
social movements? ', Soc. Res, 52, p. 889 221 Jenkins, J. C: (1983) `Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements', Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 9, p. 535. 222 Brint, S: (1984) `New class and cumulative trend explanations of the liberal attitudes of 
professionals', American Journal of Sociology, 90, pp. 30-71. 
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support them. 223 The part of this new middle class that seems more likely to 
participate is the part which consists of social and cultural specialists. New 
middle-class radicals choose the welfare and creative professions, because these 
professions provide a kind of sanctuary, where they are able to escape direct 
implication in capitalist economic relations. 224 There is also a conflict inside this 
new middle class as explained by Kriesi in discussions of his findings in the 
Netherlands; there is `an opposition of interests between on the one hand, the 
technocrats in private enterprises and public bureaucracies who try to manage 
their organisations, and on the other hand the specialists who try to defend their 
own and their client's relative autonomy against the intervention of the 
technostructure'. 25 
However, an emphasis on the new middle class is not entirely inappropriate. 
When looking specifically at who uses the internet, statistics point to the middle 
classes of industrialised nations. According to the United Nations, industrialised 
nations account for 15 percent of the world's 6 billion people, 88 percent of 
whom are internet users. Eighty per cent of the world's population has yet to 
make a phone call. More people use the internet in London than in all of Africa 
and there are more users in South Africa than in all African countries 
combined. 226 
223 Kriesi, H: (1989) `New social movements and the new class in Netherlands', American Journal 
o[Sociology, vol. 94, no5, p. 1111. 24 ibid., quotes Parkin. 
225 ibid., p. 1078. 226 Lebert, J: `Wiring human rights activism' in McCaughey, M and Ayers, M (eds. ) (2003) 
Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice, Routledge: New York and London, 
p. 224. 
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Consequently, for the purposes of this thesis and since it seems difficult to adopt a 
single position on the issue, I intend to draw various arguments from writers 
belonging to different schools, although without claiming to have found a solution 
to the problem of theorising social movements or aiming at a global explanation. 
Scott contends that an adequate theory of social movements would have to 
recognise the problematic and effortful nature of mobilisation and the consequent 
organisational constraints. This task has been tackled by theories of `resource 
mobilisation'. At the same time, resource mobilisation theory (RMT) has 
generated a sophisticated analysis of the mechanics of collective action, of the 
barriers to it, and of the conditions under which it can operate. Nevertheless, 
while RMT does help us understand the organisational dilemma facing social 
movements, it is limited by its continued adherence to economic models of human 
agency, and says little about the content and context of social movements. 
RMT, like other forms of political realism, sketches both the limits of political 
action and the largely instrumental and self-interested nature of that action. 
Resource mobilisation theorists have identified the following types of imperative 
placed upon organisations and movements by the limitations of collective action: 
(i) the necessity of providing divisible private benefits, as well as indivisible 
collective ones, places high organisational costs upon collective bodies; (ii) the 
search for resources such as external funding therefore becomes a major 
organisational preoccupation; (iii) at the same time, the organisation is restricted 
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in the demands and sacrifices it can realistically expect of participants in its costly 
and high-risk activities. Scott makes an additional point: 
In stressing the continuity, rather than discontinuity, between social movements, 
parties and institutionalised forms of political action such as pressure groups and 
parties, RMT has developed a more plausible account of social movement 
development. That is to say, it is one which corresponds more closely to the 
typical development of social movements rather than counter-factually trying to 
explain the `failure' of movements to retain their movement character zx' 
Resource mobilisation theory (RMT) has had a huge impact on social movement 
theories. It demonstrated that in order to orchestrate collective action, 
sophisticated organisational forms and modes of communication are needed. As 
summarised by Cohen, RMT theorists share the following assumptions: (1) social 
movements must be understood in terms of a conflict model of collective action; 
(2) there is no fundamental difference between institutional and non-institutional 
action; (3) both forms of action entail conflicts of interest built into 
institutionalised power relations; (4) collective action involves the rational pursuit 
of interests of groups; (5) goals and grievances are permanent products of power 
relations and cannot account for the formation of movements; (6) this depends 
instead on changes in resources, organisations, and opportunities for collective 
action; (7) success is evidenced by the recognition of the group as a political actor 
227 Scott, A: (1990) Ideology and the New Social Movements, Unwin Hyman: Boston, p. 115 
132 
or by increased material benefits; and (8) mobilisation involves large-scale, 
special-purpose, bureaucratic, formal organisations. 28 
Critically assessing RMT, one could argue that it sets out a narrow and critically 
impoverished interpretation of human motivation, which reduces it to 
instrumental rationality. There are two more aspects of RMT which make it 
vulnerable to general sociological criticism: first, its decontextualised 
understanding of preferences, choices and actions; and second, the rigidity of the 
means/ends distinction it employs. 
As Melucci and others argue, RMT-based theories do have problems: 
Structural theories, based on system analysis, explain why but not how a 
movement is established and survives; they hypothesise potential conflict without 
accounting for concrete collective action. By contrast, resource mobilization 
models regard such action as mere data and fail to examine its meaning and 
orientation. In this instance the how but not the why of collective action is 
emphasised. 229 
In other words it looks as if resource mobilization could be defined 
independently from the nature of the goals and the social relations of the actor, as 
if all actors are finally led by a logic of economic rationality. 230 
228 Cohen, 7. L (1985) `Strategy or identity: new theoretical paradigms and contemporary social 
movements', Soc. Res. 52, p. 675. 
229 Melucci, p. 21 230 Touraine, A: (1985) 'An introduction to the study of social movements', Soc. Res. 52, p. 769. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, due to the the use of the internet as a resource by 
social movements, I will follow RMT in referring to three broad sets of factors in 
analysing the emergence and developments of social movements: (1) the structure 
of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms 
of organisation (informal as well as formal) available to activists; and (3) the 
collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that 
mediate between opportunity and action. 231 The focus will be on the mobilising 
structures (the network-style structure of movements using the internet, 
participation, recruitment, tactics, goals), framing processes (issues, strategy, 
identity, the effect of the internet on these processes) and the media (and the 
internet particularly) as a component of the political opportunity structure. 
Mobilising structures 
The classical RMT model is used to understand, as McCarthy puts it: 
how mobilising structural forms emerge and evolve; how they are chosen, 
combined, and adapted by social movement activists; and how they differently 
affect particular movements as well as movement cycle trajectories. The concepts 
231 McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, p. 2 
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of political opportunity and strategic framing are, I believe, particularly useful in 
illuminating these processes. 32 
Furthermore, according to Tarrow, people engage in contentious politics: 
when patterns of political opportunities and constraints change and then, by 
strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, create new 
opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of contention. When 
their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society, when they bring people 
together around inherited cultural symbols, and when they can build on or 
construct dense social networks and connective structures, then these episodes of 
contention result in sustained interactions with opponents 
- 
specifically, in social 
movements. 233 
In a very restrictive sense, a social movement consists of two kinds of 
components: (1) networks of groups and organisations prepared to mobilise for 
protest actions to promote (or resist) social change (which is the ultimate goal of 
social movements); and (2) individuals who attend protest activities or contribute 
resources without necessarily being attached to movement groups or 
organisations. 
232 McCarthy, J: `Constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting and inventing' in McAdam, 
D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, p. 141 
233 Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 19 
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One of the most important components of resource mobilisation theory 
is 
mobilisation. Mobilisation is the process of creating movement structures and 
preparing and carrying out protest actions which are visible movement `products' 
addressed to actors and publics outside the movement. 
234 It implies a process by 
which an actor augments its resources through gaining the support of other actors 
or a process by which those that have not taken an active part in politics are drawn 
into it 235 As Robin Brown explains: 
In evaluating the impact of mobilizations it is necessary to distinguish three 
levels of outcome. Firstly, the success or failure in gaining the support of 
potential supporters, secondly, success or failure in modifying the position of 
those that the mobilization is targeted against and thirdly, the impact on the 
prospects for future mobilizations 236 
In terms of the mobilisational structure, NSMs are open, decentralised, 
nonhierarchical/ideal for internetted communication. Melucci characterises the 
new social movements as 
234 Rucht, D: `The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: A cross-movement 
and cross-national comparison' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural 
Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 186 
235 Brown, R: `Mobilizing the Bias of Communication: Information Technology, Political 
Communications and Transnational Political Strategy', American Political Science Association 
Convention, Washington DC, 30 August- 3 September 2000, p. 2 
236 Brown, R: `Mobilizing the Bias of Communication: Information Technology, Political 
Communications and Transnational Political Strategy', American Political Science Association 
Convention, Washington DC, 30 August- 3 September 2000, p. 5 
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segmented, polycephalic structures. The movement is composed by diverse, 
autonomous units that expend an important part of their resources on internal 
solidarity. A network of communication and exchange keeps the cells in contact 
with each other. Information, persons and models of behaviour circulate in the 
network, moving from one unit to another and thus promoting a certain 
homogeneity of the whole structure. Leadership is not concentrated but 
diffuse... 237 
We assume that the internet is used particularly by two kinds of movements' 
structures: (a) informal networks with a large geographical reach, and (b) big, 
powerful and more centralised social movement organisations. Moreover, the 
internet appears to play an especially crucial role in issue-focused, trasnational 
campaigns. 238 Using again the Independent Media Center example, the IMC 
network is based on a non-hierarchical structure that relies on highly complex 
processes of networked consensus: 
International meetings are held online. There are a wide array of listserv 
discussion groups that range from general discussions to finances to translation 
and technical issues. Meetings are conducted through highly complex processes 
237 Melucci, p. 14. 
238 Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens 
and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 18 
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of decision-making, using a consensus model drawn from the direct action wing 
of the anti-globalisation movement239 
According to Tormey, the internet represents an activism based on networks of 
self-avowed minorities, rather than on classic models of political organisation. 
Those who wish to `speak' can do so unmediated by the needs and interests of a 
perhaps distant leadership intent on sending the `right' signals to the electorate, 
powerful states or global institutions. As Tormey puts it: 
Networks can be extended indefinitely and in more than one or two dimensions. 
There is no `membership' as such, just engagement. There is no brake, 
organisational, fiscal, or ideological on joining in - merely access to the network. 
Networks facilitate temporary alliances, coalitions, agreements, events, 
interactions. A network consists of chains of allegiance and intersection or what 
are sometimes called `nodal points'; where there is convergence for the purpose 
of acting in support of some group or cause. (his italics) 240 
But is it unthinkable that political parties using ICTs to redesign themselves into a 
more `social movement'-like type of organisation, or that social movements are 
using them to compete with political parties? ICTs might perhaps not profoundly 
change the very `logic' of collective action, but they seem to change, in any case, 
239 Vegh, S: `Classifying forms of online activism' in McCaughey, M and Ayers, M (eds. ) (2003) 
Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice, Routledge: New York and London 240 Tormey, S: (2004) Anti-capitalism: A Beginner's Guide, Oneworld: Oxford, p. 159. 
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the structure of political communication and mobilisation. 41 Political 
organisations that are older, larger, resource-rich, and strategically linked to party 
and government politics may rely on internet-based communications mostly to 
amplify and reduce the costs of pre-existing communication routines. On the other 
hand, newer, resource-poor organisations that tend to reject conventional politics 
may be defined in important ways by their internet presence. 242 ICTs can be 
effectively used to build and maintain powerful and centralised organisations, but 
empirical evidence also suggests that ICTs can be effective tools to establish and 
run decentralised networks that allow those who are technically linked to air their 
views, and, if needed, to mobilise a virtual or physical community of activists. 43 
Some websites are also products of spectacular alliances between NGOs, culture- 
jammers, small groups of activists, opinion leaders, or just ordinary citizens with 
the skills and credibility to succeed in the attention game on the world wide web. 
`This could be called network politics 
-a process in which people, organisations, 
and groups are included not because of formal status, but because they have 
specific resources needed in the process'. 244 In addition, conventional print media 
produced by the transnational movements (TMs), e. g newsletters, newspapers, 
and magazines, appear to be of less importance than for the NSMs. Instead, the 
241 Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens 
and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 5 
242 Bennett, W. L: (2004) `Communicating global activism' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, 
P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and 
New York, p. 125, cites Graber et. al. forthcoming 243 Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens 
and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 9 
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use of electronic communication, in particular the internet, plays a crucial role for 
TMs and, to a growing extent, contemporary NSMs as well. 245 
Furthermore, the cycle of protests argument states that NSMs are simply recent 
manifestations of a cyclical pattern of social movements. 246 Some link the cycles 
to anti-modem or romantic-ideological reactions to the contradictory and 
alienating effects of modem societies, others to recurring waves of cultural 
criticism linked to changes in the cultural climate or to political and social events. 
Movements change in response to shifts in local or national political 
opportunities, available resources, the actions of counter-movements, changes in 
the strategy deployed by states, and public opinion. 247 Minkoff argues that 
`trajectories of protest cycles are jointly determined by increases in the rates of 
protest and increases in the density of social movement organisation' 
. 
248 It may be 
argued that the internet accelerates protest circles and generally makes it far easier 
to organise protest than used to be the case in the past. 
Moreover, key issues to focus on when analysing mobilisation structures in NSMs 
are ideology, goals, tactics, participants, recruitment, entry, movement phase, 
244 Rosenkrands, J: (2004) `Politicizing Homo economicus' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, 
P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and 
New York, p. 75. 
245 Rucht, D: (2004) `The quadruple "A": Media strategies of protest movements since the 1960s' 
in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and 
Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 50, cites Scott and Steer 2001 
246 Tarrow, S: (1983) `Struggling to reform; social movements and policy change during cycles of 
protest', West Soc. Pap, no 15, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 47 Kriesi et al 1995, Tarrow 1994, Tilly 1995 248 Minkoff, D: (1997) `The sequencing of social movements', American Sociological Review, vol. 62, no5, p. 780. 
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influence, self-label, distinguishing characteristics, key issues, and key 
organisations: 
New social movements call into question the structures of representative 
democracies that limit citizen input and participation in governance, instead 
advocating direct democracy, self-help groups, and cooperative styles of social 
organisation. Taken together the values of NSMs center on autonomy and 
identity. 249 
Issues of participation and recruitment are very important and briefly three points 
should be taken into consideration as outlined by Snow, Zurcher and Olson250 : the 
fewer and weaker the social ties to alternative networks, the greater the structural 
availability for movement participation; the greater the availability for 
participation, the greater the probability of accepting recruitment invitation; and, 
movements which are linked to other groups expand at a more rapid rate that 
more isolated and closed movements. This has been clearly observed with the 
anti-globalisation movement and the peace movement. The NSMs have taken to 
making good use of the greater participation offered on the internet, as well as the 
numerous links, cyberlinks or otherwise, translated into social links and ties. The 
NSMs use the Internet to support external activity, they may work within the 
249 Offe, C: (1985) `New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics', 
Soc. Res, 52, pp. 817-68. 
250 Snow, D, Zurcher, L and Olson, S. E: (1980) `Social networks and social movements: A 
microstructural approach to differential recruitment', American Sociological Review, vol. 45, no5, 
pp. 790; 794; 797 
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internet to create a foundation for their activities, and they have attempted to 
influence policy affecting the internet 251 
There is also a distinction between defensive/offensive types of movements. 
Contemporary movements combine features of both. They are defensive in that 
they `defend spaces for the creations of new identities and solidarities' and 
offensive in that 'they involve conflict between social adversaries over the control 
of a social field'. 252 Here it could be argued that groups in ethnoreligious 
cyberconflicts are more of an offensive type of movements, in contrast to the 
more mixed (defensive and offensive) character of groups in sociopolitical 
cyberconflicts, as we will become evident in subsequent chapters. 
In a very interesting theoretical synthesis, Touraine moves on to two analytical 
levels, looking at the structural and cultural dimensions of contemporary society 
and the conflictual processes of identity-formation of collective actors. He 
identifies these key elements: pursuit of collective interests, reconstruction of a 
social, cultural and political identity, changing the rules of the game, defense of a 
status or privileges, social control of the main cultural patterns, creation of a new 
order (revolution), national conflicts and neo-communitarianism253 Following 
Touraine, it could be argued here that groups in sociopolitical cyberconflicts 
pursue collective interests which relate to the reconstruction of a social, cultural 
251 Salter, L: `Democracy, new social movements, and the Internet' in McCaughey, M and Ayers, 
M (eds. ) (2003) Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice, Routledge: New York 
and London, p. 129. 
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and political identity. Evidence of this is found in the use of the internet by groups 
in the anti-globalisation and anti-war movements. By contrast, in ethnoreligious 
cyberconflicts, the element of national conflict is far more relevant. 
As far as tactics (or modes of action-internal/external) are concerned, these 
include mobilising supporters, neutralising supporters and/or transforming mass 
and elite publics into sympathisers. Briefly, tactics are influenced internally by 
organisational competition and cooperation and externally by public opinion and 
the state. Since societies provide the infrastructure for movement industries, the 
development of tactics depends on the affluence, degree of access to institutional 
centers, preexisting networks and occupational growth of particular 
movements. 254 Also, important are movement participants' professional or 
communicative skills, which enable them to participate in the process of identity- 
building. Evidently, information transmitted by successful protest mobilisations 
becomes the key indicator of political opportunity for emerging movements and 
drives the development of broad-based protest cycles. 55 On the internet, social 
movement groups are able to communicate, to generate information and to 
distribute this information cheaply and effectively, allowing response and 
feedback: 
252 Cohen, J. L (1985) `Strategy or identity: new theoretical paradigms and contemporary social 
movements', Soc. Res. 52, p. 689. 
253 Touraine, A: (1985) `An introduction to the study of social movements', Soc. Res., 52, p. 751. 254 McCarthy, J and Zald, M: (1977) `Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial 
theory', The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 82, no6, p. 1217. 253 Tarrow, S: ` Aiming at a moving target: Social science and the recent rebellion in Eastern 
Europe', Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, nol (Mar. 1991), p. 59. 
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This is in large part because of [the internet's] structure as a decentred, textual 
communications system, the content of which has traditionally been provided by 
users. Again, such characteristics accord with the requisite features of NSMs: 
nonhierarchical, open protocols; open communication; and self-generating 
information and identities? 56 
It is equally important to note here, as Bennet does, that the effects on social 
movements are due not so much to the internet as to the network structures 
established through it: `uses of the internet may have important effects on 
organisational structures, both inside member organisations and in terms of 
overall network stability and capacity'. 
257 Studies have highlighted two functions 
of the net: first, it helps communication in terms of information dissemination, 
formal networking, and action coordination; second, it helps in building a 
collective identity among participants and potential participants of the 
movement. 258 This raises the broader question: have the new forms of 
communication changed the `logic of collective action' or just the speed of protest 
diffusion? 259 
256 Salter, L: `Democracy, new social movements, and the Internet' in McCaughey, M and Ayers, 
M (eds. ) (2003) Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice, Routledge: New York 
and London, p. 129. 
257 Bennett, W. L: (2004) `Communicating global activism' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, 
P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: 
London and New York, p. 136 
258 Nip, J: (2004) The Queer Sisters and its electronic bulletin board in Van de Donk, W, Loader, 
B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: 
London and New York, p. 23 3 
259 van Aelst, P and Walgrave, S: (2004) `New media, new movements? ' in Van de Donk, W, 
Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, 
Routledge: London and New York, p. 121 
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The internet delivers significant services to movements: information 
dissemination and information retrieval, recruitment, mobilisation, soliciting 
opinions, opinion polling, discussion, facilitating contacts between the 
organisation's members, service, networking, communication and coordination 
with other organisations. 260 As le Grignou and Patou argue, the internet is an 
important tool in terms of the diffusion of protest and the consistency of protest, 
in order to achieve a `consensual mobilisation'. 261 Thus, the internet contributes to 
three different elements that establish movement formation: a shared definition of 
the problem as a basis for collective identity, actual mobilisation of participants, 
and the construction of a network of different organisations. 62 For example, 
during the 1999 anti-WTO campaign, while groups with local ties concentrated on 
mobilisation and direct action, more transnationally-based groups provided 
information and frames to feed the action. 263 
Mobilisation has been argued to be one of the crucial elements in the movements' 
organisation, incorporating the impact of technology on these movements. Brown 
emphasises its importance in this way: `[i]ndeed it may be more profitable to 
analyse the impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in 
terms of mobilisation rather than in the more sweeping terms offered by ideas 
260 le Grignou, B and Patou, C: (2004) 'ATTAC(k)ing expertise' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: 
London and New York, p. 187 
261ibid., p. 171 
262 van Aelst, P and Walgrave, S: (2004) `New media, new movements? ' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 99 263ibid., p. 101 
145 
such as cyberpolitik or netwar' 2M Two key arguments support his conviction 
These are the argument that mobilisation cuts across the distinction between 
material and ideational factors, and the argument that mobilisation keeps the 
technological issue firmly embedded in a social and political context 265 
Not surprisingly for instance, websites are action mobilisers. According to 
Edwards' research on the Dutch women's movement online, first, the emphasis is 
on external information provision. The `first generation' websites contain the 
basic (static) information about the organisation. Then, organisations expand their 
websites so as to include more information: background information on the 
problem area that they address, as well as dynamic information about their 
activities. Subsequently, organisations develop their ambitions further, and 
become more focused, using network technology for internal communication 
purposes. Next, organisations start to develop more advanced interactive 
functions of the internet in their communication with the environment. 266 
However, as van Aelst and Walgrave argue, most sites offer the `basics', such as 
feedback possibility or a newsletter, mostly via email. More sophisticated ways of 
interaction and debate such as forums or chatrooms are limited. 267 An illuminating 
aspect to their argument is that the concept of mobilisation should be extended 
264 Brown, R: `Mobilizing the Bias of Communication: Information Technology, Political 
Communications and Transnational Political Strategy', American Political Science Association 
Convention, Washington DC, 30 August- 3 September 2000, p. 2 265 Brown, R: `Information and the Power of Mobilization', International Studies Association 
Convention, New Orleans, March 2002, p3, p. 15 
266 Edwards, A: (2004) `The Dutch women's movement online' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, 
Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: 
London and New York, p. 194 
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`from (former) "unconventional" street actions such as demonstrations and sit-ins 
to new virtual actions varying from an online petition to pinning down the 
enemy's server'. 268 Costanza-Chock, a community arts activist, has a similar 
opinion: `you have all these people collectively mobilizing, engaging in action 
together, telling their friends, discussing what's happening, taking heart that 
they're not alone in what they feel is a struggle against injustice. So you have the 
movement-building elements'. 69 
The conclusion is that the internet is reshaping the organisational infrastructure of 
the movements that use it at least in three ways: mobilisation of resources, 
maintaining relations with the environment and management of frames. However, 
as Edwards argues in relation to the Dutch women's movement, `[t]he impact is 
most visible in the movement's increased capacity for mobilizing resources. To a 
lesser extent, there are also effects in the management of frames... However, the 
interactive functions on the websites of organizations in the physical domain are 
still in their infancy'. 270 Next, we shall consider the effect of the internet on the 
framing process. 
267 van Aelst, P and Walgrave, S: (2004) `New media, new movements? ' in Van de Donk, W, 
Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, 
Routledge: London and New York, p. 113 
268ibid., p. 114 
269 email interview 2001 in Taylor, P. A and Jordan, T: (2004) Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels 
with a cause?, Routlege: London, p. 153 270 Edwards, A: (2004) `The Dutch women's movement online' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 200 
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Framing process: Identity, issue, strategy. 
Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues 
used to render or cast behaviour and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest 
alternative modes of action. Symbols, frames, and ideologies are created and 
changed in the process of contestation. 271 
The management of frames is a crucial element of collective action and 
mobilisation. `[B]uilding a movement around strong ties of collective identity, 
whether inherited or constructed, does much of the work that would normally fall 
to organization; but it cannot do the work of mobilization, which depends on 
framing identities so that they will lead to action, alliances, interaction'. 72 
Similarly, Doug McAdam argues that the concept of framing is an important and 
a necessary corrective to broader structural theories, which often depict social 
movements as the inevitable byproducts of expanding political opportunities 
(political process), emerging system-level contradictions or dislocations (some 
version of new social movement theory) or newly available resources (resource 
mobilisation) 273 
271 Zald, M: `Culture, ideology and strategic framing' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M 
(eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 262 
272 Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 119 
273 McAdam, D: `The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the 
American civil rights movement' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural 
Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 339 
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If we consider the concept of `repertoires of collective action' introduced by 
Tarrow, action is shaped by and coordinated through the development of those 
models or scripts shared within a particular society at a particular historical 
juncture. As a resource, the presence of shared goals or models facilitates 
mobilisation. 74 This leads us to what the framing process involves: (1) the 
cultural tool kits available to would-be insurgents; (2) the strategic framing efforts 
of movement groups; (3) the frame contests between movement and other 
collective actors - principally the state, and countermovement groups; (4) the 
structure and role of the media in mediating such contests; and (5) the cultural 
impact of the movement in modifying the available toolkit 275 
More specifically, through `frame bridging', `frame amplification' and `frame 
extension', movements link existing cultural frames to a particular issue or 
problem, clarify and invigorate a frame that bears on a particular issue or 
problem, and expand the boundaries of a movement's primary framework to 
encompass broader interests or points of view. The most ambitious strategy is the 
fourth, `frame transformation', framing device for movements that seek 
substantial social change. 276 
274 Clemens, E: `Organizational form as frame: Collective identity and political strategy in the 
American labor movement, 1880-1920', in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, 
and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 211 275 McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, p. 19 
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According to Zald, social movements draw on the cultural stock of how to protest 
and how to organise. Templates of organisation include skills and technology of 
communication (e. g writing newsletters, running meetings), of fund raising, of 
running an office, of recruiting members, and so on. Repertoires of contention 
include building barricades, organising marches, non-violent disruption, and the 
like. Templates of organisation may be drawn from the whole society, while 
repertoires of contention are available from the whole social movements sector. 
277 
The dilemma concerning two of the three elements of framing (strategy, identity, 
issue) is the strategy or identity one, as identified by Cohen. In `Strategy or 
Identity? ', he cites Touraine's argument that the exclusive orientations to identity 
and to strategy are the opposite sides of the same coin, in that they both look at 
social conflicts in terms of the response to long term changes (modernisation) 
rather than in relational terms referring to the social structure. From such a 
standpoint, `society' is stratified in terms of the actor's ability (power and 
privilege) to adapt to change successfully (elites), her or his success in securing 
protection from change (operatives) or her or his victimisation by change 
(marginalised masses). 278 
Z" Zald, M: `Culture, ideology and strategic framing' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M 
(eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 267 278 Cohen, J. L (1985)' Strategy or identity: new theoretical paradigms and contemporary social 
movements', Soc. Res. 52, p. 675, cites Touraine, 1982: 223. 
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In terms of issues, NSMs engage with different types of issues like quality of life 
issues, redistributive issues, opposition to the present forms of social life, and 
issues that challenge modem state domination. The value-shift hypothesis states 
that NSMs stress issues of identity, participation and quality of life (referred to as 
`post-materialist' concerns) rather than economic matters. This, however, may not 
necessarily be true, as the anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist movement have 
shown. The internet connection here is that the rise of technology could possibly 
have effects which alter the agendas adopted by social movements. One example 
is that maybe there is a link of the globality of computer networks with the 
globality of protest resulting in a fusion of disparate issues. As Kahn and Kellner 
argue: 
Thus, while emergent mobile technology provides yet another impetus towards 
experimental identity construction and politics, such networking also links 
diverse communities such as labor, feminist, ecological, peace, and various anti- 
capitalist groups, providing the basis for a new politics for alliance and solidarity 
to overcome the limitations of postmodern identity politics. 279 
According to Whittier and Taylor, collective identity consists of three related 
processes: delineation of group boundaries, construction of an oppositional 
consciousness or interpretative frameworks for understanding the world in a 
279 Kahn, R and Kellner, D: `New media and internet activism: from the "Battle of Seattle" to 
blogging', New Media and Society, 6 (1), Sage: London and Thousand Oaks. 
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political light, and politicisation of everyday life. 280 Another aspect of the process 
is formulating cognitive frameworks concerning the goals, means and 
environment of action, activating relationships among the actors, and making 
emotional investments which enable individuals to recognise themselves in each 
other. 281 Also, the category of collective interest requires prior analysis of `what 
counts as collective advantage and how collective interests are recognised, 
interpreted, and able to command loyalty and commitment. ' 282 Cohen argues that 
it is incumbent on the theorist to look into the processes by which collective 
actors create the identities and solidarities they defend. 283 This means that the 
logic of collective interaction entails something other than strategic or 
instrumental rationality. For instance, Pizzorno, who uses a pure identity model, 
argues that cost-benefit calculations cannot explain the collective action of new 
groups seeking identity, autonomy and recognition. An extended version of his 
claim would be to say that `collective actors strive to create a group identity 
within a general social identity whose interpretation they contest. '284 New social 
movements use sharp antinomies such as yes/no, them/us, victory and defeat, now 
or never, to build up their identities. This hardly allows for political exchange or 
gradualist tactics. Even more striking is that they do not rely for their self- 
identification on either the established political codes (left/right, 
280 Whittier, N and Taylor, V: (1992) `Collective identity and lesbian feminist mobilization', pp. 
104-29 in Frontiers of Social Movement Theory, edited by A. Morris and C. Mueller, Yale 
University Press: New Haven. 
281 Waterman, P: (2001) Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 
Continuum: London and New York, p. 35 282 Cohen, J. L (1985) `Strategy or identity: new theoretical paradigms and contemporary social 
movements', Soc. Res, 52, p. 685. 283 ibid., p. 690. 
284 ibid., p. 694. 
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liberal/conservative, etc) nor on socio-economic codes (working class/middle 
class, poor/wealthy, rural/urban, etc. ). 285 
An interesting study on collective identity by McKenna and Bargh286 discusses 
the idea that Usenet groups provide a place for marginalised persons to 
communicate with others, thus increasing each person's self-esteem. Their theory 
hypothesises that group membership is incorporated into the self, so that the 
individual will feel her/himself to be a member of the group. As Myers287 explains 
their conclusion is that virtual group identities are just as important to the self as 
face-to-face group participation, and that respondents felt and identified with the 
people within the Usenet group, `[t]o identify common themes, opportunities and 
potential drawbacks in the integration of ICTs into the communication repertoire 
of social movements' 288 
Moreover, Touraine argues NSMs have an increasingly temporary and symbolic 
function, fighting for symbolic and cultural stakes and for a different meaning and 
orientation of social action. 
289 This is especially true in collective actions taken in 
cyberspace where symbolic change is the key function. This is why the concept of 
285 Offe, C: (1985) 'New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics', 
Soc. Res, 52, p. 830. 
286 McKenna, K and Bargh, J: (1998): `Coming out in the age of the Internet: Identity 
demarginalization through virtual group participation', Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 75, pp. 681-694. 
287 Myers, M: (2001) `Collective identity. org: Collective identity in online and offline feminist 
activist groups', thesis submitted to the Faculty of Virginia polytechnic Institute and State 
University for the degree of Masters of Science in Sociology. 
288 Wright, S: (2004) `Informing, communicating and ICTs in contemporary anti-capitalist 
movements' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, 
Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York 
289 Touraine, pp. 798-800 
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movement itself becomes increasingly inadequate and one has to give attention to 
Touraine's preference to speak of movement networks or movement areas, as the 
network of groups and individuals sharing a conflictual culture and a collective 
identity. These networks allow multiple memberships, and personal involvement 
and effective solidarity are conditions for participation. This, however, is `not a 
temporary phenomenon, but a morphological shift in the structure of collective 
action. 290 Furthermore, the form of the movement itself is a message, a symbolic 
challenge to the dominant patterns. The structure of NSMs outlined previously by 
Melucci and Touraine is the basis for internal collective identity, but also for a 
symbolic confrontation with the system. `It makes apparatuses to produce 
justifications, it pushes them to reveal their logic and the weakness of their 
reasons. It makes power visible'. 291 
Due to the fact that frames are transmitted and reframed by the mass media, and 
consequently the internet, it has been argued that `the internet can function as a 
new medium to expose frames and problem definitions and as a space to create 
shared meaning and identities among the membership and the constituency', 292 
Pini, Brown and Previte, for instance note how new configurations in computer- 
mediated communication lead to new patterns and possibilities and foster new 
coalitions of ideas/identities/frames that challenge existing ones in the `real' 
290 ibid., p. 800, cites Gerlach and Hine's work People, Power and Change, 1970 291 ibid., p. 813. 
292 Edwards, A: (2004) `The Dutch women's movement online' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 189 
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world 293 I will now proceed to look at the triangle between framing, political 
opportunity structure, the media and particularly the internet. 
The political opportunity structure: The media - the internet 
Any attempt at examining this relationship should include a discussion of the 
issues of media sensitivity and event density. 294 The press is more likely to report 
protest events that are more violent, involve more people and persist longer. The 
key event characteristics they identify are size, violence and duration. These 
factors are collectively designated as event density. Moreover, researchers using 
the media as a main source of information have to rely largely on practitioners 
from another profession, such as reporters, editors and publishers, who make the 
decisions on which version of experience will ultimately be available for research 
purposes295 Normally the media provide information on the actors who disagree, 
but much less information on what they disagree about 296 
Also, movements as it is commonly known have to walk the fine line between 
extreme forms of action, which alienate third parties but secure coverage, and 
293 Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens 
and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 24 
294 Snyder, D and Kelly, W: (1977) `Conflict intensity, media sensitivity and the validity of 
newspaper data', American Sociological Review, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 105-123 
295 Mueller, C: (1997) `International press coverage of East German protest events', American 
Sociological Review, vol. 62, no5, p. 821. 
296 Klandermans, B and Goslinga, S: `Media discourse, movement publicity, and the generation of 
collective action frames: Theoretical and empirical exercises in meaning construction' in 
McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, p. 336 
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conventionality, which (even if potentially persuasive) is ignored by the media. In 
effect, radical reform groups must master the art of simultaneously playing to a 
variety of publics, threatening opponents, and pressuring the state, all the while 
appearing non-threatening and sympathetic to the media and other publics. 297This 
has been a major concern for groups in sociopolitical cyberconflicts, where 
symbolic hacking, while drawing media attention, nevertheless deprives the other 
side of means of expression and invites counter-response. Social movements and 
mass media have several features in common: they are engaged in a struggle for 
attention; they want to maximise their outreach; they are confronted, though to 
different degrees, with competitors. Nevertheless, they not only follow a different 
functional logic, but also have a strikingly asymmetrical relationship when 
dealing with each other. This becomes clear when we consider the structural 
positions of the movements offering conflict, spectacle, surprise, threat, etc., on 
the one hand and the media (potentially) granting coverage, importance, 
sympathy, etc., on the other hand. In a nutshell, this asymmetry stems from the 
fact that most movements need the media, but the media seldom need the 
movements. 298 
Kielbowicz and Scherer indicate that the media are instrumental for social 
movements in at least three different ways: (1) media are important means of 
297 McAdam, D: `The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the American civil rights movement' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 344 298 Rucht, D: (2004) `The quadruple `A': Media strategies of protest movements since the 1960s' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York. 
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reaching the general public, to acquire approval and to mobilise potential 
participants; (2) media can link movements with other political and social actors; 
and (3) media can provide psychological support for social movements. 299 
The media spotlight validates the movement as an important player. This suggests 
that the opening and closing of media access and attention is a crucial element in 
defining political opportunity for movements 300 The media form a component of 
the political opportunity structure with both structural and dynamic elements. The 
media system's openness to social movements is itself an important element of 
political opportunity. On the one hand, the media play an important role in the 
construction of meaning and the reproduction of culture. On the other hand, the 
media are also a site or arena in which symbolic contests are carried out among 
competing sponsors of meaning, including movements 301 The role of the media 
apparatus as a validator for the larger society about whose views need to be taken 
seriously makes it crucial target for movement efforts to open political space. The 
media system operates to favor extra-institutional actors in some ways and 
institutional actors in others 302 
299 cited in Klandermans, B and Goslinga, S: ` Media discourse, movement publicity, and the 
generation of collective action frames: Theoretical and empirical exercises in meaning 
construction' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 319 
300 Gamson, W and Meyer, D: (1996) `Framing political opportunity' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J 
and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 285 301 ibid., p. 287 
302 McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, p. 289 
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In addition, Waterman uses the term communication internationalism to 
characterise the terrain in which contemporary movements operate. 303 He outlines 
four characteristics of communication internationalism: i. it operates in the field 
of ideas, information and images, revealing that which is globally concerned and 
new meanings for it, ii. it is particularly effective on the terrain of communication, 
media, and culture, iii. the basic relational principle is that of the network rather 
than the organisation, and iv. the movement needs to be primarily understood in 
communicational/cultural rather than political/organisational terms. 
Interestingly, contemporary movements combine forms of action that impact upon 
different levels of the social system, pursue diverse goals and belong to different 
phases of development of a system or to different historical systems. 04 An 
example of this communication internationalism is what Howard Rheingold 
describes in his recent work Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution when he 
writes about `smart mobs' (defined as `people who are able to act in concert even 
if they don't know each other') reshaping the way societies organise and interact. 
His thesis is that the mobile internet provides far more than a version of the wired 
workstation. It is, he asserts, creating a quiet revolution. As Rheingold puts it, 
`[m]obile communications and pervasive computing technologies, together with 
social contracts that were never possible before, are already beginning to change 
the way people meet, mate, work, war, buy, sell, govern and create'. 305 Van de 
303 Waterman, P: (2001) Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalism, 
Continuum: London and New York, p. 215 
304 ibid., p. 43 
30' Glasner, J: `Mobile junkies reshaping society? ', wired, 9/10/02 
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Donk et. al are also supporting this view. They claim that `[t]he internet is not used 
as a mere supplement to traditional media, it also offers new, innovative 
opportunities for mobilising and organising individuals. The new technologies, 
however, do not determine these innovations. The internet provokes innovation, 
but this innovation has to be organised and disseminated'. 306 
The most interesting question is whether traditional media have been sidelined by 
the alternative media of the internet, a topic I shall return to in section 6.2. For 
example, ICTs could improve a movement's capacity to act in a coordinated and 
coherent way, to react more quickly to an external challenge, and to become less 
dependent on the established mass media in conveying their messages to a 
broader audience. 07 However, Rucht argues that the net has relativised, but has 
not replaced, the traditional means of both internal and external communication of 
the movements 308 
In my view, the effect of the internet (as part of the political opportunity structure) 
on the framing process is in fact a striking one. In terms of framing, the groups 
that use the internet have been innovative in issues both of identity and strategy, 
and also in framing the issues themselves. As le Grignou and Patou argue, `[t]he 
internet makes visible the fragmented plurality of its action by listing together 
3°6 Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens 
and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 6 307 Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens 
and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 11 308 Rucht, D: `The quadruple "A": (2004) `Media strategies of protest movements since the 1960s' in Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 53 
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subjects and causes... [I]t simultaneously makes homogenous and coherent a set 
of analyses, activities and movements which otherwise be scattered' 309 The 
emergence of global justice movements that closely link a number of issues such 
as human rights, social rights, poverty and environmental issues has been greatly 
facilitated by the use of ICTs. 
In identity terms, Nip for example found the participants on the Queer Sisters 
bulletin board developed a sense of solidarity with the Queer Sisters and shared a 
culture of opposition to the dominant order, but they fell short of harbouring a 
collective consciousness. 10 This could be explained perhaps by the difficulty in 
building collective trust in cyberspace. As Wright argues, 'ICTs have sometimes 
played a dramatic role in communicating rich, multiple impressions of particular 
events as they unfold, but they have been used less successfully in promoting a 
coherent, collective assessment of what these events mean within the overall 
process of social change. '311 
At the final analysis, the internet could improve a movement's capacity to act in a 
coordinated and coherent way, to react more quickly to an external challenge, and 
to become less dependent on the established mass media in conveying its 
messages to a broader audience. The most extreme version of this argument is 
309 le Grignou, B and Patou, C: (2004) 'ATTAC(k)ing expertise' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: 
London and New York, p. 172 
310 Nip, J: (2004) `The Queer Sisters and its electronic bulletin board' in Cyberprotest: New 
media, citizens and social movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 255 
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Diebert's who stresses that the role of the internet went beyond facilitating 
activism already in place; rather it helped create `a new formation on the world 
political landscape' 312 
Another significant factor in social movement theory is system uncertainty. Those 
who govern have not only to deal with institutional systems of representation, but 
also with new forms of action such as those used by social movements. The 
resulting conflicts cannot easily be adapted to the existing channels of 
participation and representation (e. g. transformed into political parties). In 
addition, social movements can test the limits of a system; they can `violate the 
boundaries of a system, thereby pushing the system beyond the range of 
variations that it can tolerate without altering its structure,. 313 This system 
uncertainty is increased by the new tactics possible through the internet, which 
either directly use computers (such as hacking) or help social movements to 
organise, communicate and mobilise. The nature of the internet itself eliminates 
the boundaries of the state, challenging the certainty of state sovereignty and 
control. 
Of course, social movements can be crushed by a totalitarian state. This issue is 
addressed in section 4.2, when talking about dissidents using the internet against 
such states. It is also relevant, for example, in connection to the peace and anti- 
31 Wright, S: (2004) `Informing, communicating and ICTs in contemporary anti-capitalist 
movements' in Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and 
New York, p. 90 
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globalisation movements, because `social movements can easily become 
segmented, transform themselves into defense of minorities or search for identity, 
while public life becomes dominated by pro or anti state movements. That is what 
is happening today, especially in Germany and the US with peace movements' 314 
This section looked at key elements of social movement theory, which can help us 
with our analysis of sociopolitical cyberconflicts. The subject of new social 
movements was approached differently by Europeans and Americans. Europeans 
emphasised the need for a systemic approach that links new forms of social 
conflict to post-industrial capitalism and the identity-oriented paradigm, while in 
the U. S. theorists focused on resource mobilisation theory. The key issues in 
social movement theory analysed here were: the `newness' of NSMs, the NSMs 
as a product of a post-industrial economy, the alleged new middle-class 
orientation of NSMs, the mobilising structures (the network-style structure of 
movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, tactics, goals), framing 
processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of the internet on these processes) 
and the media (and the internet particularly) as a component of the political 
opportunity structure. This extensive discussion and analysis of central elements 
of social movement theory is going to prove useful when looking at new social 
movements and their use of the internet. The next section identifies elements of 
conflict theory, especially relevant to ethnoreligious cyberconflicts. 
312 Nip, J: (2004) `The Queer Sisters and its electronic bulletin board' in Cyberprotest: New 
Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 233 313 Waterman, P: (2001) Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, p. 29 314 ibid., p. 780. 
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2.2 Conflict Theory. 
The Other outrages our sense of the kind of nation ours should be in so far as s/he 
steals our enjoyment 
- 
to which we must add that this Other is always an Other in 
my interior, i. e. that my hatred of the Other is really the hatred of the part (the 
surplus) of my own enjoyment which I find unbearable and cannot acknowledge, 
and which therefore transpose ("project") into the Other via a fantasy of the 
"Other's enjoyment". '" 
Globalisation is often portrayed in broad terms of cultural and technological 
change: we share friends from different places, culture, food, and resources, and 
we show solidarity with faraway peoples. The problem is that not everybody has 
access to this opportunity-rich phenomenon. Actually, in certain instances, the 
idea of globalisation is an instance of rhetoric used by governments to justify their 
submission to financial markets. The same governments are challenged by these 
global flows of capital, technology, information and people. Also, people might 
find their identities threatened by such a process. At the same time globalisation 
itself can directly resuscitate local traditions and literally thrive on them. 
315 Eley and Suny 1996 quoted in Salecl, R: 'National Identity and Socialist Moral Majority', in G. Eley and R. G Suny (eds. ), Becoming National: A Reader, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 418-425. 
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In other words, the concept of globalisation is a conflation of two distinct 
phenomena: the corporate takeover of the world, and a process of fragmentation 
of national, ethnic and religious identity-communities, which is creating a more 
open social context. Whereas the former is to be resisted, the latter provides the 
basis for a transformative politics, if not a revolutionary macro-politics. The trick 
is not to try stopping deterritorialisation but rather, to use it as a resource. This 
has been the practice of global resistance movements, grassroots social movement 
organisations and social networks against governments and international 
institutions. As a result of the activity of such movements, neo-liberal 
governments and institutions face a counter-hegemonic account of globalisation, 
to which they have responded in a confused and often contradictory way. The 
challenge expresses itself as resistance and/or violent opposition against 
governments and against international institutions either in a sociopolitical or 
ethnoreligious context. This type of political activity is not sufficiently explained 
by new social movement theory. Instead, an approach that is capable of capturing 
the sources and nature of ethnoreligious conflict as well as its global context is 
needed. This part of the analysis will be framed by the works of Deleuze and 
Guattari, Khan, Chesters, Callinicos and Jabri, giving us another way of viewing 
the internet as a rhizome in the context of global conflict. 
In relation to the ethnoreligious context we should mention here Campbell's 
definition of ontopology, which provides us with an explanation of complex 
conflicts like that in Bosnia. Ontopology, as Campbell explains, is the connection 
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of `the ontological value of present-being to its situation, to the stable and 
presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city 
body in general'. Campbell's analysis draws on how Derrida understands 
conflicts like that in Bosnia. 
316 
In their work A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 
information revolution is altering the nature of conflict by strengthening network 
forms of organisation over hierarchical forms. The network form of organisation 
could also be described as the rhizome. 
17 They argue against a world where `the 
tree is already the image of the world or the root the image of the world tree' 
Sts 
All the various instances of desire, identity and belief are constructed as if they 
were elements within a single totality, `arborescent' or `striated' in Deleuze's 
terms, like the branches coming from the main trunk of a tree. One of the 
interesting aspects of their argument is that they prefer to explain the world with 
principles of connection, heterogeneity and multiplicity, where `any point of a 
rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be'. 319 In this vein, a 
rhizome establishes connections between semiotic chains, organisations of power 
and circumstances relevant to the arts, sciences and social struggles. In contrast to 
centred (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication 
and pre-established paths, the rhizome is an acentred, nonhierarchical, non- 
316 Edkins et. al: (1999) Sovereignty and Subjectivity, Lynne Pienner: Boulder, p. 27, cites Derrida, 
Spectres of Marx, 82 
"Deleuze, G and Guattari, F (1987), A Thousand Plateaus, Athlone: London. 
318 Ibid., p. 5. 
319 ibid., p. 7. 
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signifying system without a General and without an organising memory or central 
authority, defined solely by a circu 320 
Based on this rhizomatic conceptualisation of the world, the internet is a typical 
rhizomatic structure and the groups using it are rhizomatic in character because 
they seem to have no leader, coming together for an event (for example anti- 
globalisation protests or hacking enemy websites) and dissolving again back to 
their own ceaselessly changing line of flight into the adventitious underground 
stems and aerial roots of the rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari might have been 
easily be speaking about the internet when they wrote: 
To these centred systems the authors contrast acentred systems, finite networks 
of automata in which communication runs from any neighbour to any other, the 
stems or channels do not pre-exist, and all individuals are interchangeable, 
defined only by their state at a given moment 
- 
such that the local operations are 
co-ordinated and the final, global result synchronised without a central agency. 32' 
r 
The world system operates as an arborescent apparatus. However, such an 
apparatus is necessarily haunted by the possible emergence of `lines of flight' 
which take its elements outside the framework it constitutes. The elements which 
escape the world system have a different structure 
- 
less arborescent than 
rhizomatic, emerging through underground networks connected horizontally and 
320 ibid, p. 40. 
321 ` ibid., p. 17. 
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lacking a hierarchic centre. The system's resort to violence is an attempt to crush 
various rhizomatic and quasi-rhizomatic elements which tend to escape it. 
It is no wonder that rhizomes are a source of threat to those whose commitments 
are structured around the positivist valuation of machines of control. Arguments 
like these were takem up by Arquilla and Ronfeldt to explore the future of conflict 
and network forms of social organisation. Particularly relevant to my research is 
the question of how the structure of the internet itself (a global network with no 
central authority) has offered another experience of governance (no governance), 
time and space (compression), ideology (freedom of information and access to it), 
identity (multiplicity) and fundamentally an opposition to surveillance and 
control, boundaries and apparatuses. In the final analysis, new information-age 
ideologies could easily be arguing for a transfer of virtual social and political 
structures to the offline world, reversing for once the existing process of online 
actors imitating real life in cyberspace. The internet is not a medium. It is 
`another' place: 
Global interpersonal communication is the greatest tool for world peace our 
species has ever known. We have the technology to achieve collective 
consciousness on a planetary scale. The potential of Electronic Revolution is 
awesome. Instead of electing an aristocracy whose choices are packaged by mass 
media marketing to govern us, we have the ability to transcend the physical 
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limitations of deceptive appearance and illuminate the truth of being through the 
digitized reflection of intelligence 322 
The form of the internet is itself a message, a symbolic challenge to dominant 
patterns of hierarchical structures of governance. The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan largely follow the model of non- outlined in Baudrillard's analysis of 
the first Gulf War war and further extended by Ignatieff323. Rather than being 
collisions of two powers located symmetrically within a single discourse, they 
involve the feints and counterfeints of two sides separated by radical discursive 
difference. America and its allies were in both cases attempting to impose a 
discourse of control embodying a logic of deterrence. As General Wesley Clark 
said of the bombing of Yugoslavia, `this was not, strictly speaking, a war'. 324 
Non-war happens within an almost virtual `public sphere'. As Baudrillard argues, 
media images are now the continuation of war by other means. War, the most 
concentrated form of violence, has become cinematographic and televisual, just 
like the mechanically produced image. 
The true belligerents are those who thrive on the ideology of the truth of this war, 
despite the fact that the war itself exerts its ravages on another level, through 
faking, through hyper reality, the simulacrum, through all these strategies of 
psychological deterrence that make play with facts and images, with the 
322 Taylor, P: (1999) Hackers, Routlege: London 
323 Ignatieff, M: (2000) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, Chatto and Windus: London. 324 ibid., p. 3 
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precession of the virtual over the real, virtual time over real time, and the 
inexorable confusion between the two 325 
As Bloom argues, `the mass public as a foreign policy variable will always react 
against policies that can be perceived to be a threat to national identity and to 
policies which protect or enhance national identity... national chauvinism is 
commercially successful' 326 Another interesting point Bloom makes is that there 
is one tier of information possessed by the security services and decision-making 
elites; there is another tier in the public domain. The restriction on complete 
disclosure is precisely to avoid the possible triggering of the national identity 
dynamic which would take decision making out of the hands of the `responsible' 
and informed few. 327 
Non-war often occurs in the form of ethnoreligious conflict, based on issues of 
ethnic, religious and national affiliation involving a strong sense of identity. 
Ethnic affiliation provides a sense of security in a divided society, reciprocal help, 
and protection against neglect of one's interests by strangers. Ethnic divisions 
reaffirm rather than undermine fixity and closure. As Horowitz puts it, `[i]n 
deeply divided societies ethnicity 
- 
in contrast to other lines of cleavage, such as 
class or occupation 
- 
appear permanent and all encompassing, predetermining 
325 Baudrillard, J: (1995) The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, p. 177 326 Bloom, W: (1990) Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, p. 80. 327 ibid., p. 88 
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who will be granted and denied access to power and resources'. 328 Ali Khan 
argues that there is an old and apparently primordial human inclination to 
maintain self-identity by continually creating an `other'. Power systems become 
dependent on such identities and loyalties via patronage networks. 329 
The information revolution is likely to strengthen local and ethnic identities. In 
fact, territorial and ethnic communities may become even more cohesive and 
permanent. Communication resources in many nation-states are actually 
decentralised, creating local and provincial print media, radio and television. 
Pluralist and alternative viewpoints in national discourse are protected by 
allocating radio and television resources to ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
minorities. This resurgence of territorial and ethnic identities may weaken those 
nation-states that are built by joining disparate historic provinces, localities and 
ethnic populations 330 
Khan's model is certainly relevant to politics in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is 
echoed in Vivienne Jabri's analysis of the ways in which discourses of inclusion 
and exclusion constitute individual identity in ways which lead to violent 
conflicts. 
328 Horowitz in Diamond and Plattner: (1994) Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, p. xviii. 329 Khan, A: (1996) The Extinction of Nation States: A World Without Borders, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, p. 128. 330 ibid., p. 128 
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Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is 
not, identity politics is always a politics of the creation of difference... What is 
shocking about these developments is not the inevitable dialectic of 
identity/difference that they display, but rather the atavistic belief that identities 
can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness. The 
negotiation of identity/difference to use William Connolly's felicitous phrase is 
the political problem facing democracies on a global scale 331 
Three phenomena challenge these traditional notions of sovereign bodies; 
corporate transnationalism/global economy, environmental unity, and the 
information revolution are in the process of transforming traditional notions of 
territorial communities tied to contiguous geographical areas. Information-driven 
communities require no geographical contiguity, threatening the core 
characteristic of the state structure. 
Robin Brown, when considering the relevance of Schattschneider's work to the 
information society, argues that private matters become identified as public as the 
scope of conflict grows. Easier access to information, and the mobilisational 
possibilities that result, make it easier to expand the scope of conflict. As a result, 
the information society, by facilitating the diffusion of information on a global 
331 Jabri, V: (1996) Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester University Press, p. 3 
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basis, creates new possibilities for political strategy through the globalisation of 
conflict 332 As Brown puts it: 
Schattschneider's theory would suggest that groups that are disadvantaged at the 
current scope of politics would initially embrace the new technology. Dominant 
actors would seek to limit its impact but if this was not feasible they would have 
to adopt their own strategies to the new environment. 333 
In line with this argument, if some people want to expand the scope of conflict, 
then others want to reduce it. The ways to do this are multiple. `The first is to 
ensure that people are unaware of potential issues or actual conflicts. The second 
strategy is to construct a political discourse that legitimates the involvement of 
some people but not others. '334 An example of this can be found in political 
discourse during the 2003 Iraq war. 
Furthermore, between the global resistance movements and the ethnoreligious 
movements, it is clear that very little of the periphery is subsumed into the world 
system in a stable and hegemonic way; there are, rather, flows of domination 
between ` rich and poor, hemispherically from N to S, regionally between 
peripheral and core nationally across class and ethnic boundaries' 335 The ` line of 
flight' emerging from resistance movements could be best described as parallel 
32 Brown, R: `The Contagiousness of Conflict: E. E. Schattschneider as a theorist of the 
information society', Information, Communication and Society, 5: 2 2002, pp. 264-5 333 ibid., pp. 266-7 334 ibid., p. 268 335 Chesters, `Shape shifting: Civil society, complexity and social movements', Anarchist Studies, 
It, 1, pp. 42-65 
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lines, a parallelogram of forces as Graeme Chesters argues: the whole of 
singularities against WTO, IMF, WB; People's Global Action, World Social 
Forum and suchlike have an ecology of action which indicates a web of horizontal 
social solidarities in which power might be devolved, or even dissolved. Anti- 
capitalist and other rhizomatic groups have constructed many new forms of 
political action, and also new forms of communication. 
In theory that is. In practice what we get when we abstract the ethnoreligious 
movements or groups, we are left with antiwar groups, anti-capitalist/anti- 
globalisation movements, campaigns that focus on specific issues and grievances, 
and lifestyle-issue movements (the latter not quite relevant to our discussion, and 
as pointed by Callinicos336). These can be referred to as movements of a 
sociopolitical nature. In contrast to the closure of space, the violence and identity 
divide found in enthnoreligious discourses, these movements seem to rely more 
on networking and grassroots organising, much more than is the case with the 
hierarchical structures, states and their followers. Several metaphors have been 
used to describe a large number of groups being brought together under a 
common cause, groups that disperse as easily as they come together, a 
parallelogram of forces following a swarm logic like ants in an ant colony. It may 
be argued that because citizens do not believe in power through conventional 
politics, citizens are increasingly sympathetic to direct action. 
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Without the need for a leader and without a particular individual having a 
privileged insight, or being able to conceptualise the whole characteristics, there 
is an emphasis on participation, antipathy to hierarchy, a preference for consensus 
processes and/or directly democratic decision-making, an ethos of respect for 
differences and an assertion of unity in diversity. The project is less the capture of 
the state apparatus than the construction of an open and transnational public 
sphere, a rhizomatic extension of struggles operating through weak ties 337 
Sometimes, ethnoreligious and sociopolitical conflicts overlap. Whatever the 
connection between the Palestinians' oppression and global capitalism in the 
shape of US imperialism, the system itself is not the centre of Palestinian 
consciousness when they fight the Israeli state. As Trotsky pointed out, 
sometimes the point of honour is not what one has in common with the 
movement, but in the particularity that distinguishes them from it. 338 Apart from 
the rhizo-terrorists such as al-Qaeda, anti-capitalist and other rhizomatic groups 
have constructed many new forms of political action, and also new forms of 
communication. 
Furthermore, another part of conflict theory deals with conflict resolution. I think 
it would prove important for a later discussion in section 5.3 to deal here with 
some aspects of conflict resolution, such as mediation and negotiation. 
336 Callinicos: `Regroupment, realignment and the revolutionary left', 
www. swp. org. uk/]NTER/regroupen. pdf 337 Chesters, `Shape shifting: Civil society, complexity and social movements', Anarchist Studies, 
11,1, pp. 42-65 
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To begin with, Tidwe11339 refers to the work of Bush and Folger, The Promise of 
Mediation. The authors argue that there are four primary objectives found in 
mediation broadly-defined. The first is satisfaction theory, wherein mediation 
serves to satisfy human needs. The second is social justice, which emphasises the 
role of mediation in the formation of community. The third perspective is 
transformation, where mediation is the ability to transform both individuals and 
society as a whole. Transformation occurs when people alter their values and 
beliefs about themselves and others. Lastly, there is the oppression story, which 
views mediation as a tool for control and domination. 
Another way of problematising negotiation is offered by what Rothstein calls the 
concept of interactive problem-solving Sao According to him, negotiation should 
first of all treat the conflict as a problem shared by the parties. Second, 
negotiation explores ways of solving this problem, `not by eliminating all conflict 
and potential conflict between the parties, but by addressing the underlying causes 
of the conflict and reversing the escalatory dynamics of conflict relationship'. His 
third step is that negotiation is an interactive process, capable of producing ideas 
to solve the problem which are responsive to the parties' fundamental concerns. 
Furthermore, negotiation is very much affected by culture. Culture is brought into 
the negotiation process by individuals, groups and organisations. It conditions 
"`Trotsky: The new course', www. marxists. orglarchive/trotsky/I 923-nc/index. htm 
339 Tidwell, A. C: (1998) Conflict Resolved?, Pinter: London and New York, p. 156. 
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how they view the negotiation, the kind of game they perceive to be going on. As 
Berton and his colleagues argue, structural components of a negotiation are not 
culturally free 341 External constraints, such as the legal framework and the 
organisational setting of a negotiation, are social constructs. The other main 
factors affecting negotiation include the number of parties involved, the number 
of issues at stake and the distribution of power between the parties. Also, beliefs 
express a set of values derived from the cultural background of the negotiator. In 
this way, cultural values directly affect the behaviour of actors involved. Tidwell 
has the same view when he argues that `methods such as mediation or facilitation 
may not be appropriate within a given cultural context... [I]n cultures in which to 
speak directly about a conflict is regarded inappropriate, many Western methods 
342 would simply not work'. 
According to Cairns there is no single way to build a peaceful society after a war 
has ended. What both `successful' and `failed' peace processes show is that 
`peace cannot be built simply on multi-party elections, after which most of the 
international community make a quick exit' 343 What he recommends instead is 
reviving the community systems of mediation. This can sometimes be an effective 
means of resolving current conflicts. He uses the example of community leaders 
from both sides of Mali's conflict to make his point. They have formed so-called 
peace cells to resolve intercommunal disputes. This initiative has not replaced 
Sao Rothstein, R. L: (1999) After the Peace, Lynne Rienner: Boulder, London, p. 193. 341 Berton, P et. al: (1999) International Negotiation, St. Martin's Press: New York, pp. 21; 26. 342 Tidwell, A. C: (1998) Conflict Resolved?, Pinter: London and New York, p. 6 343 E: (1997) A Safer Future, Oxfam Publications: England, p. 88. 
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traditional ways of dealing with conflicts, but it is built on them, including the 
web of alliances, which cross ethnic groups and families, known as `cousinage'. 
Another positive case is Colombia with the growth of so-called `communities of 
peace'. These are groups declaring neutrality in the fighting between military, 
paramilitary and guerrillas. The Antioqua Indigenous Organization, which Oxfam 
supports, combines practical help of food shelter and medicine with the use of the 
media to proclaim neutrality. 
This section discussed the rhizomatic structure of new social movements and of 
the internet itself in the contexts of globalisation, issues of national identity, 
ontopology, ethnic affiliation and discourses of inclusion and exclusion. These 
issues are crucially linked to ethnoreligious cyberconflicts and the various ways 
the opposing parties in them develop and perform. I then looked at the structure of 
conflicts involving new social movements such as the anti-war and anti-capitalist 
movements, where there is an emphasis on participation, antipathy to hierarchy, 
and the project is less the capture of state apparatus and more the construction of 
an open and transnational public sphere. This discussion provided a context 
through which we can analyse new social movements and their use of the internet 
in sociopolitical cyberconflicts and a focus on national identity and discourse to 
help interpret ethnoreligious cyberconflicts. Lastly, I discussed some of the 
aspects of negotiation and mediation as part of conflict resolution techniques, 
which will prove useful in the discussion of attempts at conflict resolution on the 
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internet. The next section offers a discussion of media theory elements that would 
prove useful when looking at the internet as a medium. 
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2.3 Media Theory. 
`The Gulf War is over and the press 1ost'344 
The total obliteration of war by information, propaganda, commentaries, with 
camera-men in the first tanks and war reporters dying heroic deaths, the mish- 
mash of enlightened manipulation of public opinion and oblivious activity: all 
this is another expression for the withering of experience, the vacuum between 
men and their fate, in which their real fate lies. It is as if the reified, hardened 
plaster cast of events takes place of events themselves. Men are reduced to walk- 
on parts in a monster documentary film which has no spectators, since the least 
of them has his bit to do on the screen 345 
De Fleur Ball-Rokeach distinguishes between three different effects of the mass 
media on individuals, which are closely linked to the emergence and coverage of 
global conflicts. These are: cognitive effects (the creation and resolution of 
ambiguity, attitude formation, agenda-setting, expansion of people's systems of 
beliefs, impact on values), affective effects (desensitisation, anxiety, morale and 
alienation) and behavioral effects (activation, deactivation). 346 Another 
particularly relevant issue is the dynamic of mass media construction of 
344 Barry Zorthian, Chief Pentagon Public Affairs spokesman, during the Vietnam war, to a National Press Club forum on March 19,1991. 
aas p. 55, Poster, M: (1995) quotes P. 11 from Adorno, T: (1974) Minima Moralia: Reflections from 
a Damaged Life, trans. E. Jepcott, New Left Books: London. 
346 De Fleur, M and Ball-Roceach, S: (1982) Theories ofMass-communication, 4t' edn, Longman: New York and London. 
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consensus, control, adaptation, conflict and change. These dimensions and their 
effects on conflict of either ethnoreligious or sociopolitical roots are the focus of 
this section. 
One of the key issues is the way in which the media set an agenda. A useful 
approach looks at the actual language used by the media, especially appropriate 
for internet analysis because the most common feature of the internet is text. The 
questions that need to be asked, as outlined by Fairclough, are: how is the world 
(events, relationships) represented? What identities are set up between those 
involved in the story? What relationships are set up between those involved? 
What are, then, the particular representations of the world, particular 
constructions of social identities and particular constructions of social 
relations? 347 Among others, Fairclough provides an example of the analysis of 
discourses in texts when he examines press coverage of an air attack on Iraq by 
the USA, Britain and France on 13 January 1993, referring to five British 
newspapers. A brief glimpse of this analysis could prove useful as a guideline for 
my research: 
The main headline and lead paragraph from the Sun show that formulations of 
the attack do not by any means draw only upon military discourse: Spank you 
And Good Night... and More than 100 allied jets 
... 
gave tyrant Saddam Hussein 
a spanking. This is a metaphorical application of an authoritarian discourse of 
347 Fairclough, N: (1995) Media Discourse, Arnold: London and New York, p. 5. 
180 
family discipline which is a prominent element in the representations of the 
attack 
- 
Saddam as the naughty child punished by his exasperated parents. 48 
The Gulf War has inspired a lot of media research, being the ultimate television 
war, 349 and it will continue to do so in the future, because it was the first war 
extensively covered through the internet. Taylor poses key questions in relation to 
the control of information by military and political authorities: what arrangements 
were made for the release of information and why? How much censorship was 
taking place? How far back did the journalists stand from what was being told to 
them or were they merely drawn into the media management system? What 
alternative sources of information were available? 350 (This last question is 
especially interesting in relation to web coverage and blogging during the 2003 
war in Iraq). 
A good example of the media construction of social identities, and specifically the 
enemy identity, is the emphasis placed by Bush senior's administration on 
projecting the image of an enemy posing a serious military, economic and 
ideological threat to the New World Order. Saddam was represented as a 
formidable military power, ready to dominate the Middle East. Taylor puts it 
down very graphically: `Kuwait had been "raped", Iraqi troops were "plundering" 
the tiny and helpless state and "butchering" its people.. 
. 
It was even claimed for 
348 ibid., p. 95 349 Taylor, P (1992) War and the Media Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf war, Manchester University Press: Manchester, see also MacGregorl997; Wolfsfeld, 1997 3S0 ibid., p. vii 
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domestic consumption, that this would be a war for the American way of life. 
Saddam must not be "appeased" as Hitler had been in Munich... ' 351 
The fact that the CNN provided a public insight into the traditionally secretive 
world of diplomacy has altered the way modem warfare is projected onto the 
world's television screens. What is more, it raises a lot of ambiguity over what 
truly happened in that war, that is, over the relationship between the `real' war 
and the war as portrayed by the media. 
One of the central questions is how censored or restricted journalists are while 
covering conflicts and how `unbiased' they can be in constructing social reality, 
identities and relations. Knightley in his work on war correspondents from Crimea 
to Kosovo reveals how the role of the war correspondent as the heroic truth- 
seeker is in danger of becoming more that of a mythmaker. Again, the Gulf war 
conflict is taken as a turning point in the history of war correspondents. As 
Knightly argues, `[n]ot only was it a war in which the military succeeded in 
changing people's perceptions of what battle was really like..., but one in which 
the way the war was communicated was as important as the conduct of the war 
itself. '352 
War correspondents are just one part of a larger picture. As McGregor argues, the 
largely consistent findings show the news products to be, in one sense or another, 
351 ibid., p. 5 
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an artificial and very predictable symbolic construction of reality. 353 However, 
this conclusion is itself open to alternative interpretations, since homogeneity 
could result either from a hegemonic ideology or simply from the standardisation 
to be expected in mass production processes, or perhaps a combination of the 
two. 354 In the `first living room war', the Vietnam War, despite the fact that the 
network news deserve credit for the eventual disillusionment with the war, at the 
same time they were also responsible for creating or at least reinforcing the 
illusion of American omnipotence in the first place. 355 An example of this was 
that American media delayed for two years the reporting of the My Lai massacre, 
not because of censorship, nor because the facts were not instantly available, but 
due to resistance to the story by the US media itself. 356 That was because the 
massacre occurred in 1967, when the storyline was focused on `good news' about 
a war editors were persuaded the US was winning: 
Other television reporters have detected significant media impact "only at 
moments of policy panic" or "where policymaking is weak or cynical". Although 
television assumed a high profile in accounts of policy influence, closer analysis 
revealed interdependence with other forms of news media 357 
352 Knightley, P: (2000) The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-maker 
from Crimea to Kosovo, Prion: London, p. 500. 
353 McGregor, B: (1997) Live, Direct and Biased? Making Television News in the Satellite Age, 
Arnold: London and New York. 
354 ibid., p. 78, cites McQuail. 
355 Epstein quoted in Mercer, D, Mungham, G and Williams, K: (1987) The Fog of War: The 
Media on the Battlefield, Heinman: London, p. 229. 
356 Mercer, D, Mungham, G and Williams, K: (1987) The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield, Heinman: London 
3s' Koppel, T in `Impact of television on US foreign policy', Congressional Hearing, 5 
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A much more recent `construction of reality' by western media was in the Balkan 
conflicts, where civil wars were called `ethnic cleansing' and painted with simple 
terms of `goodies and baddies', portraying the situation as a conflict where the 
international community could do nothing. When Milosevic failed to `stop the 
ethnic cleansing' of Albanians in Kosovo and the decision to bomb him into 
submission was taken, an impressive system of control and propaganda in both 
the US and Britain swung into action. 358 In the two main sections of interest, news 
of the fighting and justification for it, the Kosovo conflict was a case in point of 
propaganda-led warfare, because ` to sell a war in a democracy when you are not 
attacked, you have to demonise the leader or show that there are humanitarian 
reasons for going in'. 359 The extent to which the media were managed was high, 
as the words of Alastair Campbell, press officer and adviser to Blair betray: '[ilt 
was vital to try and hold the public's interest on our terms' 360 The same Mr. 
Campbell was later accused in the media of spindoctoring, through what came to 
be known as the `dodgy' dossier, a report which relied in part on a Ph. D. thesis on 
the web, justifying Britain's decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003, leading 
to two inquiries that involved the Prime Minister himself. 361 Tony Blair has also 
won the top prize winning the `Lifetime Menace' award for what the London- 
based Privacy International characterised as `his active involvement in the 
government's attack on civil liberties', as he angered privacy groups with his 
358 Knightley, P: (2000) The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-maker 
from Crimea to Kosovo, Prion: London, p. 502 
359 ibid., p. 502, Knightley quotes Robert Lichter, President for Media and Public affairs in 
Washington. 
36° ibid., p. 503, Knightley cites BBC2, October 16,1999. 361 Deans, J: `Butler criticises 45-minute claim', The Guardian, 14/7/04 
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plans to force phone companies and internet service providers to retain users' data 
for 12 months as part of the state's stepped-up war on terrorism and crime. 362 
The implementation of policy decisions is often affected by the weight of media 
exposure. As Major General Lewis MacKenzie, commander of UNPROFOR in 
Sarajevo, commented: 
Wherever the media goes, a lot of serious violations of human rights either move 
away or stop. The media was the only major weapon system I had. Whenever I 
went to negotiations with the warring parties, it was a tremendous weapon to be 
able to say: 'OK, if you don't want to do it the UN's way, I'll nail your butt on 
CNN in about 20 minutes'. That worked, nine times out of ten 363 
Furthermore, there are three levels of media effect on policy: strategic (whether to 
intervene or not, withdraw, etc), tactical (innovations in the protection of Sarajevo 
that responded in part to media coverage), and presentational (they probably 
would not have happened apart from the media exposure that would accompany 
them). In addition, there are different degrees of media effect: primary (Somalia, 
Haiti, Rwanda), secondary (contributory effect, e. g. Iraq and Bosnia), and 
negligible. 64 
362 Scheeres, J: ` Blair tagged as privacy threat', 25/3/03 
363 Quoted in New York Times, July 28,1995, A4, cited in Minear, L, Scott, C and Weiss, T (1994): The News Media, Civil War and Humanitarian Action, Lynne Rienner: Boulder and 
London, p. 59. 
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Moreover, as far as humanitarian intervention is concerned, the media had been 
criticised on several fronts. One complaint is that they pay too much attention to 
breaking events, while ignoring the historical and political context (reportage of 
the Rwandan crisis). Another is that the international media have focused on 
subjects of perceived interest to readers and viewers in developed countries, 
denigrating local institutions and overemphasising the importance of international 
and western initiatives. 365 More importantly, criticism often centres on the 
tendency of the media to perpetuate negative images and ethnocentric views, 
when those who suffer are often non-white and their `rescuers' white, a portrayal 
which contributes to charges of racism in war coverage, or to media coverage as 
the ` pornography of suffering'. 
In a media-intense environment, politicians and the public have become very 
unforgiving of even minor mistakes and transgressions. Events with minor 
operational effects, such as the killing of a Somali youth for stealing a soldier's 
sunglasses or the dramatic rescue of a downed F-16 pilot in Bosnia, often have 
disproportionately large effects on public opinion and therefore policy and 
outcomes. As a result, even the minutest aspect of military operations must now 
be planned with sensitivity to the public perception of the fight 366 
364 Minear, L, Scott, C and Weiss, T (1994): The News Media, Civil IVar and Humanitarian 
Action, Lynne Rienner: Boulder and London, p. 7 t-72. 
365 ibid., p. 37 
366 Shapiro, J: (1999): `Information and war: Is it a revolution? ' in Khalizad, Z, White, J and Marshall, A: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California, 
p. 125. 
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Nationalism, constructed primarily (as Anderson shows) through traditional 
media such as newspapers and novels and also promoted by newer media such as 
TV, has the effect that the entire populace, not just the elite, identifies its interests 
with those of the government. Consequently, the government can mobilise the 
entire capacity of the society for a prolonged war, and even if the regular army is 
defeated, the people will continue to resist through irregular means. The inability 
of the government to control the information flow gives enemies a means to 
undermine this identity of interests. New techniques that allow the manipulation 
of video images and sound recordings and therefore allow the conduct of 
sophisticated psychological operations provide another resource for undermining 
the identity of interests between the government and the wider populace. Indeed, 
some believe that the real war in the information age will be for the hearts and 
minds of the populace or the fears and insecurities of the troops 367 
But information technology is linked to the inventiveness, freedom, aspirations, 
and irrepressibility of the citizen. If anything, state power, in its traditional sense, 
can only retard this technology. The information revolution both liberates and 
requires liberation. As the U. S. experience shows, the freer the market, the greater 
the level of performance that information technology delivers 368 
367 Adams, 1996; Cooper, 1996; Nichiporuk and Builder, 1995 cited in Shapiro, J: (1999): 
`Information and war: Is it a revolution? ' in Khalizad, Z, White, J and Marshall, A: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California: p. 126 38 Gombert, D (2001): `Right makes might:, Freedom and power in the information age', p. 50 in Libicki, M and Shapiro, J: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California. 
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An extreme example of the possibilities and impact of the individual in virtual 
political reality was during the Chechen hostage crisis in the Moscow theatre in 
October 2002, when one of the hostages, Rankov, contacted his friend, Olga 
Brukovsky, on a cell phone while the standoff was in progress. She took down his 
words and published them online at LiveJournal. com, a website that is popular 
amongst Russians, initiating a flurry of responses especially when Russian 
security police raided the theatre in a controversial rescue attempt, killing 117 
hostages. Anton Nossik, one of the founders of LiveJournal's Russian community 
and chief editor of Lenta. Ru, the country's leading online news service, said at the 
time that the site had become an especially important source of information for 
people living in remote locations, such as Siberia and the Far East, where news 
agencies seldom send reporters. While Russian authorities attempted to control 
the flow of information (one television station was temporarily shut down, along 
with the website for the radio station Echo of Moscow), LiveJournal served as `a 
good mirror of public opinion' according to Roman Leibov, a professor of 
Russian literature at Tartu University. 369 
In relation to the LiveJournal experience, the Europeans after having watched a 
number of heavily-hyped US internet publications struggle have chosen more 
modest and long-term business plans. For example, Transitions Online, based in 
Prague, after it ran out of money as a print publication, sought refuge on the 
internet. The publication, which charges its subscribers a small fee but still raises 
369Kettman, S: ` Europe's spin on web reporting', wired, 18/7/2001 
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90 per cent of its budgets through grants, has a network of local correspondents in 
more than two dozen Central and Eastern European countries and has won a 
NetMedia award in 2001 for outstanding contribution to online journalism in 
Europe. The vast majority of their correspondents had never met until a 
conference was organised. 370 
The online records of activity are commonly falsified either by direct 
modification of the records themselves or by replacement of the monitoring 
software that produces these records. While there are analogies to these activities 
in the physical world, the ease, rate, and invisibility of these activities on the 
internet especially complicates the analysis task. Direct support for dissidents or 
embryonic democratic institutions is increasingly available both from the 
governments and non-governmental organisations of the democratic core. The 
penetrability of even self-isolated societies is growing, especially when 
sophisticated transnational ` civil society' groups make it their business to network 
with the oppressed. 
Advanced technological systems will not only help shape the environment of 
future conflict but will also magnify the importance of the psychological battle to 
conflict outcomes. Leaders of the several former Yugoslav republics used 
television, radio, and print media to promote ethnic hatred and mobilise their 
publics to take up arms to advance or defend communal political and territorial 
370 ibid 
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interests. Indeed, some observers believe the media became the `main instruments 
in stirring up and managing' the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, 
broadcasts from the government-controlled Rwanda Radio did much to foster the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda by deliberately fomenting ethnic hatred among the 
Hutus and inciting the mass killings of Tutsis. After the Hutu government had 
been routed by Tutsi forces, a mobile radio still under the control of former Hutu 
government officials precipitated the massive flight of Hutu refugees into 
Tanzania and Zaire by assuring them that they faced `certain slaughter' if they fell 
under Tutsi contro1371. Hostile radio broadcasts also helped to undermine the U. S. 
and UN intervention in Somalia. To counter U. S. and UN attempts to marginalise 
him politically, Aideed successfully used his radio station in Mogadishu to rally 
support for his continued leadership and to foment anti-U. S. and anti-UN 
sentiment among his countrymen. 
72 
The U. S. and other news media will become an increasingly ubiquitous presence 
on the future battlefield. The media will have an independent capability to gain 
access to future conflict arenas and to provide real-time visual and audio coverage 
of battlefield events. Thus, the media will be able to report promptly the human 
costs of U. S. combat involvement to both U. S. domestic and international 
audiences. Evidently, embedded journalists with the troops during the 2003 Iraq 
conflict is a step in that direction. As the U. S. experience in Vietnam and Somalia 
demonstrated, media news coverage and commentary will help shape U. S. 
371 Adelman, H and Suhrke, A: (1996) Early Warning and Conflict management : Genocide in Rwanda, p. 38. 
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domestic perceptions about whether a U. S. military involvement is effective or 
not and, most importantly, whether it merits continued public support. 373 
Advanced technological information systems will allow state and substate actors, 
including news services, non-governmental organisations, and even individual 
citizens, to make voice, video, and written information instantly available to 
audiences located in the remotest areas of the globe. 'ICTs have sometimes 
played a dramatic role in communicating rich, multiple impressions of particular 
events as they unfold..., but they have been used less successfully in promoting a 
coherent, collective assessment of what these events mean within the overall 
process of social change'. 374 
The idea of this thesis is to try and look at media and conflict together and focus 
on their interaction, followed up by more analysis on ethnoreligious conflict as a 
phenomenon and how it is affected by the presence of the media. With the 
internet ranking as the top information source, outpacing TV, newspapers and 
radio 
- 
as found by a UCLA study 
- 
media theory should relate, analyse and 
discuss the new medium in a more rigorous manner. 
372 Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp. 116-117. 
37 Hosmer, S: (1999) `The information revolution and psychological effects' in Khalizad, Z, 
White, J and Marshall, A: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: 
California. 
374 Wright, S: `Informing, communicating and ICTs in contemporary anti-capitalist movements' in 
Van de Doak, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 90 
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A theoretical model that attempts to discuss media and conflict together is Gadi 
Wolfsfeld's political contest model 375 The thrust of this model is that the best 
way to understand the role of the news media in politics is to view the 
competition over the news media as part of a larger and more significant contest 
among political antagonists for political control. Wolfsfeld's model rests on five 
major arguments. First, that the political process is more likely to have an 
influence on the news media than the news media on the political process. 
Second, the authorities' level of control over the political environment is one of 
the key variables that determine the role of the news media in political conflicts. 
Political conflicts are characterised by moves and counter-moves, as each 
antagonist tries to initiate and control political events, to dominate political 
discourse about the conflict, and to mobilise as many supporters as possible to 
their side. Those who have success in these areas also enjoy a good deal of 
success in the news media. Third, the role of the news media in political conflicts 
varies over time and across different circumstances. It varies along with such 
factors as the political context of the conflict, the resources, skills and political 
power of the players involved, the relationship between the press and each 
antagonist, the state of public opinion, the ability of the journalists to gain access 
to the conflict events, and last by what is happening in the field. The fourth 
argument is that those who hope to understand variations in the role of the news 
media must look on the competition among antagonists along two dimensions, 
one structural and the other cultural. The structural dimension looks at the extent 
375 Wolfsfeld, G: (1997) Media and Political Conflict, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
p. 3-5. 
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of mutual dependence between the antagonists and each news medium to explain 
the power of each side in the transaction, while the cultural dimension focuses on 
the construction of media frames of conflict events. Wolfsfeld's fifth argument is 
that while authorities have tremendous advantages over challengers in the 
quantity and quality of media coverage they receive, many challengers can 
overcome these obstacles and use the news media as a tool for political influence. 
More analytically, according to Wolfsfeld the ability of an antagonist to control 
the political environment can be understood in terms of three variables: the ability 
to initiate and control events, the ability to regulate the flow of information, and 
the ability to mobilise elite support. 376 The first factor relies on the fact that 
governments are in a much better position to coordinate their press relations when 
they can anticipate the events that will be covered. When, on the other hand, the 
powerful are forced to react to events, it suggests that others are setting and 
framing the media's agenda. The second variable is the ability to regulate the flow 
of information. Governments, both democratic and non-democratic, often find 
compelling reasons to employ censorship during political conflicts and this 
increases the value of official sources of information by eliminating competition. 
The ability of the powerful to regulate the flow of information to the press is also 
affected by the nature of the logistical and geographical environment. Powerful 
governments prefer to operate under conditions in which they can isolate the areas 
of actual conflict and regulate the entry and exit of journalists. While the physical 
circumstances of certain locales facilitate government control, other locations are 
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more porous and offer easier access for reporters, thereby increasing the level of 
journalistic independence. The third variable that decides the powerful's level of 
control over the information environment is the ability to mobilise elite support: 
When the various factions within a government are promoting different frames 
about a conflict, it is more difficult to control the informational environment 
because journalists can choose among a variety of sources. When on the other 
hand, the official frame is the only frame available among elites, journalists will 
have little choice but to adopt the frame. " 
The construction of media frames is another important issue in Wolfsfeld's work. 
He claims there are three major elements that contribute to the construction of 
media frames of conflict: the nature of the information and events that are being 
processed, the need to create a good news story, and the need to create a story that 
resonates politically within a particular culture: 
The news media have a large variety of frames waiting on the shelf for those 
activists who are skilled enough to construct an effective package and lucky 
enough to be promoting them at a time when the authorities are vulnerable to 
attack. In these cases the news media can play a critical role by legitimating 
oppositional frames that increase the status, resources, and power of 
challengers 378 
376 ibid., pp. 25-28 
377 ibid., p. 29 
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The 1991 Gulf conflict represents an excellent example of a case in which the 
news media enthusiastically adopted the authorities' law and order frame and 
virtually ignored the injustice and defiance frame being promoted by the 
challenger. The Allied forces enjoyed a multitude of advantages in the structural 
field that allowed them to control a great deal of the media discourse about the 
war. Saddam Hussein was defined early by the news media as the aggressor and 
the international consensus around the law and order frame made it extremely 
difficult for Iraq to promote its particular version of the injustice and defiance 
frame. 379 
This section looked at various elements of media theory such as: media discourse 
and construction of social identity and relations citing the First Gulf War; the 
construction of reality by western media in the Balkan conflicts; the relationship 
between the media and humanitarian intervention; and the effect of the internet on 
conflict (the LiveJournal experience). The next section combines elements of the 
theories analysed so far, deriving an analytical framework for cyberconflict. 
378 ibid., p. 55 379 ibid., p. 192 
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2.4 Deriving an integrated framework for cyberconflict 
This part is bringing together the three theories - social movement, conflict and 
media theories 
- 
into an integrated model for analysing cyberconflict in its 
ethnoreligious and sociopolitical dimensions. Firstly, I provide a justification of 
why these theories are necessary for any explanation of cyberconflict. Secondly, I 
lay out a proposed model for such an analysis drawing on these theories, and 
finally, I call for a reversal of the two modalities of cyberconflict, from 
hierarchical to rhizomatic and (almost) vice versa. 
Reasoning 
The central argument of this thesis is that there are two types of political conflict 
on the internet (cyberconflict): ethnoreligious and sociopolitical. In order to 
analyse `real' political conflicts, political scientists have devised `Conflict 
Theory' and `International Conflict Analysis'. The problem of just using conflict 
theory is that it cannot fully account for two important parameters of 
cyberconflict: its sociopolitical dimension (social movements or dissidents using 
the internet against antagonistic institutions) and the fact that conflict is taking 
place within or with the help of a medium (the internet). Again, in order to 
understand how social movements are engaging in cyberconflicts and are affected 
by the use of IT technology, it would be logical to use the theoretical tools already 
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there from the new social movement theorists. The problem with this approach is 
that it leaves out a more thorough examination of the media context (in this case 
cyberspace) in which sociopolitical cyberconflicts are taking place. Again, if one 
decides to just use media theory to analyse cyberconflict, many questions of what 
conflict in these different dimensions means for the ethnoreligious and 
sociopolitical groups engaging in them are going to remain unanswered. Lastly, 
an attempt to integrate social movement and media theories, while leaving 
conflict theory out, will miss explanations of ethnoreligious conflict. The reason 
for this is that social movement theory, as far as I discussed it and analysed it 
above, does not seem to engage with conflict in ethnic and religious terms. In 
other words, any attempt to analyse an ethnoreligious conflict (such as the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict) using social movement theory just seems implausible. 
The political environment of the internet is analysed here not in terms of the 
internet as a mass medium in the traditional sense (i. e. what would be an internet 
news bureau's or the online version of an already established medium's influence 
on the political outcome of a conflict), but rather as a significant new resource 
used by the opposing parties in a conflict. This presents us with a major 
theoretical challenge, because there is no theoretical model to date that can 
provide us with the conceptual tools to analyse the use of the interner by the 
actual parties in the conflict (endogenously) and not just theorise about the way in 
which the media influence 
- 
or not 
- 
the political outcome of a conflict 
(exogenously). The reason for this, as we saw in the section 1.4 above, is that the 
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internet is not a traditional medium, for access to which groups, institutions, or 
states compete. It may be used by anyone, at any time, from most places on the 
planet. Furthermore, despite the fact that actors using the internet might still seek 
traditional political goals like power, participation or democracy, the postmodern 
nature of the medium makes a more complex theoretical approach necessary. 
Explaining cyberconflict in a single framework, for instance a media studies 
approach, a conflict theory approach or even a social movement approach such as 
resource mobilisation theory (RMT) would provide us with a one-dimensional 
and inadequate discussion. My interest lies in examining this phenomenon under 
as many `theoretical lights' as possible and at the same time refraining from being 
blinded by the radiance of the novelty of the medium itself. 
Theoretical Framework 
Searching for a satisfactory theoretical framework, I have come up with the 
following parameters to be looked at while analysing cyberconflicts. 
1. Environment of Conflict and Conflict Mapping (real and virtual). The world 
system generates an arborescent apparatus, which is haunted by lines of flight, 
emerging through underground networks connected horizontally and lacking a 
hierarchical centre (Deleuze and Guattari). The structure of the internet is 
ideal for network groups (since it is a global network with no central 
authority) and has offered another experience of governance (no governance), 
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time and space (compression), ideology (freedom of information and access to 
it), identity (multiplicity) and fundamentally an opposition to surveillance and 
control, boundaries and apparatuses. However, in ethnoreligious 
cyberconflicts, where the groups' systems of belief and organisation aspire to 
hierarchical apparatuses (nation, religion, identification with parties and 
leaders), this network form is not always evident. This is why there is a dual 
modality of cyberconflict: one rhizomatic and one hierarchical. 
2. Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts: The impact of ICTs on: a. Mobilising structures 
(network style of movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, 
tactics, goals), b. Framing Processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of 
the internet on these processes), c. Political opportunity structure (the internet 
as a component of this structure), d. hacktivism. 
3. Ethnoreligious Cyberconflicts: a. Ethnic/religious affiliation, chauvinism, 
national identity, b. Discourses of inclusion and exclusion, c. Information 
warfare, the use of the internet as a weapon, propaganda and mobilisational 
resource d. Conflict resolution, which depends on the legal and organisational 
framework, the number of parties and issues, the distribution of power, and 
the content of values and beliefs. 
4. The internet as a medium: a. Analysing discourses (representations of the 
world, constructions of social identities and social relations), b. Control of 
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information, level of censorship, alternative sources, c. Wolsfeld: Political 
contest model among antagonists: the ability to initiate and control events, 
dominate political discourse, mobilise supporters, d. Media effects on policy 
(strategic, tactical, representational). 
Calling for a Reversal: From hierarchical to rhizomatic and (almost) vice versa. 
Dual Modality: If etluioreligious cyberconflicts are mapped as 
representing/defending loyalties of hierarchical apparatuses and sociopolitical 
cyberconflicts are empowering network forms of organisation, then as a result: 
Actors in ethnoreligious CC need to operate in a more network fashion, if they are 
fighting network forms of terrorism or resistance. Actors in sociopolitical CC 
need to operate in a more organised fashion, if they are to constructively engage 
with the present global political system or parts of that system. Conflict resolution 
will be possible, only when hierarchical apparatuses become more networked and 
rhizomatic groups become more conscious of the rest of their hosting network 380 
380 A further observation that can be made here is that ethnoreligious dimensions to cyberconflict 
environments are going to prove crucial to future `high' information warfare, targeting national 
and international infrastructures. Sociopolitical dimensions in both real and virtual environments 
are equally relevant to future `low' societal end of the spectrum warfare, targeting real international bodies and movements and their virtual representatives. Unfortunately my `footnote' 
observation at this early stage cannot be supported by empirical evidence. 
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Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts and the argument for greater organisational 
efficiency: 
The majority of groups engaging in sociopolitical cyberconflicts, as we see in 
section 4.1 where I discuss the anti-globalisation/anti-capitalist movement and in 
section 6.1 where I look at the anti-war movement, can be placed under the 
category of transnational social movements (TMs). Movements are changing from 
fairly coherent national organisations into transnational networks, with highly 
fragmented and specialised nodes composed of organisations and less organised 
mobilisations, all of which are linked through new technologies of 
communication. 3111 
Tarrow defines TMs as `sustained interactions with opponents 
- 
national or 
nonnational - by connected networks of challengers organised across national 
boundaries'. 82 In these movements we find what is called `cross-border 
diffusion': the communication of movement ideas, forms of organisation, or 
challenges to similar targets from one centre of contention to another. 383 Tarrow's 
preoccupation with transnational movements highlights the difficulties of 
aggregating people with different demands and in different locations in concerted 
campaigns of collective action. This involves `mounting collective challenges, 
drawing on social networks, common purposes, and cultural frameworks, building 
381 Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 178, cites Gamer 1994: 431 
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solidarity through connective structures and collective identities to sustain 
collective action'. 384 The dangers resulting from such an attempt are, first, the 
search for transnational common denominators that will resonate at some level 
with many cultures and tradition, and second, following a variety of issues that 
take root in particular places, which can produce ideological divergence within 
the same transnational network, as activists adapt the network to their cultures 385 
These dangers are indeed present for transnational movements. My concern is 
here to demonstrate the need to strengthen the organisational structures and 
informal weak connective structures these non-hierarchical movements normally 
have. Without sufficient organisation 
- 
whether formal or informal 
- 
political 
opportunities are not likely to be seized. An emerging international pattern of 
social movement organisation seems to be appearing: a combination of small 
professional leaderships; large but passive mass support; and impersonal network. 
like structures 386 
One of the explanations of why new social movements are decentralised or 
rhizomatic is that strong executive power structures in a given political system 
tend to induce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic and hierarchical political 
forms, which is then reflected in the movements' emphasis on informal and 
382 ibid., p. 84 
383 ibid., p. 86 
384 ibid., p. 4 
385 ibid., p. 191 
386 ibid., p. 133 
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decentralised structures. 387 Explaining this, however, does not imply that the 
following can be ignored: 'SMOs [social movement organisations] with 
formalized and professionalized structures tend to have easier access to public 
authorities, because government bureaucracies prefer to deal with organizations 
with working procedures similar to their own'. 
388 
As it happens, Bennet argues that new waves of movements with their variform 
and shifting organisations, their tendency to produce rapid and rapidly-liquidated 
coalitions, their focus on short- and medium-term issues rather than fully-fledged 
ideologies do not produce standing activist commitments or deeply held 
loyalties. 389 Although I find this largely convincing, let me just state a reservation 
about Bennet's argument. Rapid coalitions can also have a positive impact on the 
flexibility and mobility of these movements, if we consider the example of the 
anti-globalisation movement. Such coalitions have greater discretionary 
resources, enjoy easier access to the media, have cheaper and faster geographic 
mobility and cultural interaction, and can call upon the collaboration of different 
types of movement-like organisations for rapidly organised issue campaigns 390 
387 Rucht, D: `The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: A cross-movement 
and cross-national comparison' in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural 
Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 192 
388 Kriesi, H: `The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context' in 
McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M. (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, p. 158 
389 Bennett, W. L: (2004) `Communicating global activism' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, 
P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and 
New York, p. 128, citing Tarrow, 1999: 30. 
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Brown following Tarrow has expressed the hierarchical/network dilemma in 
similar terms. 91 His argument is that networks 
with decentralized decision-making have the advantage of being better able to 
deal with local conditions than centralized and hierarchical organizations. 
However, networks may find it difficult to develop cultures or perspectives and 
while their superiority to hierarchies is asserted the advantage of hierarchy is that 
it allows concentration of resources behind a common purpose quickly and 
easily. 392 
Following this reasoning, I think that here, the most illuminating perspective is 
provided by Tarrow, who explains that the problem for movement organisers is to 
create organisational models that are sufficiently robust to structure sustained 
relations with opponents, but are flexible enough to permit the informal 
connections that link people and networks to one another to aggregate and 
coordinate contention. The most effective forms of organisation are based on 
partly autonomous and contextually-rooted local units linked by connective 
structures, and coordinated by formal organisations 
393 Tarrow develops the 
argument further: 
390 Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 207 
391 Brown, R: `Conceptualizing the Impact of Communication Technologies on World Politics: 
Space, Time, and Mobilization', International Studies Association Conference, Washington DC 
17-21 February 1999, p. 9 cites Tarrow, 1998, ch. 8 
392 Brown, R: ` Mobilizing the Bias of Communication: Information Technology, Political 
Communications and Transnational Political Strategy', American Political Science Association 
Convention, Washington DC, 30 August- 3 September 2000, p. 11 393 Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 124 
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The dilemma of hierarchical movement organizations is that, when they 
permanently internalize their base, they lose their capacity for disruption, but 
when they move in the opposite direction, they lack the infrastructure to maintain 
a sustained interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters. This suggests a 
delicate balance between formal organization and autonomy 
- 
one that can only 
be bridged by strong, informal, and nonhierarchical connective structures 394 
One may then plausibly argue for stronger organisation with strong informal and 
nonhierarchical connective structures which, although remaining autonomous, 
would be coordinated by formal organisations. This might solve some of the 
problems stated above. 
It is equally important to stress the impact of new communication technologies on 
these movements, because in several instances the internet has been responsible 
for the rapid cross-border diffusion of movement ideas and organisation of protest 
and even the globality of protest itself: 
The growth of broad networks despite (or because of) relatively weak social 
identity and ideology ties, the transformation of both individual member 
organizations and the growth of patterns of whole networks, and the capacity to 
communicate messages from desktops to television screens. The same qualities 
394 Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 137 
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that make these communication-based politics durable also make then vulnerable 
to problems of control, decision making and collective identity. 
395 
This is the reason why stronger organisation is of paramount importance. In order 
for communication revolution to change the political opportunity structure and 
challenge the scope of political life, `rather than assuming that the impact of 
technology makes organisation irrelevant, this suggests that the fragmentation of 
media spheres will actually make organization more important as a way of 
triggering political action'. 396 
As Van Aelst and Walgrave have argued, although the availability of new 
communication technologies makes traditional organisations somewhat 
dispensable for mobilisation purposes, a certain institutionalisation remains 
necessary in order to exert a more lasting political influence. 397 But if the network 
is the prevalent organisational form surfacing from the integration of the internet, 
the movement's goals can be achieved only when combined strategies of 
398 traditional and new media usage are implemented. The reason for this is that 
`while networked communication may help sustain the campaigns that organize 
global activism, these leaderless networks may undermine the thematic coherence 
393 Bennett, W. L: (2004) `Communicating global activism' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, 
P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and 
New York, p. 144 
396 Brown, R: `The Contagiousness of Conflict: E. E Schattschneider as a theorist of the 
information society', Information, Communication and Society, 5: 2 2002, p. 271 
397 Edwards, A: (2004) `The Dutch women's movement online' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, 
Nixon, P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: 
London and New York, p. 200 
398 Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, P, Rucht, D: (2004) Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens 
and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 161 
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of the ideas that are communicated through them'. 399 Moreover, communication 
in diverse networks is ideologically thin and `as anyone who has caught the 
internet virus can attest, virtual activism may serve as a substitute 
- 
and not as a 
spur 
- 
to activism in the real world'. 400 
Before concluding that the world is entering an unprecedented age of global 
movements, we will `need to follow some of the recent campaigns that have been 
assisted by electronic communication to find out whether it increases the 
movement's power or merely changes how it frames its message' 40' Three kinds 
of long-term and indirect effects of movements are important: their effect on the 
political socialisation of the people and groups who have participated in them; the 
effects of their struggles on political institutions and practices; and their 
contribution to changes in political structure. 02 The central question raised by 
new waves of social protest is whether they are creating a transnational movement 
culture that threatens the structure and sovereignty of the national state 403 
399 Bennett, W. L: (2004) `Communicating global activism' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, 
P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 134 
400 Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 193 401 ibid., p. 194 
402 ibid., p. 164 
403 ibid. 
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Ethnoreligious Cyberconflicts and the argument for moving towards network 
forms of organisation 
This idea has been fundamental in Arquilla and Ronfeldt's works on conflict in 
the information age. They basically argue that hierarchies have a difficult time 
fighting networks (e. g. Colombia, Algeria, the Zapatistas). It takes networks to 
fight networks and whoever masters the network form first and with the most 
success will gain major advantages 404 What Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue is that 
terrorists will continue moving from hierarchical to information-age network 
designs and that within groups `great man leaderships will give way to flatter 
decentralised systems. This way more effort will go into building arrays of 
transnationally internetted groups than into building state-alone groups' 405 As a 
result, power seems to be migrating to nonstate actors, who are able to organise 
into `sprawling multi-organizational networks', which are more flexible and 
responsive than hierarchies in reacting to outside developments and are better 
than hierarchies at using information to improve decision-making 406 
This vision emphasises adapting to a major consequence of the information 
revolution 
- 
the rise of network forms of organisation. Especially after 9/11 it has 
become essential for states to become more flexible, in order to be able to face 
network-style organisations. Arquilla and Ronfeldt's thesis is that the challenge is 
404 Arquilla, J and Ronfeldt, D: (2001) (eds. ) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime 
and Militancy, Rand: California, p. 55 40' Lesser et. al, p. 41 406 ibid., p. 45 
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to develop hybrids in which "all channel" networks are fitted to flattened 
hierarchies. The major benefits may accrue in the areas of interagency and 
interservice cooperation. Since militaries must retain hierarchical command 
structures at their core, their hybrids should retain - yet flatten - the residual 
hierarchy, while allowing dispersed maneuver "nodes" to have direct, all channel 
contact with each other, and with the higher command 407 
The information revolution is favoring and strengthening networked 
organisational designs, often at the expense of hierarchies. States need to wake up 
to this fact and realise that networks can be fought effectively only by flexible 
network-style responses. For now I will rest this argument, but I shall come back 
to it in section 3.1, where I discuss information warfare more substantially. 
407 Arquilla, J and Ronfeldt, D: (1997) `Looking Ahead: Preparing for Information-Age Conflict' 
in Arquilla, J and Ronfeldt, D (eds. )ln Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information 
Age, Rand: California, p. 440 
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Chapter 3: The environment of Cyberconflict 
By the turn of the century a new kind of conflict, named `cyberconflict' to mean 
conflict in computer-mediated environments (cyberspace), had emerged and 
become prevalent. This thesis seeks to introduce the key terms and themes of 
cyberconflict and argue that two different types of conflict occur: one between 
ethnic or religious groups fighting over in cyberspace, as they do in real life, and 
second, conflicts between a social movement and its antagonistic institution 
(hacktivism). This chapter unfolds the environment of cyberconflict by analysing 
the terms involved and engaging with the current debates in information warfare 
and security. More specifically, it includes analyses on hackers, information 
warfare, cyberterrorism, internet security analysis and cyberconflict's 
sociopolitical implications. 
The political use of the internet has created a new lexicon, spawning terms like 
`cyberwar', `cyberattack' and `netwar'. The term `cyberconflict' (CC) 
- 
the 
generic reference to a certain form of politics on the internet - is now in regular 
use, but it has not yet been sufficiently clarified. This is because there are 
problems in defining and categorising the wide variety of events occurring in 
cyberspace that fall under this conceptual umbrella. Here, the term cyberconflict 
is used to refer to conflicts of the real world spilling over to cyberspace. Typical 
of cyberattacks is the use by opposing parties of either Information Technology as 
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such or IT as a weapon - for example worms408, Distributed Denial of service 
attacks (DDoS)409, Domain Name Service attacks (DNS)410, or unauthorised 
intrusionsalt 
- 
to attack the other side. The argument of this thesis is that 
cyberconflict includes two different categories of cyberpolitical action. These 
categories are sometimes blurred, but need to be distinguished in order to 
understand internet politics. 
One of these theoretical lights is Gadi Wolfsfeld's political contest model. As 
discussed above, his work Media and Political Conflict (1997) looks at the role of 
the media in political conflicts by building what he calls the political contest 
model. According to Wolfsfeld, the best way to understand the role of the news 
media in political conflict is `to view the competition over the news media as part 
of a larger and more significant contest among political antagonists for political 
408 Most contemporary viruses are worms, enabled by `buffer overflows'. Buffer overflow is an 
event in which more data is put into a buffer (computer holding area) than the buffer has been 
allocated. In recent years they have become very popular with new worms such as Code Red, 
Code Red II, which allows it to gain control of the infected machine and the Nimda worm. (Vatis, 
M: `Cyber Attacks During The War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis', Sep., 22,2001, 
Institute for Technology Studies, Dartmouth College). Some researchers have predicted the 
emergence of new worms (Warhol worms, flash worms), spreading in seconds, leaving no time for 
system administrators to react. (Weaver, N: `Warhol Worms: The potential for very fast internet 
plagues", University of California Berkley, Aug. 15,2001) 
409 DDos attacks employ armies of `zombie' machines (insecure server compromised by a hacker 
who places software on it that can launch an overwhelming number of requests, rendering the site 
inoperable). As demonstated in the Kosovo conflict, military websites and communications 
systems are especially likely to receive DDos variants (Vatis, 200 1) 
ao Domain name servers are the `Yellow Pages' that computers consult in order to obtain the 
mapping between the name of a system and the numerical adress of the system. If the DNS 
provides an incorrect numerical adress for a website then the user's system will connect to the 
incorrect server. An attacker can disseminate false information this way and prevent acces to the 
original site (Vatis, 2001). 
411 A series of intrusions known as Moonlight Maze, which are believed to have originated in 
Russia were firstly detected in March 1998 and hundreds of unclassified networks used by the 
Pentagon, NASA and the Department of energy, may have been compromised. 
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control' 412 However, the true relevance of his work to cyberconflict can be seen 
in his discussion of the three variables that constitute the ability of the antagonist 
to control the political environment, which in turn increase the ability of an 
antagonist to dominate public discourse about a particular issue 413 These are the 
ability to initiate and control; the ability to regulate the flow of information; and 
the ability to mobilise support. The problem with this is that Wolfsfeld is talking 
about `real' political conflicts, where the news media outside the conflict 
(exogenously) respond to events. However, we are interested in how the parties in 
a `cyberconflict' (either socio-political or ethnoreligious 
- 
and this is where 
Wolfsfeld's variables prove helpful in order to understand the differences) use a 
medium directly (endogenously) without third parties (traditional news media) to 
influence the political outcome of a conflict. 
Netwarriors: Terrorists or Social Activists? 
It is not surprising that the internet has been used vigorously by social activists 
and campaigners all over the world. The internet quickly puts information into the 
hands of organisers, allows rapid replication of a successful effort, allows users to 
select their level of activity and helps publicise the campaign. It is therefore an 
organising tool par excellance, because the more traditional telephone trees or fax 
machines are too slow and the physical distances are too difficult and too 
412 Wolfsfeld, p. 3. 413 ibid., p. 25. 
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expensive to cover. 4t4 However, the internet is not only used by social activists. 
An examination of historical precedents indicates that major political and military 
conflicts are increasingly accompanied by a significant amount of online 
aggressive activity. Ongoing conflicts also show that cyberattacks are escalating 
in volume, sophistication and coordination. 4t5 Parties in cyberconflicts have been 
described as terrorists or social activists depending on the discursive mood of 
their critics. This is why it is important to examine the politics of this 
phenomenon and understand its implications for future conflicts. 
414 Danitz, T and Strobel, W: (2001) `Cyberactivists use the Internet to promote democracy in Burma', in J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime 
and Militancy, Rand: California, p. 162 415 Vatis, M: (200 1) 'Cyberattacks during the war on terrorism: A predictive analysis', Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College: Dartmouth. 
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3.1 Information Warfare 
Hackers 
It is vital to include an analysis of the hacking phenomenon and a discussion of 
where it fits in the political environment of cyberconflict. Essentially those 
involved in ethnoreligious or sociopolitical environments of cyberconflict are 
hackers 
- 
excepting of course social movement actors using the internet as a 
mobilisational resource. I will briefly focus on Paul Taylor's416 influential work 
Hackers, which provides excellent interviews and discussion on hackers, 
computer scientists, and computer security practitioners. 
In contrast to my analysis of computer-mediated conflict between opposing sides 
of a `real world' conflict, Taylor concentrates upon the conflict between the 
computer security industry and the computer underground (hackers). The 
computer cognoscenti are split into two camps: the `doves' who are prepared to 
cooperate with the computer underground, arguing that hackers represent an 
important stock of technical knowledge that society should not prematurely 
isolate itself from by adopting a `punish first, ask questions later' approach, and 
the ` hawks', who advocate that the computer underground should be punished in 
416 Taylor, P: (1999) Hackers: Crime in the Digital Sublime, Routledge: London. 
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the courts. 17 Similarly, a definition of a `hacker' varies, according to the 
discursive mood of the speaker: 
... 
to the lay person the phrase is likely to conjure up sensationalised images of 
malicious computer geeks in darkened rooms obsessively typing away; 
meanwhile to the computer aficionado, the phrase is more likely to be associated 
with its dramatic fictionalisation in the movies and the postmodern literary genre 
of cyberpunk; to the computer programmer the term may refer to some of the 
earliest and most imaginative people involved in programming; and finally, 
wihin the computer security industry, the term hacker is likely to present a cue 
for opprobrium to be directed at `electronic vandals'. 18 
The word `hacker', coined at MIT in the 1960s, connoted a computer virtuoso, 
who according to the New Hacker's Dictionary `enjoys exploring the details of 
programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities; one who programs 
enthusiastically, even obsessively'. The meaning has evolved from the highly 
skilled, but playful activity of academic computer programmers searching for the 
most elegant programming solution to being increasingly associated with its 
present day connotation of illicit computer intrusion. 19 Today's generation-x 
anarchist hackers share with their artisan and activist hacker predecessors a 
distrust of authority, a libertarian attitude and a tendency to position themselves 
417 ibid., p. xi 418 ibid., pxii 419 ibid., pp. 13-14 
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outside bourgeois society's norms and values. 20 The main characteristics of a 
hack according to Taylor are: a. simplicity (the act has to be simple, but 
impressive), b. mastery (the act involves sophisticated technical knowledge), c. 
illicitness (the act is against the rules) 421 Thus, a hacker is defined not just by 
what he does but how he does it. The motivations for hacking are: feelings of 
addiction, the urge of curiosity, boredom with the educational system, enjoyment 
of a feeling of power, peer recognition, and political motivations. The computer 
industry is accused of over-emphasizing the vandal-oriented motivations and 
pathological aspects of hacking 422 So how does hacking feel? 
... 
the adrenaline rush I get when I'm trying to evade authority, the thrill I get 
from having written a program that does something that was supposed to be 
impossible to do, and the ability to have social relations with other hackers is all 
very addictive... For a long time, I was extremely shy around others, and I am 
able to let my thoughts run free when I am alone with my computer and a modem 
hooked up to it... If I were ever in a position where I knew my computer activity 
was over with the rest of my life I would suffer withdrawal 423 
Part of it was a sense of power. You were running an informal network of about 
250 computers and no-one else outside your close circle of friends knew about it. 
The final goal was total world domination, to have everything under control. It 
was the ultimate game on the ultimate scale. You got a thrill out of knowing how 
420 ibid., p. 24 Taylor cites Hannemyr 1997: 2 
421 ibid., p. 15 
422 ibid., p. 46 423 ibid., p. 48, Maelstrom, email interview 
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much power you had. It was possibly hitting back at society. There was a sort of 
political anarchism involved. The main thrill was beating the system 424 
In Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and Surveillance in the Information 
Age, Thomas writes that what is talked about in terms of hackers is the manner in 
which hackers themselves exist in a shadow space of secrecy, possessing near- 
mystical powers that allow control of technology that itself is beyond discourse. 
The hackers themselves are coded in such a way that they literally become the 
secret that needs to be broken. Fundamentally, one can watch a hacker's actions, 
even monitor them online, but this means nothing until they can be attached to a 
real body and therefore become prosecutable. The reason for looking at hackers is 
that individuals and groups engaged in sociopolitical and ethnoreligious 
cyberconflicts are part of the hacking culture in a particularly politicised way. 
Nowadays, hackers fight for clearer political goals than their forebears, especially 
campaigning for information freedom. Many hackers believe that electronic 
communications are unsafe, with governments legally tapping data lines, copying 
electronic mail and with suspicion of hacking often enough to get search warrants 
or to confiscate equipment. Accordingly, Goggans, another hacker Taylor 
interviewed, argues: 
424 ibid., p. 56, Taylor cites Bowcott and Hamilton (1990: 42) 
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I know all too well how simple it is to view and alter consumer credit, to transfer 
funds, to monitor telephone conversations etc... I can monitor data on any 
network in existence, I can root privileges on ANY Sun Microsystems UNIX. If 
I, a 22 year-old, non-degreed, self-taught, can do these things, what can a 
professionally taught profit motivated individual do? THERE IS NO 
PRIVACY... People need to know the truth about the vulnerabilities of the 
computers they have entrusted their lives to 425 
However, as Taylor and Jordan argue, `[h]ackers' over-identification with 
technical means over political ends and their parasitical relationship to various 
technological systems means that although they are at the heart of the exercise of 
power, they remain in an ultimately powerless dependent relationship' 426 
Further, the computer underground is anarchic, a confederation of 
phreakers/hackers and virus writers from all over the world whose common 
interests transcend culture or language. `They change IDs, aliases, sites, their 
methods and gang membership as rapidly as the authorities track them. Stamping 
out hacking is like trying to pin down mercury' 427 
Hacking can potentially perform a variety of benevolent services to the security 
industry: it has been responsible for many of the most progressive developments 
in software development, it reflects the ways in which the development of high 
425 ibid., p. 70, Goggans email interview 426 Taylor, P. A and Jordan, T: (2004) Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels with a cause?, Routlege: London, p. 162 
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technology has outpaced orthodox forms of institutional education, it is an 
important form of watchdog counter-response to the use of surveillance 
technology and data gathering by the state and to the increasingly monolithic 
communications power of giant corporations, and finally as guerilla know-how, it 
is essential to the task of maintaining fronts of cultural resistance and stocks of 
oppositional knowledge as a hedge against a techno-fascist future. 
28 Also, the 
hacker presence constantly pushes forward the limits of computer security and 
thus contributes to a general climate of improved security consciousness, without 
which `the nation would be nakedly awaiting serious attack from thieves and 
foreign agents' 429 
On the other side of the coin, the business sector is reluctant to report computer 
crime for two reasons. Firstly, for fear of adverse publicity, public embarrassment 
or loss of good will. Secondly, for fear of the loss of investor or public confidence 
and the resulting economic consequences. Official statistics on hacking incidents 
tend to be unreliable, firstly because the organisations affected may be totally 
oblivious to security breaches that have occurred, leading to possible under- 
reporting, and secondly because there is a tendency for both computer security 
figures and hackers to hyperbolise the situation, leading perhaps to over-reporting. 
At the same time, serious security incidents are whitewashed, because otherwise 
the management would be accused of negligence 430 
427 ibid., p. 28, Taylor cites Clough and Mungo (1992: 18) 428 ibid., p. 43 Taylor cites Ross (1991: 82) 429 
ibid., p. 97, Maelstrom, email interview 430 ibid., pp. 67-68 
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One of Taylor's main arguments is that a knowledge gap exists between the 
computer security industry and the computer underground. Due to the fact that 
computer security is lacking in any theoretical grounding, the only true way to test 
security is to actually attempt to breach a system. There is a scarcity of theoretical 
knowledge surrounding computer security with various calls for more hands-on 
experience of security to supplement more formal theory. `The knowledge gap is 
thus rooted in the difference between theoretical concepts and guidelines to 
security and the "nitty gritty" of real world computing situations where security 
weaknesses flourish in the interstices of continually expanding and evolving 
computer systems' 431 Hackers are sometimes used to do the testing. The problem, 
however, is that hackers may have potentially useful knowledge, but such 
knowledge often does not sit comfortably with the academic and commercial 
world's preference for ethically unproblematic and rigorously researched 
knowledge. Often, hackers are labelled as deviant despite the fact that the hacker 
community shares some of the same characteristics as its computer security 
industry counterpart. 
These are tough time for hackers. Federal agencies now have broad new powers 
to spy on them, thanks to provisions in the anti-terrorist USA PATRIOT Act. The 
House of Representatives in the United States passed a law that could send 
hackers to prison for life, and on top of that, former hackers have difficulty 
431 ibid., p. 79 
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finding a job, because there are enough people with the same level of skills 
around. 
Information warfare and cyberterrorism 
The most common of the views on information warfare and the future of conflict, 
whose best-known exponents are Heidi and Alvin Toffler432, extrapolates from 
the idea that territory, population, and natural resources are becoming less 
important relative to human capital and the possession of information. Taking this 
process to its logical conclusion, these theorists see information soon becoming 
the key source of wealth and power, equivalent to steel, coal, and oil in the 
industrial age or fertile land in the agricultural age. This change will eventually 
amount to a social revolution whose scope is equivalent to only two previous such 
transformations: the agricultural and industrial revolutions 433 Just as the transition 
from agriculture to industry was correlated with the industrialisation of warfare, 
so too counterparts aver that people war as they work 434 The transition will be 
from industry to information-based services and this will correlate with the 
`informatting' of warfare. War waged in cyberspace might be bloodless and even 
clean, a possibility that has led one high-ranking military officer to see 
information technology as `America's gift to warfare. '435 Sun Ji is an icon in this 
pantheon, with his observation that the `acme of skill' consists in winning without 
432 Toffler, A: (1980) The Third Wave, Morrow: New York. 
433 Shapiro, J: (1999): `Information and war: Is it a revolution? ' in Khalizad, Z, White, J and 
Marshall, A: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California 
p. 117 
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fighting. Advanced technological systems will not only help shape the 
environment of future conflict but will also magnify the importance of the 
psychological battle to the conflict outcome. 
One definition of cyberterrorism is `computer-based attacks intended to intimidate 
or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, religious 
or ideological' 436 So, who can be a cyberterrorist? The answer is anyone, David 
and Sakurai argue, citing a CERT/CC April 2002 report, which states the level of 
automation in attack tools continues to increase. Automated attacks commonly 
involve four phases: (1) Scanning for potential victims, (2) Compromising 
vulnerable systems, (3) Propagating the attack, (4) Coordinated management of 
attack tools 437 
Indeed, the problem for American defence experts is that they don't know who 
the enemy is: 
Whether they are disgruntled Americans, Hamas terrorists or pariah dictators as 
Saddam, the attackers could wage cyber warfare undetected on any laptop 
computer from the Sinai desert to Singapore. Just as exasperating for the 
government would be deciding how to deploy its military. `If you don't know 
who your enemy is, how can you retaliate? ' said one expert. This makes cyber 
434 Owens, 1995. 
°3S ibid. 
436 Denning, D: (2001) `Is cyberterrorism next? ' www. ssrc. org/sepl l/essays/denning/html 
437 David, M. W and Sakurai. K: `Combating cyberterrorism: Improving analysis and 
accountability', Journal of Information Warfare (2003) 2,2: 15-26 
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warfare the great equaliser, a cheap and effective weapon for any third world 
rogue state or small terrorist organisation wanting to wage war against a super- 
power and win. All they might need is a few million dollars to hire a handful of 
`cyber mercenaries' capable of penetrating supposedly secure systems 438 
Michael Vatis, director of the institute for Security Technology Studies in 
Dartmouth reported the following on September 26th 2001 before a US House 
Subcommittee: 
(1) the likelihood of cyberattacks against the US and allied information infrastructure 
is high; 
(2) such attacks could come from terrorists and/or their nation-state sponsors, but are 
more likely to come from sympathisers of terrorists or of nation states targeted by 
US military operations; 
(3) such attacks will almost certainly target the websites of government agencies and 
private companies in the US and allied countries, but could also attack more 
high-value targets such as networks that control critical infrastructures; 
(4) such attacks could utilize destructive worms and viruses, Distributed Denial of 
Service exploits, and intrusions to disrupt targeted networks; 
(5) such cyber exploits could be combined into a potent mix to cause widespread 
disruption, and also combined with physical terrorist attacks to maximize the 
destructive potential of both sets of terrorist tools 439 
438 Sunday Times 17 May 1998, p. 26 439 David, M. W and Sakurai. K: `Combating cyberterrorism: Improving analysis and 
accountability', Journal of Information Warfare (2003) 2,2, pp. 15-26 
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The concept most commonly used to connect IT and the military is information 
warfare. What is meant is that the object of conflict is no longer territory or 
resources, but information. The object of information warfare is the control over 
information as a source of wealth and power. 4440 The U. S. Air Force has described 
it as encompassing `any action to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy's 
information and its functions, protecting ourselves against those actions and 
exploiting our own military information functions' 441 The battlespace of 
information warfare is cyberspace 
- 
an ethereal place which does not fit neatly 
into the land, sea air space metaphors, where conflicting parties strive for 
information superiority and dominance. According to Shapiro, `information 
dominance means that your side has the ability to collect, communicate, and 
protect information without disruption, while the other side does not'2 Taking 
out all information-transfer media would bring down a country's stock market, 
banking system, air traffic control, emergency dispatches and more. In November 
2003, the US Homeland Security Department's first simulation of a terrorist 
attack on computer, banking and utility systems exposed problems with the ways 
victimised industries communicated vital information during the crisis. It 
simulated physical and computer attacks on banks, power companies and the oil 
and gas industry. Electronic communications may have been used by the Sept. 11 
terrorists and are certainly used by some of those accused of related terrorism 
offences, such as alleged 911 accomplice Moussaoui, who requested that 
440 Shapiro, J: (1999): `Information and war: Is it a revolution? ' in Khalizad, Z, White, J and 
Marshall, A: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California, 
119 cites Toffler and Toffler (1993) Dearth and Williams (1996) and Schwartau (1994). 41 Larsen, J, Director, Institute for National Security Studies. 
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prosecutors turn over their records of messages sent and received through his 
email account, claiming his email could help him establish his alibi 
443 
Remarkably, terrorists are being bred and trained to be technologically savvy and 
to attack, disrupt, damage and perhaps even destroy technology infrastructures 
and computer-based economic activities. They are the biggest threat to the 
information infrastructure and the new digital economy. 444 Cyberterrorists could 
act in the name of one religion or another and support or be supported by one or 
more outlaw nations. They will attack anything that is vulnerable and will focus 
their attacks on headline-grabbing efforts to make civilian populations fearful and 
to embarrass government officials and organisations. Erbschloe has offered the 
following conclusions as far as terrorists' use of information warfare is 
concerned: 
Because of the international nature of information warfare, existing political 
structures are not prepared to immediately investigate the source of attacks and to 
appropriately respond to and counter information warfare scenarios. It is not 
likely that all governments will equally participate or cooperate in the 
investigation or information warfare attacks or that they will work together to 
halt attacks... Information warfare attacks can effectively impact the economics 
442 Shapiro, p. 130 
443 Delio, M: `Did FBI bungle email evidence? ', wired. com, 30/8/02 444 Erbschloe, M: (2001) Information Warfare: How to Survive Cyber Attacks, McGraw- 
Hill: Berkely, California, p. 37 
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of a nation or region without destroying infrastructures or disabling military 
capabilities 445 
According to Erbschloe sustained terrorist information warfare strategies are the 
ongoing deliberate efforts of an organised political group against the military, 
industrial, civilian, and government economic information infrastructures or 
activities of a nation, region, organisation of states, population or corporate entity. 
In purely information-warfare terms, there are five dynamics that favor the outlaw 
attacker in comparison to the defender. 446 Firstly, a fundamental dynamic of 
information warfare is that defenders must always succeed in protecting systems, 
whereas if attackers do not succeed, they can try again or move to another target. 
A second dynamic is the growth of computer networks and the increase of 
internet connectivity. A conversation with a director of computer security at a 
large telecommunications firm reveals the magnitude of the problem. When 
asked, `Are all of the computers in your company secure? ' the answer was: `They 
will be when I find out where they all are'. 47 A third dynamic is that the attackers 
have access to all of the same technology the defender has as well as all of the 
technical information about systems, including weaknesses in hardware and 
software. Relating to that is that the attackers can use the internet and become 
members of the same clubs, chat rooms, bulletin boards and email lists that 
defenders use to get information about products and to talk with their peers. 
aas ibid., p. 95 
446 ibid., pp. 174-5 
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Lastly, attackers not only can work from almost anywhere in the world, but they 
can easily outnumber defenders. Also, hackers and computer bandits take as much 
pride in their abilities and accomplishments as do the people trying to stop them. 
Similar levels of pride have been noted for terrorists, especially those who have a 
religious basis for their actions. Ultimately, as Erbschloe argues, religious or 
politically motivated terrorists usually gain little in the way of financial 
compensation, but are often revered in their community and can die as heroes in 
their country 448 
In such an arena, several questions emerge. First, is a strategic information attack 
tantamount to a physical attack? Second, can a military advantage in information 
technology guarantee success within low-intensity conflict, against low-tech 
asymmetrical strategies? 449 Third, is there a transition from platform-centric 
warfare (wherein networks exist to enhance platform performance) to network- 
centric warfare (wherein platforms are the eyes, ears and fists of a broader 
entity)? 45° Although it is too early to answer, there are some early indications. As 
far as Shapiro is concerned, there will be a definite change in battle dynamics: 
`commanders would no longer be encouraged to use intuition or take risks 
because "dominant battle space knowledge" would render such attributes 
unnecessary or even dangerous. A radically different military and a very different 
aal ibid., p. 174 
448 ibid., p. 259 
449 Gombert., p. 61 
450 Libicki, M and Shapiro, J: (2001) Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California. 
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style of fighting would certainly result' 
. 
451 Also, command, control, 
communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C41 SR) will control the outcome of the conflict. 452 
At the systemic level, information warfare is the organisation of information to 
provide warfighters with what has been termed `dominant battlespace 
knowledge', an important component of which is the American Department of 
Defense's nascent `system of systems. ' Insofar as the ability to kill what can be 
seen makes seeing (locating, identifying, and tracking) the key to war, seeing is 
increasingly best done by networking sensors and human observers to create a 
shared ground truth that forms the basis of command, control, and operations. 
One of the most influential centres analysing information warfare is the Rand 
Corporation. Starting with their work Countering the New Terrorism, Lesser, 
Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini and Jenkins introduced the concept of 
cyberterrorism and, in subsequent publications analysed below, gave a thorough 
analysis of the issues involved. 
Terrorism according to these authors has always been about information: 
... 
from the fact that trainees for suicide bombings are kept from listening to 
international media, through the ways that terrorists seek to create disasters that 
451 Shapiro, J: (1999): `Information and war: Is it a revolution? ' in Khalizad, Z, White, J and Marshall, A: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California, 
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will consume the front pages, to the related debates about countermeasures that 
would limit freedom of the press, increase public surveillance and intelligence 
gathering, and heighten security over information and communication systems 453 
According to a report released on May 1999 by the Rand Corporation, which was 
the result of a year-long project sponsored by the Airforce's Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Air and Space Operations, there will be a new form of terrorism known as 
`netwar': 
The rise of networks is likely to reshape terrorism in the Information Age and 
lead to the adoption of netwar 
-a kind of Information Age conflict that will be 
waged principally by nonstate actors. There is a new generation of radicals and 
activists who are just beginning to create Information Age ideologies. New kinds 
of actors, such as anarchistic leagues of computer- hacking `cyboteurs' may also 
partake of netwar. 454 
The same report advised that the U. S Air Force should slow its modernisation 
plans and rethink its connections to the internet if it wants to fight off a 
revolutionary, as yet undeveloped form of cyberterrorism. The rise of networks is 
likely to reshape terrorism in the Information Age and lead to the adoption of 
p146 
ase Gombert, p. 59 
453 Lesser, I, Hoffman, B, Arquilla, J, Ronfeldt, D, Zanini, M, Jenkins, B. M: (1999) Countering 
the New Terrorism, Rand: California, p. 72 454 Verton, D: `New cyberterror threatens AF', Federal Computer Week, 3/5/99 
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netwar 
-a kind of Information Age conflict that will be waged principally 
by non- 
state actors. 455 
The Rand report also predicts that cyberterrorists will use new tactics such as 
`swarming', which occurs when members of a terrorist group, spread over great 
distances, electronically converge on a target from multiple directions, a tactic 
different from the traditional form of attacking in waves, which delivers a 
knockout blow from a single direction on the internet 456 
However, it would be useful to stress that terrorists might be more interested to 
keep the internet up and running than to disrupt or destroy its components. One 
has to agree with Arquilla and Ronfeldt that network-based conflict will become a 
major phenomenon of the future and this can be clearly demonstrated with al- 
Qaeda long before the September 11th attack, with reports of bin Laden having 
advanced information systems designed by Egyptian computer scientists. 57 As 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue: 
These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed small groups who 
communicate, co-ordinate and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, 
without a precise central command... To give a string of examples, netwar is 
455 D. Verton, `New cyberterror threatens AF', Federal Computer Week, 3/5/99 
456 For more information see Arquilla, J and Ronfeldt, D: (2000) Swarming and the Future of 
Conflict, Rand: California. 
457 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, (2001) Networks and Netwars, Rand: California. The authors cite: `Arab 
Afghans said to launch world-wide terrorist war', Paris al-Watan al-Arabi, December 1,1995, 
pp22-24/ Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia: `Editor's journey to meet Bin Laden described', London al- 
Quds al-Arabi, 1997, pp. 4 
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about the Middle East's Hamas more than the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), Mexico's Zapatistas more than Cuba's Fidelistas, and the American 
Christian patriot movement more than the Ku Klux Klan 458 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that power seems to be migrating to nonstate actors, 
who are able to organise into `sprawling multi-organizational networks', which 
are more flexible and responsive than hierarchies in reacting to outside 
developments, and appear to be better than hierarchies at using information to 
improve decision-making 459 Essentially, what these writer argue is that conflicts 
will evolve around `knowledge' and the use of `soft power'. This would come 
about with the help of information-age ideologies, in which identities and 
loyalties shift from the nation-state to the transnational level of global civil 
society. 
When Lesser et al. talk about networks, they describe three types: a. the chain 
network where actors move along a chain of separated contacts, and where end- 
to-end communication travels through the intermediate nodes; b. the star, hub or 
wheel network, where a set of a actors is tied to a central node or actor, and must 
go through that node to coordinate; and c. the all-channel network, as in a 
collaborative network of small, militant groups where every group is connected to 
every other. 460 It is important to note that netwar is not simply a function of the 
4458 5 
ibid, p. 45. 
9 Lesser, I, Hoffman, B, Arquilla, J, Ronfeldt, D, Zanini, M, Jenkins, B. M: (1999) Countering 
the New Terrorism, Rand: California 
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internet; it does not take place only in cyberspace or the infosphere. As Lesser et. 
al argue: 
Some key battles may occur there, but a war's overall conduct and outcome will 
normally depend mostly on what happens in the real world. Even in information- 
age conflicts, what happens in the real world is generally more important than 
what happens in the virtual worlds of cyberspace or the infosphere. Netwar is not 
Internet war. 461 
For example, Hamas uses internet chat rooms and emails in the United States to 
coordinate their activities across Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, making it 
difficult for Israeli security officials to trace their messages and decode their 
contents 462 In a 1998 US News and World Report there was evidence of 12 of the 
30 groups on the US State Department's list of terrorist organisations on the Web. 
More recently, it seems that virtually every terrorist organisation is on the 
internet 463 For instance, the presence of Middle Eastern terrorist organisations on 
the internet is suspected in the case of the Islamic Gateway, a World Wide 
Website that contains information on a number of Islamic activist organisations 
based in the United Kingdom. British Islamic activists use the World Wide Web 
to broadcast their news and attract funding; they are also turning to the internet as 
an organisational and communication tool. While the vast majority of Islamic 
461 ibid., p. 53 
462 Denning, D: `Activism, hacktivism and cyberterrorism: The Internet as a tool for influencing 
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activist groups represented in the Islamic Gateway are legitimate, one group - the 
Global Jihad Fund 
- 
makes no secret of its militant goals. 464 
Moreover, an internet site claiming to represent al-Qaeda said that the network 
decided to launch suicide attacks against Israel with the goal being the destruction 
of the Jewish state. US government officials believe that the site indeed speaks for 
al-Qaeda, and intelligence officers had been monitoring it for some time. Bruce 
Hoffman, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corporation research group, 
commented that al-Qaeda's new attacks on Israel stem from terrorists looking for 
work, with al-Qaeda desperate to appear relevant, to be a player in Middle Eastern 
politics 465 Also, Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas) warned in closed-door briefings for 
members of Congress that there is a 50 per cent chance that the next time al- 
Qaeda terrorists strike the United States, their attack will include a cyberattack. 
Smith said that officials from federal law enforcement and intelligence-gathering 
agencies disclosed that al-Qaeda operatives have been exploring US websites and 
probing the electronic infrastructure of American companies in search of ways to 
disable power and water supplies, disrupt phone services and damage other parts 
of the critical infrastructure. 466 In more subtle terms, Azzam Publications, based 
in London and named after Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a mentor of Osama bin 
Laden, has a site dedicated to Jihad around the world. It is alleged that the site, 
which sold Jihad-related material from books to videos, was raising funds for the 
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Taliban in Afghanistan and for allied guerrillas fighting the Russians in 
Chechnya. 467 
Also, US forces hunting down al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters strung fiber-optic 
cables through the treetops and installed satellite uplinks, providing thousands of 
American troops with a crucial link to home: the internet. The technology of 
course stands in stark contrast to the spartan surroundings, as few people in 
Afghanistan have phones and fewer still have ever seen the intemet. 468 
Jerry Everard, in his work Virtual States, argues that a developed nation engaged 
in open conflict with a small, less-wired nation could find its own economic 
system targeted, with its banking system, its stock exchanges, its 
telecommunications and power grid systems, and its logistical support networks 
being systematically targeted from any point on earth. `Such activities could result 
in swaying the hearts and minds of the domestic polity of the developed west 
toward the conclusion that big states may find the cost of small wars far greater 
that they bargained for' 469 
Advanced technological information systems will allow state and substate actors, 
including news services, non-governmental organisations, and even individual 
citizens, to make voice, video, and written information instantly available to 
466 Matthews, W: `Al-Qaeda cyber alarm sounded', 25/7/02 467 'Terrorists using the net to raise funds reach public', Miami Herald 3/4/01 469 
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audiences located in the remotest areas of the globe. This touches on another 
important factor: information classification. Up until now, information data in the 
US was put into separate partitions, where only a few people had access to it. 
What is needed for effective governance, however, is that authorities need to 
make information available `by job' to whoever needs it 
- 
regardless of their 
security clearance. `We have to change the way we classify information. The old 
system may have worked against the Soviet Union. But today, the federal 
government needs to make information available to law enforcement, and the 
security staff guarding the power plant', Jim Caverly, who heads the Homeland 
Security's Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
division, has commented 470 
Steven Aftergood, who heads the Federation of American Scientists' Project on 
Government Secrecy, has also pointed out that `any attempt to control the flow of 
information impedes the whole. It's the difference between a top down command 
structure and a network' 471 Military and intelligence officials are trying to move 
away from their old hierarchies and toward a structure in which every soldier, 
every drone and every general is connected by computer networks. As Jordan 
Crandall writes: 
469 Everard, J: (2000) The Internet, Democracy and Democratization, Frank Cass: London and Portland, p. 115 470 Schachtman, N: `Spies attack White House secrecy', wired, 16/10/03 471 ibid. 
235 
Computerization has brought massive changes in the development and 
coordination of databases, the speed and quality of communication with 
intelligence and tactical agencies, operations and combat teams. New 
technologies of tracking, identification, and networking have increased this 
infrastructure into a massive machinery of proactive supervision and tactical 
knowledge. Originally conceived for the defense and intelligence industries, 
these technologies have, after the cold war, rapidly spread into the law 
enforcement and private sectors 42 
Furthermore, due to the fact that netwar defies and cuts across standard 
boundaries and jurisdictions, governments have difficulty assigning responsibility 
to a single agency (military, police or intelligence) to respond. This poses a 
challenge to the state, because traditionally, ideals of sovereignty and authority 
are `linked to a bureaucratic rationality in which issues and problems can be 
neatly divided, and specific offices can be charged with taking care of specific 
problems. In netwar, things are rarely so clear' 473 
Mulveron contemplates various scenarios in The People's Liberation Army in the 
Information Age, assessing the capabilities of the US and China in a possible 
confrontation. He writes that there are important differences between Chinese and 
American Information Warfare (1W) literatures. People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
writers look at 1W in strictly military terms, while Western authors accept the 
dichotomy between information warfare waged between states or militaries 
472 Crandall, J: ` Anything that moves: Armed vision', http: //ctheory. net/text-file? pick=l 15 
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(cyberwar) and information warfare waged between substate actors and states 
(netwar). Both US and Chinese authors are guilty of over-using Sun Ji, especially 
the notion of `winning the battle without fighting'. Chinese theorists are also 
forced to discuss from an inferior technologically standpoint, in opposition to an 
advanced foe 474 Nevertheless Mulveron believes that IW presents the Chinese 
with a potentially potent, if circumscribed, asymmetrical weapon. `Defined 
carefully, it could give the PLA a longer-range power projection capability 
against US forces that its conventional forces cannot currently hope to match... to 
attack its information systems, especially those related to command and control 
and transportation' 475 
The reason for this is that launching a cyberattack is fairly inexpensive. One 
knowledgeable hacker with a computer can wreak havoc on an automated 
pipeline. A cell of `cyber-space guerrillas' armed with few thousand dollars' 
worth of hardware could disable a nation's power grid. Several hackers together 
can dramatically increase the capabilities of a terrorist group. 76 More guerrilla 
groups will be attracted to cyberwarfare, because they can spread propaganda, 
recruit sympathisers and collect data. The possibilities are endless: military 
espionage, control and disruption of information flow, destruction, distortion and 
fabrication of data, electronic bombs and psychological operations could be 
potential tactics. 
a" ibid., p. 54 474 Mulveron, J and Yang, R: (1999) The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, Rand: California, p. 182 
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On the other hand, Winn Schwartau, author of Pearl Harbor Dot Com, argues 
against those who believe that information warfare is just a hype, that 
cyberattacks can cause terror and that the fundamental flaw in the sceptics' 
argument is their assumption that because things haven't gone wrong before, they 
will never go wrong. It relies on a flawed fortress mentality, which has never 
worked as a defense. 477 An example he gives of viable electronic terrorism is 
waging an IW attack against a series of US domestic air carriers where the 
attackers do not use a conventional bomb but rather, an electromagnetic bomb, 
which sufficiently interferes with the avionics of the plane to cause it to crash 478 
As early as 1995, the Pentagon's assistant director for strategic planning made 
clear that the problem is real enough: 
... 
as the information age matures, a truly revolutionary form of warfare will 
emerge. Information warfare will be fought in a different environment, with 
adversaries grappling in cyberspace. As every potential adversary achieves 
access to multiple information systems, warfare will be conducted virtually at the 
speed of light over global distances. Domination of cyberspace may render the 
need to employ conventional forces and firepower less likely. 479 
476 Jane's International Police issues: `Information warfare: the coming threat', 2 Dec 1998 477 Shachtman, N: `Terrorists on the Net? Who cares? ', wired, 20/12/02 478 Venke, B: `Information warrior', wired, 4/8/1996 
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Consequently, there must be some perceived threat, as the US government has 
devoted dozens of committees to deal with information warfare. The most 
important ones are the National Information Protection Center (NIPC), consisting 
of FBI agents and military and national security components, the Critical 
Infrastructure Coordination Group and the US Commerce Department's Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO). The latter include business and private- 
sector specialists 480 The special force is the Air Force Information Warfare 
Center (AFIWC) at Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, which monitors activity 
in the nation's defense networks and in case of attack goes on the offensive. 
However, in January 2003, the US government issued a revised Cybersecurity 
plan reducing by nearly half its initiatives to tighten security for vital computer 
networks, placing more emphasis on the New Homeland Security Department and 
eliminating the plan to consult regularly with privacy experts. The plan was to 
launch some tests against civilian US agencies and improve the safety of 
automated systems that operate the nation's water, chemical and electrical 
networks, while also reserving the right to wage cyberwarfare if the nation is 
attacked 481 `When a nation, a terrorist group, or other adversary attacks the 
United Sates through cyberspace, the US response need not be limited to criminal 
prosecution', the plan said. Also, the US government asked internet users and 
businesses to practice `safe computing online' and promised to bolster its own 
cyber-defenses 482 
480 Pence, S: ` How today's playgrounds become tomorrow's battlefields... or will it? ', wired. 481 
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However, this National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace imposes few new 
requirements on the private businesses that control 85 per cent of the global 
computer network. `Instead the Bush administration sees its role largely as a 
cheerleader, encouraging businesses to keep their networks secure and supporting 
publicity campaigns to encourage greater individual use of anti-virus software, 
firewalls and other security tools' 483 The Department of Homeland Security is 
expected to lead a response when cyberattacks occur, set up programs to develop 
a more tech-savvy work force and encourage business sectors like banking and 
utilities to bolster security standards on their own. 
The full extent of the US cyber-arsenal is among the most tightly held national 
security secrets, even more guarded than nuclear capabilities. Because of secrecy 
concerns, many of the programmes remain known only to strictly compartmented 
groups, a situation that in the past has inhibited the drafting of general policy and 
specific rules of engagement. As Maj. Gen. James David Bryan, who heads the 
Joint Task Force on Computer Network Operations explains, his group has three 
main missions: to experiment with cyber-weapons in order to better understand 
their effects; to normalise the use of such weapons, treating them `not as a 
separate entity', but as an integral part of the US arsenal; and to train a 
asa professional cadre of military cyberwarriors 
482 ibid. 
483 
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Furthermore, McCaffrey, a highly decorated combat veteran, told attendees at the 
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) annual conference that the 
government's ability to protect the country is `only is good as the technology that 
backs it up'. 85 The government's current snooping system, known as Carnivore, 
makes it too easy to enable the reading of all emails with only a warrant. As a 
result, indiscriminate access makes it difficult for local law-enforcement agencies 
to find useful evidence in a sea of data. Kelly Kuchta, a cybersecurity expert who 
is chair of ASIS's information technology security council, sees private security 
firms as being more willing to work with law enforcement agencies since Sept. 
11,2001, sharing information about cyberattacks with the FBI as part of 
InfraGuard, a cooperative program between the public and private sectors 486 The 
Bush administration has toughened anti-hacking laws since Sept. 11 and 
increasingly lobbied governments to cooperate in international computer-crime 
investigations. The United States and Britain were among 26 nations that last year 
signed the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, an international treaty 
that provides for hacker extraditions even among countries without other formal 
extradition agreements. 
Such zeal on behalf of national governments could be explained, if we consider 
the economic, military and socio-political aspects of cyberconflict. The protection 
of commercial information infrastructure is a national security concern, which 
cannot be disregarded easily. According to a study conducted by the FBI, nearly 
485 ibid. 
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90 per cent of US businesses and government agencies suffered hacker attacks in 
2002, only a third of companies that suffered attacks reported the intrusions to law 
enforcement, and around 78 per cent of companies surveyed also said that 
employees had abused their internet access privileges by downloading 
pornography or private software. 487 
The burden is therefore on the government to demonstrate that the protection of 
commercial information infrastructure is a national security concern that cannot 
be discharged any other way. Convincing a population wary of government 
intervention of the need for such intrusive government action may require a crisis 
such as Sept. 11. 
487 Newbytes: `American companies fail to report intrusions', www. nua. com 
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3.2 Internet Security Analysis: Incidents and Responses 
Incidents and Responses 
An examination of historical precedents indicates that major political and military 
conflicts are increasingly accompanied by significant cyberattack activity. 
Ongoing conflicts also show that the cyberattacks are escalating in volume, 
sophistication and coordination. 488 
It would be useful here to include some cases of internet security breaches. As 
early as March and April 1994 Air Force computer security experts discovered 
that their classified network at the Rome (New York) Laboratories had been 
attacked. Attackers gained complete access to all Rome networks, copying 
sensitive (though not classified) information, and while they could have brought 
the network down, they chose not to. 89 Through the Rome Lab they accessed 
other classified sites like the South Korean Atomic Research Institute. The 
hackers were discovered as codenamed 'Kuji' and `Datastream Cowboy'. 
Datastream was identified through an informant after he bragged and left his 
phone number with him. He turned out to be a sixteen-year-old using nothing 
more than a 486sx PC 490 In 1994, they were arrested in England, and turned out 
488 Vatis, M: `Cyberattacks during the war on terrorism: A predictive analysis', Institute for Security technology Studies, Dartmouth College. 
489 Shapiro, J: (2001) `Information and war: Is it a revolution? ', p. 132 in Libicki, M and Shapiro, J: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California 490 Selden, Z: `Information security: The implications of cyberwar for national security ', Business Executives for National Security Report, Nov 1996, www. bens. org. pubs 
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to have planted eavesdropping software that allowed them to monitor emails and 
other sensitive information. 491 
In one long-running operation, the subject of a U. S. spy investigation dubbed 
`Storm Cloud' and `Moonlight Maze', hackers traced back to Russia were found 
to have been quietly downloading millions of pages of sensitive data, including 
one colonel's email inbox. Most recently in April 2001, government computer 
operators watched as reams of electronic documents flowed from Defense 
Department computers, among others. Remarkably, Gary McKinnon, a British 
hacker indicted for hacking into scores of US military computers, installed copies 
of a commercial remote access utility called RemotelyAnywhere on Navy and 
other military systems he hacked. For nearly a year, McKinnon was able to 
control a vast network of defense computers without detection, authorities said. 
Using a personal computer connected to an ISP in England, McKinnon 
downloaded a trial copy of RemotelyAnywhere in March 2001 from a server 
maintained by Binary Research, the Milwaukee-based distributor of 
RemotelyAnywhere. To obtain a special code to unlock the demonstration 
software, McKinnon also provided his girlfriend's email address. McKinnon was 
indicted in federal courts in Virginia and New Jersey on eight counts of computer 
crimes. McKinnon was facing on each count a maximum sentence of 10 years in 
prison and a $250,000 fine. Investigators characterised the hacker as `a conspiracy 
491 'Indictment due against hacker', Associated Press, 12/11/02 
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theorist' who `seemed to think that the government was controlling all sorts of 
things' 492 
A more publicised incident was the Slammer worm, also known as Sapphire, 
which spread in 10 minutes in the last weekend of January 2003, quickly crippling 
many computer systems around the world offline. It targeted Microsoft's SQL 
Sever 2000 as well as applications created with the Microsoft SQL Server 2000 
Desktop Engine. Microsoft had released a patch for Slammer in July 2002, but 
security experts said a successful installation required users to manually edit 
system files, a compilation that resulted in some patches being installed 
incorrectly, if they were installed at all. The worm inflicted 247,000 computers 
worldwide, while the code is exceedingly condensed and does not include 
references to hacker aliases or locations. It used a transmission method that made 
it especially easy for its author to throw off investigators by falsifying his digital 
trail. 
Many top experts believe the programming for the internet worm was based on 
software code published on the Web months before by a respected British 
computer researcher, David Litchfield, and later modified by a virus author within 
the Chinese hacker community known as Lion. Litchfield said he originally 
published the blueprints for computer administrators to understand how hackers 
might use the program to attack their systems 493 Another issue cropping up with 
492 McWilliams, B: `Dot-mil hacker's download mistake', wired 15/11/02 
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the Slammer worm was that the internet security firm Symantec withheld 
information about the worm for hours after spotting it, sharing the information 
only with select customers, leaving the rest of the global community to cope with 
the impact of Slammer. South Korean telephone systems administrator Lee Ji-Ho, 
whose country's entire communications system collapsed for roughly 24 hours 
because of Slammer. said: `[mly country was hurt hard by this Slammer. We 
could have been prepared and maybe avoided had we known ahead' 494 Code Red 
and Nimda spread around the world in a matter of hours, but Slammer took under 
three minutes to affect thousands of machines, and was able to compromise nearly 
all vulnerable systems in about half an hour. Another computer virus found in the 
wild in October 2003, called Mimail. C, was capable of turning infected personal 
computers into `spamming' machines 495 
As far as viruses are concerned, about 1,000 viruses are created every month by 
virus writers who increasingly intend to target new operating systems. Jan 
Rhuska, the chief executive of Sophos, the world's fourth largest anti-virus 
provider, has commented that the number of viruses created would continue to 
climb in the coming years and said of the virus writers, believed to be computer. 
obsessed males between the ages of 14 to 34 years, that `have chronic lack of 
girlfriends, are usually socially inadequate and are drawn compulsively to write 
self-replicating codes' 496 In January 2003, Welsh virus writer and Web designer 
493 
`Few clues in worm whodunnit', Associated Press 494 Delio, M: `What Symantec knew but didn't say', wired 495 'New virus dresses up as email', Reuters, 31/10/03 496 
`Not just your average loser', Reuters, 18/3/03 
246 
Simon Vallor, 22, was sentenced to two years in jail for spreading three mass- 
mailing computer viruses that infected more than 27,000 computers in 42 
countries. Some of the viruses like Klez, a mass mailing worm that originated in 
November 2001, just refuse to go away. 497 Members of the computing industry 
and law enforcement, when testifying before the technology subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Government reform in the US, proposed solutions for these 
kinds of attack such as better standards for producing software, computing ethics 
education directed at children, increased funding and training for computer 
forensics to catch hackers and virus writers, and protocols for information sharing 
that would aid in capturing perpetrators across borders. 98 
The year 2003 has been deemed the worst in computer-virus history by security 
experts, despite the fact that worm and virus writers displayed no significant 
technological progress in the code of their new creations. That year computer 
worms managed to shut down ATMs, slow airline and train travel by affecting 
reservation and signaling systems, clog emergency phone services, and crash 
networks controlling critical systems at hospitals and at least one nuclear plant. 
`The scary thing is that the Blaster and Slammer worms were not intended to take 
down critical systems. The worms were just programmed to propagate. Imagine 
what could have happened if they had carried a malicious payload', said Mikko 
Hypponen, director of anti-virus research for F-Secure 499 
497 ibid. 
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The most troubling development in 2003 was that spammers and virus writers 
have evidently decided to partner, resulting in a demon love-child virus-worm that 
both infects computers and spews spam. Slammer, released in January 2003, has 
been described by many as the biggest attack against the internet ever. Spreading 
over network connections, Slammer searched for victims so aggressively that it 
caused an enormous amount of network traffic, dramatically slowing network 
response times across the internet. 
Following Slammer the next big virus was Blaster (aka MS Blast), detected in 
August, which wormed into computers through a hole in the Windows operating 
system. Millions of Windows 2000 and Windows XP users were alerted to the 
presence of Blaster in their computers when they saw an error message informing 
them their machine would be restarting in 60 seconds. Just a week after that, 
Sobig. F was released, quickly becoming the worst worm ever, sending over 300 
million infected messages around the world, according to anti-virus experts. `It is 
likely that there is a virus-writer group behind Sobig. They used the worm to 
infect a huge number of computers and then sold various spammer groups lists of 
proxy servers, which would be open for spreading spam. It was clearly a business 
operation', commented Hypponen, a security expert with F-Secure. Experts 
expect that this type of commercial activity will increase, and say that viruses will 
quickly become the spammers' tool of choice in their never-ending efforts to 
force junk mail into people's inboxes. 500 
499 Delio, M: `The Internet is a very sick place', wired, 23/12/04 S0° ibid. 
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The same pattern was noticeable in January 2004 with the MyDoom virus, whose 
social engineering specifically targeted the corporate world. `Malicious hackers 
have been selling the use of compromised commuters to spammers for some time 
now 
- 
it's good money for them. Compromised home-user machines are already 
in widespread use by spammers and MyDoom-infected machines will only add to 
that pressure on inboxes' said Jose Nazario, security analyst for Arbor 
Networks. 501 Additionally, German police have arrested an 18-year-old suspected 
of creating the Sasser computer worm, which surfaced in May 2004 wreaking 
havoc on personal computers. `Hopefully this arrest will limit their activities. If 
we can start catching these guys it will certainly put more pressure on existing 
virus writers' said Hyponnen 502 Also, due to the fact that pieces of code found in 
a recent version of the Netsky worm made references to Sasser, Graham Cluely, 
consultant at Sophos, said the police may have cracked the Netsky gang with the 
arrest. The economic toll of Sasser may never be known, but it has claimed some 
big scalps, including Germany's Deutsche Post, Britain's coastguard stations and 
investment bank Goldman Sachs. 503 
The economic threat in cyberspace manifested itself when a Mafia-led syndicate 
used banking and telecommunications insiders to break into an Italian bank's 
computer network, diverting the equivalent of $115 million in European Union 
aid to Mafia-controlled bank accounts overseas before Italian authorities detected 
501 Delio, M: ` Worm slowing, but still dangerous', wired, 28/1/04 502 Delio, M: `The Internet is a very sick place', wired, 23/12/04 
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the activity. 504 Additionally in June 2003, a huge internet piracy ring was shut 
down in an Italian financial police operation that resulted in the arrest of 181 
people and the recovery of pirated software worth about $139.5 million. The 
piracy network used email and illegal websites to market itself and distributed 
goods via mail order. 505 Moreover, one of the most impressive cyberattacks 
occurred in October 2002, when nine of the thirteen computer servers that manage 
global internet traffic were crippled. The attack lasted for an hour, but it was 
described as the most sophisticated, large-scale assault against these crucial 
computers in the history of the internet. 506 
Despite the fact that there have been several serious incidents of cyberattack, 
doubts have been raised as to the real or exaggerated nature of cyberwar. Several 
experts think that information warfare will likely go much further than nuisance 
attacks by hacktivists. In a rather humorous mood the Crypt Newsletter wrote that 
`[t]he wonderful thing about secret cyberwar is that it can be anything anyone 
wants it to be. In secret cyberwar, it is not really necessary that anyone be an 
actual reliable witness to it or that effects of it even be presented or seen'. 507 The 
point made is that there are instances where cyberwar stories are reported in the 
media, but not experienced by anyone else. The criticism the Crypt Newsletter 
made late in 1998 in Issues in Science and Technology magazine was that one has 
to be skeptical of the warnings of information warfare, because those alarms often 
503 'Sasser worm suspect confesses', Reuters, 8/5/04 
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come from the very people who are to benefit from government spending to 
combat the threat. An example they give to reinforce this argument is that the 
primary author of a January 1997 Defense Science Board report on information 
warfare, which recommended an immediate $580 million investment (and $15 
billion over five years) in private sector R&D for hardware and software to 
implement computer security, was Duane Andrews, executive vice president of 
SAIC, a computer security vendor and supplier of information warfare consulting 
services. 508 
Another instance of absurd claims was criticised by the Crypt when the Economist 
reported a Pentagon estimate that the Taiwanese spread two viruses, known as the 
Bloody 6/4 and Michelangelo, damaging 360,000 computers in China at a cost of 
$120 million. The Crypt Newsletter wrote that, contrary to such claims, neither 
virus is spread on the internet or by networked computer connections and that 
both have been essentially distinct on western computers. Therefore, there is 
controversy as to whether media reporting is accurate, since it takes a modicum of 
technical expertise to report on such incidents and second as to whether there is 
vested interest in exaggerating cyberwar reports to receive funding 
- 
for instance 
the FBI receives special funding for such projects outside normal budgets. 509 
Another example was the `Fluffy Bunny', which for a six-month period starting in 
mid 2001 penetrated the networks of several top internet firms, including Exodus, 
508 ibid. 
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VA Software and Akamai. The hackers also vandalised websites operated by 
leading security outfits including the SANS institute 510 However, despite the 
thousands of hackable holes found in email, websites, files and operating systems, 
few of the hacks in 2002 turned out to have any real impact on most computer 
users. The Klez virus infected some machines and the Linux Slapper worm made 
more work for system administrators for while. Sweeny, an internet security 
expert commented in December 2002 that `[t]he average user wouldn't know a 
hack if it walked up and hit them. And many of the so-called security holes 
require a very specific event to occur and the odds are very slim that it will 
. 
51 1 This is an opinion also shared by Jim Lewis, a 16-year veteran of the 
State and Commerce Departments, who compiled an analysis for the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies. `A hacker or a large group of hackers would 
need to find vulnerabilities in multiple systems to significantly disrupt the power 
supply and even then, an attack might only disrupt service for a few hours'. 512 
Internet Security Analysis 
There are two components in computer security: virus protection (lack of trust in 
outside sources) and authentication (verifying that a person is known to you). But 
the first notion of `common sense' is far less effective in securing computers. We 
expect our machines to do what they are told, but such expectations leave them 
510 McWilliams, B: 'Fluffy Bunny no longer energized', wired, 29/7/02 51! Delio, M: `So many holes, so few hacks', wired, 30/12/02 
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prey to low-level, but insidious, information-warfare attacks. 513 In Britain, three- 
quarters of all companies have been hit by hackers. Each attack costs 120,000 
pounds on average. 
By contrast, the question of `what forms of attack' is somewhat more 
approachable than the `who' questions. It is tempting to see intrusions in terms of 
a pyramid that goes from transient vulnerability probing and defacing of websites 
at the base to large scale efforts to undermine the critical missions of an 
organisation or the critical functions of a nation at the top 
- 
and to suggest that 
there is an inverse relationship between frequency and significance, with many 
trivial incidents and comparatively few of the more serious incidents. 
This lack of congruence between limited intent and far-reaching consequences 
stems from the capacity of worms and viruses for infinite replication and 
multiplication. 
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Consider the `I love you' virus for example, which caused an estimated $6.7 
billion in damages in the first 5 days. It was caused by a single individual with 
poor support and little preparation. As Shimeall et. al argue, the lesson was very 
clear: `the development of national and global information systems has out paced 
appropriate safeguards and security measures. This provides new targets and new 
opportunities for criminal organisations, terrorist groups and hostile nations'. 514 
One further barrier here may be the structure of the intelligence community itself, 
which for constitutional reasons has been partitioned into domestic and foreign 
intelligence. While this distinction is critical in the physical world, it vanishes 
rapidly in the cyber-world. The intelligence community has been left with the 
uncomfortable choice of violating important barriers, an unacceptable option, or 
yielding the cyber world to transnational threats, likewise an unacceptable 
option. 515 
In Shimeall et al. 's internet security analysis, six problems are prominent: 1. the 
lack of borders, which is different from the more familiar domains of intelligence; 
2. the identification of intruders, which is critical to the assessment of the 
challenge and the nature of the response; 3. the forms of attack which either fall 
far short of what was intended, or far exceed what the perpetrator initially 
envisaged; 4. The question of how intrusions take place, which is the most 
technical aspect of the problem and the easiest o answer; 5. the legal issue of who 
314 Shimeall, T, Dunlevy, C, Williams, P: Intelligence Analysis for Internet security: Ideas, Barriers and Possibilities, Certo Analysis Center, Carnegie Mellon University May 2001, p. 2 
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gets notified when analysts attribute an intrusion to a foreign individual; 6. the 
structure of the intelligence community itself, which for constitutional reasons has 
been partitioned into domestic and foreign intelligence. 516 
Another problem in internet security analysis is that of disclosing computer 
intrusions publicly. US cybersecurity director Richard Clark, in November 2002, 
and virtually all software companies insisted that software vendors should have a 
chance to fix problems before security researchers disclose them publicly. 517 
Researchers have criticised Symantec for encouraging people to create and release 
malicious code. `Given that Symantec also sells security and antivirus software, I 
think there is a terrible conflict of interest here. 518 Moreover, security experts 
caution IT managers not to publicise security holes simply to embarrass vendors 
into action, because within hours, black-hat hackers would know the vulnerability 
and use it. One test case is NASA where more than 24 percent of attempted hack 
attacks penetrated the system in the third quarter of 2000, but by the end of 2001, 
after scanning and fixing system flaws, only a fraction of 1 percent of attacks 
were successful. 
More specifically, methods of intrusion are the online equivalent of military 
tactics, and just as in the military world there has historically been a dialectic 
between defense and offense, similarly on the internet, there is a dialectic between 
515 ibid., p. 10 
116 ibid., pp. 5-10 
s" Delio, M: `How much hack info is too much? ', wired. com, 19/11/02 518 ibid. 
255 
protection and intrusion. Intruders manipulate the sources of intrusion and the 
online records of activity. The sources of intrusion are manipulated either by 
staging intrusions through a series of already-intruded and corrupted hosts, or by 
falsifying source information from the network traffic. Online records on the other 
hand are falsified either by directly modifying the records themselves or by 
replacing the monitoring software that produces these records. 519 The following 
are of paramount importance: details of the victim's infrastructure, the nature of 
the intrusion, identity clues left by the intruder, network traffic flow, and intrusion 
tools left as traffic artifacts on the victim hosts. 
The latest in internet security is that angry computer users fed up with attacks 
from internet hackers are hacking back. They are buying counterstrike software to 
turn the tables on the hackers. The new software could spawn a generation of 
vigilante net users prepared to take the law into their own hands to protect their 
hard drives. 520 In other words, the users of the internet are not easily controlled or 
subverted. As Foucault has suggested, every exercise of power whether it is by a 
government or a cyberwarrior will create a resistance somewhere, even among the 
`public'. 
319 Shimeall et at, p. 8 520 Harding, D: `Vigilantes fight back by hacking the hackers', Metro, 10/6/04 
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3.3 Sociopolitical Implications 
To continue, Gombert believes that competitiveness in information technology 
depends on economic and political freedom and on integration into the core. By 
integration into the core he means the core of power in western democratic states. 
According to this view integration to the core creates shared stakes that eclipse, or 
at least qualify, power politics and point toward a democratic commonwealth of 
interests and values. 521 The idea behind this is that the constantly-changing nature 
of this technology favours open economic systems: 
The main economic uses to which information technology is put 
- 
distributing 
information, decentralising functions and decision-making, creating horizontal 
links, improving producer-consumer contact, sharpening external awareness and 
adaptability 
- 
correspond with strong market forces. Even if the supply of 
information technology becomes less dependent on economic freedom over time, 
the demand will not. Therefore, we should expect capitalist systems to retain 
their advantage through the information age 522 
What this amounts to is that other powers that want to get into the game where 
open market democracies dominate will have to `open up to the pressures for 
321 Gombert, D (2001): `Right makes might: Freedom and power in the information age', p. 50 in Libicki, M and Shapiro, J: Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information Warfare, Rand: California. 
522 ibid., p. 54 
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reform and freedom that create modem knowledge-based power'. 523 According to 
Gombert there are three reasons why this is the case. First, competitiveness in 
information technology depends on economic and political freedom and on 
integration into the core. Second, military power and other forms of national 
power depend on broad-based competitiveness in the creation and use of 
information technology. Third, integration into the core creates shared stakes that 
eclipse, or at least qualify, power politics and which point towards a democratic 
commonwealth of interests and values. 524 Interestingly, Gombert argues: 
Direct support for dissidents or embryonic democratic institutions is increasingly 
available both from the governments and nongovernmental organizations of the 
democratic core, thanks to (what else? ) information technology. The penetrability 
of even self-isolated societies is growing, especially when sophisticated 
transnational "civil society" groups make it their business to network with the 
oppressed. 
Most information products and services work well only when embedded in a 
society whose skills and infrastructure are undergoing a larger information 
revolution. These technologies are increasingly interdependent, especially as 
computer networking expands; individual items of hardware are of limited utility. 
What good are desktop computers without networks and a steady diet of software 
upgrades? Information technology is constantly being modified, enhanced, and 
overtaken by better ideas, leaving importing states to engage in an expensive and 
523 ibid., p. 61 
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never-ending game of catch-up technologies which have been conducive to state 
power, even to coercive state power. 
On the socio-political aspect of cyberconflict, the lack of central control, cheap 
remote access from anywhere and interconnectivity promise to render cyberspace 
an unprecedented power-enhancer against repressive regimes and societies. This 
is one of the reasons that the US has devoted so many committees to monitoring 
the web and defending electronic frontiers. In a report entitled `Strategic 
Assessment: the Internet', dating back to July 1995, Charles Swett, assistant for 
Strategic Assessment, office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and low intensity conflict, writes: 
Current information about conflicts placed on the Internet in real time by on- 
the-scene observers and alternative news sources will be voraciously devoured 
by the world audience and will have an immediate and tangible impact on the 
course of events. Video footage of military operations will be captured by 
inexpensive, hand-held digital video cameras operated by local individuals, 
transformed unedited into data files, and then uploaded into the global 
information flow, reaching millions of people in a matter of minutes. Public 
opinion and calls for action (or calls to terminate actions) may be formed 
before national leaders have a chance to develop positions or to react to 
developments 525 
$24 ibid., p. 50 
525 Swett, C: `Strategic assessment: The Internet', July 1995, web paper 
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This is more or less what happened with the anti-globalisation movement, with 
the anti-war movement and in various other conflicts. Indicative example are the 
photos of naked prisoners at Abu Ghraib, as well as the video of Nick Berg's 
murder by fundamentalists in Iraq shown globally through the internet. Three 
other important points Swett makes which are relevant here are, firstly, that if 
protest groups opposing oppressive regimes persuade trade unions or 
organisations from richer countries to equip them with the necessary facilities, 
they can reach a world wide audience, a situation that any government would find 
difficult to control. Swett's claim is supported by the efforts of several dissidents, 
as the Zapatista, East Timorese, Tunisian, Chinese, Iraqi, African and Indian 
social movements have demonstrated. Secondly, such a threat would be very 
difficult to counter, because personal contact of people living under oppressive 
regimes with the free world would `open' their eyes to the distorted propaganda 
of the regime and discredit their government. 526 Third, the internet has the 
potential to significantly influence the course of a conflict. In Swett's words: 
Thus the Internet can indirectly play an important role in the way the world deals 
with a conflict, without having substantial physical presence within the conflict. 
The Internet can play an important positive role during future international crises 
and conflicts. In the chaotic conditions usually present in such situations, normal 
government and commercial reporting channels are often unreliable or 
526 ibid. 
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unavailable, and the Internet might be one of the few means of communication 
present 527 
To continue, the largest and most active international political groups using the 
internet appear to be the San Francisco-based Institute for Global 
Communications (IGC) and the Association for Progressive Communications 
(APC). Therefore, a review of the IGC can provide a good perspective on the 
breadth of DoD (US Department of Defense)-relevant information available on 
the internet. According to a text file placed on the IGC's publicly-accessible 
internet site: 
IGC provides computer networking tools for international communication and 
information exchange. IGC is the U. S. member of the Association for 
Progressive Communication (APC), a coalition of computer networks providing 
services to over 25,000 activists and organizations in more than 130 countries. 
The IGC networks 
- 
PeaceNet, EcoNet, ConflictNet and LaborNet 
- 
together with 
APC partner networks, comprise the world's only computer communications 
system dedicated solely to environmental preservation, peace, and human rights. 
New technologies are helping these worldwide communities cooperate more 
effectively and efficiently... Send and receive private messages to and from more 
than 18,000 international peace, environmental and conflict resolution users on 
our affiliated networks or to millions of users on virtually any other network., 328 
527 ibid. 
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The Association for Progressive Communication (APC) provides low-cost 
computer communication services and information sharing tools to individuals 
and NGOs working on social issues. So, in a way we find `solidarity in 
cyberspace' 529, where a new `electronic fabric of struggle' is being constructed, 
helping to unite activist movements around the world. 530 However, as Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt531 argue, there is concern about the internet being used for crying 
wolf and for manipulation by people with hidden agendas. The concern is that 
government actors may post misinformation and disinformation on the internet in 
order to provoke an overeaction that embarasses the activists. The internet is a 
potent tool for inflammatory rumor, as well as `black' and `grey' propaganda, in 
that actual affiliation of the provider of information can be masked easily and any 
news materials that are put on the Web can be transformed so as to make faked 
events appear true. 532 
Further, in recent conflicts the internet has been cited by both parties as playing a 
key role. As early as 1989, during the heyday of the pro-democracy movement in 
China, Chinese students used the internet to exchange information, and news was 
faxed to China to inform people who were unable to obtain information because 
of the censorship imposed by the Chinese government. In October 1989, after the 
Tiananmen massacre, students oraganised a rally in Washington through email, 
528 ibid. 
529 Mansbach, R (2000): The Global Puzzle, 3`d ed., Boston: Houghton Miffin 
sso quote from Cleaver 1995 found in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999 531 Ronfeldt, D, Arquilla, J, Fuller, G. E and Fuller, M: The Zapatista "Social Netwar" in Mexico, 
Rand 1998, p. 71 
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with 40,000 people across the country participating. Also, they successfully 
lobbied Congress, using email as the major communications medium to pass the 
Chinese Students Protection Act of 1992, which protected them from being forced 
to go back to China and face prosecution. 533 
Also, new global conflicts have involved cross-fertilisation and combination of 
energies generated at a local, grassroots level. As Cleaver points out, 
local conflicts between citizen groups and governments have expanded into 
global efforts in response to two things: first, to a spreading uniformity of 
policies and international agreements among governments to implement world- 
wide sets of rules and second, to the resultant perception of common interests in 
challenging not only those rules but any set of uniform mandates unrelated to 
local situations. 334 
An example mentioned by Cleaver is when OECD opened to dialogue after 
failing to pass the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which aimed at a global 
set of rights for corporate investors. This temporary defeat has been credited to 
the use of the internet in organising a campaign against MAI in countries around 
the world. 535 This pressure caused the OECD to halt negotiations for six months 
in April 1998, and France pulled out of the negotiations, undermining them. 
s" Wang, F: ` Subscribing to democracy through the Internet', JAHC, p. 16. The author cites Li, T: 
`Computer mediated communications and the Chinese students in the US', The Information 
Society, 1990, pp. 125-137 534 Cleaver, H: `Computer linked social movements and the global threat to capitalism', 
www. antenna. nl. /--waterman/cleaver2html. 
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Nevertheless, there have been criticisms of activists using the internet. The first 
criticism is that on certain occasions, the target is badly chosen because they are 
not properly connected to the group their actions are supposedly supporting. 
Second, the use of hacking tactics denies the opponent of freedom of speech and 
provides a precedent for activists to be attacked in the same way. Third, there is 
the problem of gaining legitimacy through providing evidence that the action 
involved a fair amount of people and not just a small number of hackers. 536 
Moreover, there is information about all kinds of political struggle out there in 
cyberspace, which have not yet been connected, because the availability of 
information does not guarantee that the necessary connection will be made to 
generate action. Worse, the very amount of information and the number of groups 
using it will make this situation deteriorate. 
However, unlike newspapers, radio and television media where feedback is slow, 
the internet enables quick interaction, and email lists with ongoing flows of 
discussion form an alternative community of debate, outside traditional 
policymaking institutions. 537 Moreover, the groups involved have characteristics 
which reflect the democratic character of the medium. Users of the Internet are 
colour-, class- and gender-blind and, in contrast to face-to-face interaction where 
536 ibid., p. 17 
537 ibid., p. 16 
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the status of the speaker is primary, attention is focused on what is said, not who 
is saying it. 538 
Even though the internet's potential for mobilising world opinion is likely to be 
diluted by the increasingly large number of issue-oriented groups contending for 
attention in cyberspace, it will still remain a potent instrument for rallying like- 
minded people to support or oppose particular actions and causes. 539 
Unfortunately, news materials that are put on the web can be masked easily and 
any visual `news' materials can be transformed as to make faked events appear 
true. Moreoever, new problems constantly arise, such as spamming, which has 
been tormenting users for some time now. British lawmakers plan to use a new 
tactic to stop the torrent of junk email sparr that floods in from overseas, 
extraditing the mass-mailers and bringing them to trial in the United Kingdom. 
While the initial policy would be used to target spammers, it could be expanded to 
include suspects in other cybercrime offences such as virus-writing and 
hacking. 540 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the environment of cyberconflict by defining the terms 
involved and the approach to be taken, looking at cyberterrorism, information 
539 Wang cites Kraut (1991) 
5'9 Hosmer cites Mburjo (1997) 
540 'UK plans to extradite spammers', Reuters, 30/10/03 
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warfare, internet security analysis and the sociopolitical implications of 
cyberconflict. The central argument of the thesis is that two types of cyberconflict 
occur: firstly, between ethnic or religious groups fighting in cyberspace as they do 
in real life, and secondly, between a social movement and its antagonistic 
institution (hacktivism). This distinction is needed because we can use social 
movement theory to explain sociopolitical cyberconflicts and conflict theory to 
understand ethnoreligious cyberconflict, under the more general umbrella of 
media theory, as we discuss a new medium. 
These issues were addressed by analysing the internet not in terms of a mass 
medium in the traditional sense, i. e. its influence on the political outcome of a 
conflict, but rather as a resource used by the opposing parties in a conflict. In this 
context I discuss Wolfsfeld's political contest model, Deleuze and Guattari's 
rhizomatic politics and Arquilla and Ronfeldt's argument that the information 
revolution is altering the nature of conflict by strengthening network forms of 
organisation over hierarchical forms. 
Following these theoretical insights, I provided an analysis of the hacking 
phenomenon. The motivations for hacking as explained by Taylor are feelings of 
addiction, the urge of curiosity, boredom with the educational system, peer 
recognition and political action. Hacking can potentially perform a variety of 
benevolent services to the security industry, for instance as a watchdog counter- 
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response to the use of surveillance technology and data gathering by the state, 
contributing to a general climate of improved security consciousness. 
The section on information warfare draws attention to the idea that territory, 
population and natural resources are becoming less important relative to human 
capital and the possession of information. Moreover, intelligence officials are 
trying to move away from their old hierarchies and towards a structure in which 
every soldier, every drone and every general is connected by computer networks. 
This is because power seems to be migrating to non-state actors, which are more 
flexible and responsive than hierarchies at using information to improve decision- 
making. 
Despite this trend, doubts have been raised as to the real or exaggerated nature of 
cyberwar. There is controversy as to whether media reporting on cyberattacks is 
accurate and as to whether there is a vested interest in exaggerating cyberwar 
reports to receive funding. Nevertheless, the U. S. government has created dozens 
of committees to deal with information warfare. Notably, the full extent of the 
U. S. cyberarsenal is among the most tightly held national security secrets, even 
more guarded than nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the Bush administration has 
toughened anti-hacker laws since September the 11th and increasingly lobbies 
governments to cooperate in international computer crime investigations. 
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The section on internet security analysis looks at incidents like the Slammer, 
Blaster and MyDoom viruses which made the year 2003 the worst in computer- 
virus history, reaching the conclusion that the development of national and global 
information systems has outpaced appropriate safeguards and security measures. 
This provides new targets and new opportunities for criminal organisations, 
terrorist groups and hostile nations. Another problem in internet security analysis 
is that of disclosing computer intrusions publicly. 
On the sociopolitical implications of cyberconflict, which ultimately justify its 
study, I found that if protest groups opposing oppressive regimes persuade 
supporters in richer countries to equip them with the necessary facilities, they can 
reach a worldwide audience, a situation any government would find difficult to 
control. Also, in international crises and conflicts where normal government and 
commercial reporting are unreliable, the internet might be one of the few means 
of communication present. An example of alternative reporting is the internet's 
effect on the 2003 Iraq conflict, discussed in section 6.2. On the downside, there 
is information about all kinds of political struggle out there in cyberspace, which 
have not yet been connected, because the availability of information does not 
guarantee that the necessary connection will be made to generate action. 
In the following chapter I use elements of social movement theory to look at 
sociopolitical cyberconflicts, where social movements use the internet against 
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antagonistic institutions and also address the issue of dissidents using the internet 
to oppose their respective governments. 
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Chapter 4: Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts 
This chapter looks at sociopolitical cyberconflicts, providing an explanation of the 
forms and types of this kind of conflict and discussing instances of it, such as the 
anti-globalisation movement. It also includes an extensive examination of Chinese 
cyberdissidents and the Chinese government's cyberstrategies, as well as a brief 
look at internet censorship and dissidents internationally. The main argument of 
the chapter is that groups involved in sociopolitical cyberconflicts use the internet 
as an organisational and mobilisational resource attempting to reframe issues and 
take advantage of the openings of the political opportunity structures offered by 
new communication technologies. Lastly, I explicitly link the examples with my 
proposed integrated theoretical framework. 
4.1 Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts 
Sociopolitical cyberconflicts can be placed into two broad groups, either those 
which are primarily concerned with global issues such as the environment, issues 
in relation to which the level of negotiation with governments is open for debate, 
and those involving groups who are much less inclined to negotiate with 
governments, being as they are concerned with issues such as their own liberation 
from the control of the state. 54' One aspect of the problem seems to be that with 
the explosion of the size of the internet, protests and political activism have 
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entered a new realm. Political activism on the internet has generated a wide range 
of activity such as using email and websites to organise, web defacements and 
denial-of-service attacks, described above. These politically motivated attacks are 
called hacktivism. Stanton McCandlish, program director of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation describes it as follows: `[a] kind of electronic civil 
disobedience in which activists take direct action by breaking into or protesting 
with government or corporate computer systems. It's a kind of low-level 
information warfare, and it is on the rise'. 542 The main purpose of these activists is 
to influence or challenge public or enemy opinion and battle for media access and 
coverage. In many respects, then, the archetypal netwar design corresponds to 
what earlier analysts called a `segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated 
network' (SPIN): 
By segmentary I mean that it is cellular, composed of many different groups... 
By polycentric I mean that it has many different leaders or centers of direction... 
By networked I mean that the segments and the leaders are integrated into 
reticulated systems or networks through various structural, personal, and 
ideological ties. Networks are usually unbounded and expanding... This acronym 
[SPIN] helps us picture this organization as a fluid, dynamic, expanding one, 
spinning out into mainstream society. 543 
541 Arquilla, J and Ronfeldt, D: (eds) (2001) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime 
and Militancy, California: Rand, p. 15. 
542 Pick Magazine, vol8, no54, Dec 1998 
543 This SPIN concept, a precursor of the netwar concept, was proposed by Luther Gerlach and 
Virginia Hine in the 1960s to depict U. S. social movements. It anticipates many points about 
network forms of organization that are now coming into focus in the analysis not only of social 
movements but also some terrorist, criminal, ethno-nationalist, and fundamentalist 
organisations. 43 See Luther P. Gerlach, 'Protest Movements and the Construction of Risk', in B. 
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The quality of networks contrasts sharply with the tendency to forge social and 
political order through mutual identifications with leaders, ideologies and 
memberships in conventional social and political groups. Gerlach applied the 
SPIN model to contemporary global protest networks. First, he replaced the idea 
of polycephalous organisation with polycentric order, indicating that, like earlier 
SPIN movements, global activist networks have many centres or hubs, but unlike 
their predecessors, these hubs are less likely to be defined around prominent 
leaders. In addition, he noted that the primary basis of movement integration and 
growth has shifted from ideology to more personal and fluid forms of 
association. 
544 
Sociopolitical cyberconflict could be seen as taking two forms, one being when 
proper hackers attack virtually-chosen political targets, the other being when 
persons organise through the internet to protest, or carry through email a political 
message. One of the first examples of hacktivism conducted by hackers was back 
in 1999 when the 24-member Legions of the Underground called for an 
information warfare campaign against China and Iraq against human rights 
violations in those countries. 545 However, hackers around the world condemned 
the initiative by issuing a statement signed by well-known names in the computer 
B. Johnson and V. T. Covello (eds. ), The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk, D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., Boston, Massachusetts, 1987, p. 115, based on Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia Hine: (1970) People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation, The Bobbs-Merrill 
Co: New York. 
544 Bennett, W. L: (2004) `Communicating global activism' in Van de Donk, W, Loader, B, Nixon, 
P, Rucht, D: Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, Routledge: London and New York, p. 126 
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underground such as 2600, the Chaos Computer Club, LOpht, Heavy Industries, 
Phrack, Toxyn, Cult of the Dead Cow, ! Hispahack, Pulhas and several Dutch 
hackers. The joint statement said: `Legions of the Underground will do little to 
alter existing conditions and much to endanger the rights of hackers around the 
world. Declaring "war" against the country is the most irresponsible thing a 
hacker group could do. This has nothing to do with hacktivism or hacker ethics 
and is nothing a hacker could be proud of 9.546 
One kind of online activism is the distribution of email petitions, where each 
person adds his or her name to a list of names that will then be forwarded to 
friends and acquaintances. The original email petition then splits into several lists. 
The result is that if the originator of the petition tries to count the number of 
people who signed the original list, he or she would have to sift through 
potentially thousands of duplicate signatures. Also the opportunity for forgery 
looms large. For these reasons, politicians treat them as dubious. On the other 
hand, petitions posted on a website show the signer actively logging onto the site 
and allow the reader more time to engage with the issue. Web-based petitions are 
utilised more in the activist world, but email petitions contribute to electronic 
activism in their capacity for getting the word out of dates and times of organised 
protests, demonstrations and coordinated activities. 547 
545 Glave, G: `Crackers call off war', wired, 8/1/99 
546 ibid. 
547 Lebowitz, R: `Can Internet technology still revolutionize activism? ', Digital Freedom Network 
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Cronauer has looked at how the use of electronic mailing lists contributed or 
hindered mobilisation of list subscribers, by examining messages sent through 
two electronic mailing lists. Specifically, at how groups form their goals and 
activities; how individuals respond to these online framing efforts; how structural 
features of electronic mailing lists shape online messages; and how the context 
such lists are used affect online interactions. 549 Cronauer's two electronic mailing 
lists, in the course of several months were used to organise opposition and create 
alternatives to the globalisation agenda pursued and represented through an APEC 
summit in Canada and both a European Union and a G7/G8 summit in Germany. 
In both cases local groups formed specifically to protest the respective meetings 
to exist only temporarily. The mailing lists were, however also used by other 
groups, including those the newly formed groups came out of, thereby allowing 
for long-term involvement. She identifies the following aspects of online 
mobilisation: outreach, networking, increase of visibility, opinion formation, and 
strategic planning. Even more importantly, she found that electronic mailing lists 
impact social activist groups in various ways: 
they may result in different (be that additional or alternative) means of 
communication and hence in different ways to communicate; inhibit individuals 
from becoming mobilised that otherwise may have become mobilised; or prompt 
548 Cronauer, K: `Activism and the Internet: Uses of electronic mailing lists by social activists', 
University of British Columbia, based on research conducted during the Social Reseach Council's 
Program on Information technology, International Cooperation and Global Security in the summer 
2001 at the University of Berkeley California, web accessed 11/04 
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individuals to become mobilised that otherwise may not have become 
mobilised 549 
An example of an organised protest through the internet on a small scale occurred 
in Madrid in November 2002, when the cyberpunks, who gather at the site 
Ciberpunk, discovered that Gallardon, president of the Community of Madrid, 
had proposed a law that would classify Madrid's cybercafes as casinos. If the law 
had passed, minors would not have been allowed in cybercafes, from which 
roughly 20 per cent of Spain's young internet users connect to the internet. In 
October, the country passed a law requiring all internet users to register with the 
government. But Gallardon announced he would not support the law, an action 
reported in Spanish newspapers as a win for cyberpunks, who credit their victory 
to the internet and getting non-net users involved. `The Internet is still a strange 
land to our politicians, who are not used to facing such an immediate reaction' 
sso said activist David de Ugarte. 
Tim Jordan writes that social activists or hacktivists have found two uses for the 
internet, Mass Virtual Direct Action (MVDA) and Individual Virtual Direct 
Action (IVDA). 55' According to Jordan, MVDA involves the simultaneous use by 
many people of the internet to create electronic civil disobedience. An example of 
Mass Virtual Direct Action on the internet is the one organised by the Electronic 
Disturbance Theatre (EDT). To demonstrate solidarity with the Zapatistas, an 
$49 ibid. 
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estimated 10,000 people from all over the world participated in the sit-in on 
September 9,1998 against the sides of President Zedillo, the Pentagon and the 
Frankfurt stock exchange, delivering 600,000 hits per minute to each. There are 
two characteristics of this type of hacktivism. First, hacktions are not aimed at 
halting a target permanently, but have symbolic dimensions. Second, MVDA 
activists rarely try to hide their identities, seeking public debate and discussion. 
IVDA differentiates from MVDA in that it could be taken by an individual and 
does not depend on a mass protest. The actions taken are either semiotic attacks 
(i. e. defacements), computer intrusion or attacks on network security. 
According to more recent analysis from Jordan and Taylor, hacktivism breaks 
down into two broader streams of actions: 
1. Mass virtual direct actions, which use cyberspatial technologies of limited potential 
in order to re-embody virtual actions. 
2. Digitally correct actions, which defend and extend the peculiar powers cyberspace 
creates 552 
As Taylor and Jordan explain, mass action hacktivism is the kind of action most 
closely associated with the anti-globalisation movement. Here we find the most 
direct attempts to `turn' traditional forms of radical protest, such as street 
demonstrations, into forms of cyberspatial protest. Digitally correct hacktivism, 
550 Delio, M: `Cyber-rights activists log a win', wired. com, 26/11/02 551 Jordan, (2001), Mapping Hacktivism, p. 8 
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consists of online direct actions that are influenced perhaps more by the history 
and technical concerns of hacking than by the more directly political concerns of 
anti-globalisation protests. 553 Mass electronic disobedience creates the complex 
situation in which an embodied presence at a terminal uses direct action to 
become an abstract virtual presence, which in turn joins with other abstractions to 
jam up a virtual site. Legitimation comes from the embodied presence, action 
from the virtual presence. 554 
An example of mass action hacktivism would be the Seattle anti-World Trade 
Organisation protests at the end of November 1999, which were the first to take 
full advantage of the alternative media network via the internet. Protestors used 
cellphones, direct transmissions from independent media feeding directly onto the 
internet, personal computers with wireless modems broadcasting live video, and a 
variety of other network communications. As Naomi Klein pointed out in the New 
York Times, this is a movement 
born of the anarchic pathways of the Internet... the most internationally minded, 
globally linked movement the world has ever seen... When protesters shout 
about the evils of globalization, most are not calling for a return to narrow 
nationalism, but for the borders of globalization to be expanded, for trade to be 
linked to democratic reform, higher wages, labor rights and environmental 
552 Taylor, P. A and Jordan, T: (2004) Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels with a cause?, Routlege: 
London, p. 116 
s ibid., p. 68 
554 ibid., p. 170 
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protection. This is what sets the young protesters in Seattle apart from their 60s 
predecessors "5 
During the anti-WTO protests, hacktivists managed to acquire the URL 
www. atg t. org, using the GATT address for a parody WTO site, looking identical 
to the original WTO one, but included a text criticising WTO trade policies. 
Another famous Nacktion was an MVDA by the Electrohippies, which included a 
virtual sit-in with a downloadable web page aiming to flood the WTO server. The 
Electrohippies claim that 400,000 hits in this MVDA had slowed down the WTO 
and at times completely halted it. 556 The Electrohippies developed what they 
called a client-side DDOS, whose central feature was that each client or end 
computer had to choose to initiate the attack on its own, thereby depending on 
many people to initiate a mass action. 557 Electrohippies Collective 2000 stated 
that `[w]e have to treat cyberspace as if it were another part of society. Therefore, 
we must find mechanisms for lobbying and protest in cyberspace to complement 
those normally used in real life'. 558 
The anti-WTO protesters were able to initiate a newsworthy event, putting the 
other side on the defensive. Using the internet, they could send stories directly 
from the street for the whole world to see, rendering the flow of information 
uncontrollable. Thirdly, they were able to mobilise support by promoting an 
sss Kneen, K: `Battle in Seattle', Rams Horn Article, www. interweb-tech com/nsmnet, accessed 3/10/02 
556 Jordan, 2001, p. 8 
557 Taylor, P. A and Jordan, T: (2004) Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels with a cause?, Routlege: 
London, p. 77 
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alternative frame for the event. More recently, in September 2003, during the 
WTO meeting in Cancun, activists used a peer-to-peer video-sharing service 
called v2v to transmit broadcast-quality video of the protests to television stations 
and other activists. They also set up wireless networks at the protest welcome 
centre in a nearby town, streaming recordings of interviews and speeches over the 
internet for rebroadcast on participating radio stations. Two tactics were not used 
in Cancun: the use of Distributed Denial of Service attacks to shut down the WTO 
site and the `flash mob' concept, a way of mobilising large groups of people by 
sending out a single message to awaiting participants. With just 10 per cent of 
Mexico's population online, it evidently wouldn't work. 559 
There is a debate between hacktivists concerning Denial of Service attacks and 
web defacements. On the one hand, there are activists who claim that such actions 
run contrary to other people's right to freedom of speech, and on the other, there 
are those who view these actions as the only way to get the public's attention. In 
any case, the fact is that web defacements cannot be dismissed as electronic 
graffiti and Denial of Service attacks as nuisances, because there is concern by 
online companies that it could affect share prices, reduce earnings and cause 
damage to reputation and customer confidence. Indeed, this is the reason why 
there should be more analysis on the reasoning underpinning hacktivism and its 
political rationale. 
558 ibid., p. 78 
559 Arasavala, A: `Today's tech-dependent activists', 28/8/03 
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Real hacktivism is not supposed to be about taking down servers and websites and 
grafitting webpages. Hacktivism as defined by the Cult of the Dead Cow, the 
group of hackers and artists who coined the phrase, was intended to refer to the 
development and use of technology to foster human rights and the open exchange 
of information 560 Professor Ronald Deibert from the University of Toronto's 
Citizen Lab, which sponsors and develops technology used by activists said real 
hacktivism is fast becoming understood and accepted by mainstream human rights 
activists and is now being supported by large foundations like the Soros 
foundation, Markle Foundation and Ford Foundation, which funds groups such as 
Privaterra, eRiders and Indymedia, which use technology to defend civil rights 561 
Additionally, a network of radical internet service providers has sprung up, 
including Riseup, Mutualaid, resist. ca, Interactivist, OAT, and others. Radical 
geeks brought together by antiglobalisation protests and the Indymedia network 
have developed their own international network of mutual aid, support, skills 
sharing, free software and solidarity. 562 
A very explicit example of the schism in the hacktivist community between those 
that support hack attacks and those who believe it to be an infringement of free 
speech is what happened during the Republican National Convention (August 30th 
through to September 2 °d 2004). Protest organisers used web sites and printed 
560 Delio, M: `Hacktivism and how it got there', wired. com, 14/7/04 
561 Delio, M: `Hacktivism and how it got there', wired. com, 14/7/04 562 Munson, C: `Seattle Weekly trashes anti-globalization movement', www. couterpunch. org, 30/11/04 
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fliers to direct thousands of supporters to rallies and marches. But police also 
were surfing the web and collecting those same fliers in order to mobilise their 
own sizable forces. In many cases, police arrived at protest sites well before the 
demonstrators, pre-empting marches and rallies before they coalesced, using the 
protesters' own lines of communication to keep most of them well away from 
Madison Square Garden, the convention site. 563 The Times reported that during 
the weeklong protests, the police were monitoring websites. Authorities at the 
highest level of government seem to be paying attention. Just as the week of 
protests was kicking off, the Justice department announced it had opened a 
criminal investigation into the New York City Indymedia centre for posting 
names of Republican delegates. 564 
In addition to the various groups using SMS text messaging to send out action 
alerts, warnings, news and announcements, the New York Independent Media 
Center (IMC) set up an automated information line that activists could call 24 
hours a day to hear breaking news from Indymedia and to listen to a live 
streaming broadcast from the A-noise radio collective, which was broadcasting 
live reports from the streets. The SMS messages alerted activists of routes that 
remained open to travel to protests when police blocked off large sections of the 
city. It alerted Indymedia journalists of where cameras were needed to document 
protests, legal observers of real-time rights violations and activist medic teams of 
563 Zucchino, D: `Internet helps corral protesters', Chicago Tribune, 4/9/04 564 Scahill, J: `Indymedia and the text message jihad', www. counterpunch org, 9/9/04. 
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where people were in need of medical attention. 565 In contrast to previous protests 
Indymedia was not only available to people at home but went mobile. Evan 
Henshlaw-Path, the Indymedia tech activist who developed the info-line concept 
has commented: 
Our task is to help facilitate horizontal communication and information 
distribution to all activists in the streets. The police want to keep the protests 
under control and stay a step ahead of the protesters. So, all of this 
communications infrastructure helps on a tactical level. We've appropriated 
technology as an essential tool for radical social change. 566 
Nevertheless the internet was not only used as a resource but also as a weapon, as 
hacktivists launched a campaign of electronic disobedience to coincide with the 
demonstrations against the Republican National Convention. 567 They targeted 
major credit card corporations, disrupting various right-wing fascist groups, and 
performed an electronic sit-in against Republican websites. Credit card numbers 
stolen from major news corporations were used by anti-RNC hacktivists to make 
$2600 in donations to various humanitarian and civil rights organisations. A right- 
wing fascist organisation known as ProtestWarrior was also hacked and defaced a 
week before the convention began: `By infiltrating and crashing legal, peaceful 
assemblies, the ProtestWarriors are fighting against the democratic process while 
565 ibid. 
566 Scahill, J: `Indymedia and the text message jihad', www. couterpunc h orc, 9/9/04 567 For examples of protest and hacktivist resources look at infoshop. org, crimethnic. com, broadleft. org, the hacktivist. com, electronic disturbance theatre, hackthissite. org, 2600. com, 
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claiming to uphold the core values of this country'. 568 The cell/home phone 
numbers, names, addresses, and passwords of the site's lead organisers along with 
the email addresses of all ProtestWarrior members were posted to the site and 
emailed out to every member. 569 
The Internet Liberation Front hacked and defaced six Republican websites. These 
hackers do not believe hacktivism to be a violent tactic. By using direct action 
techniques such as website defacements and financial disruption, `hacktivists' 
believe they are putting pressure and on politicians to make progressive and 
revolutionary changes: 570 
The will of the people was not expressed in these elections. Imperialist war, tax 
cuts for the rich, and ecological destruction are not in the interest of working 
people or the stability of our global society. The Bush administration are rich 
lying thieves, these inaugurations are a joke, and the whole system is corrupt. 
Speaking of protests, on the down side, the epic qualities of the best 
demonstrations, both in terms of size and drama, are lost in cyberspace. While 
mass action hacktivism clearly involves symbolic actions, and it can draw large 
numbers of people together to protest, some of the qualities of a symbolic 
hbx. us, fromthewilderness. com, and an example of a counterconvention site 
www. counterconvention. org. 
568 Indymedia: `Hacktivism: A week of electronic disruption during the Republican National 
Convention', www. indymedia. org, 5/9/04 
569 bid. 
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demonstration are lost. 571 However, as stated earlier, `online protests have the 
advantage of being able to pass a great amount of information, in forms that mean 
people can take a little and explore a lot. In non-virtual spaces it is difficult to 
hand over more than a leaflet, even if volumes could be devoted on the particular 
cause'. 572 As Taylor and Jordan argue, in the overarching context of virtual times, 
and born both from hacking and from the anti-globalisation movement of the 
twenty-first century, hacktivism is perhaps the first widespread social and 
political movement of the new millennium 573 
4.2 Chinese Dissidents 
The stronger the state, the weaker its encouragement of institutional participation 
and the greater the incentive to confrontation and violence when collective action 
does break out 574 
The argument from state strength runs like this: centralised states attract collective 
actors to the summit of the political system, whereas decentralised states provide 
a multitude of targets at the base. 575 Gary Marx distinguished repressive actions 
571 Taylor, P. A and Jordan, T: (2004) Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels with a cause?, Routlege: 
London, p. 80 
572 ibid., p. 80 
s" ibid., p. 43 
574 Tarrow, S: `States and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements' in 
McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, p. 46 
... Tarrow, S: (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 81 
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into different categories according to their specific aims: the creation of an 
unfavorable public image, disinformation, restricting a movement's resources and 
limiting its facilities, derecruitment of activists, destroying leaders, fuelling 
internal conflicts, encouraging conflicts between groups, and sabotaging 
particular actions 576 
Direct support for dissidents or embryonic democratic institutions is increasingly 
available both from the governments and non-governmental organisations of the 
democratic core. The penetrability of even self-isolated societies is growing, 
especially when sophisticated transnational `civil society' groups make it their 
business to network with the oppressed. Laclau and Mouffe offer a useful way of 
thinking about discourse and ideology, especially since it does not restrict 
methodological enquiry, nor necessarily following their own logic. Discourse is 
`the structured totality resulting from... practice', when elements are those 
differences that are `not discursively articulated' because of the floating character 
they acquire in periods of social crisis and dislocation. 577 
In a RAND report on the political use of the internet, Chase and Mulveron 
describe and analyse Chinese dissidents' use of the internet and the Chinese 
576 Della Porta, D: `Social Movements and the state: Thoughts on the policing of protest' in 
McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds. ): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, p. 65 
S" Howarth, D, Norval, J and Stavrakakis, Y (eds): (2000) Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, Manchester University Press: Manchester 
and NY, p. 7. 
285 
government's counter-strategies. 578 The dissidents have used email spamming, set 
up proxy servers to access blocked sites, set up sophisticated websites, used email 
lists, bulletin board sites, file trading and e-magazines and a particular group even 
organised a mass demonstration and a press conference through the internet. 
Nevertheless, there have been arguments that China will not change, politically 
until the Chinese people demand change. The internet may help citizens of the 
People's Republic break free of centuries of kowtowing to imperial rule, but it is 
not going to cause that rupture by itself. 579 
This report is important for our understanding of how the internet could be used to 
achieve political aims, because both the dissidents and the Chinese leadership 
itself have not only realised the political potential of the internet, but as the 
RAND report indicates, are already engaging in an online battle over the internet, 
which touches reality as well. 
The question the two authors address is whether the internet provides dissidents 
with new tools that they can use to break through the barriers of censorship and 
ultimately undermine the power of non-democratic regimes or whether it is more 
likely that those authoritarian governments will use the internet as another 
instrument to repress dissent, silence their critics, and strengthen their own 
power. 580 The main dissident groups examined in the report are the Falungong 
578 Chase, M and Mulveron, J: (2002) You've Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of the Internet 
and Being's Counter-strategies, Rand: California. 
579 Leonard, A: `Will the Net save China? ', Salon. com, 21/3/02 
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religious sect, the Chinese Democratic Party (CDP) and the Tibetan community- 
in-exile. 
The Falungong is a religious sect banned in China, whose membership is 
estimated to be in the millions. It combines meditation with certain quasi-spiritual 
beliefs. 581 On July 20 1999, hundreds of key members were arrested in the middle 
of the night, and the next day the sect was banned for allegedly spreading 
`superstitious, evil thinking. ' In October 1999, Falungong held a clandestine 
conference in Beijing to tell the world about police beatings of detained members. 
This conference was attended by foreign journalists, and was again organised 
through the internet. 582 
Because the sect is banned in China, email is vital for communication and 
information dissemination. The sect's leader Li Hongzhi, now living in the U. S., 
has set up email lists to connect followers in the U. S. and China. After his retreat 
from `public' life, all his new writings are disseminated through email lists via 
Minghui Net. Email lists gained even more importance after the Falungong 
bulletin boards and chatrooms were attacked by the state. 583 The official Chinese 
news agency, Xinhua, stated in February 19th 2004 that a court in western 
Chongqing had found three men and two women guilty of `vilifying the 
sal In August 2002 the world's leading psychiatric association decided to look into reports that 
China is silencing political dissidents by confining them to mental wards, where some including 
members of the Falungong sect are drugged or undergo electric shocks. The group said that among 
those are nearly 500 members of the Falungong. Thousands of its followers have reportedly been 
arrested and sent to labor camps. (Greimel, H: `Psychiatry group hopes to probe Chinese mental 
wards for dissidents', Aug., 26`h 2002, Associated Press online) 582 Chase and Mulveron, p. 10 
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government's image through spreading fabricated stories on persecution of cult 
practitioners' and had given them prison terms of 5 to 14 years. Reporters 
Without Borders has called for the release of 22 Falungong members imprisoned 
for publishing news on the internet about the spiritual movement. `The crackdown 
on members of this spiritual movement is completely unjustified. The five 
Internet users were convicted for posting online what is already very well-known 
to human rights organisations, that members of Falungong are systematically 
tortured in prison, ' commented Julien Pain, who researches internet speech issues 
for the group 584 
The Chinese Democratic Party announced its existence on June 24,1998. Their 
formation was timed to coincide with Clinton's visit to China. However, as US- 
Chinese relations deteriorated, Beijing decided on a crackdown against the CDP 
and in late December 1998, the CDP's most prominent members, Wang Youcai, 
Xu Wenli and Qin Yongmin, were sentenced to long prison terms on charges of 
endangering state security. At least two dozen more CDP members have since 
been imprisoned, and many others are being held in detention. Despite the 
crackdown, a number of CDP members remain active on the mainland. The CDP 
has also developed an organisation-in-exile in the United States. 585 Several CDP 
members assert that the use of email and the internet was critical to the formation 
of the party and allowed its membership to expand from about 12 activists in one 
region to more than 200 in provinces and municipalities throughout China in only 
sas ibid, p. 17 
sea 'Net dissidents jailed in China', wired. com, 24/2/04 
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four months. 86 The Chinese Democratic Party is an example of a sociopolitical 
group seeking participation, power and democracy using information technology 
techniques to voice those demands, in a country where power and political 
participation is only kept for the communist party and where dissidents are 
arrested and democracy is non-existent. 
The third dissident group examined is the Tibetan government-in-exile and its 
supporters, and more than a dozen associated NGOs. Two-way email 
communication is an important channel for Falungong members, Tibetan exiles, 
and various NGOs and human rights advocacy groups to pressure U. S 
government officials. Nevertheless, one official Chase and Malveron interviewed 
opined that because of the vast quantity of email received on a daily basis, the 
messages have largely lost their effect. 587 
This extract is from an article that represents some of the strong views appearing 
on Chinese dissident websites: Can you establish your own political party? Can 
you set up a free labor union? Can you freely publish your political ideas? 
Organise groups? Demonstrate? As long as you don't have those few things, you 
don't have anything. '588 
585 Chase and Mulveron, pp. 12-13 586 ibid, p. 15, the authors cite Farley, M: `Hacktivists besiege China', Los Angeles Times, January 
4,1999 and Becker J: `Review of dissidents, human rights issues', South China Morning Post, 
January 12,1999. 
S87 ibid, p. 18 interviews with U. S government executive and legislative officials, May-June 2000 588 'True democracy, fake democracy or no democracy' by Backgo, posted on the China Popular Marxist Liberal Left wing ideology website. 
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Other technologies used by dissidents are bulletin board sites and chat rooms. The 
number of postings to the forums has tended to peak around the time of important 
events. This is how the authors describe it: 
For example our observations indicate that traffic on these sites increased around 
the time of the diplomatic standoff that ensued after the April 2001 collision of a 
US reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter aircraft. In addition, in 2000, 
the number of postings on such sites surged around the times of the Taiwanese 
presidential election, Chen Shui-bian's inauguration, the permanent normal trade 
relations (PNTR) vote in the US congress, and the anniversary of the June 4, 
1989, Tiananmen Square crackdown. 89 
Several dissident groups maintain their own BBS. The CDP established more than 
a dozen Chinese language BBS in May 2000. The Tibetan exile community also 
makes extensive use of BBS and chat rooms. 590 
In some cases, postings have led to arrests. One example is Fu Lijun, 37, an 
assistant professor at Xinxiang Medical College in Henan, who was arrested in 
October 1999 for posting an article in a chat room detailing how Falungong could 
cure illness. 591 Several other Chinese cyberdissidents are undergoing protracted 
legal battles over their online writings. A court has rejected appeals on behalf of 4 
other people who were each given multi-year prison sentences for expressing 
5'9 Chase and Mulveron, p. 21 590 ibid, p. 22 
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themselves in cyberspace. Another online protestor, He Depu, was sentenced to 8 
years in prison for his activities in connection with the banned Chinese 
Democratic Party and for posting supposedly subversive writings on the internet. 
The harsh treatment of online dissidents has prompted protests from human rights 
groups. Robert Menard, the secretary-general of Reporters Sans Frontiers, 
expressed `regret that the Chinese authorities have turned a deaf ear to the 
growing number of voices speaking out in China and abroad against their policy 
of cracking down on cyberdissidents'. 592 In November 2003, about 500 
intellectuals in China and overseas signed a petition urging Beijing to free internet 
essayist Du Daobin, who was detained for allegedly `subverting the state 
administration' 593 According to Amnesty International's records, by January 
2004,54 people had been detained or imprisoned for expressing their opinions 
and downloading information from the internet, a 60 per cent increase on the 
November 2002 figures. 594 
Chase and Mulveron offer us plenty of information on how Chinese students have 
used the internet extensively in the past five years: 595 during the 1996 Diaoyu 
Islands dispute; in the aftermath of the accidental bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999; following the murder in late May 2000 of Qiu 
391 ibid, p. 22 the authors cite `Doctor jailed for promoting Falungong on Internet' 
http: //www. june4. org. /news/database/ian2OOO/dQqQdI! ed. htmi 
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Qingfeng, a Beijing university student; after the April 2001 collision of a US EP-3 
surveillance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter; and following the September 11 
terrorist attacks on the United States. During the summer of 1996, renewed 
friction related to the longstanding dispute between China and Japan over the 
Diaoyu Islands prompted an outpouring of nationalistic sentiment and 
unauthorised public protests in China. The students used internet bulletin boards, 
chat rooms and email to disseminate information not carried in official media and 
to organise protests. Chinese leaders, worried that nationalistic outbursts could 
harm Sino-Japanese relations and even be directed against the regime for failing 
to be more assertive, temporarily shut down internet bulletin board sites at several 
universities in Beijing and `advised' the organiser of the protest campaign to leave 
the capital for `vacation' in the remote Gansu Province. 596 As for officials in 
Beijing, BBS offer potential political advantages: 
First, there is some evidence to indicate that government officials use popular 
sites such as the Strong Country forum to gauge opinion on a broad range of 
domestic and foreign-policy issues. Although the ultimate effects of the Internet 
remain to be seen there already been significant developments. Indeed in a 
forthcoming study of the Internet and the development of civil society In China, 
Guobin Yang argues that through the use of means such as chat rooms and 
596 ibid, p. 23 the authors cite Chen Chiu `University students transmit messages on defending the 
Diaoyu islands through the Internet, and the authorities are shocked at this and order the 
strengthening of control', Sing Tao Jih Pao, Sept 17,1996, in FBIS, Sept 18,1996 
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bulletin board sites, Chinese Internet users "are engaged in the discursive 
construction of an online public sphere". 597 
Amnesty International has reported similarly: 
Nevertheless, Internet Activism appears to be growing in China as fast as the 
controls are tightened. Over the last year, there have been signs of Internet users 
acting increasingly in solidarity with one another, in particular by expressing 
support for each other online. Such expressions of solidarity have proved 
dangerous as a growing number of people have been detained on the basis of 
such postings 598 
Furthermore, there is a new way dissidents use to communicate their views: email 
spamming. While to most users spamming is a nuisance, it can enable groups to 
transmit uncensored information to an unprecedented number of people within 
China, and to provide recipients with `plausible deniability'. The publishers of 
two Chinese-language electronic magazines, Tunnel (Suidao) and VIP Reference 
(Da Cankao), have mounted the best-publicised and most sophisticated efforts. 
Tunnel, the first Chinese e-magazine, is published weekly and is reportedly 
compiled and edited largely within China, then sent to Silicon Valley, and finally 
mass-emailed back to the PRC from anonymous, US-based email accounts, such 
597 ibid, p. 27 the authors cite Guobin Young, `The impact of the Internet on civil society in China: A preliminary assessment'., p. 24 
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as nobody@usa. net. 599 The editors opine that computers and the internet can be 
used to `disintegrate the two pillars of an autocratic society: monopoly and 
suppression'. 600 The VIP Reference magazine contains articles from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and western news sources that are not available to the public in China. 
The magazine declines to reveal how many mainland subscribers it has, but is 
reportedly sent to between 250,000 and 300,000 Chinese email addresses. The 
editors frequently change website addresses and use different email addresses 
every day to prevent Chinese security services from blocking distribution of their 
electronic publications. `We are computer experts, and above all we like the 
concept of free speech. We are destined to destroy the Chinese system of 
censorship over the Internet. We believe that the Chinese people, like any other 
people in the world, deserve the rights of knowledge and free expression', said the 
Chinese editor of VIP reference. 60' 
Moreover, users in China have translated Freenet, which allows people to 
exchange files over the internet through a shared network, like Kazaa and 
Gnutella, to Mandarin Chinese and have adapted it for distribution on a single 
floppy-disk. The reasoning behind this is to use it to share documents the 
government has been trying to censor, relating to the Tienanmen Square massacre 
and Falungong. 602 File-sharing networks, using the same technology that gives 
American music and movie companies fits, can help dissidents communicate. 
599 Chase and Mulveron, p. 29 
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Since networks like Gnutella and Kazaa have no central source, they are harder to 
turn off than centralised websites, chatrooms and BBS. 603 Also, numerous efforts 
are under way in the west to help Chinese web users get around China's 
censorship of the internet. In 2001, Bill Xia, who left China for the U. S. in the 
1990s, and some other U. S. 
-based volunteers started Dynamic Internet 
technology. This allows a user inside China to access the internet, not through a 
system controlled by the government, but through a proxy server. Another idea is 
to present the Chinese authorities with so many proxy addresses that they would 
never be able to block them all. The US-based group, peacefire. org, has adopted 
this approach. 604 
Often, the use of proxy servers becomes a controversy in itself. For example, 
Symantec has labelled a program that enables Chinese surfers to view blocked 
websites as a Trojan horse. Users of Norton Anti-Virus cannot access Freegate, a 
popular program which circumvents government blocks. Freegate lets users view 
sites banned by the Chinese government by taking advantage of a range of proxy 
servers assigned to changeable internet addresses. 605 
Nevertheless, dissidents, Falungong adherents, and Tibetan exiles utilise websites 
for communication and motivation. The overseas branch of the CDP, Frank Liu, 
Falungong, and the Tibetan exile community maintain particularly interesting and 
602 Jardin, X: 'P2P App's aim: Defend free speech', 29/10/02 
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informative websites. The CDP web page includes links to organisational 
information, important CDP documents, a publicity department, an invitation to 
join the CDP, and a variety of BBS forums. It includes a list of members of the 
CDP's national committee, with links to biographies of the most prominent 
members. 606 Frank Siqing Liu, director and lone employee of the Hong Kong 
Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, maintains a web page that 
features daily bulletins on arrests of dissidents and practitioners of Falungong, 
information on workers demonstrations and links updates from a variety of 
international sources such as the BBC and Radio Free Asia. Liu's website was 
hacked and the site was replaced with a message that said, `this site sold to 
www. islam. org. '6o7 
The Falungong site (www. falundafa. org), which is bilingual, frequently updated, 
and well organised, contains messages from the cult's founder Li Hongzhi, links 
to 26 Falungong sites, a calendar of conferences and events, and audio downloads 
that enable practitioners to listen to Master Li's lectures from anywhere in the 
world. Also, Falungong has used text messages to send out thousands of 
messages, totally undetected. Meanwhile, the Tibetan community-in-exile and its 
supporting NGOs maintain a sophisticated and informative set of websites around 
605 IndyMedia: `Symantec helps China crush freedom of information', newswire. indymedia. org, 
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the world. The main advocacy sites can be divided between those of officials, 
supporters and radicals. 608 
These efforts towards political participation by Chinese dissidents mirror both the 
unprecedented opportunities offered by the internet and communication 
technologies in general, and the actual pressing need to use them as an alternative 
information source and coordination network, providing information citizens need 
to participate in political life and fight for a more open and democratic system. 
According to Chase and Mulveron there are five key future trends in dissident use 
of the internet: 
First, in the short term, the Internet will require some human rights NGOs and 
advocacy groups to change their traditional focus on reporting arrests. Second, it 
will permit small groups and individuals with limited resources to exert much 
greater influence than would otherwise be possible. Third, it appears likely that 
overseas dissidents, and perhaps even mainland dissidents, will engage in more 
email spamming campaigns in the near future. Fourth, dissidents may 
increasingly turn to emerging "peer-to-peer" technology to exchange 
information. Finally, dissidents and other unauthorised organisations will try to 
find new ways to exploit the Internet's motivational and organisational 
bog potential 
608 ibid, pp. 33-34, for more details on the categorization of the Tibetan dissidents see also p. 35 609 ibid, p. 40 
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In contrast to Chase and Mulveron's findings, administrative assistant Wang Yi, 
like many of her friends, is aware of the political nuances that can `scupper' her 
surfing, but isn't too concerned about the situation. 
The truth is most young people are just not that interested (in politics). I want to 
know how to improve my chances of a good job, others want to chat and find a 
boyfriend, and many just want to escape from hard studies by playing games like 
Counter-Strike. Personally, I know no one interested in cyber dissidents. It's just 
not part of our lives 610 
This view is also supported by Bobson Wong, an independent researcher based in 
New York, who says that the majority of Chinese web users are not looking to be 
cyberdissidents. `These are not people itching to read CNN. There have been 
surveys done of internet users in China, and surveys reveal that most internet 
users in China trust the government'. 61 
Despite the political use of the internet by dissidents, the Chinese government has 
been able to deal with it effectively using both low-tech and high-tech solutions. 
Installing advanced telecommunications infrastructure to facilitate reform has 
complicated internal security for the Chinese government. As Nina Hachigian 
puts it, the challenge for the regime is to `prevent this commercial goldmine from 
becoming political quicksand'. 612 President Jiang Zemin specifically threatened 
610 Mackenzie, H: `Chinese work around net blocking', wired, 26/6/03 611 'Bypassing China's net firewall', BBC News, 3/11/04 
612 Chase and Mulveron, p. 46, the authors cite Hachigian, N: `China's cyberstrategy' 
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computer programmers, along with artists and writers, with stiff jail terms if they 
613 
`endanger state security' 
. 
The low-tech solutions employed by the Chinese authorities include the use of 
informers and surveillance, arrests of internet dissidents, the promulgation of 
regulations, and, in some cases, the physical shutdown of network resources 
614 
The government also has the ability to search for key words and block sensitive 
email messages. Several hundreds of thousands of web pages, such as those 
devoted to Taiwan, the Falungong and foreign news, are blocked by the 
government. Chinese censors employ filtering technology to block and intercept 
emails to and from the country's close to 80 million internet users. This is how 
Paul Mooney of the Herald Tribune describes it: 
Beijing has become skilled at hunting down proxy servers that allow users to 
maneuver around firewalls... Nor are Internet cafes safe havens any longer for 
exploring the Internet. Cafes in some provinces are experimenting with swipe 
cards linked to customers' national ID cards. One cafe manager showed me a 
back room where a police-linked computer, connected to four spy cameras, 
monitored users 615 
613 Farley, M: `Dissidents hack holes in China's new wall', Los Angeles Times. 
614 Chase and Mulveron, p. 49 
615 Mooney, P: `China's big mamas vs. online dissidents', International Herald Tribune, 23/4/04. 
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Reporters Without Borders also reported that messages critical of the Chinese 
government either never appear or are purged from popular chat rooms, while 
Chinese law enforcement agencies track down and even jail the authors of the 
messages. The most filtered topics are human rights, Taiwanese independence, 
pornography, oral sex, SARS, the BBC and the Falungong movement. 
A list obtained by the China Internet Project in Berkeley found that over 1,000 
words, including `dictatorship', `truth', and `riot police' are automatically banned 
in China's online forums 616 
The strategy of the security apparatus is to create a climate that promotes self- 
censorship and self-deterrence. This is exemplified by the comments of a public 
security official: `People are used to being wary, and the general sense that you 
are under surveillance acts as a disincentive. The key to controlling the net in 
China is in managing people, and this is a process that begins the moment you 
purchase a modem. 617 No one knows exactly how big China's internet police 
force is, although estimates run as high as 40,000.618 
Low-tech solutions include shutting down internet cafes, an approach used 
especially after the Lanjisu fire, but already present. For example, the Ministry of 
Public Security authorities in Baoding City, Hebei Province, issued new 
regulations for 100 internet cafes in the city. The regulations announced a `point 
616 New Scientist: `The "blog" revolution sweeps across China', Special Report from New Scientist Print Edition, www. newscientist. com, 24/11/04 617 Chase and Mulveron, p. xiii 618 Mooney, P: 'China's big mamas vs. online dissidents', International Herald Tribune, 23/4/04 
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71 a 
system', whereby a cafe `allowing a customer to browse "reactionary" 
information will be deducted 10 points'. If a cafe loses 30 points within a single 
year, its license will be suspended for one year. 619 
Following the fire at Lanjisu internet cafe in Beijing in June 2002 which killed 25 
people, the Public Security Ministry closed down 2,400 internet cafes in Beijing, 
ostensibly for safety reasons. The government ordered all internet cafes to 
augment their filtering software within weeks and to keep records of all users for 
a 90-day period. The software prevents access to 500,000 foreign websites, while 
those attempting to access these banned sites are automatically reported to the 
Public Security Bureau. Internet police in cities such as Xi'an and Chongqing can 
reportedly trace the activities of the users without their knowledge and monitor 
62° their online activities by various technical means. In March 2002, the 
authorities introduced a voluntary pledge, entitled, A Public Pledge on Self- 
Discipline for the China Internet Industry, to reinforce existing regulations 
controlling the use of the internet in China. Over 3000 Chinese internet business 
users have signed the pledge, including the US-based search engine Yahoo!. In 
protest against the measures taken by authorities to control freedom of expression, 
information and association on the internet, a group of 18 dissidents and 
619 Chase and Mulveron, p. 60 the authors cite 'Eight reactionary activists from Jilin who were 
imprisoned before call for reversing the verdict on the June 4`h incident and for government 
compensation', Hong Kong Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, June 3,2000 
in FBIS 
620 
`People's Republic of China: State control of the Internet in China', Amnesty International, 
26/11/02. 
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intellectuals published a Declaration of Citizens' Rights for the Internet on July 
621 29 2002 
The net police closed almost half of the coutry's 200,000 internet cafes and 
installed surveillance software in the rest. In Liaoning province, where 40% of the 
people who go online do so in internet cafes, software was installed in 7000 cafes 
to track down web users' online movements and keep records of their names, 
addresses and ID numbers. 622 
As the Head of Human Rights in China Xiao Qiang explains: 
There are new subjects and topics being banned by the government and [internet] 
users need to come up with new key words or phrases for these topics. While the 
overall censorship is still effective, the Net has already created a bottom-up force 
and is constantly negotiating this new space with the old style, top-down 
censorship and propaganda regime. The transformative effect of the internet has 
already set China on an irreversible course towards greater openness and public 
participation in social and political life' 623 
Government inspectors have checked up on 1.8m cafes since the campaign began, 
seeking out those letting kids play violent games or access subversive foreign 
621 ibid. 
622 New Scientist: `The "blog" revolution sweeps across China', Special Report from New 
Scientist Print Edition, www. newscientist. com, 24/11/04 
623 Greenberg, A: 'China: Web users get their ten cents worth despite the censors', South China 
Morning Post, 5/10/05 
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sites. In addition to the 1,600 cafes closed permanently, 18,000 have been shut 
down for `rectification'. The government said that since the summer (2004) 445 
people have been arrested and 1,125 web sites have been shut down. 
624 Beijing 
does not actually label sites as `blocked'. Instead, when a user clicks on a blocked 
site, the page will begin to down load, slowly, and the user is redirected either to 
an error message or back to a Chinese search engine. 625 
In one prominent example, email, mobile phone text messaging, and world news 
coverage that made it to China in part via the internet are widely credited with 
forcing the central government to go public with the facts and scope of the 2002-3 
SARS epidemic. 
In addition to traditional methods of control, the Chinese authorities have also 
made use of high-tech countermeasures, such as blocking websites and email, 
government-sponsored hacking, monitoring and filtering of email and online 
propaganda, denial, deception, and misinformation 626 
Nevertheless, the most effective line of defence in China's internet security 
strategy is the use of bureaucratic regulations to shape the market environment 
and the incentives of key participants in ways favorable to the state's interests. 
Since 1995, the Chinese government has promulgated a blizzard of rules 
governing nearly every aspect of the internet market. In particular, the 1997 
624 Sherriff, L: `China shuts 1,600 cybercafes', www. there2ister. co. uk 1/11/04 625 McLaughlin, K: `Internet prods Asia to open up', www. csmonitor. com, 9/9/04 
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Public Security Bureau regulation entitled `Computer Information Network and 
Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations' places most of the 
onus for monitoring, reporting, and preventing anti-regime use of the internet on 
domestic providers. 627 As a result, ISPs have implemented certain self-censoring 
policies to avoid trouble with the authorities. According to a January 24,2000 
Reuters story, ISP employees monitor chatrooms and bulletin boards, ferreting out 
risky political commentary, foul language, and unwanted advertisements. The 
most recent regulations on the use of the internet were promulgated by the 
Ministry of Information Industry in January 2002. These regulations require ISPs 
to maintain detailed records about their users, install software to record email 
messages sent and received by their users, and send copies of any emails that 
violate PRC law to the appropriate Chinese governments departments. 28 
Also, authorities at various times have blocked politically `sensitive' websites, 
including those of dissident groups and major foreign news organisations such as 
the Voice of America, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the BBC. 
In September 2002, they even banned the search engine Google. Google is hugely 
popular among China's internet users because of its wide-ranging capacity. A 
search in English for former President Jiang Zemin's name turns up links to 
156,000 websites mentioning him as opposed to a search on Sina. com, which 
turns up 1,600 mentions of Jiang. The Chinese-language service of Yahoo turns 
up just 24, largely because Yahoo has offices in Beijing and follows the 
626 ibid, p. 61 
627 ibid., p. 57 
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censorship restrictions. Also, in the case of Google, even if a site is made 
unavailable by a government or an ISP, Google makes the site available through 
the cache of pages it photographs as it crawls the web. The fact that numerous 
news sites especially are blocked by the Chinese authorities indicates that they are 
not prepared to let access to information -a basic ingredient for citizen 
participation and democracy - be a democratising force in the People's Republic 
of China. The dissident groups fighting against censorship and for democracy in 
China are prosecuted by the state, spied upon, arrested and then given jail 
sentences of up to 15 years in prison. 
Matters became worse for Chinese surfers just before November 2002 Communist 
Party Congress. State media quoted Jiang in August as telling propaganda 
officials to create a `sound atmosphere' for the meeting. Michael Robinson, chief 
technical officer of Beijing-based Clarity Data Systems, was quoted as saying at 
the time: `[t]his is a serious escalation. They are not acting as administrators. 
They are acting as hackers. They are impersonating authority they don't actually 
have' 629 The move appeared to have been ordered by public security authorities 
and implemented locally via internet servers run by the country's fixed phone 
giant China Telecom. Nevertheless, the battle for Google between Chinese 
authorities and the country's millions of internet users ended in defeat for the web 
censors. The censors allowed access to be restored after a complete block on the 
628 ibid., p. 61 
629 Bodeen, C: `Search engine Google blocked in China', Associated Press, 3/9/02 
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site for almost ten days. However, they also put on filters that would refuse 
searches for President Jiang and other politically sensitive queries. 630 
Blocking certain sites in China is easily done for internet service providers as 
flipping a light switch. As much as 80 per cent of the country's internet traffic 
flows through ChinaNet, a subsidiary of China Telecom. `On balance, we believe 
that having a service which links that work and omits a fractional number is better 
than having a service that is not available at all. It was a difficult trade-off for us 
to make, but the one we felt ultimately serves the best interests of our users 
located in China', Google said in its blog. The organisation Reporters Without 
Borders has accused Google of pandering to Chinese interests and filtering its 
Chinese language site. 631 Bill Xia, Dynamic Internet Technology, a research firm 
striving to defeat online censorship, suspects that Google is cooperating with the 
Chinese government's censorship efforts to smooth the way for expansion plans 
that could help them boost future profits. 632 Although China no longer blocks 
Google in its entirety, a Chinese user of Google can potentially have a much 
different experience than one from another country due to China'a content 
filtering practices. Chinese Internet users' access to Google is filtered for specific 
keywords, and this filtering disrupts Google searches as well as access to the 
Google cache. The isolation and filtering of the text string 'search? q=cache' 
suggest that the Chinese state knows how access to Google's cache can be used as 
630 Gittings, J: `Sense and censorship', 17/9/02 
631 Singer, M: `China's Google block sparks media group's protest', www. internetnews. com, 
30/11/04 
632 Associated Press: `Google bows to Chinese censorship', www. wired. com, 25/9/04 
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an ad hoc form of censorship circumvention and has taken steps to limit its 
accordingly. The fact that other search engines' cache functions are not filtered 
suggests that China has deliberately targeted Google for filtering. 633 
Most of the government's attempts to prevent the viewing of banned websites use 
multiple layers of filtering, ranging from the ISP to the network carrier to the non- 
technical aspects of web surfing in China (e. g. registration with the police, 
observation by internet cafe workers). In addition, blocks on websites are often 
temporarily removed when high-level foreign delegations visit China. During the 
October 2001 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Shanghai, 
for instance, Beijing permitted access to several websites that are normally 
blocked, including those of the Washington Post and CNN. This was presumably 
intended to avoid embarrassing international media reports which would burnish 
China's image, in order to make a good impression on visiting world leaders. As 
soon as President Bush and other world leaders left Shanghai however, the 
websites were once again blocked. 
634 
Despite these types of efforts to block sensitive sites, however, the China News 
Digest (CND) is at the forefront of the promotion of one of the most potent 
weapons used in fighting website blocking: proxy servers. A proxy server sits 
between a client application, such as a web browser, and a real server, and, as 
well as evading blocking, proxy servers are also used to improve performance and 
633 OpenNet Initiative: `Google search and cache filtering behind China's great firewall', 
www. opennetinitiative. net, 30/8/04 
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filter requests. The CND website contains a guide to using proxy servers to 
circumvent firewalls and internet censorship, as well as a call for volunteers to 
provide CND with additional proxy services. However, Chinese authorities have 
redoubled their efforts to block access to popular proxy servers. 635 For the 
moment at least, Beijing has the upper hand in the website blocking battle. Chase 
and Mulveron cite one activist who recently visited the mainland: `[t]he 
authorities have become much better at finding and blocking proxies in China; I 
was there for eight days and experienced eight days of Internet black out' 636 
Zittrain and Elderman, who did an empirical analysis of internet filtering in 
China, tracked 19,032 websites that were inaccessible from China on multiple 
occasions, but while remaining accessible from the United States. The authors 
concluded (1) that the Chinese government maintains an active interest in 
preventing users from viewing certain web content; (2) that it has managed to 
configure overlapping nationwide systems to effectively 
- 
if at times irregularly 
- 
block such content from users who do not regularly seek to circumvent such 
blocking; and (3) that such blocking systems are becoming more refined even as 
they are probably more labour and technology intensive to maintain than cruder 
predecessors. 637 
634 Chase and Mulveron, p. 64 
633 ibid, pp. 66-67 
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Furthermore, Chase and Mulveron argue that there is some evidence to suggest 
that the Chinese government or elements within it have engaged in hacking of 
dissident and anti-regime computer systems outside of China. Because of the 
difficulty in establishing official culpability for hacking attacks without additional 
evidence, governments can claim a reasonable measure of plausible deniability in 
these cases. This is how the authors describe it: 
The Chinese origin hacking attacks that occurred against Taiwan in august 1999 
and against Japan in February 2000 are examples of incidents in which 
government culpability, either limited or complete, is difficult to determine solely 
on the basis of the intrusion data. Stronger evidence exists to support the 
conclusion that the Chinese government or elements within it were responsible 
for one or more of the China-origin network attacks against computer systems in 
the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom 6'a 
In October 2003, it was revealed that a Beijing-based internet company was 
implicated in creating a program specifically designed to spy on computers of 
pro-Tibet dissidents. The attempt to spy has been done through sending 
innocuous-looking messages, purportedly from officials of the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and members of Tibet Support Groups (TSG), with 
subject matters listing current developments, including a recently held Fourth 
International Tibet Support Group Conference in Prague. Once attachments to 
such emails were opened, they planted a Trojan horse on the computer, which 
638 Chase and Mulveron, p. 71 
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made its content accessible to the Internet Group in China. These emails came 
from a Chinese IP and contained attachments of a Trojan horse that can 
potentially do anything. 
This was not the first time that organisations in China have tried to penetrate into 
the network system of TGIE. Jigme Tsering of the Dharamsala-based Tibetan 
Computer Resource Centre (TCRC) has revealed that there have been repeated 
attempts in the past to infect TGIE computers with viruses in order to obtain 
information. In an interview to the UK internet news site The Register in 
September 2002, Tsering warned that Tibet supporters were being targeted by an 
unnamed virus which was designed to fool the unwary by posing as an email from 
the Dalai Lama's office. 639 It is no secret that in addition to forcing ISPs and 
internet cafes to use filtering software, government minders hand-delete 
individual messages from discussion boards and change the domain-server 
records of forbidden sites so visitors are routed to authorised pages. 
Another incident indicates how the Chinese government deals with dissidents' use 
of the internet. Human Rights Watch reported that in May 1998, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security installed monitoring devices at the facilities of ISPs 
that can track individual email accounts 640 In January 2000, Liu Ming, the 
younger sister of student leader Liu Gang, wrote an indictment against the 
639 'Chinese internet group found spying on Tibetan government computers', www. savetibet. org, 28/10/03 
640 Chase and Mulveron, p. 82 The authors cite US Department of State, ` China country report on human rights practices'. 
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Changchun City Public Bureau, which was then disseminated abroad via the 
internet by Leng Wanbao, a noted dissident in Changchun City, Jilin province. 
Leng was picked up and interrogated for three hours by the police, who knew 
about the activity immediately-641 Chinese authorities have also detained Du 
Daobin, a civil servant, whose essays are banned by Beijing on the internet, on 
charges of subversion. Du who works for the municipal medical reform office, 
signed an online petition calling for the release of fellow cyberdissident Liu Di, a 
female psychology student from Beijing Normal University who was detained in 
the capital in November 2002.642 
In November 2003, a court turned down the appeals of four internet dissidents 
who were sentenced to up to 10 years in jail for posting their political views. They 
were arrested in March 2001 after they set up the `New Youth Association', an 
academic study group that discussed China's growing social problems 643 
Similarly Li Zhi, a 32-year old local official from Dazhou has been charged with 
conspiracy to subvert state power, according to the Human Rights in China 
(HRIC) group. Li frequently expressed his views on online bulletin boards and in 
chatrooms, and he has also been accused of communicating with overseas 
dissidents. Liu Qing, the president of HRIC has commented that `[m]onitoring 
email and internet chat rooms is an unacceptable invasion of privacy, and a 
64' ibid, p. 82, the authors cite `Report on PRC controlling dissidents' email', Hong Kong 
Information Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Movement in China, Jan 19,2000 in FBIS, 
Jan 19,2000 
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reprehensible method of gathering evidence for prosecution of a political 
crime' 
644 
The Chinese forums 
use a system of filters that enable them to sort the messages to two categories: 
those containing banned words and the rest. Messages in the first category are 
systematically blocked... Site Web Masters are supposed to check these blocked 
messages to establish whether they really need to be censored. But in fact, it is 
very rare for a message that has been filtered out to be manually restored to the 
bas forum 
Some analysts argue that, at least in the short to medium term, the spread of the 
internet will tend to benefit authoritarian regimes at the expense of dissidents and 
pro-democracy activists 646 As Kalathil and Boas observe, for example, China and 
other authoritarian states have responded effectively to the dissident challenge by 
implementing a combination of reactive measures, including blocking websites 
and jailing activists, and proactive policies, such as distributing propaganda online 
and proffering e-government services. 7 China's proactive efforts to use the 
internet to bolster regime power, however, have thus far produced only limited 
results. For example, although Beijing has actively promoted a `government 
644 
`China online dissident charged', BBC news, 24/9/03 
645 Ching, F: `The Internet dissidents', Globe and Mail, 22/5/03 
646 Chase and Mulveron, p. 87 
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authoritarian regimes: China, Cuba, and the counterrevolution', Carnegie Endowment working 
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online' plan, a recent survey of e-government initiatives around the world found 
that China ranked eighty third out of 196 countries. 8 
While Beijing has done a remarkable job of finding effective counterstrategies to 
potential negative effects of the information revolution, the scale of China's 
information-technology modernisation would suggest that time is eventually on 
the side of the regime's opponents. 649 Nina Hachigian predicts that `control over 
information will slowly shift from the state to networked citizens', leading to 
potentially `seismic' changes. 
Interestingly, this is how Chase and Mulveron put it: 
The government will not lose the upper hand soon though, because the 
government's strategy is also aided by the current economic environment in 
China, which encourages the commercialisation of the Internet, not its 
politicisation. Thus the Internet, despite the rhetoric of its most enthusiastic 
supporters, will probably not bring "revolutionary" political change to China, but 
instead will be a key pillar of China's slower, evolutionary path toward increased 
pluralization and possibly even nascent democratisation 65° 
The fact that the internet is so hard to control has also given it a role in making 
other media more open. According to Liu Qing, a prominent dissident who left 
648 ibid, p. 88, the authors cite World Markets Research Centre and Brown University, ` Global e- 
government survey', Sept. 2001 
9 ibid, p. 89, the authors cite Hachigian, N, `China's cyberstrategy'. 
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China after his release from jail in 1992, and who is now chairman of the US- 
based Human-Rights in China, `[n]o matter how sophisticated its technology there 
is no way the government can fully control the internet. That's why in China these 
days you can see all kinds of organisations and activities springing up, moving the 
country towards real change'. 651 The latest news of China's censoring techniques 
is that China is expanding its censorship controls to cover text messages sent 
using mobile phones 652 
By the end of October 2004, China had more than 45 large blog-hosting services. 
Any tech-savvy user can download and install blogging software themselves, 
bypassing the controls. Blogs play an important role in republishing information 
as quickly as it is banned from official websites. For example when China's most 
influential bulletin board Yitahutu (the site had more than 300,000 registered 
users and 700 discussion forums), was closed down by the net police. After the 
closure, all the major university bulletins were instructed to delete any discussion 
of the event. Even the name was censored from Chinese search engines. But the 
net police found it harder to purge discussion, because boggers found euphemisms 
for the event despite key word filtering. 653 
Bloggers in China have had email messages telling them to register or face 
sanctions. And, according to Reporters without borders, one blogger who 
650ibid, p. 90 
651 Luard, T: 'Chinese activists evade web controls', BBCnews Online, 30/1/04 
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contacted the Sanghai police to register was told there was no point in registering 
as independent blogs would not be granted permission to continue 654 By January 
2003, China had about 2000 bloggers when, without warning, the Chinese 
government blocked all access to blogspot. com, the server that hosts all blogs 
registered on blogger. com. The net police do not make the reasons for such 
actions public, but Chines bloggers point out that DynaWeb, an anti-censorship 
service run by overseas Chinese, had been using a blog on blogspot. com to 
publish proxy addresses that allowed users to get around the Great Firewall. The 
authorities' blanket blockade affected all China's bloggers, leaving them suddenly 
unable to reach their journals. 655 
A study from the Harvard Law School found that the Chinese government has 
become increasingly sophisticated at controlling the internet, taking a 
multilayered approach that contributes to precision in blocking political dissent by 
blocking just specific references to Tibetan independence without blocking all 
references to Tibet. John Palfrey, one of the researchers of the study sees China as 
the most successful country in the world to manage to filter the internet despite 
the fast changes in technology. The testing determined that though some 
dissidents complain that email newsletters sent in bulk are sometimes blocked, 
individual messages tend not to get filtered. This is because individual internet 
653 New Scientist: `The `blog' revolution sweeps across China', Special Report form New Scientist 
Print Edition, www. newscientist. com, 24/11/04 
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service providers, cybercafe owners and discussion forum moderators deploy 
additional blocking under threat of penalties by the state apparatus. 656 
The Chinese case is closely related to my research and the five research 
parameters 
- 
democracy, participation, power, globalisation and social movements 
- 
because these movements are globalised, involve groups that seek participation 
and power (Falungong), or in some cases, participation, democracy and power 
(CDP and Tibetan exile community). The information restricted in the Chinese 
state offline is available in cyberspace, subverting the national boundaries that 
have in the past helped the Chinese government to control access to information. 
Despite the fact that the Chinese authorities have been competent in internet 
filtering and arresting cyberdissidents, ultimately the total control of information 
spreading through the internet is impossible. This is why cyberdissidents will in 
the future have more opportunity to voice their viewpoints and coordinate their 
activities through the net, demanding more participation, more power and 
definitely more democracy from the Chinese state. 
656 Associated Press: `China's filters strong, subtle', wired. com, 14/4/05 
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4.3 Internet censorship internationally 
In its 2004 report `Internet Under Surveillance', the RSF gave positive grades 
only to Japan and Taiwan for internet freedom. The US was considering 
allocating $100 million to thwart internet censorship by authoritarian regimes 
with the introduction of a bill that would establish an Office of Global Internet 
Freedom to foster development of censorship-busting technology for users in 
countries including China and Saudi Arabia. The bill would allocate $50 million 
each for 2003 and 2004. The Bill says: `With nearly 10 per cent of the world's 
population now online and more gaining access each day, the internet stands to 
become the most powerful engine for democratization and the free exchange of 
ideas ever invented'. 657 The bill cites a catalogue of censorship techniques: 
surveillance of email and message boards, blocking content based on keywords, 
blocking individuals from visiting proscribed websites, blacklisting users, and 
wholesale denial of internet access. An attempt to overcome this is with Six/Four, 
developed by the Hacktivismo Group, was planned as a full-scale peer-to-peer 
platform for all internet activities. 
Ironically, in June 2002 with the restructuring of the US government, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft scrapped the guidelines that govern the FBI's conduct, 
allowing the bureau to monitor websites, public gatherings and religious 
657 Wagner, M: `Fighting net censorship abroad', wired. com, 3/10/02 
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institutions that are not under criminal investigation. Ashcroft also said that the 
government would photograph and fingerprint up to 100,000 foreigners entering 
the country from Arab and Muslim countries. Marc Rotenberg, director of the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, commented: `I think we've reached the 
point in the debate where we need to ask larger questions about where this 
administration is taking the US government. Someone needs to apply the breaks 
or the United States will become a "police state" '. 658 The Congress approved a 
bill in November 2003 that expands the reach of the Patriot act, shifting the 
balance of power away from the legislature and the courts, while expanding the 
power of the FBI to subpoena business documents and transactions without first 
seeking approval from a judge. Under the PATRIOT Act, the FBI can acquire 
bank records and internet or phone logs simply by issuing itself a so-called 
national security letter saying the records are relevant to an investigation into 
terrorism. The target institution is issued an order and kept from revealing the 
subpoena's existence to anyone, including the subject of the investigation. 659 A 
new law officially called the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, called 
PATRIOT II by privacy advocates, calls for the creation of a terrorist DNA 
database, eases laws pertaining to search, seizure and admissible evidence, and 
would allow the attorney general to revoke the citizenship of any resident who 
provides `material support' to terrorist groups. 660 Similar concerns are raised in an 
EU report released by the European Commission which argues that after the 
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the US, `many governments enhanced their 
658 Manjoo, F: ` Do dots connect o police state? ', wired, 7/6/02 659 Singel, R: ` Congress expands FBI spying power', wired, 24/11/03 
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surveillance powers, but at the risk of affecting privacy'. Phillipe Busquin, the 
European Union's commissioner for research has stated that `citizens are not 
prepared to let privacy be one of the casualties in the war on terrorism'. 
661 
An example of the use of state powers against privacy would be when in 
September 2002 the University of California had to reconsider their decision that 
would have forced a student activist group to remove from its website a link to a 
guerilla group accused of being a terrorist organisation. The campus activist 
group, known as Burn, provided a link which directed visitors to the official site 
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the 34 groups on 
the US government's list of foreign terrorist organisations. Gary Ratcliff, UCSD 
University Centers director sent the initial cease-and-desist letter to the Che Cafe 
Collective, the university group that sponsors Burn, which cites a section of the 
USA PATRIOT Act that deems it unlawful for any U. S. citizen to provide 
`material support or resources' to foreign terrorist organisations. Civil rights 
groups have heavily criticised the PATRIOT Act, claiming it violates 
constitutional rights 662 A UCSD student and member of the Collective who says 
her name is Allie Katz noted that Burn would not take down the link if the 
university decided to stand by its initial demand. `We see this as a free-speech 
issue, ' she said. `Merely having a link doesn't constitute material support'. 
Ratcliff responded that `[t]he academic computing department has found that 
some outside groups have Unix accounts on the Burn server. We're not sure if 
660 Delio, M: ` Do privacy fears allow terrorism? ', wired, 3/4/03 661 Wenzel, E: ` More privacy protections needed', Associated Press, 18/11/03 
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FARC does, but that's why we'd like to talk further with the students'. 663 In April, 
UCSD officials had succeeded in having the Groundwork Collective, Burn's 
previous sponsor, remove a link to the PKK. If the university stands by its initial 
demand and succeeds in having the FARC link removed by way of the PATRIOT 
Act, the decision could set a precedent for other public institutions looking to 
eradicate controversial links and sites. Another story relating to academia in the 
US is the website www. campus-watch. ore, set up by Middle East Forum, a think-tank 
set up `to monitor the attitudes of American professors and universities toward 
Islamic fundamentalism'. What gave the site instant notoriety was its posting of 
extensive dossiers on eight dubious professors. The students were invited to 
`inform' on any other of their teachers who should join the `treacherous octet! 9664 
Moreover, in contrast with China, which targets political freedom, Saudi Arabia, 
clamps down on personal freedom, being more concerned about personal morality 
than political subversion. According to a Harvard Law School study in the Saudi 
Arabian case, the Saudi government is keeping its subjects from viewing sites 
about drugs, women and rock-and-roll. The Saudi case is more typical than 
China's, although a few regimes like China exist, notably Vietnam and the United 
Arab Emirates which actually attempt to filter their entire national internet traffic 
wholesale 665 Ben Edelman, one of the analysts behind the report on Saudi Arabia, 
has commented: `[i]f you are trying to get into the club of rich, industrialised 
`62 ibid. 
663 Asaravala, A: `College questioning site's link', Associated Press, 28/9/02 
664 Sutherland, J: `Campus watch', wired, 7/10/02 
665 Shachtman, N: `Why countries make sites unseen', wired, 18/7/02 
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countries, filtering is not something you want to be seen as doing. But you need to 
be wealthy enough to afford a filtering system. So it's not happening in Africa, for 
example. There's no money for it' 666 For the study, Jonathan Zittrain and Ben 
Edelman tested 64,000 websites, with the full collaboration of the Saudi 
government. Most other countries are not willing when asked. The Saudis are 
open about their censorship of the web. If a site is blacklisted, the user is directed 
to a web page that informs him or her that access is denied, in contrast with China 
where a surfer simply gets an error message. 667 
Radical Islamic websites are not the only contribution of Islamic faith on the web, 
as more moderate groups struggle to break the monopoly of the state in setting the 
political and social agenda. These sites aim particularly to attract younger 
Muslims by offering a modem interpretation of Islam disseminated by modem or 
perhaps postmodern technology. Examples of sites include the Cairo-based 
Islamonline website (www. islamonline. net), set up by Egyptian Islamist 
intellectuals with a twenty-four hour news service providing a wealth of 
information with the objective `to work for the good of humanity and to support 
principles of freedom, justice, democracy and human rights'. 668 Also, the Al 
Shaab newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Islamist-oriented Labor Party, went 
online after being banned, with the editor publishing fierce criticism of the 
regime. This resulted in censorship from the state and the site was hacked many 
666 Manjoo, F: ` Do dots connect o police State? ', wired, 7/6/02 667 'Net use is catching on in Saudi Arabia', BBCnews, 31/7/02 
668 Abdel-Latif, 0: `Cyber-struggle: Islamist websites versus the Egyptian state', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin, December 2004. 
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times. Another newspaper of the Muslim Brotherhood, shut down from the 
Egyptian government, went online (www. ikhwanonline. com) connecting to 
audiences home and abroad, and fielding 54 candidates as independents 669 
Text messaging is also a more recent part of Arab dissent during the past 15 years. 
Saudi exiles and Islamic activists waged an underground war of faxed pamphlets 
during the early and mid-1990s. Satellite television channels transformed the 
images and ideas available to Arab viewers during the same period. More 
recently, CDs, DVDs and the World Wide Web have dominated underground 
political publishing in the Gulf. 
As Coll writes: 
The technology also helps democratic organizers who are often overmatched by 
the Gulfs authoritarian governments. In a region where formal political parties 
are banned but loose political societies are often tolerated, text messaging allows 
organisers to build unofficial membership lists, spread news about detained 
activists, encourage voter turnout, schedule meetings and rallies, and develop 
new issue campaigns 
- 
all while avoiding government-censored newspapers, 
television station and websites 670 
669 ibid. 
670 Coll, S: ` In the Gulf, dissidence goes digital: Text messaging is new tool of political 
underground', Washington Post Foreign Service, 29/3/05 
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He mentions the example of Kuwaiti women organising protests for voting rights 
said they had been more effective during their 2005 campaign than during their 
last serious effort five years ago because text messaging had allowed them to call 
younger protesters out of schools and into the streets 671 
And things can get really dangerous for cyberdissidents in these countries. 
Massoud Hamid, a 29 year-old Syrian journalism student was sentenced to three 
years in prison for posting photographs on a website. The photos showed a 
peaceful Kurdish demonstration outside UNICEF's Damascus headquarters. 
Hamid has already spent 14 months in prison. n 
In a world wide trend of repressive governments cracking down on internet 
journalists and dissidents, Tunisia's crackdown on cyber-dissidents took an 
ominous turn with the arrest and detention of journalist Zouhair Yahyaoui, 
founder and editor of the online news site TUNeZINE. Better known under the 
pseudonym Ettounsi ("The Tunisian"), Yahyaoui was charged under clause 2 of 
Article 306b of the Tunisian criminal code for `knowingly putting out false news' 
and also for `stealing' internet connection time at a local cyber cafe where he was 
working. Yahyaoui set up the site in July 2001 to put out news about the fight for 
democracy and freedom in Tunisia. 673 He published opposition material online 
and was one of the first people to circulate a letter from his uncle, Judge Mokhtar 
Yahyaoui, to President Ben Ali, criticizing the country's legal system. Between 
671 ibid. 
672 Kiss, J: ` Student jailed for web pics', www. iournalism co uk, 14/10/04 
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May 26 and 28 2002, TUNeZINE organised an online forum on a recent 
government referendum and the state of the opposition, which drew a large 
number of participants. The TUNeZINE website, which is hosted in France, has 
been censored by the Tunisian authorities from the outset, but each week a list of 
`proxy' addresses has been available so Tunisians could get around the blockage 
and access the site. Reporters Without Borders denounced as `scandalous' 
Yahyaoui's jailing for two years and four months. His lawyer, who visited him in 
prison, said he had been slapped and hit on the head while being interrogated. He 
was undressed and tortured three times by being made to hang by his arms with 
his feet barely touching the ground. After the last session of this, he revealed the 
password to his site, which enabled-the authorities to block public access to it. 674 
Iran also leads in crackdowns on internet journalists and dissidents according to a 
report from The Guardian. 675 The report specifically cites the arrest of journalist 
Sole Sa'di following an article he had written online criticising supreme leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the arrest of Mohamed Mohsen Sazegra, the 
manager of news site alliran. net, as signs that the clerics who run the society will 
not put up with the relative freedoms that flourish on the internet. Moreover, a 
number of internet service providers have been shut down, leading to the 
resignation of the head of the national association of Iranian ISPs in protest 676 
673 McGrath, D: `Tunisian Net dissident jailed', Associated Press, 13/7/02 
674 ibid. 
675 
`Iran cracks down on internet journalists', Europemedia. net, 10/3/03 676 'Iran cracks down on internet journalists', Europemedia. net, 10/3/03 
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Blogging has served as an outlet for dissent. According to Hossein Derakhstan, a 
28 year-old blogger, `[u]ntil there is a free press in Iran again weblogs will 
flourish. In the last few years about 90 per cent (pro-democracy) newspapers in 
Iran have been shut down. So people have turned to the Internet to get news. '677 
But the relative tolerance of blogging may be coming to an end, since journalist 
Sina Motallebi was arrested in Tehran for blogging. According to the Islamic 
News Agency he has been charged with `undermining national security through 
cultural activities' through the content of his blog, as well as in his other writings 
and the interviews he gave to foreign media outlets 
678 His arrest brought fear to 
other bloggers, as people have stopped blogging or have censored their blogs by 
removing any posts that might offend. 
Nevertheless, the socio-cultural importance of blogging is substantial. `The blogs 
show that [Iranians] are carrying new values and promoting new lifestyles. Older 
generations try to hide their personal feelings and opinions from others. 
Individuality, self-expression and tolerance are new values which are quite 
obvious through a quick study of the content of Persian web logs', Derakhshan 
said. 679 Similarly REDCAT, a theatre in Los Angeles, has been screening a series 
of films from Iran's hidden cinema. Underground film-making means that as 
more filmmakers hit the streets with digital camcoders in their backpacks, the 
Iranian government may have a hard time tracking them down: 
67 Delio, M: `Blogs opening Iranian society? ', wired, 28/3/03 
678 ibid. 
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With the advent of digital modes of recording, a lot of things we thought we 
knew about repressive regimes and modes of censorship of cinema are not true 
anymore. With a pocket digital camera you can record professional images, and 
you can have an editing system at home, so you don't need a permit. And you 
can walk outside of the country and present these images in the world 680 
Iran's hardline clerics publicly `disqualified' more than 2500 reform candidates 
for Parliament, but could not shut down either the 30 major political websites 
which are accessible in Iran or the 20,000 Iranian blog sites. The fundamentalists' 
landslide victory in Iran's Summer 2004 elections might have disheartened 
western observers, but these alternate channel of communications show signs that 
the internet has become the most successful way to work around oppression. 681 
Hundreds of Iranian online journals have been protesting against media 
censorship by renaming their websites after pro-reformist newspapers and 
websites that have been banned or shut down by authorities. It is thought that the 
number of Iranian blogs is now between 10,000 and 15,000. Some recent reports 
have suggested that Iranian authorities are considering the creation of a national 
intranet 
-an internet service just for Iran- in an attempt to separate from the world 
wide web. 682 
679 ibid. 
680 Berenice Reynaud quoted in Silverman, J: `Iran's most wanted: Filmakers', wired, 6/2/04 681 Thomas, L: `Electronic resistance: Young Iranians go digital in their quest for freedom', fwd from Smygo list 
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Iran has a thriving community of around 46,000 bloggers, but the government has 
persisted in persecuting people connected with the pro-democracy writing. 
683An 
imprisoned Iranian blogger Mojtaba Saminejad, arrested in November 2004, after 
writing about the arrests of three fellow bloggers. He was released on payment of 
£30,000, but was rearrested for relaunching his blog. In May he went on hunger 
strike. While in prison his blog was hijacked by hackers connected to the 
Hezbollah group. The international group Committee to Protect Bloggers 
organised a day of protest for the blogger and offer campaign banners and advice 
on writing letters to the Iranian government. 
In Iraq, The blog Iraqthemodel. blogspot. com, and reportedly 60 others are 
bringing to light events and public opnion in Iraq that are not commonly being 
aired in the conventional media in the United Syayes and elsewhere. 
684 While 
American bloggers have challenged the veracity of major media reports, their 
Iraqi counterparts are creating a tru, free press, online, in their homeland, for the 
first time in that country's modem history, using internet technology. The blogs 
are getting 3,000 to 6,000 visits per day - up to 200,000 visitors per month. 
Another bloggerZeyad, of the Healinglraq. blogspot. com, did reporting on the 
demonstrations against terrorism last December, which went unreported by the 
international and local media. Sam, a blogger who runs Hammorabi, reported on 
his site that Dutch troops who are participating in the coalition have received 
683 Kiss, J: ` Bloggers rally to support voice of dissent in Iran', www. joumalism. co. uk, 18/3/05 
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many threats to kill them, up to the top level. Some of these threats came as 
telephone calls to their private phones or as messages inside their mobile phones 
or to their emails. 
Moreover, at least pre-war, the internet was too expensive for Iraqis, with 
academics and government officials allowed to open email accounts on a monthly 
fee of $25 dollars a month, in an nation where a university professor is lucky to 
earn $120 a month. Censorship was also present. For example if one typed 
`Israel', one got `Your access has been denied'. A reporter for Wired turned the 
tables when he hacked into Saddam Hussein's email account through his `send 
mail to' link on the official Iraq website 685 
In Afghanistan, where the internet is too expensive for the public to use anyway, 
viewing is censored by running Net Nanny, a program that allows administrators 
to block sites, chats and newsgroups, as well as monitor online activity. Despite 
these measures, motivated users will always find ways around technical 
mechanisms intended to control their web browsing. Technologies aimed at 
controlling internet content tend to fail in two different ways. `Not only are they 
unable to reliably block access to the forbidden fruit, but they also tend to 
684 Koprowski, G: ` The Web: Iraqi blogs building free speech', United Press International, 
www. upi. com, 6/10/04 
685 'Blocked browsing: Iraq censors web surfing for few with Internet access', ABC news, undated 
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inappropriately block innocent materials, often of social, health, political or other 
major importance'. 686 
In Pakistan, the military government, as a matter of policy, blocks websites. For 
instance, they have curtailed access to a Washington-based news website The 
South Asia Tribune, which was launched in 2002 by journalist Shaheen Sehbai. It 
was blocked by the Pakistan Internet Exchange (PIE), a subsidiary of the Pakistan 
Telecommunication Company which provides internet bandwidth in Pakistan. 
The PIE since the beginning of 2003 is denying access to objectionable websites, 
and also banning internet telephony and voice/chat websites. But technology 
surpasses such bans, as internet users in Pakistan are logging-on en masse to 
proxy servers, thousands of which are available on the world wide web. 87 
North Korea, in keeping with the country's isolationist, agrarian agenda, has 
simply rendered internet access illegal. Computers are rare and internet access is 
almost non-existent, yet North Korea is suspected to have a military academy 
specialising in electronic warfare, turning out 100 cybersoldiers every year for 
nearly two decades. 88 Graduates of the elite program at Mirim College are skilled 
in everything from writing computer viruses to penetrating network defenses and 
programming weapon guidance systems. In May 2003, South Korea's Defense 
Security Command raised the issue at a cybersecurity seminar. In fact, the North 
Korean government would be grossly negligent if it failed to beef up its 
696 Weinstein, L: `Filters, laws won't clean up Net', wired, 16/12/02 
697 Mustafa, W: `Pakistan's netizens outsmart censors', wired, 4/6/03 
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information warfare capability, because South Korea, one of the most wired 
nations in the world, makes no secret that preparing for war is a top military 
priority. 
689 
South Korea, the world leader in broadband access, with more than half the 
population online, is not above net censorship. In July, two students have been 
arrested for posting material online that mocked political candidtates and others 
for promoting communism via the web. The government blocked a reported 
18,000 web pages last year according to Reporters Without Borders. 
Another example of conflict between dissidents and the government occurred in 
Ukraine, when Ukraine's successor to the KGB, known as the SBU, wanted to 
take over the top-level domain name. Dmitry Kohmanyuk, a network systems 
administrator who officially has control of the domain name and runs it with a 
group of volunteers in the US, said at the time that he would give it up, but only if 
the new system was based on the internet principle of non-discrimination, and 
was open to everybody. The reason he did not trust the SBU was because in 2000 
Georgiy Gongadze, the founder of a feisty political site Ukrainian Truth, was 
found murdered outside Kiev. 
690 
Also, Burmese dissidents are operating more and more from neighbouring 
countries such as India, where they use the net to campaign against the military 
688 McWilliams, B: `North Korea's school for hackers', wired, 2/6/03 689 McWilliams, B: 'North Korea's school for hackers', wired, 2/6/03 
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government. Aung Naing, editor of the Dhaka, Bangladesh-based Network Media 
Group has commented that `online independent news groups have become the 
window for the international community to peer inside this opaque country'. 
Burmese dissidents complain that their email systems are always coming under 
virus attacks. 
691 
In South Africa in July 2002, internet professionals accused the government of 
trying to hijack the world wide web and petitioned President Mbeki not to sign a 
new bill that would allow the government to take control of the registration and 
administration of internet domains (website names, addresses and space), and give 
it free access to information stored on the web 692 Also, in Zimbabwe, the 
country's only independent newspaper was relaunched online despite being 
banned by the government. Production stopped when armed police raided the 
newspaper's office in Harare. Staff were ordered from the premises and computer 
equipment was confiscated. Just days after arrest warrants were issued for 45 
Daily News journalists, Ngunjiri Nderitu, web editor of the newspaper, hoped that 
the internet would allow them to reach their readership in Zimbabwe. Daily News 
staff moved to Johannesburg to avoid government action, and their website 
remained active throughout the difficulties. 693 
690 Barton, J: `Ukraine's domain in dot-dispute', wired, 22/6/01 691 `Groups campaign online against Burmese dictators', USA Today, undated 692 Wagner, M: `Fighting net censorship abroad', wired. com, 3/10/02 693 
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Another example is Cuba, where, despite the strict censorship of the net (the 
Cuban government has banned the sale of computers to the public), the 
government launched a website in September 2002 to refute US charges that it 
sponsors terrorism and to seek support in the United States for the release of five 
Cubans imprisoned there for spying. Cuba is still on Washington's blacklist along 
with Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan, for providing a haven for 
Basque separatist group ETA and supporting Colombian guerillas. The site 
www. antiterroristas. cu published an interview with Noam Chomsky, who 
criticised his country for using the term `terrorism' only for acts of violence 
against the United States. 
Vietnam is another interesting case in point, where the government spies on 
internet cafe customers to prevent them from accessing documents it considers 
politically and morally objectionable. Vietnamese people living abroad, as well as 
dissidents inside the country, use the internet to circulate documents critical of the 
government. There have been cases were people were arrested for posting on the 
web, such as Pham Hong Son, who was arrested for translating and circulating on 
the net an article about democracy from a US state department internet site. 
Internet service providers in Vietnam are responsible for filtering websites, but 
internet cafe owners are required to monitor customers as well. The Prime 
Minister also issued a directive prohibiting all citizens, except top Communist 
party and government officials, from watching international satellite TV 694 
694 'Vietnam to monitor "reactionary" web use', wired, 26/6/02 
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A report titled Internet Under Surveillance by Reporters without Borders in June 
2004 summarised the censorship tactics of authoritarian regimes. These are: 
blocking sites, targeted filtering, modified mirrors (authorities in Uzbekistan 
change the content deemed unfavourable), prohibiting web-based emailing and 
owning ISPs, forcing cybercafes users to show IDs, and banning access and 
equipment 695 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined empirical examples of sociopolitical cyberconflict and 
dissidents' use of the internet against authoritarian governments. In particular, it 
looked at the anti-globalisation movement and Chinese dissidents' use of the net, 
as well as the Chinese government's counterstrategies. The remainder of the 
chapter included examples of dissidents fighting online against other authoritarian 
regimes. This showed how widespread both censorship activities by states and 
attempts to circumvent these controls have become. 
The integrated theoretical framework, proposed in section 2.4, urges us to focus 
on the following parameters when looking at sociopolitical cyberconflicts: 
2. The sociopolitical impact of ICTs on: 
333 
a. Mobilising structures (network style of movements using the internet, 
participation, recruitment, tactics, goals), b. Framing Processes (issues, strategy, 
identity, the effect of the internet on these processes), c. Political opportunity 
structure (the internet as a component of this structure), d. Hacktivism. 
Each of the examples laid out in this chapter can be explicitly linked with these 
components of the model. The network forms of these groups, like the structure of 
the internet itself, can be explained as rhizomatic, netwar, or SPIN. Global activist 
networks have many centres or hubs, but unlike their predecessors, those hubs are 
less likely to be defined around prominent leaders. Movement integration has 
shifted from ideological integration towards more personal and fluids forms of 
association based on weak ties and informal connective structures. This leads to a 
rhizomatic style of politics whish fully realises the organisational and 
mobilisational potential of internet network structures (see 2a). 
The successful protest against an intemet regulation in Spain demonstrated the 
speed of diffusion of protest and the effect of the internet as an informational, 
mobilisational and organisational tactic (see 2a). The virtual sit-in to demonstrate 
solidarity with the Zapatistas reflects an impact of the internet on the framing 
process, using symbolic interplay in cyberspace (see 2b). In the Seattle protests, 
alternative media were used as part of new communication technologies affecting 
protest and lobbying in cyberspace and the capture of windows of political 
695 Scheeres, J: `Progress report for net censors', wired, 22/6/04 
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opportunities (see 2c, 2d). The anti-globalisation movement (Indymedia, 
anticorporate hacktivism, etc. ) are also given fuller attention in section 2.1 above. 
Chinese dissidents have used email spamming, proxy servers to access blocked 
sites, sophisticated websites, email lists, bulletin board sites, file-trading and e- 
magazines to express their dissent online. Dissident use of the internet exhibits 
characteristics that are typical of NSM activity. Links between issues raised in 
this chapter and the proposed thoretical framework include: issues of media 
sensitivity and event density, a political opportunity structure opened by the 
internet to allow cyberdissidents to reach international public opinion (online 
dissent, activism and arrest is extensively reported by foreign media 
- 
see 2c), the 
structure of the online dissident movement (it seems to have no central leadership 
and looks network-type in character, for example the internet was crucial for 
recruitment for the CDP party 
- 
see 2a), the use of technologically-enhanced 
tactics, opening up alternative information and coordination networks (see 2b), 
collective identity (cyberdissidents increasingly show solidarity towards each 
other 
- 
see 2b), and the problematic relationship with the state (there is a 
crackdown on dissidents by the state). Those using the internet against their 
governments seek power, participation and democracy, making demands that 
governments are not only unwilling to provide, but more importantly, which 
prompt counterstrategies to crack down on these cyberdissidents (see 4d in next 
component, internet as a medium: medium effects on policy). The internet is 
therefore a battleground for these opposing interests and it remains to be seen 
335 
whether it will develop into a powerful engine for democratisation, or will fall 
under the pressure and regulation of authoritarian regimes. 
4 The internet as a medium: 
a. Analysing discourses (representations of the world, constructions of social 
identities and social relations), b. Control of information, level of censorship, 
alternative sources, c. Wolsfeld: Political contest model among antagonists: the 
ability to initiate and control events, dominate political discourse, mobilise 
supporters, d. Media effects on policy (strategic, tactical, representational). 
The anti-WTO protesters were able to initiate a newsworthy event, putting the 
other side to the defensive. Using the internet they could send stories directly 
from the street for the whole world to see, rendering the information 
uncontrollable. Thirdly, they were able to mobilise support by promoting an 
alternative frame for the event (see 4c). 
Dissidents against governments were able to use a variety of internet-based 
techniques (email lists, email spamming, BBS, peer-to-peer and e-magazines) to 
spread alternative frames for events and a possible alternative online democratic 
public sphere (see 4b: alternative sources). A discourse analysis (see 4a) of BBS 
messages, for instance those asking: "Can you establish your own political party? 
Can you set up a free labor union? Can you freely publish your political ideas? 
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Organise groups? Demonstrate? As long as you don't have those few things, you 
don't have anything'696, shows the determination of dissidents to question the 
monopoly of the state, the censorship and the repressive structure of Chinese 
politics, whilst creating an alternative public sphere. 
An example of dissidents' use of the internet is spamming e-magazines to an 
unprecedented number of people within China, a method which provides 
recipients with `plausible deniability'. The VIP Reference magazine is reportedly 
sent to between 250,000 and 300,000 Chinese email addresses. Also, file-trading 
networks like Kazaa and Gnutella can help dissidents communicate, since they 
have no central source and would be harder to turn off (see 4b). China has 
responded effectively to the dissident challenge by implementing a combination 
of reactive measures, including blocking websites and jailing activists and 
proactive policies, such as distributing propaganda online and proffering e- 
government services (see 2d). Also, in the other countries mentioned it is crucial 
to analyse the effect of government control and censorship (see 4b). 
If we take Cronauer's argument on the long term effects and the interlinkage of 
groups using emailing lists, the effects of networking, recruiting and the 
development of strategies, then the mobilisation structure is affected greatly by 
online efforts (2a, 2b, 2c). Hacktivism and its dilemmas are expressed vividly 
during the RNC protests (2d). Hacktivist attempts at entering the mainstream 
696 'True democracy, fake democracy or no democracy' by Backgo, posted on the China Popular 
Marxist Liberal Left wing ideology website. 
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through funding by big foundations and using the internet as a resource on the one 
hand, and on the other, different fractions within the hacktivist movement 
insisting on using the internet as a weapon for financial disruption and virtual 
attacks demonstrations a dilemma that deserves attention in any future discussion 
or analysis of future sociopolitical cyberconflicts. In terms of the media 
component (4) the new technological elements of 24 hour coverage, mobile 
reporting and organizing in protests demonstrate the notion that citizen journalism 
or open source journalism has entered mainstream. (An undeniable fact if we 
consider the example of the 7/7 terrorist blasts in London, where 1,000 photos and 
20 pieces of amateur video were sent into the BBC news website alone, and even 
featured in newspaper front pages. 97) This has potentially media effects on policy 
(4d), as the immediate coverage can have all sorts of negative and positive effects 
on the coverage and outcome of the outcome of conflicts. 
In relation to China and internet censorship issues (4b) it is obvious that most 
governments get negative points for the freedom of their citizen's access to the 
network. Bypassing censorship and using techniques to get banned information or 
to transmit forbidden information affects media coverage in all these countries 
and this again can affect policy. Interestingly, the key words or the themes banned 
in most authoritarian regimes if analysed discursively (4a) point to either desired 
banned topics and ideologies, such as democracy, participation, revolution, 
reform etc, or very negative ones, such as massacre, or historical events of 
697 Twist, 7: ` Mobiles capture blast aftermath', BBCnews, www. bbc. co. uk, 8/7/05 
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oppression, repression and conflict. Online efforts, such as pro-democracy, 
activist or anti-government websites point to the fact that people believe in the 
power of the medium enough to organize and run thousands of these sites and in 
many cases they are able to initiate and control events, mobile and recruit others 
for their cause (4c), as in the case of sites in the Islamic world, in China, in Latin 
America, activist sites for anti-globalisation and single-issue protests and 
mobilizations both on national and international levels. 
This framework for looking at sociopolitical cyberconflict includes the most basic 
aspects of the phenomenon and it is not suggested as definitive. It is offered as an 
analytical tool for future students of political conflict on the internet and as a way 
of opening space for discussion. The next chapter looks at a different type of 
cyberconflict, focusing on ethnoreligious conflicts, using conflict theory as the 
theoretical standpoint. 
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Chapter 5: Ethnoreligious Cyberconflict 
This chapter looks at ethnoreligious cyberconflicts, that is, real-world conflicts 
with ethnoreligious characteristics which spill over into cyberspace, such as the 
Kosovo conflict, the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Kashmir dispute, the 
Sino-American incident and Al-Qaida on the web. It also includes an assessment 
of ethnic conflicts and a discussion of whether the internet could be used as a tool 
of conflict resolution, using examples of particular efforts in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. The main argument concerning this type of conflict is that the 
groups involved use the internet not as a resource with which to reframe the 
issues, but rather as a weapon, like throwing stones. Lastly, the chapter ends by 
linking these examples of ethnoreligious cyberconflict with the proposed 
integrated theoretical framework. 
5.1 Ethnoreligious Cyberconflicts 
KOSOVO 
On the October 20,1998, the Kosovo Information Centre (KIC), which supports 
the party of the ethnic Albanian leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, reported that hackers 
claiming to be members of the Serbian terrorist organisation Crna Ruka (Black 
Hand) hacked its webpage. The hackers left an image of the Serbian nationalist 
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symbol and wrote in Serbian and English: `[w]elcome to the Web page of the 
biggest liars and killers... Brother Albanians, this coat of arms will be in your flag 
as long as you exist' 698 After the pages were restored, the hackers came back 
with a message saying who they were and posting the slogan `Long Live Serbia'. 
The same cyber-unit also attacked other Albanian sites and the largest Croatian 
daily English newspapers. Croatian hackers retaliated by crashing pages of the 
Serbian National University Library. 
Later, in April 2000, more than fifty websites were taken over by Serb hackers. 
The visitors to high-profile websites such as those of Adidas and Manchester 
United were surprised to see the image of a double-headed eagle, with the slogan 
`Kosovo is Serbia'. Also hacked were the Albanian site Kosovapress and the 
Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore, as well as the Serbian Ministry of Information 
and Bosnian, Croatian and Yugoslav sites. The Serbian Ministry of Information 
said that sites of Yugoslav providers, political parties and firms were attacked in a 
synchronised manner. 699 
The technical director of WebDNS, a domain monitoring company, also 
commented that the attack was part of a sustained campaign. The way he 
explained it was that the hackers replaced the contact details in Network 
Solutions, under which most of the sites were registered, by transferring the 
contact addresses to a Yugoslav site and then to an Albanian one. They probably 
698 'War of words on the Internet', BBC on line, 25/10/98 
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tricked Network Solutions by sending an email requesting a change of address 
and pretending to be from the companies that were hacked. 
During the same conflict, but concerning different players, US defense officials 
said on November 8th 1999 that the Pentagon refrained from unleashing an all-out 
computer attack on Serbia, because they were uncertain about the legal 
implications of launching the world's first cyberwar. They claimed that, in theory, 
they had the capacity to hack Milosevic's bank account and plunder Serbia's 
financial system. Furthermore, in May 1999, the Pentagon issued a fifty-page 
booklet of guidelines for waging cyberwar called `Assessment of International 
Legal Issues in Information Operations', which the Defense Department had been 
preparing since the first cyber-offensive used in Haiti in 1994. The report 
considers that information operations would be legal `weapons' in the traditional 
law of war, thus rendering cyberattacks on civilian targets like universities or 
financial infrastructure a war crime. John Arquilla, a cyberwar expert at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in California, and Martin Libicki, a researcher on 
cyberwarfare for the Rand Corporation think-tank in Washington, both think that 
the Pentagon spied on Serbian computers, but did not attack them for strategic 
reasons. 700 
Despite these instances of cyberwarfare, the real novelty of the use of the internet 
during the Kosovo conflict was the amazing amount of emails sent to news 
699 
`Serb hackers on the rampage', BBConline, 14/4/00 
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organisations from the people in the region. As Chris Nuttal comments, `[i]f 
someone could write a program quickly enough, it should be possible to collate 
them from all over the Net and automatically build up an interactive map of 
Yugoslavia linking to accounts of the bombings town by town. 701 
The Kosovo conflict is considered the first major conflict where cyberwarfare was 
used. NATO admitted that its website was blocked due to a bombardment of 
automated requests for information. During the bombing campaign, NATO web 
servers were subjected to sustained attacks by what NATO suspected were 
hackers in the employ of the Yugoslav military. 02. The attacks, which included 
`ping saturation' (denial of service attack where a target computer is 
overwhelmed with ping requests) and email viruses which brought NATO servers 
to a halt for a number of days. The attacks caused serious disruptions in the 
communication infrastructure of the organisation. 
ISRAEL-PALESTINE 
The increasing importance of cyberconflict is indeed very evident when it reflects 
conflicts belonging to the real world. In October 2000, Israeli and Palestinian 
hackers engaged in adversial hacking when the prolonged peace talks between the 
two parties broke down. Until the beginning of November 2000, groups 
70° Borger, J: `Pentagon kept lid on cyberwar in Kosovo', Washington Guardian, Guardian 
Unlimited, 9/11/99 
70 1 Nuttal, C: ` Kosovo 
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supporting either side in the conflict limited their online activities to defacements 
and Denial of Service attacks against websites affiliated with the Palestinian 
movement or Israeli nationalists. One example was when an Israeli flag, Hebrew 
text and a piano recording of `Hatikva', the Israeli national anthem, appeared on 
the Hezbollah home page. 703 Also, Palestinian hackers created a website called 
Wizel. com 
-a host for a FloodNet attack, a type of attack which reloads a targeted 
web page several times, rendering the site inoperable. The reaction was a 
sustained counterattack from pro-Palestinian `cybersoldiers' from the US. The 
websites of the Israeli Army, Foreign Ministry and Parliament, among others, 
were attacked. Targets also included financial institutions, as a result of which, e- 
commerce sites crashed and there was an economic impact reflected in the Israeli 
stock market. 704 
The situation escalated in the first days of November 2000, when an anti-Israeli 
hacker attacked the website of one of Washington's most powerful lobbying 
organisations, the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (Aipac). Fred 
Cohen, a computer-security professor, commented at the time: `[w]hen you talk 
about war, you are talking about turning off the constraints that hold back people. 
You have people who want to break into computers, and now they have an excuse 
- 
they can do it for a cause'. 705 The hackers published critical emails downloaded 
from Aipac's own databases and credit card numbers and email addresses of 
702 Messmer, E: ` Serb supporters ock it to NATO and U. S computers', Network World, 5/4 /99 703 Hockstader, L: `Pings and e-arrows fly in Mideast cyber-war', Washington Post online, 27/10/00 
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Aipac members. After the FBI was informed, the members of the organisation, 
including a Republican Senator, were advised to cancel their credit cards and 
monitor their accounts. The hackers wrote that `[t]he hack is to protest against the 
atrocities in Palestine by the barbaric Israeli soldiers and their constant support by 
the US government'. 706 Aipac spokesman Kenneth Bricker said at the time that 
the hackers downloaded credit card numbers and about 3,500 names and web 
addresses from people who had contracted Aipac's website. The broadest list of 
the organisation's 55,000 members was stored in a separate computer system and 
was not compromised. 
The Israelis were not slow to retaliate. According to MAGLAN, an Israeli 
information warfare research lab, an Israeli supporter, `PoloO', posted Palestinian 
leaders' cell phones numbers, as well as information about accessing the 
telephone and fax systems of the Palestinian Authority, plus 24 different websites, 
15 IRC channels and an IRC server through which the Palestinian movement 
communicates. Analysis by iDefense, a security monitoring agency, considered a 
number of key players in the cyber conflict. On the Israeli side the wizel. com 
creators, a. israforce. com, Smallmistake and Hizballah attacked Palestinian sites. 
On the Palestinian side there is Unity, a Muslim extremist group, one of the 
forerunners of what is referred to as e 
-jihad or cyberjihad. Unity attacked the Tel 
Aviv Stock Exchange. Later they announced that their strategy was four-phased. 
los Lemos, R: `Hactivism: Mideast war heats up', zdnet. com, 6/11/2000 706 
`Israeli lobby group hacked', BBConline, 3/11/00 
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Phase one included crashing official Israeli government sites, phase two hit the 
Bank of Israel and phase three targeted the Israel ISP infrastructure, Lucent and 
Golden Airlines, and an Israeli telecommunications provider. They also said that 
they would not realise phase four, the destruction of e-commerce sites, but added: 
`[w]e warn the Zionists and their supporters that any attempt to touch any Anti- 
Zionist site will be faced with phase four of the cyberwar - causing millions of 
dollars in transactions'. 707 Unity also claimed in an email in February 2001 to 
have successfully attacked AT&T in retaliation for the company doing business - 
as a back-up in case of emergency - with the Israeli Defense Force, claiming to 
have blocked the site for seventy-two hours in a particular hit. 708 
What distinguishes this cyberconflict from past ones is that it has moved beyond 
being a game controlled by a few highly-specialised hackers into being a full- 
scale action involving thousands of Israeli and Arab youngsters sending racist and 
occasionally pornographic emails to their opponents while circulating for their 
supporters a range of website addresses with simple instructions on how to crush 
the enemy's electronic fortresses. 709 One site offered a menu of targets to attack, 
including the sites of Hezbollah, the Palestinian National Authority, llamas and a 
dozen others. 10 The site encouraged users to click on the targets they would like 
to disable and offered a set of simple instructions for executing the assault. The 
whole process did not take more than a minute or two and generated multiple and 
707 Gentile, C: ` Hacker war rages in Holy Land', Wired News, 8/11/00 
708 Galvin, J: `Cyberwars bring real world conflict to the Web', ZDNet, 20/2/01 
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high-speed attacks. IDefense's director of intelligence production Ben Venzke 
thinks that the Palestinians won this particular battle in cyberspace, because 
according to him, there are people on the Palestinian side trying to learn how to 
hack overnight to join the effort. 711 
The political crisis in the beginning of 2002 in the Middle East spawned another 
increase in defacement attacks on Israeli Web servers. Israel was the victim of 10 
out of 15 significant web defacements in the Middle East over the first two weeks 
of April 2002 according to security consultancy mi2g. Mi2g reported Israeli 
websites with the `il' domain were defaced 413 times in 2001- up 220 per cent 
from the year before 
- 
and Israel has been the biggest victim of web defacements 
over the past three years, suffering 548 of the 1,295 attacks in the Middle East. 
The most active anti-Israeli hacker group claims to be Egyptian and started its 
activities just after 9/11.712 
INDIA-PAKISTAN 
Also, sympathisers on both sides of the Kashmir conflict (in northwestern India) 
have used cyberattacks to disrupt each other's computer systems and to 
disseminate propaganda. One of the first moments of cyberwarfare in the region 
was reported on October 16,1998 by the Indian news agency PTI. Suspected 
Pakistani intelligence operatives had hijacked the Indian Army's only website, 
710 ibid. 
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`Kashmir: A Paradise', which gives the Indian view on Kashmir. The site was set 
up a month earlier as counter-propaganda to the dozens of sites supporting 
Muslim Kashmiris seeking independence. The hackers had put up information on 
alleged torture of Kashmiris by the Indian security forces. The attack came at the 
time when Indian and Pakistan began talks in Islamabad in an effort to ease 
tensions. The Pakistani hackers dedicated the `new' site to `all the Kashmiri 
brothers who are suffering the brutal oppression of the Indian army'. 
713 The 
photographs of the site were overwritten with the slogans: `Stop the Indians' and 
`Save Kashmir'. Pictures showing Kashmiris allegedly killed by Indian forces 
were posed under headings such as `massacre', `torture', `extra judicial 
execution' and `the agony of crackdown'. A government statement said the 
hackers changed the site parameters so that visitors were diverted to a different 
server. 
Among the propaganda on the site, there was also a guest-book where visitors can 
leave comments. Two typical responses from the opposing sides were: `[t]his 
website is very biased and very unfair to the Pakistani point of view. This is just a 
whole charade by the Indians and 80% of it is absolutely untrue! ' (Pakistani), and 
`[a] whole hearted salute for my brothers fighting for our country with a religious 
maverick enemy' (Indian). 14 
712 Leyden, J: `Middle East conflict spills over into cyberspace', the Register, www. mi2g. com. 713 3 'Indian Army website ambushed', BBC online, 16/10/98 
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In March 2000, the cyberconflict escalated when a group of Pakistani hackers 
defaced 600 websites and temporarily took over government and private computer 
systems. The majority of the sites were hacked after the Pakistanis broke into 
IndiaLinks, India's largest internet service provider. The team responsible, the 
`Muslim On Line Syndicate', were described by their spokesperson as a group of 
nine ranging from 16 to 24 years of age. 715 Their spokesman also described their 
operations as taking control of a server, then defacing the site, after they have no 
more use for the data or the server. Their message was: `[w]e hope to bring the 
Kashmir conflict to the world's attention... We wish that our Muslim brothers will 
be given the right to choose, as was promised them half a century ago'. 716 
The number of Pro-Pakistani defacements of Indian websites has increased 
dramatically between 1999 and 2001: 45 in 1999,133 in 2000 and 275 by the end 
of August 2001 717 However, the assault on Pakistani sites has not been as 
successful. There were reports that Indian hackers have repeatedly tried to hack 
the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, without any result. Nevertheless, they have left 
messages to their Pakistani counterparts like `keep your hands off Indian sites', 
threats of `breaking the Internet backbone' of Pakistan and claims that `India is 
the superpower of Information Technology'. 718 
"s Hopper, I: `Kashmir conflict continues to escalate on line', CNN. com, 20/3/00 76 ibid. 
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More recently, an email worm in March 2003 appeared to be yet another salvo in 
a yearlong war between Indian and Pakistani hackers. According to the Indian 
Snakes, authors of the worm known as Yaha, it was written to retaliate against 
Pakistani hackers, who the Snakes said were defacing websites in India. Yaha 
variants have been around the net for over a year. It began its life as a standard 
mass-mailer worm. Political messages first appeared in its E variant, released in 
June 2002, which attempted to launch elementary Denial-of-Service attacks 
against the Pakistani government's primary website. Yaha. Q attempted to launch 
a Denial-of-Service attack against five Pakistani sites, changing user settings on 
infected machines and containing a number of messages directed at Pakistani 
hackers, other virus writers and an anti-virus researcher. 
Virus writers often use their creations to make a point, but very few are overtly 
political. Another example of a politically-motivated virus attack was the Lion 
worm of 2001, which was, according to its author, intended to chastise Japan over 
the issue of Japanese textbooks that implied that the Japanese occupation of China 
and Korea was justified and beneficial to the occupied countries. 719 
US-CHINA 
Another example of ethnoreligious cyberconflict is the Sino-American 
cyberconflict which emerged during an international diplomatic incident. A US 
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spy-plane made an emergency landing on Chinese soil on April 1 S` 2001 after 
colliding with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea, in a collision which 
killed the Chinese pilot. After this incident, Chinese hackers vowed to attack US 
sites, a threat which led hackers in the US to retaliate. According to UK computer 
security firm Mi2g, the Honkers Union of China hacking groups defaced 80 
websites and the Americans defaced more than 100 during April 2001.720 China's 
remote sensing satellite ground station was overwritten with a picture of a 
mushroom cloud, while in the US, the White House historical association was 
plastered with Chinese flags as were the departments of Health, Navy, Labour and 
the House of representatives' email servers. 
On May 9th 2001, Chinese hackers boasted they had defaced 1,000 US websites, 
but called a truce to the conflict. A statement by the Honker Union of China said 
that, having attacked 1,000 sites, they had reached their goal, and that any attack 
from that point on had no connection with them. Their American counterparts 
broke into hundreds of Chinese sites, leaving messages such as, `[w]e will hate 
China forever and will hack its sites'. 721 After a meeting online between the 
Honkers Union and the Chinese Red Guest Network Alliance, it was decided that 
their attack would last a week, ending on May 7`h, the two-year anniversary of the 
bombing of the Chinese embassy. They decided to keep the destruction of 
business websites to a minimum and attack government websites instead. They 
said that the point of the attack was to encourage people in the US to protest 
719 Delio, M: `Virus uses netizens as pawns', wired, 13/3/03 720 Left, S: `Chinese and American hackers declare "cyberwar"', Guardian unlimited, 4/5/01 
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against their government and demand peace between nations. One hacker said: 
`[t]he U. S. wants the world to go to war. All people cherish peace, but the mildew 
dog government of the U. S. wants war. We will attack to send a message to the 
people of the U. S., to tell them we are all one, but they must stop their 
government from destroying the world'. 
722 
Attacks that were discussed on an Internet Relay Chat during their meeting 
included defacing websites, emailing viruses to U. S. government employees and 
flooding computers with garbage data. A US hacker collective dubbed Project 
China left this message on a Chinese site: `Get ready to meet a strike force with 
strength the world has never seen before! We are going for all-out cyberwarfare 
on your gov. cn boxed and every box that you fucks haven't secured! ' 723 The 
Xinhua News Agency reported at the time that U. S hackers had defaced the 
websites of the provincial governments of Yichun, Xiajun and Beijing, the Deng 
Xiaoping Universities, as well as the Samsung and Daewoo Telecom sites in 
South Korea. A South Korean government security agency blamed the Sino-US 
cyberwar for the 164 cyberattacks on South Korean websites that had occurred 
during that time. Computer analysts said that American and Chinese hackers were 
using Korea to get into rival countries' computer systems without revealing their 
identities, because S. Korea has extensive links with both countries. 
721 
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Interestingly, the Chinese government has been quite open about its future 
strategic military objective. In the spring 2001 issue of China Military Science 
Journal, a member of the Chinese Committee of Science, Technology and 
Industry of the System Engineering Institute wrote, 
We are in the midst of a new technology in which electronic information 
technology is the control technology. The technology provides unprecedented 
applications for the development of new weaponry... Military battles during the 
21' century will unfold around the use of information for military and political 
goals 724 
This is hardly surprising. As we have seen in section 4.2, the Chinese government 
has placed heavy and detailed regulations on the internet, has arrested 25 people 
the past two years due to their online activities, has closed down thousands of 
internet cafes, and has blocked thousands of sites. Reportedly, elements of the 
government have also hacked sites belonging to dissident groups. 
Al-QAIDA ON THE WEB 
The size and the structure of the internet provides virtual sanctuary. The internet 
provides the glue that links groups that operate within the ancient modes of 
organic order 
- 
religious, tribal, etc. that from the backbone of the physical world 
sanctuary, with the modern world's operational environment. However, the 
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internet is more than merely a communications medium, it is a place of sanctuary 
in itself. 725 
Most militant groups now rely on the web to recruit new adherents. Terrorist 
groups rely increasingly on internet chat rooms, more anonymous than traditional 
websites. Gabriel Weiman, a professor at University in Haifa in Israel, began 
tracking terrorist-related web sites eight years ago, he found 12; today there are 
more than 4,500.726 
The web's growing centrality in Al-Qaida-related operations has led such analysts 
as former CIA director John E. McLaughlin to describe the movement as 
primarily driven today by `ideology and the Internet'. 727 The web's shapeless 
disregard for national boundaries and ethnic markers fits exactly with bin Laden's 
original vision for Al-Qaida, which he founded to stimulate revolt among the 
worldwide Muslim ummah, or community of believers. 
It was said that the Hamburg cell around Muhammad Atta, one of the presumed 
suicide pilots, was systematically using the internet to organise the 9/11 attacks. 728 
For security reasons, these individuals rarely used their private PCs from home, 
but more often visited internet cafes. The US intelligence agencies came to this 
724 Chepsiuk, R: (2001) `Get ready for cyberwars', ncmonline, 23/8/01. 
725 'Global guerrillas and temporary autonomous zones', forwarded from e- 
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conclusion when they arrested the alleged mastermind of the attacks, Abu 
Zubayda, and put his personal computer through the hoop. In it, they found a 
large number of encoded messages 
- 
the last ones having been sent on Sept. 9. 
Vince Cannistraro, the former head of the CIA's couter-intelligence unit once 
said: `Internet communications have become the main communications system 
among Al-Qaida around the world because it's safer, easier and more anonymous 
if they take the right precautions, and I think they're doing that'. 729 
In November 2001, as the Taliban collapsed and Al-Qaida lost its Afghan 
sanctuary, Osama bin Laden biographer Hamid Mir watched `every second Al- 
Qaida member carrying a laptop computer along with Kalashnikov' as they 
prepared to scatter into hiding and exile. 730 On the screens were photographs 
were photographs of Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta. With laptops and DVDs, in 
secret hideouts and neighbourhood internet cafes, young coding jihadis have 
sought to replicate the training, communication, planning and preaching facilities 
they lost in Afghanistan with countless new locations on the internet. AlQaeda 
suicide bombers and ambush units in Iraq routinely depend on the web for 
training and tactical support, relying on the internet's anonymity and flexibility to 
operate with near impunity in cyberspace. In Qatar, Egypt and Europe, cells 
affiliated with Al-Qaeda that have recently carried out or seriously planned 
bombings have relied heavily on the internet. Al-Qaida's innovation on the web 
728 Aliefudien: `Al-Qaeda, big brother, and cyberspace', Tehran Times, 26/12/04 729 ibid. 
730 Coll, S and Glasser, S: ` Terrorists turn to the web as base of operations', Washington Post, 
7/8/05, accessed 16/8/05 
355 
`erodes the ability of our security services to hit them when they are most 
vulnerable, when they are moving', as Michael Sheuer, former CIA chief of the 
unit that tracked bin Laden explains. `It used to be they had to go to Sudan, they 
had to go to Yemen, they had to go to Afghanistan to train. An Al-Qaida 
operative `no longer has to carry anything that is incriminating. He doesn't need 
his schematics, he doesn't nee his blueprints, he doesn't need anything that is 
incriminating'. Everything is posted on the web or `can be sent ahead by 
encrypted Internet, and it gets lost in the billions of messages that are out there'. 
731 
Al-Qaida militants have defied a crackdown and the loss of senior leaders in 
Saudi Arabia by using the internet to win over new recruits in Osama bin Laden's 
birthplace. 732 Despite the killing of top contributors, including one of its leading 
web magazine editors Issa Saad bin Oshan, the group has continued to publish its 
two widely distribute magazines regularly for the past year. Paul Eedle, a London 
based analyst who closely follows Qaeda sites explains it as follows: `This shows 
how a small group can continue a campaign using the Internet. Before the days of 
the Internet a group would pretty much fade from view if they were reduced in 
numbers like Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia'. 733 
The group `Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia' after an attack on a hotel in central 
Baghdad, released an internet statement claiming credit, while one group even 
731 ibid. 
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released its own videotape of the bombing, along with statements explaining why 
and how it chose that target. Within hours, all of it was appearing not only in 
Arabic websites and chat rooms, but also on television stations and even in some 
Western news reports. 
734 
It's an all too familiar ritual, hours after an attack on an American convoy or an 
Iraqi police patrol, a brief statement begins appearing on Islamist web sites 
claiming it was carried out by fighters loyal to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 735 
Everyday messages appear on the web offering encouragement to resistance 
fighters. Zarqawi's group started an internet magazine, complete with 
photographs and 43 pages of text. According to Michael Doran, a professor of 
Near East Studies at Princeton university who monitors traffic on Islamist web 
sites and chat rooms the magazine is partly a reaction against the Arab state 
media, which often misrepresent terrorist attacks like any other Qaeda-linked web 
publications. Other Islamist groups are joining the effort, including one calling 
itself the Jihadist Information Brigade. 
Maaskar al-Battar (al-Bataar Training Camp), a jihadi online publication, with 
motivational material interwoven with military training input, which has ceased 
publication was aimed at building a jihad culture among Muslim youth and to 
equip them to fight against those who have `invaded the Islamic world'. With 
733 ibid. 
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Maaskar al-Battar, training to become a jihad was available at the click of a 
mouse. The first issue drew attention to the convenience of online training it 
provided. `Oh Mujahid (holy warrior) brother, in order to join the great training 
camps you don't have to travel to other lands 
... 
Alone, in your home or with a 
group of your brothers, you too can begin to execute the new program. You can 
all join the al-Battar Training Camp'. 736 Al-Khansa, a magazine aimed 
exclusively at women and named after a woman poet who was a close associate of 
Prophet Mohammed, aimed at motivating women to participate more actively in 
the jihad. Jihadi online publications are not just about getting matter, putting 
together content and posting it on the internet. They are also concerned about 
survival, which is determined not so much by funding and circulation as it is 
about evading counter-terror experts. They constantly move URLs and change 
addresses regularly, sometimes embedding themselves within other websites to 
evade detection. Another jihadi online publication named Dhurwat al-Sanam, 
Arabic for the `highest or more virtous belief/insight' has been posted by the 
official spokesman of Al-Qaida in Iraq. 737 
Imam Samudra, charged with engineering the devastating Bali nightclub 
bombings, published a jailhouse autobiography justifying the Bali attacks, which 
killed 202 people it wasn't surprising. What was a surprise was that into the back 
of the book is a chapter entitled ' Hacking, Why Not? '. There Samudra urges 
736 Ramachandran, S: ` Jihad's latest `rag' hits the internet', Asian Times, www. atimes. com, 31/5/05 
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fellow Muslim radicals to take the holy war into cyberspace by attacking US 
computers, with the particular aim of committing credit card fraud, called 
`carding'. The chapter then provides an outline on how to get started. Samudra is 
among the most technologically savvy members of Jamaah Islamiah, an 
underground Islamic radical movement in Southeast Asia that is linked to Al- 
Qaida. He sought to fund the Bali attacks in part through online credit card fraud, 
according to Indonesian police. `This is hacking for dummies. But in this day and 
age, you don't have to be an expert hacker to have a tremendous impact', 
comments Evan F. Kohlman, a US consultant on international terrorism who 
reviewed the chapter. Kohlman and other cyberterrorism experts say the kind of 
fraud preached by Samudra is becoming increasingly attractive as a source of 
funding for Al-Qaida operatives in several regions of the world. 738 
Three internet cafes, including one located in downtown Riyadh, have been raided 
by security officials in a move to track down on terrorists who have been using 
public cafes to exchange information, post terror messages and issue treats to 
organisations, government agencies and nations. 739 Arif Ziauddin, manager of one 
of the raided cafes, stated that many terror suspects have turned to cyberspce to 
communicate with their accomplices since the May 12 2003 bombings in Riyadh. 
738 Sipress, A: `An Indonesian's prison pepoir takes war into cyberspace', Washington Post 
Foreign Service, 14/12/04 
739 Khan, Ghazanfar Ali M: `Terror crackdown leads to cybercafes', www. arabnews. com, 18/1/05 
On June 1 2004, al-Qaida terrorsits conducted one of their most spectacular 
operations 
-a brutal assault on the Saudi oil town of Khobar, replete with seek- 
and-destroy missions targeting non-Muslims and gun battles with security forces. 
740An internet post by a man who calls himself Fawaz Bin Muhammad al-Nashmi, 
posted on June 3 to a forum called Al-Qal'ah (the Fortress) recounts a heroic 
`battle' in which he along with comrades set out to cleanse the Arabian peninsula 
of infidels. The posting resembles a Hollywood action film. Although al-Qaida 
adherents are commonly described as a having a medieval world view, their 
rhetoric and self-image owe as much to blockbuster movies and Mortal Kimbat as 
to epic tales of seventh-century Islam. Al-Nashmi uses the word `i1j' to refer to 
the non-Muslism he and his comrades murder, which means an unbeliever. It has 
become a jocular pejorative for US soldiers, and Al-Nashmi uses it 
interchangeably with `cafir', the standard put-down for an infidel. As improbable 
as it is that these events occurred as he describes them, his idealized narrative 
presents them as they appear to the mind's eye of Al-Qaida. The pool of potential 
recruits teems with young men adrift amid feelings of humiliation and 
powerlessness, eager for a world view that answers their questions, and hungry 
for action. In his account of a blood-soaked day, al-Nashmi gives them what they 
lack 
- 
power over life and death, a mission to rid the world of enemies, and 
violence as the path to deliverance. 
740 Kimmage, D: `Al-Qaida's next action hero', 16/6/04, http: //state. msn. com/id/2102487 
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Efforts at undermining Al-Qaida's virtual operations, networking, mobilisation, 
propaganda, recruiting and fundraising are many and in fact various research 
centres, university and think tanks have been funded or prepare proposals for 
funding on several counterterrorism projects. For instance, documents obtained by 
the Electronic Privacy Information Centre through a Freedom of Information Act 
show that the US Central Intelligence Agency and the National Science 
Foundation collaborated to fund researchers developing software to electronically 
spy on internet chat rooms. The project is described as the `fully automated 
surveillance system for data collection and analysis in internet chat rooms to 
discover hidden groups'. 74' 
A new generation of software called Starlight 3.0, developed for the Department 
of Homeland Security by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), can 
unravel the complex relationships between people, places, and events. 742 
Anticipating terrorist activity requires continually decoding the meaning behind 
countless emails, web pages, financial transactions, and other documents, 
according to Jim Thomas, director of the National Visualization and Analytics 
Centre (NVAC) in Richland, Washington. In September 2005, NVAC, a division 
of the PNNL, will release its Starlight 3.0 visual analytics software, which 
graphically displays the relationships and interactions between documents 
containing text, images, audio, and video. Starlight quadruples the number of 
documents that can be analyzed at one time 
-from the previous 10,000 to 40,000 
741 Indymedia: `CIA behind automated chat room spying scheme', www. indymedia. ore, 15/12/04 742 Gartner, J: `A vision of terror', www. technologyreview. com, 10/5/05 
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- 
depending on the type of files. It also permits visualizations to be opened 
simultaneously, which allows officers for the first time to analyze geospatial data 
within the program. 
Moreover, British chief police officers are asking the UK government for new 
powers that would allow them to attack terrorist websites. 743 Ken Jones, chairman 
of the ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee said that the evolving 
nature of the current threat from international terrorism demands that those 
charged with countering the threat have the tools they need to do the job. But a 
representative of Spy. org. uk, a civil liberties advocacy web site, in an email to 
silicon. com, wrote: `Who exactly is going to define what a terrorist website is? 
There are none of these hosted in the UK, so the targets must be abroad 
... 
The 
only people who seem to have a legal hacking law at the moment are the 
Australians, but it does not appear that they have dared use it against overseas 
targets. 
Other legal issues are also controversial. The case of Babar Ahmad, who after 
being arrested under our draconian and catch all Terrorism Act, and released 
without charge, presumably for lack of actual evidence, has been arrested in 
London in order to be extradited to the USA. He is accused of running a website 
in the USA, which apparently supported the Taleban in Afghanistan and some 
rebels in Chechnya in Russia. Neither of these were at the time or are now, 
743 Illet, D: 'UK cops want to attack terrorism web sites', silicon. com, published on ZDNet News, 25/7/05, accessed 16/8/05 
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proscribed terrorist organisations in the United Kingdom, yet this British citizen is 
in the process of being extradited to a foreign country the USA, regarding 
possible actions in a third and fourth country i. e 744 
744 'Global guerrillas and temporary autonomous zones', forwarded from e- 
resistanceng,,, aahoogroups. com, posted on 20/8/04, accessed 27/12/04 
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5.2 Ethnic Cyberconflicts 
So far I looked at the Israeli-Palestinian, Indian-Pakistani and US-Chinese 
cyberconflicts, which are considered to be ethnoreligious cyberconflicts. The next 
section looks at various cyberconflicts that are more ethnic in character, namely 
China-Taiwan, China-Japan and Colombia (more of an internal conflict), in order 
to include empirical evidence and discussion of different types of cyberconflict. 
After Taiwanese president Teng-Hui talked about a two-state theory to describe 
the relationship between China and Taiwan in what was perceived by many as a 
declaration of independence, Chinese hackers attacked many of the Taiwanese 
government's websites. The hackers during the first week of August 1999 filled 
the pages with political slogans and warnings to the `separationists'. On the 
rebound, Taiwanese hackers attacked Chinese government sites, with hack 
attempts succeeding. The interesting part was that Taiwanese hackers added many 
liberal elements to their hacking such as music (pop songs and the national 
anthem), animations and comments citing popular culture. 
The Taiwanese authorities warned that hacking even a Chinese site is illegal and 
that hackers would be prosecuted. The response from a representative of 
Taiwanese hackers was that their movement was an autonomous action against 
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any kind of information warfare invasion, and a dismissal of the government's 
745 
countermeasures as unethical. 
Also, in February 2000, Chinese hackers launched an attack against major 
Japanese companies. The reason for this was what they perceived as Japan's hard 
line against China. They left messages such as `Down with Japanese militarism' 
and `Kill all Japs'. 46 Japan more recently has been targeted twice. During the first 
week of April 2001, pro-Korean hackers attacked Japanese organisations 
responsible for the approval of a new history book. The textbook glossed over 
atrocities committed by Japan during World War II and the occupation of China 
and South Korea. The attackers were mainly Korean students, who crashed 
several websites belonging to Japanese organisations, including Japan's education 
ministry, the Liberal Democratic Party and the publishers of the book. Then in 
August 2001, pro-Chinese hackers defaced several sites belonging to Japanese 
companies after Japan's Prime Minister visited a controversial war memorial, the 
Yasukuni Shrine. 747 Chinese hackers have demonstrated their willingness to use 
cyberspace as a platform for protests and patriotic nationalism - though this is not 
to say that other nationalities have not been doing the same. Similarly, in 
Malaysia between April 1999 and April 2000, there were 89 hacker attacks on 60 
government agencies, including sensitive data-carrying targets like the treasury, 
. as Jame, F: ` China, Taiwan in web hacking "war" ZDNet, 10/8/99 
746 ibid. 
747 'Chinese hackers attack Japanese websites over the Shrine visit', Agence France Presse, 
14/8/01 
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public works, social security and immigration, along with major non-government 
sites such as Malaysian Airlines. 
Japan has bolstered the defence of its computer systems in the face of a surge in 
cyberattacks believed linked to anti-Japanese sentiment in Asia during the spring 
of 2005. Government officials were reluctant to publicly pin the attacks on 
Chinese and South Korea hackers because of the difficulty of identifying their 
source, but the attacks coincided with violent anti-Japanese protests in China. 
This actually fuels the argument that `real' conflicts have the tendency to transfer 
online to the extent that cyberconflicts and hackattacks can be used as a barometer 
for real life conflicts. Cyberattacks hit Japan's National Police agency, Self- 
Defence Forces and the Defense and Foreign Ministries, other businesses and a 
Tokyo war shrine criticised in Asia for honouring convicted war criminals. An 
official in Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, which honors war criminals among Japan's 
2.5 million war dead, said on condition of anonymity that the site was hit with 
15,000 attacks per second. 748 Experts say the recent flow of internet intrusions 
marks a shift from `kid's play' hacking to organized, full-scale, politically 
motivated assaults. `People have discovered that they can conduct "digital 
demonstrations" at any time. It's almost unthinkable that a huge flock of Chinese 
people could come to Japan and hold a protest. But digitally is possible', 
748 Lateline News: `Digital demonstrations in China spark concern in Japan', 
hgp-//news. muzi. com/11/enp-lish/1362332. htmi, 11/5/05, accessed 1/7/05 
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comments Itsuro Nishimoto, A SecureNet service, a division of Internet security 
LAC. 749 
COLOMBIA 
After the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) hijacked a 
commercial plane and kidnapped a senator at the end of February 2002, the 
government called off peace talks and decided to send troops to reclaim a 
Switzerland-sized territory it conceded to the rebels in 1998. While there were 
battles on the ground, another crucial battle was being fought in cyberspace to 
influence public opinion. 
On their multi-lingual website, FARC condemn the government's move, rally 
their foreign supporters and swear to fight to the finish. FARC commandos wrote 
in a press release published on their site the day after President Andres Pastrana 
ended negotiations in a televised speech, `[o]nce more the Colombian oligarchy 
impedes the dialogue that would allow the structural, economic, political, social 
and military changes that Colombia requires to escape the profound crisis that 
liberal and conservative governments have historically mired in'. 750 They 
continued in an online editorial: `[w]hile there is no definite solution to the great 
injustices suffered by our people, while resources are spent on war and not peace, 
749 ibid. 
750 Scheeres, J: ` Colombia's cyber (un)civil war', Wired news, 4/3/02 
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we will continue forward in the conquest of power for the construction of the New 
Colombia '. 751 
2005 was the first year in more than a decade that no Colombian reporters were 
killed. However, the statistic, while welcome, was due more to the increased 
caution being practiced by journalists rather than an improvement in the country's 
situation. From a journalistic perspective, this is cause for concern because it 
appears to have resulted in a self-censorship that has rendered serious 
investigative journalism virtually non-existent and led to a distorted portrayal of 
Colombia's conflict. 
Reporters are fearful of the reactions of right-wing paramilitaries and leftist 
guerrillas to the stories that they report. Paramilitaries from the United Self- 
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are prominent in Puerto Asis and other towns 
in Putumayo, while the Revolutionary Military Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
guerrillas control many of the rural areas. Due to their fear of the armed groups, 
local journalists in Puturnayo practice what they call `social journalism', in which 
they focus on social and political stories that do not involve the armed groups. 752 
751 ibid. 
752 Leech, G: `Scared into silence', www. columbiaiournal ore, accessed 1411/05 
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5.3 Is the internet a tool for conflict resolution or an escalating factor? 
The examples of ethnoreligious and sociopolitical cyberconflict show that 
cyberattacks follow actual conflict, and are therefore closely linked with the real 
world. Also, cyberspace can be used as a battleground for future warfare, as some 
experts argue. On the other hand, in the pursuit of potential positive uses of the 
internet as a tool for communication and conflict resolution between opposing 
sides in a conflict, the Palestine-Israeli conflict emerges as a constructive 
example. 
One of the initiatives taken to promote cooperation in the Middle East region 
through the internet is the Middle East Virtual Community (MEViC). MEViC 
(www. mevic. org) seeks to create a virtual community of academics and 
intellectuals in order to foster cooperation, collaboration in research, 
communication and understanding in the region. The organisation currently has 
participants from Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the Gulf, Turkey and Morocco. 
Working as individuals, they have been able to bypass political and institutional 
constraints that have been characteristic of the region. As Dachan puts it, `[t]he 
singular aspects of computer mediated communication are particularly relevant to 
creating the kind of community and discussion groups dealing with the issues 
related to regional conflict, and should serve as an important component of 
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community based diplomacy'. 753 Moreover, such a community has the potential 
for creating strong dialogue, especially when there is a group of committed 
individuals, limited by neither time nor space, and having the capacity to plan and 
organise, to access regional research centers and to use online document 
delivering systems. 
Another interesting attempt at dialogue is an internet community called the 
Middleast Abrahamic Forum (MEAF). On the homepage of the community, it is 
mentioned that the forum is devoted to interfaith dialogue between the three 
Abrahamic traditions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The first seven months of 
the life of this community are described by its founder and manager Mohamed 
Mosad754 The values emphasised by the majority of members included stressing 
the importance of unity between the different religions. The forum participants 
exchanged ideas reflecting the beliefs common to the different religions. Then, 
they moved to discussing the value of dialogue itself and its ethics, and, while 
they became more convinced of the differences betweeen them, they remained 
committed to a search for peaceful coexistence. Mosad writes that although there 
were threads calling for a debate to prove which religion is the right one or 
reminding the dreamy members of the conflictual aspects of reality, participants 
in the forum still managed to develop a common language. 7" 
753 Dachan, M: 'Internet usage in the Middle East: Some political and social implications', Department of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 754 Mosad, M: `The web community: A social movement in cyberspace? ', Department of 
sociology, American university of Cairo. 
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Also, Mosad is interested in the individual and collective identities of the MEAF 
virtual community. Responding to a thread raising the question of `who are we', 
the members defined themselves in terms of nationality, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, age, and political position. Some shaped their identity in opposition to an 
`Other'. Some spoke with `I', others with `we'; some were talking as members of 
a community, while others were representing different identities from outside. It 
is useful to include here Mosad's comment that identity becomes an issue when 
one's status quo is threatened. He argues that, in this particular community, 
people felt threatened in two situations. Firstly, they felt threatened when facing 
the political situation or international media coverage from outside the 
community, when this operates in a way which threatens a person's particular 
identity (e. g. defending Muslims from being called terrorists after a suicide 
bombing). Secondly, they became defensive when their identity was threatened by 
an inside alternative. For instance, when a Jewish member said that Jerusalem 
should belong to the three traditions, some Jewish members stressed their Israeli 
identity and their critic's American one. 756 
As far as their collective identity is concerned, Mosad explains that, when 
receiving a new member, the old ones replied in a sense of `we welcome you', 
and, when dealing with a rebelling member, the rest of the members would show 
solidarity against him/her. It did not matter what religion s/he was or which 
iss Mohamed Mosad: `The web community: A social movement in cyberspace? ', Department of 
sociology, American university of Cairo. 
756 ibid. 
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country s/he was from; every member responded in the same way to refute 
him/her, and when the member would not be convinced politely, they would start 
to attack the opponent in his/her thread, showing solidarity with their community. 
Even more interestingly (since, as Mosad notes, a collective identity is not simply 
the drawing of a cognitive boundary; it is also an emotion), many of the members 
started a good friendship via phone-calls and emails, and when they would notice 
an absence of an active member, they would send messages to check on him. 
The power-game turned out to be a game for information. Social movements, 
instead of exercising a physical action, acted so as to control the way information 
would be interpreted. That is why communities like these are becoming important 
as initiatives in regional conflicts. An example was when the MEAF community 
participated in a campaign to stop the demolition of Palestinian homes, where 
members of the community bombarded the Israeli PM, the general secretary of 
the UN and the then US Secretary of State Madeline Albright. 
A third effort in the same region to build communication bridges through the 
internet was initiated by the Project for Arab-Jewish Dialogue of the Program in 
Conflict Resolution at Bar-Ilan University with Palestinians counterparts from the 
Bethlehem-Hebron area. Participants from Bar-Ilan University and Beit Ommar 
village participated in an experimental email dialogue for approximately two 
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months during the late spring of 1998.757 Eight participants on each side were 
paired up and given instructions to introduce themselves to each other and 
describe a Muslim or Jewish holiday and conduct clarifications with each other on 
this topic. The organising parties had to overcome major technical difficulties, 
namely, to install the first email location in Beit Ommar. Due to the success of 
this first dialogue, a second one was attempted, this time focusing directly on two 
holidays, Ramadan and Rosh Hashanah. The email effort was meant to explore 
possibilities for precise data transmission and comprehension across the Israeli- 
Palestinian divide, as well as to facilitate the positive relationship-building 
necessary for both conflict resolution and effective coactivity. Eight participants 
from both sides took short examinations on the two holidays before and after the 
email exchange, and concluded the two-month cycle with actual face-to-face 
workshops. An example of their email messages follows. 
An Israeli student wrote: 
I learned that Ramadan is one of the five foundations of Islam, and that every 
Moslem has to fast for the whole month of Ramadan, in which the Quran was 
given to Mohammad on the night of the 27`x'. I didn't quite understand what do 
you do during the days of the fasting, are there any special thing you do during 
's' Mollov, B, Schwartz, Steinberg, G and Lavie, C: `The Impact of Israeli-Palestinian 
intercultural dialogue: Virtual and face to face', Bar-Ilan University, 
www. mevic. org/papers/mollovvirtual. htmi 
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the day? Special prayers? Special places to got to? Another question: Do all 
759 Moslems fast on this month or just the very religious ones... 
His Palestinian partner responded: 
It is so nice to hear from you, and it was a nice time that we spent at Bar-Ilan 
University. Regarding your questions: we spend time during the day in Ramadan 
as usual, we go to work normally, and we pray the five prayers but we add in the 
last prayer an extra prayer and during these prayers we read the whole Quran 
during the month... Not all Moslems fast, but we can say most of them. I would 
like to ask what does Rosh Hashanah symbolize? And how many days do you 
celebrate? 759 
During the two-month email cycle, in total 65 messages were exchanged and the 
organisers were impressed by the richness of the message content and the social 
information exchanged. Furthermore, while both groups performed poorly in their 
exams prior to the dialogue, with the Israelis scoring 58% and the Palestinians 
51%, after the dialogue the Palestinians increased their knowledge to 73% and the 
Israelis to 61%. Palestinian results can be partly explained due to the fact that 
Israeli communication styles place less emphasis to social interaction and talk 
straight and to the point, that is to say, Arab participants acquired greater amounts 
of information from their Israeli partners than vice versa. 760 
759 ibid. 
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Despite these efforts of reconciliation, there is a cyberbattle for hearts and minds 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Examples include the pro-Palestine Electronic 
Intifada (www. electronicintifada. com), a site that encourages media activism and 
features daily reports from the Palestinian territories, while in the pro-Israel camp 
there is the New York-based Israel Support Group (ISG) (www. israelscom), which 
hosts a comprehensive site with news, video reports, and activist guides 761 One of 
the largest Islamic websites, IslamiCity (www. islamicity. com), reaches about 50 
million people a month and features polls, TV and radio broadcasts, and religious 
guidance. Similarly, Middle East news Online (www. middiceastwire. com) partners 
with 120 content providers worldwide and uses a network of reporters to 
disseminate information about the entire region. `The impact of the Internet on the 
media is that they are hearing from people on both sides of the conflict', 
comments Rania Awwad, a representative for Palestine Media Watch 
(www. pmwatch. org). 762 Also, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) 
(www. memri. org) uses the web to monitor Arab media for anti-Israel content. All 
this cyberactivism means that journalists are subject not just to increased scrutiny, 
but also to massive lobbying campaigns. 
Some observers worry that the proliferation of independent websites, media 
monitors and lobbying campaigns will have a polarizing effect on the conflict. 
"Muslims get news from a Muslim perspective. Jews get news from their 
's9 ibid. 
760 ibid. 
761 Foreign Policy: 'Net Effect: The Middle East's e-war', July/ August 2002 762 ibid. 
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perspective. There is a gap in understanding what is happening in the conflict", 
says IslamiCity's Mohammed Abdul Aleem. 763 
Conclusion 
In ethnoreligious cyberconflicts, when an anti-Israeli activist attacks the Aipac 
site, an Israeli sets up a website of targets to attack, when Pakistanis attack India's 
largest internet service or when Chinese and American nationalists hack each 
other, the use of the internet is different from that found in sociopolitical 
cyberconflicts. The parties in ethnoreligious cyberconflicts mostly do not use the 
internet in order to mobilise support or influence public opinion. They use it as a 
weapon, like throwing stones. 
Cyberconflict should not be dismissed as just a series of catfights between 
computer geeks. Mi2g Chief executive, DK Matai, has argued that cyberwarfare 
could be used as a barometer for political tensions around the world. `The tense 
situation in the Middle East is reflected in both covert and overt hack attacks'. 764 
In addition, cyberconflict is a phenomenon that includes a variety of actors with 
different characteristics, many of whom cannot be easily distinguished as either 
terrorist or activist in nature. Accordingly, the political game between parties in 
763 ibid. 
764 
`Israel under hack attack', BBConline, 16/4/2002 
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an ethnoreligious conflict or among social activists engaged in a sociopolitical 
one is neither clear, nor fully developed at this early stage. 
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that we are discussing two different 
kinds of cyberconflict and that they should be treated as distinct. The groups in 
sociopolitical cyberconflicts initiate a newsworthy event by putting the other side 
to the defensive, sending stories for the whole world to see, rendering information 
uncontrollable or mobilising support by promoting an alternative frame for the 
event. On the other hand, in ethnoreligious cyberconflicts, the opposing parties 
tend to use the internet as a weapon. While they might initiate events, they fail to 
promote an alternative frame. They simply attack the enemy or defend their 
electronic territory. 
This means that cyberconflict needs to be monitored, and the actors and practices 
involved in such conflict need to be researched and evaluated. It is important that 
we increase our understanding of the nature and trajectories of conflict with an 
internet component, for a number of political reasons. These include improving 
conflict resolution and mediation strategies, and developing ways of bringing 
cyberwar activities under the purview of international agreements governing 
conflict. 
This section looked at ethnoreligious and ethnic cyberconf]icts, in particular, 
cyberconflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, Indians and Pakistanis, and 
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Americans and Chinese, as well as incidents in South-East Asia, Colombia and 
Kosovo and attempts at conflict resolution using the internet as the platform. 
The integrated theoretical framework proposed in section 2.4 urges us to focus on 
the following parameters when looking at ethnoreligious cyberconflicts: 
3. Ethnoreligious Cyberconflicts: 
a. Ethnic/religious affiliation, chauvinism, national identity, b. Discourses of 
inclusion and exclusion, c. Information warfare, the use of the internet as a 
weapon, propaganda and mobilisational tool, d. Conflict resolution depends on 
legal, organisational framework, number of parties issues, distribution of power, 
values and beliefs. 
In the Israeli-Palestinian cyberconflict, we see the use of national symbols when 
hacking websites, such as the Israeli flag, Hebrew text and even a recording of the 
Israeli national anthem on the Hezbollah home page. This explicitly urges us to 
look at issues of national identity, nationalism and ethnicity (see 3a). Secondly, 
the language used by hackers, as for instance in the AIPAC hack ('[t]he hack is to 
protest against atrocities in Palestine by the barbaric Israeli soldiers and their 
constant support by the US government'), relies on an `us' and `them' mentality, 
where Israelis and their American supporters are portrayed as barbaric, reflecting 
discourses of inclusion and exclusion (see 3b). Thirdly, the internet in 
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ethnoreligious cyberconflict became a battleground and was used as a weapon by 
both sides, and full-scale action by thousands of Israeli and Palestinian youngsters 
involved both racist emails (see 3a , 3c) and circulating instructions on how to 
crush the enemy's website (see 3c). 
Similarly, in the Indian-Pakistani cyberconflict, the Indian Army's website was 
set up as a propaganda tool, and hacked pictures of alleged tortures of Kashmiris 
by Indians were placed on the site, in a similar propaganda tactic (see 3c). Also, 
the internet was used as a weapon, when the worm Yaha was released by Indian 
hackers (see 3c). In terms of national identity and discourses of exclusion and 
inclusion, the following is telling: `[a] whole hearted salute for my brothers 
fighting for our country with a religious maverick enemy' and `[w]e wish that our 
Muslim brothers given the right to choose, as was promised them... ' In both 
sentences, religion is mentioned (religious affiliation), the word `brothers' 
(collective identity and solidarity), and `our country' and a promised land (see 3a, 
3band3c). 
In the rest of the examples, similar links can be made with the proposed 
framework. Again this is clear in the discourse used: `We will hate China forever 
and will hack its sites' (US-China), `Down with Japanese militarism, Kill all Japs' 
(China-Japan), ` Welcome to the web page of the biggest liars and killers, Long 
Live Serbia', (Kosovo-Serbia). In all of these cases, a nation is identified as the 
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enemy by nationality and appropriate adjectives are used to create the 
inclusion/exclusion effect (see 3a, 3b). 
The conflict resolution component in the framework (see 3d) is included due to 
the attempts at such resolution through the internet. The three examples (MEViC, 
MEAF and the Project for Arab-Jewish Dialogue) place emphasis on community- 
based diplomacy, interfaith dialogue (which reflects the importance of exchanging 
ideas reflecting the common beliefs between different religions), and building a 
positive relationship as a platform for resolution. 
The internet as a medium: 
a. Analysing discourses (representations of the world, constructions of social 
identities and social relations), b. Control of information, level of censorship, 
alternative sources, c. Wolsfeld: Political contest model among antagonists: the 
ability to initiate and control events, dominate political discourse, mobilise 
supporters, d. Media effects on policy (strategic, tactical, representational). 
In Colombia and Kosovo the internet was used as a medium for disseminating 
information to the extent that, in the latter conflict, a commentator has said that if 
one was to collate the amount of emails sent to news organisations, one would 
build up an interactive map of Yugoslavia linking to accounts of bombing town 
by town. Online news organisations like the Electronic Intifada and the Israeli 
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Support Group also represent alternative sources for the explanation of conflict 
(see 4b), can be used for propaganda and mobilisation, and reflect a political 
contest between Israelis and Palestinians to dominate political discourse (see 4b). 
The Al-Qaida network and its ideology relies more on common religious 
affiliation and kinship networks than strict national identity, which fits well with 
the borderless and network character of the internet (3a). Secondly, the internet 
has been used as a primary mobilisational tool (3c), before the 9/11, especially 
after the break down of cells in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. On the 
internet Al-Qaida is replicating recruitment and training techniques and evading 
security services, because they cannot be physically intercepted due to the 
virtuality of their networks. The internet is used as a propaganda tool via 
electronic magazines, training manuals and general recruitment sites (3c), as well 
as a weapon for financial disruptions aiming at financing operations, or stealing 
data and blueprints. 
On the organisational aspect and in order to avoid confusion, it is crucial to note 
that Al-Qaeda is quite a unique case in point, because as an ethnoreligious actor in 
a cyberconflict, although expected to be more hierarchical 
- 
like the hackers in 
Israeli-Palestinian cyberconflict and use the internet more as a weapon and not as 
a resource 
- 
is instead networked in comparison to the rest of the ethnoreligious 
cyberconflicts and uses the internet in all sorts of resourceful ways. A possible 
explanation for this is two fold: Firstly, their ideology does not rest on national 
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identity, so it is open to international networking through religion and 
kinship/family and secondly, they are not left with any other choice but to use the 
internet in resourceful ways, because they are not legitimate and they are not 
going to be given a chance at conflict resolution. 
This chapter attempted to describe some cases of ethnoreligious cyberconflict, to 
understand their operation, to examine the current methods and weapons used and 
link these examples with the proposed integrated theoretical framework. The 
conclusion I came to is that the knife can cut both ways. On the one hand, 
evidence suggests that cyberconflicts can spill over to the real world with 
information warfare becoming a threat to governments and businesses. On the 
other hand, the inexpensive, easy-to-use and interactive style of the medium can 
provide significant assistance in bringing opposing sides together who would 
otherwise not communicate due to spatial, political, religious or other differences. 
The next chapter examines the effect of the internet on the March 2003 Iraq 
conflict. 
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Chapter 6: The effects of the internet on the 2003 Iraq war 
In the particular case of post-September 11 information warfare, the assertions of 
US unity by the Bush administration have resulted in a context in which public 
statements directed to the international community are interpreted as 
representative of the US as a political entity and not just the utterances of a 
particular individual in the current administration"' 
Before and during the March 2003 Iraq war, information technologies, and 
particularly the internet, inspired several groups belonging to all sorts of different 
backgrounds and ideologies to voice their opinion on the war and in certain 
instances to engage in symbolic hacking against opposing groups or institutions. 
But still, the principal originality of this conflict was the effect of the internet on 
war coverage. This section looks at three levels of the Internet's role in the 
conflict: its effect on the organisation and spread of the peace movement, its 
impact on war coverage and the issue of war-related cyberconflicts. 
Before delving deeper, it would be helpful to explain again that with the advent of 
the internet, new forms of conflict have emerged, not directly linked with 
information warfare but rather, connected to a more subtle form of societal 
765 Walls, A. T: `The image of unanimity: The utility of the promotion and disparagement of 
cultural and social unanimity as a form of context manipulation in information warfare in the 
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netwar766, where new social movements, ethnic groups and terrorists use the 
internet to organise, acquire resources and attack `the other side'. Despite the 
high-tech name, the groups involved have quite traditional political goals 
- 
power, 
participation, democracy, alternative ideologies 
- 
using, however, a postmodern, 
interactive medium. 
There are two types of cyberconflict. The groups in sociopolitical cyberconflicts 
(for example, the peace and anti-globalisation movements) initiate a newsworthy 
event by putting the other side on the defensive, sending stories for the whole 
world to see, rendering information uncontrollable and mobilising support by 
promoting an alternative frame for the event. On the other hand, in ethnoreligious 
cyberconflicts (such as Israeli-Palestinian hacking and Indian-Pakistani activity), 
the opposing parties tend to use the internet as a weapon. While they might 
initiate events, they fail to promote an alternative frame. They simply attack the 
enemy or defend their electronic territory. 767 Thereby, I analyse the different 
kinds of cyberconflict in the context of international conflict theory for 
ethnoreligious cyberconflict and social movement theory for sociopolitical 
cyberconflict, while keeping in mind that this takes place in a new media 
environment, using media theory. 
aftermath of the attacks of September 11,2001', Journal of Information Warfare, (2002) 2,2: 
119-127 767 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) Networks and Netwars, Rand: California. 767 Karatzogianni, A: `The politics of cyberconflict', Journal of Politics, February 2004, vol. 24 (1), pp. 46-55 
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The most recent opportunity to apply this theoretical framework arose with the 
recent war in Iraq. There the distinction (ethnoreligious/sociopolitical) worked 
quite well. There was sociopolitical CC before the war, starting with the peace 
groups organising demonstrations and events through the internet, and, while the 
tension was mounting, there were hackings between anti-war and pro-war 
hacktivists (sociopolitical), but also between pro-Islamic and anti-Islamic hackers 
(ethnoreligious). The most interesting part was the effect of the internet on war 
coverage. The war itself was dubbed as the first internet war, and the use of 
`blogs' helped ordinary people to become involved in reporting the war and 
presenting an alternative by means of independent media, avoiding the restraints 
the corporate media face, namely censorship and the demands and politics of 
advertisers. 768 
769 
`Some critical media voices face censorship', Media Advisory, Fair and Accuracy in Reporting, 
3/4/03 
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6.1 The internet's role in the organisation of anti-war protests 
The importance of the internet in the organisation of political groups is not new. 
However, in this particular conflict, its effects were for the first time indicative of 
the full potential of the new medium in politics. In the months preceding the 
actual war in Iraq, we witnessed a plenitude of phenomena on, off and because of 
the internet that in previous international conflicts were only embryonic. Anti-war 
groups used email lists and websites, group text messages and chatrooms to 
organise protests, making politics more accessible to an unprecedented number of 
people from all backgrounds, who normally would not or could not get so 
involved. 
In fact, anti-war protests in world capitals were impressive, whenever they 
actually made it to the newsrooms. In world capitals, people of all ages and 
nationalities took to the streets to demonstrate against the possibility of a war with 
Iraq. In only one weekend of February 15th and 16th 2003, or F-15 in activist 
parlance, about 10 million people protested globally against the war, rendering 
them the biggest peace protests since the Anti-Vietnam War protests of the 
1960s/70s. 769 In the US, the two biggest demonstrations took place in San 
Francisco and Washington. The disparity of protestors, where London is a case in 
point, is a sign that the antiwar movement has gone mainstream thanks to 
hundreds of anti-war websites and mailing lists. The internet speeds up 
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organising, doing in months what took years in the Vietnam era. 70 As historian 
and columnist Ruth Rosen explains in The San Francisco Chronicle, `[n]ever 
before in human history has an anti-war movement grown so fast and spread so 
quickly. It is even more remarkable because the war has yet to begin. Publicized 
throughout cyberspace, the anti-war movement has left behind its sectarian roots 
and entered mainstream culture'. 771 
More astonishingly, millions of people all over the world were protesting the 
possibility of a war that had not even started yet. According to Sarah Sloan, an 
organiser with International ANSWER, the internet played a very significant role, 
because ` it made a major difference in getting our message out there especially 
because the mainstream media is not covering the anti-war movement'. The 
internet also allowed protests to go international, with protestors in 32 countries 
holding demonstrations. ` There is no way the event would have been international 
without the Internet'. 772 The same is being suggested by Rayman Elamine, 
organiser with Direct Action to Stop the War, -an umbrella organisation for a 
number of antiwar groups based in San Francisco Bay Area. `Groups wouldn't 
have been able to do some of the logistical and other planning without the aid of 
the Internet for getting the message out'. 773 Alistair Alexander from the Stop the 
War Coalition in England has commented in a Guardian article that the web `has 
769 Gumbel, A: `Global peace movement is alive and kicking', The Sunday Independent, 16/3/03 
770 Max, S, a Manhattan based trainer of community activists for 30 years, quoted in `Cyberspace 
spurs activism too', Corydon Ireland, Democrat and Chronicle. 
As quoted in Kahney, L: `Internet strokes anti-war movement', wired, Jan/21/03, accessed 
20/3/03 
772 As quoted in Kahney, L: `Internet strokes anti-war movement', wired, Jan/21/03 773 As quoted in Glasner, J: ` Protests to start when war does', wired, 19/3/03 
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allowed Stop the War to connect with people in a way politicians have failed to 
do. The much hyped age of online politics has finally arrived'. 774 
Indeed there is no end to practitioners and theorists alike concerning the 
possibilities of the medium in the organisation of the anti war movement. 
Kahney, for instance, mentions the United for Peace website, which includes 
news, contacts of activist groups and travel arrangements to the protests from 
3000 different cities. `Before the Internet people felt blacked out by the media, 
because it doesn't represent their views. Now because of the Net, they feel like 
they are part of a movement. They are no longer isolated. It helps mobilise 
people, gets them to move'. 775 Howard Rheingold, a well-known researcher in the 
field, has similar views. `Instead of having some hierarchical top-down coalition, 
it's possible to have loose coalitions of small groups that organise very 
quickly'. 776 
In fact, the distinguishing characteristic of these groups is their disparity and their 
full use of networking, where we witness `a mass mobilisation without leaders 
-a 
digital swarm'. 777 In other words, it exhibits the characteristics of a rhizome: 778 
74 Alexander, A: 'Britain's biggest political protest was mobilised on the web', The Guardian, 
19/2/03 
775 As quoted in Kahney, L: `Internet strokes anti-war movement', wired, Jan/21/03, 776 As quoted in Glasner, J: 'Protests to start when war does', wired. 
777 Lance Bennnet, University of Washington, quoted in `Internet may mobilise largest protests 
ever seen, Professor predicts', www. ascribe. ore. 17/3/03 
778 Deleuze, G and Guattari, F: (1987) A Thousand Plateaus, Athlon: London. 
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What they (virtual networks) fostered was a form of interaction that preserved the 
integrity and autonomy of the constituent parts. No group was subject to the will 
of another. No group had to recognise one as a leading group or as the `vanguard' 
of the movement. There was no need for bureaucracy, permanent staffs, officials, 
`leadership', or even premises, beyond somewhere to house a server. Here was a 
form of interaction that denied the need for the very institutional and logistical 
framework that had for a century defined the terms and conditions of political 
activism. 79 
I receive the same impression when looking at these protests, which were very 
graphically reported as 
[n]ot just the usual left-liberal suspects with their tie-dyes and political correct 
slogans, but Spanish-speaking bus drivers, public health workers, suburban 
mothers and their children, blue-collar production line workers, lawyers and 
Republican-voting executives. Also unprecedented is the participation of the big 
labour unions, who where notoriously quiet during the Vietnam war... '80 
Thus the internet has become more than just an organising tool. It can be argued 
that, by allowing mobilisation to emerge from free-willing amorphous groups, 
rather than top-down hierarchies, the net has changed protests in a more 
fundamental way. `It took four and a half years to multiply the size of the 
779Tormey, S: (2004) Anti-capitalism: A Beginner's Guide, Oneworld: Oxford, p. 65. 780 Gumbel, A: `Global peace movement is alive and kicking', the Sunday Independent, 16/3/03 
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Vietnam protests twenty fold. This time the same thing has happened in six 
months', Todd Gitlin, sociology professor at Columbia has commented. 781 
Virtually, the evidence of this is seen in the growing number of web-pages 
supporting or criticising the war. For instance, Moveon. org, a political website 
with 650,000 subscribers based in Silicon Valley, raised $400,000 through 10,000 
or more individual donations to remake the 1960s ` Daisy' anti-nuclear war ad. 782 
Also, online groups promote and offer updates on protests, list event information, 
use chatrooms, conferences and email lists and offer special updates on the 
conflict (www. notinourname. net, www. stopwar. com etc). These include religious 
sites, with examples ranging from the catholic church (www. vatican. va) and the 
US conference of Catholic Bishops (www. usccb. org) to Jewish and Muslim sites 
such as the aforementioned IslamiCity. 783 The National Council of Churches 
provides a grassroots toolkit on its site, which puts it this way: `[h]ere is a 
grassroots tool, roughly based on the Sherrod Brown Amendment, that activists 
can use to request information from their member of Congress on Iraq'. 794 
In Europe, anti-war groups are using the internet to organise protests outside US 
military bases and to organise protests generally, in countries such as Germany 
791 Lee, J: 'How the protesters mobilized', New York Times, 23/2/03 
792 Kahney, L: `Internet strokes anti-war movement', wired, Jan/21/03 
783 Webb, C: `Religious groups go online for peace', Washington Post. The article mentions: 
www. guaker. com, www. afsc. ore (American friends service committee), Unitarian movement 
www. uua. org, Presbyterian church (www. pcusa. org) world council of churches www 
- 
coe. or 
, 
the Washington based group Churches for Middle East peace (www. emep. or&), 
www. peaceprayer. com. American Jews www. peace now. orc, A ewishpeacefellow. oru, 
www. jewishpeacethread. com, www. peacelobby. org, Muslim sites www. ymca. ore, 
www. icna. com, www. mpfweb. org. 
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(www. resistthewar. de), Britain (www. reclaimthebases. org. uk. www. peaceuk. net), 
France (www. mvtpaix. org) and Spain (www. pazahora. org). Internationally, there 
are sites originating from Australia, South Africa, Egypt and also the global 
Independent Media Center (www. indymedia. org) which is linked to worldwide 
anti-war coverage or sites like `The Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq' 
(www. casi. org. uk). 785 
Not surprisingly, those supporting the war rallied around the flag online too. 
Organisations supporting the war used message boards, weblogs, online petitions 
and email to rally support for using force to disarm Iraq, from sites such as 
grassfire. net 786 
More interestingly, there was a `Virtual March' on Washington where tens of 
thousands of people bombarded the switchboard of the White House and other US 
government offices with protest calls and emails, halting much business in the 
capital. The coalition of 32 organisations which organised the action claimed that 
more than 400,000 people registered to participate in the campaign. Meanwhile, 
784 ibid. 
785 Webb, C: `Overseas the Internet is rallying point for antiwar activists', Washington Post, 
17/1/03 
786 Webb, C: ` Rallying around the flag online', Washington Post, 1413/03 
Others sites supporting the war:: www. citizensunited. com, www ere u r, om, 
http: //defenseofamerica. org, www. leatherneck. com, www coldfurv cam, www. defendamerica. com 
which is sponsored by the department of defense, features news and information about the US war 
on terrorism and preparations for the Iraq war. Pro-war Bloggers: www. thesafetvvalve. com 
www andrewsullivan. com, www. scraopleface corn. 
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700 theatre groups in 42 countries led coordinated readings of the Aristophanes' 
anti-war comedy Lysistrata. 787 
Yet, there is not optimism everywhere one turns. Stewart Nusbaumer, coordinator 
of Veterans Against the War, makes a somewhat valid point. `On the one hand, 
[the internet] gives you larger numbers of people. But I've also noticed it's not 
great for a specific demonstration somewhere. I get emails from people who say: I 
live 2,000 miles away' 788 Still, there is recognition that the internet has been 
important in the growth of the movement.. `It has been invaluable in sharing 
information. With a growing constituency in the US becoming convinced the 
American Media is not giving an honest or complete picture, people have turned 
to alternative sources online, notably the European press'. 789 
The strength the internet gives these type of movements is that it preserves the 
particularity of distinct groups and causes, while greatly facilitating the creation 
of networks of the like-minded: 
As well as preserving a distinct space or presence, groups could make common 
cause with other groups that shared their values. This could be achieved either 
through a simple `links' page which indicated which groups they felt some sense 
787 Kahney, L: `Internet strokes anti-war movement', wired, Jan/21/03, accessed 20/3/03, `Internet 
may mobilise largest protests ever seen', Professor predicts, www, ascribe. ore. 17/3/03 788 Glasner, J: `Protests to start when war does', wired 
789 Gumbel, A: 'Global peace movement is alive and kicking', the Sunday Independent, 16/3/03 
392 
of common cause with or through more elaborate networks, sites and 
mechanisms that acted as an umbrella organisation all of its own. 79° 
On the other hand, there are weaknesses in this kind of politics, since it could be 
argued that the leaderless and dispersed nature of online activism is ineffective, in 
that it ultimately fails to reach the vast majority of the world, where many 
activists in developing countries have little or no access to the internet or ICTs in 
general. 
790 Tormey, S: (2004) Anti-capitalism: A Beginner's Guide, Oneworld: Oxford. 
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6.2 The internet's effect on media coverage 
The internet was influential in the media coverage of this war for a variety of 
reasons, some touching on the simple fact that more people are online now than in 
the last war in Iraq, others emerging because technology has advanced to include 
instant messaging, audiovisual imagery, file sharing etc. Still, what made the 
difference in this conflict was that the media environment was in such a ripe state 
for alternative reporting of the conflict, mainly because Americans (as well as the 
rest of us) searched online for news they could not find at home. An indicative 
example is that as early as January 2003, according to Wired News, half the 1.3 
million visitors to the Website for Britain's Guardian and Observer newspapers 
were from the Americas. 791 
This part of the discussion looks at three main aspects of the internet's impact on 
war coverage: the integration of the internet into mainstream media, the effect of 
online material challenging official government sources and mainstream media, 
and the `blogging' phenomenon, whereby everybody can be a journalist on the 
Net. 
`You are combining the speed of television with the depth of print. This could 
define how future wars are covered', Mitch Gelman, executive producer of CNN, 
the media network that defined the coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, has 
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commented. 792 The web pages of all major media networks were well prepared 
for the integration of the internet in their coverage of the war. CNN itself planned 
for a war-tracker page, continuously featuring live reports from the frontline, 3-D 
charts that track bombs dropped, Iraqi casualties and defections and interactive 
maps of the battlefield, troop movements and terrain. ABCnews planned for fixed 
cameras on locations in Kuwait and Qatar 24 hours. MSNBC. com said that chat 
rooms and satellite transmitters that run off car cigarette lighters would be used, 
CBSNews. com would offer free video, maps and backgrounds and reporters with 
online notebooks and video feeds, and FoxNews would include the War on Terror 
page with a correspondent tracker and video clips from the front. 793 As for the 
BBC's online coverage, it competed remarkably with its American counterparts. 
On the downside, many independent news operations on the internet have 
slimmed down or disappeared altogether since the info-bubble burst in 1999.794 
Despite all the available tools, a large number of media watchdogs, journalists and 
audiences have protested the unchallenging position of the mainstream media 
towards both the decision to go to war and in terms of the actual coverage during 
the war. As a result, the internet itself was used not only to mobilise international 
civil society as explained above, but also to offer alternative coverage of the 
conflict. There are different lines of development here: the US government's 
troublesome if not `bombastic' relationship with the media, American media 
791 Kurtz, H: `Webloggers, signing on as war correspondents', Washington Post, 22/3/03 792 Swartz, J: `Iraq war could herald a new age of web-based news coverage', USA Today, 18/3/03 793 ibid. 
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mostly following the government line with patriotic fervor, Americans turning to 
non-US sources by using the internet, and the rest of the world discovering the 
unpredictable and amazing effect of the internet on coverage, and the potential for 
first-hand eyewitness accounts via emails and blogging. 
Let us now examine these developments one by one. As far as the US 
administration is concerned, even though it made it clear there would be no 
censorship, it made it very difficult for war correspondents that were not 
embedded with their troops to get non-official stories out. On the other hand, 
embedded journalists were controlled by the military. `We will tell you what you 
can report from the speech afterwards', an army media organiser told journalists 
on their first day as embedded correspondents with ls` Fusiliers Battle Group. 795 
Embedded journalists in Iraq topped 800 at the height of the combat in 2003, but 
their number has since dropped to the double figure. Five journalists have been 
kicked out of embed slots for reporting secure information. 796 Most US journalists 
do not leave their hotels, and in some cases, even their rooms are located in 
heavily fortified compounds in and around the Green Zone, the US military's 
Baghdad enclave. Their reporting is based in large parts on handouts from the US 
occupation officials or material gained while `embedded' with US military units, 
is supplemented by on-the-spot accounts and interviews obtained by Iraqi 
794 Noted by David Carlson, professor in media journalism in the University of Florida, quoted in 
`Media plot online war coverage', Reuters, 6/3/03 
795 Tomlin, J: ` Censored in the desert', Press Gazzete, 16/5/03 
796 Strupp, J: `Five embeds booted out of Iraq in recent months, www. editorpublisher. com, 7/1/05 
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`stringers', who risk their lives for a fraction of the salary paid to their Western 
counterparts. 97 Colonel Steve Boylan, a spokesman for the US military forces, 
acknowledged that some of the detained journalists have been `held for several 
months'. None of them have been formally charged with any crime or even 
presented in court. 798 
This `difficulty' demonstrates itself in the fact that the largest single group of war 
correspondents appears to have been killed by the US Military. As Philip 
Knightley, writer of The First Casualty: The war correspondent as Hero and 
Myth Maker from Crimea to Kosovo, puts it, `[t]he figures in Iraq tell a terrible 
story. Fifteen media people dead, with two missing, presumed dead. If you 
consider how short the campaign was, Iraq will be notorious as the most 
dangerous war for journalists ever'. 799 
In a single day on April 8 2003, a US missile hit an al-Jazeera office, killing a 
Jordanian journalist, and a US tank fired a shell at the Palestine Hotel, killing two 
more. Al-Jazeera offices in Basra were shelled on April 2 and a car clearly 
marked as belonging to the same station was shot at by US soldiers a day before 
the Palestine Hotel incident. International journalists and press freedom groups 
have condemned the attacks on the press corps in Iraq. `We can only conclude 
797 ibid. 
798 Van Auken, B: 'US imprisons Iraqi journalists without charges', www. wsws. org, 7/5/05, 
accessed on www. uruknet. info 7/8/05 
799 Knightley, P: ` Turning the tanks on the reporters', 14/6/03, The Guardian 
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that the US Army deliberately and without warning targeted journalists'. 800 `We 
believe these attacks violate the Geneva conventions' 801 The attacks on 
journalists `look very much like murder', Robert Fisk of the London Independent 
802 
reported on March 3,2003. 
Eason Jordan, CNN's chief news executive, suggested at the World Economic 
Forum in Switzerland that some of the 63 journalists killed in Iraq had been 
specifically targeted by US troops. 803 Jordan quickly backed off his suggestion, 
but constant exposure from political weblogs led to his resignation. A year before 
that, he had admitted that CNN withheld news of atrocities taking place in Iraq 
under the regime of Saddam Hussein because the network was afraid it might lose 
access to the country. Echoing the same claim, the president of the 35,000" 
member Newspaper Guild asserted US troops deliberately are killing journalists 
in Iraq. 804 
Furthermore, with 600 correspondents, including about 150 from foreign media, 
accepting the Pentagon offer to be embedded with military troops, one would 
expect satisfying coverage. But even when embedded reports not consistent with 
the official Pentagon line appeared, they were not taken up from American 
800 Reporters Without Borders 
801 Committee to protect journalists in a letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 8/9/03 
8°Z Fair and Accuracy in Reporting, www. fair, org has a wealth of information on this, these quotes 
are from `Is Killing part of the Pentagon policy? ', 10/4/03 
803 World Net daily: 'US troops killing journalists, www. globalres( arch co m, 20/5/05, accessed 
7/8/05 
804 World Net Daily: `President of Newspaper Guild Echoes Claim of Ex-CNN Exec' 19/5/05, 
www. costalpost. com, accessed 21/9/05 
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media. 805 A look at some examples helps explain why more and more people 
turned to the internet for information on the war. A Washington Post article on 
William Branigin's eyewitness account describing the killing of civilians outside 
the Iraqi town of Najaf, where military procedures may not have been properly 
followed, was not picked up from the New York Times, which instead ran a story 
presenting the official line: `Failing to Heed Warning, 7 Iraqi Women and 
Children Die'. 806 
Such uncritical coverage is hardly surprising, since several national and local 
media figures in the US had their work jeopardised, either explicitly or implicitly, 
because of the critical views they expressed on the war. Veteran war 
correspondent Peter Arnett was fired by NBC after giving an interview to Iraqi 
TV, Henry Norr was suspended without pay from the San Francisco Chronicle 
for using his sick day to get arrested in an anti-war protest and Phil Donahue's 
talkshow was cancelled, in what the MSNBC argued in an internal memo leaked 
to the All your TV website on 25 February 2003 would be a `difficult face for 
NBC in a time of war... He seems to delight in presenting guests who are anti- 
war, anti-Bush and skeptical of the administration's motives'. 807 
805 'Official story vs eyewitness account', 4/4/03, www. fair org, also see another incident 
considering Robert Fisk's report on evidence that civilians were killed by US strikes: `Journalist's 
evidence that US bombed market ignored by US press', 4/4/03, www. fair. org 806 
`Official story vs eyewitness account', 4/4/03, www. fair ore 807 
`Some critical media voices face censorship', 3/4/03, www. fair. ore 
399 
Again, this is to be expected in a media environment where official sources 
dominate US network newscasts and dissent is considered immoral. 808 Nearly 
two-thirds of all sources, 64 per cent, used in news programs were pro-war, while 
71 per cent of US guests favored the war. Anti-war voices made up only 10 per 
cent of all sources, just 6 per cent of non-Iraqi voices and a miserly 3 per cent of 
US sources. Viewers were more than six times as likely to see a pro-war source as 
one who was anti-war, and with US guests alone, the ratio increases to 25 to 1.809 
`Given how timid most US news organisations have been in challenging the 
White house position in Iraq, I am not surprised if Americans are turning to 
foreign news services for a perspective on the conflict that goes beyond freedom 
fries', Wired News quotes former Newsweek contributing editor Deborah 
Branscum as saying. He continues: 
Although it's true that anyone with a website can publish news, it's still the 
established media players, such as newspaper publishers, that attract the largest 
aos For more on this and inter-media politics see: Younge, G: 'Now dissent is "immoral"', The 
Guardian, 2/6/03; Kennedy, D: 'The GOP attack machine: All who are not Bushies are evil', 
phoenix. com, 6/6/03; Lazare, D: `The New Yorker goes to war', The Nation, 216/03; Vann, B and 
North, D: `Panic and hysteria reign at the New York Times', www. wsws. ore; McQuaig, L: `Bush 
unchallenged by media', Toronto Star, 25/5/03; The following articles from www. fair. org: 
Rendall, S: `Dissent, disloyalty and Double Standards: Kosovo doves denounced Iraq war protest 
as anti-American', May/June 2003; Naureckas, J: 'Wolf Blitzer for the Defense (Department): 
Making sure the official line is the last word', January/February 2003; `In Iraq crisis, networks are 
megaphones for official views', 18/3/03; Solomon, N: 'Media war: Obsessed with tactics and 
technology', 27/3/03. 
809 For more analysis see Rendall, S and Broughel, T: 'Amplifying officials, squelching dissent: 
FAIR study finds democracy poorly served by war coverage', Extra!, May/June 2003. The news 
programs studied were ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, 
CNN's Wolf Blitzer reports, Fox's Special Report with Brit Hume, and PBS's Newshour with Jim 
Lehrer. 
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share of an online audience, it's also true that more people are using the Internet 
as their primary news source, the same handful of companies run these sites 810 
The `100 Orders' penned by former US administrator in Iraq L. Paul Bremer 
include Order 65 passed March 20 2004 to establish an Iraqi communications and 
media commission. This commission has powers to control the media because it 
has control over licensing and regulating telecommunications, broadcasting, 
information services and all other media establishments. The media commission 
sent out an order asking news organisations to `stick to the government line on the 
US led offensive in Fallujah or face legal action'. 8 It would be a worthwhile 
undertaking to look at 
http: //www. iragbodycount. net/resources/Falluiahh/index. phn, which archives 
three hundred selected news stories on the April 2004 siege of Fallujah. 
In an article in the Guardian Dahr Jamail, an unembedded journalist in Iraq, noted 
that refugees from Fallujah told him that `civilians carrying white flags were 
gunned down by American soldiers. Corpses were tied to US tanks and paraded 
around like trophies'. 812 
American documentary film-maker mark Manning returned from Fallujah after 
delivering supplies to refugees. Manning was able to secretly conduct 25 hours of 
videotaped interviews with dozens of Iraqi eyewitnesses. In an interview with a 
810 Chris Murray, legislative counsel for Consumers Union quoted in Glasner, J: `Media more diverse? Not really', wired news 30/5/03 
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local newspaper in the US, Manning recounted how he was told grisly accounts of 
Iraqi mothers killed in front of their sons, brothers in front of their sisters, all at 
the hands of American soldiers. He also heard allegations of wholesale rape of 
civilians, by both American and Iraqi troops. Manning said he heard numerous 
reports of the second siege of Fallujah [November 2004] that described American 
forces deploying 
- 
in violation of international treaties 
- 
napalm, chemical 
weapons, phosphorous bombs, and `bunker-busting' shells laced with depleted 
uranium. 
' 13 
A Los Angeles Times scoop (3/6/04) revealed that one of the most enduring 
images of the war 
- 
the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein in a Baghdad 
square on April 9,2003, was a US Army psychological warfare operation staged 
to look like a spontaneous Iraqi action: `As the Iraqi regime was collapsing on 
April 9,2003, Marines converged on Firdos Square in central Baghdad, as was 
widely assumed from the TV images 
- 
who decided to topple the statue, the Army 
report said. And it was a quick thinking Army psychological operations team that 
made it appear to be a spontaneous Iraqi undertaking'. 814 
As Gardiner sums it up: 
811 Jamail, D: `Media repression in "Liberated" Land', www. dissidentvoice org, 18/11/04 812 Steel, J and Jamail, D: 'This is our Guernica', The Guardian, 27/4/05 813 Welsh, N: `Diving into Fallujah', Santa Barbara Independent, 17/3/05, 
www. independent. com/cover/Cover956. htm 
814 Fair. org: `The return of PSYOPS: Military's media manipulation demands more investigation', Media Advisory, www. fair. org, 12/3/04 
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Among the fabricated stories was the early surrender of the commander and the 
entire 51sß Iraqi mechanized division. We were told of an uprising in Basra - it 
did not happen. We were told on White House and State Department web sites 
that Iraqi military has formed units of children to attack the coalition 
- 
untrue. 
We were told of a whole range of agreements between the French and Iraq before 
the war over weapons 
- 
false. We were told Saddam had marked a red line 
around Baghdad and that when we crossed it Iraq would use chemical weapons - 
completely fabricated 815 
Again, in `psy-op' terms, on the evening of October 14, a young Marine 
spokesman near Fallouja appeared on CNN and made a dramatic announcement. 
`Troops crossed the line of departure', 1St Lt. Lyle Gilbert declared, using a 
common military expression signalling the start of a major campaign. `It's going 
to be a long night. '816 CNN, which had been alerted to expect a major news 
development, reported that the long-awaited offensive to retake the Iraqi city of 
Fallujah had begun. In fact, the Falloujah offensive would not kick off for another 
three weeks. As Mazetti explains, Gilbert's carefully worded announcement was 
an elaborate psychological operation -or `psy-op'- intended to confuse insurgents 
in Falloujah and allow US commanders to see how guerrillas would react if they 
believed US troops were entering the city, according to several Pentagon 
officials. 817 
8I Gardiner, S: ` The enemy is us', Salon. com, 22/9/04 
816 Mazzetti, M: `PR meets Psy-Ops in War on Terror', www. latimes com, accessed 24/1/05 817 ibid. 
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A report by the Defense Science Board, a panel of outside experts that advises 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, concluded that a `crisis' in US `strategic 
communications' had undermine American efforts to fight Islamic extremism 
worldwide. The study cited polling in the Arab world that revealed widespread 
hatred of the United States throughout the Middle East. A poll taken in June by 
Zogby International revealed that 94% of Saudi Arabians had an `infavorable' 
view of the Unite States, compared with 87% in April 2002. In Egypt, the second 
largest recipient of US aid, 98% of respondents held an unfavourable view of the 
United States. 18 
In May 2004, photos of Iraqi prisoners being humiliated by US soldiers popped 
up all over the web as the internet once again proved to be the place millions of 
people turned to get information on a big story. While American newspapers were 
careful in how many and which prisoner photos they printed, lots of websites 
posted as many images as they could find in great graphic detail. Among the sites 
were www. thememoryhole. org and www. e. lobalsecurity. org, a global think tank, which 
posted the full text of the army's report into the Abu Ghraib abuse and other 
documents on the Iraq prison scandal. Among the many activist sites covering the 
prison scandal were Electroniclraq (electroniciraq. net) and AlterNet. org. Weblogs 
also posted exhaustive commentary on the naked pictures that were first 
publicised on CBS's `60 Minutes IF. English-language website al-Jazeera 
(en lid sh. aljazeera. net) published more subdued coverage such as a photo gallery 
818 ibid. For more on the poll, visit www. zoeby. com 
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showing Muslims protesting outside the prison and a survey of site visitors in 
which 62 per cent of the 72,840 respondents said they suspected that abuse of 
Iraqi prisoners was routine. 819 
Paul Taylor explores the extent to which the `mental atmosphere' of the Abu 
Ghraib prison reflects more widespread values within the western mediascape that 
has become increasingly synonymous with our idea of public discourse. 820 As 
Taylor very intelligently puts it, Baudrilland's notion of the ecstacy of 
communication was implicitly acknowledged by Donald Rumsfeld who 
complained that it was much harder nowadays to control information sent back 
home by soldiers serving overseas. Unlike conventional letters in which the 
censors can black out the offending parts, Rumsfeld bemoans the fact that US 
soldiers were `running around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable 
photographs and then passing them off, against the law, to the media, to our 
surprise'. 821 
Specifically in the light of Abu Ghraib, Sontag points out that although `trophy' 
pictures have been taken in many previous military and social conflicts, these 
particular photographs: 
819 Walker, L: `Iraq prison scandal at its most graphic', Washington Post, 9/5/04 
820 Taylor, P: `The pornographic barbarism of the self-reflecting sign', fwd in email, undated. 821 Sontag, S: ` What have we done? ', The Guardian G2 Section, 13/5/04, as quoted in Taylor, P: 
The Pornographic barbarism of the self reflecting sign'. Also look her work Sontag, S: (2003) 
Regarding the Pain of Others, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. 
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... 
reflect a shift in the use of pictures 
- 
less objects to be saved than evanescent 
messages to be disseminated, circulated... now the soldiers themselves are all 
photographers 
- 
recording their war, their fun, their observations of what they 
find picturesque, their atrocities 
- 
and swapping images among themselves, and 
emailing them around the globe, it was all fun. And this idea of fun is, alas, more 
and more 
- 
contrary to what Mr. Bush is telling the world 
- 
part of the "true 
nature and heart of America". 822 
It is worth mentioning how online newspapers operate here. With the net able to 
supply information almost instantly, newspapers had little choice but to put 
everything they publish every day up on the internet in the hope of keeping people 
on their site and returning to their site the next day. The struggle has always been 
how to make money by charging for the content while also keeping as many 
people as possible visiting the site to make it attractive to advertisers with the 
ever-present back-of-the-mind fear that free and diverse online content will stop 
people buying printed newspapers. 
According to K. McCarthy, newspaper websites and their content have gradually 
become split into six areas: First, news stories which are free and will always be. 
After a week, though, these stories become archive stories and access to them 
may be charged for. Second, columnists and opinion pieces news items that are 
exclusive and identifiable to the individual paper. Third, email services 
- 
giving 
people a concise rundown of stories that are likely to interest them direct to their 
822 Sontag, S: 'What have we done? ', The Guardian G2 Section, 13/5/04 quoted in Taylor as 
406 
inboxes. Fourth is the digital facsimile of the printed newspaper 
- 
whether in 
internet-standard jpeg images, PDF files or using some proprietary software. And 
finally there are the add-ons: crosswords, competitions, games, etc. 823 
To continue, MoveOn. org, already mentioned for its successful anti-war efforts, 
concluded the same in a recent advertising campaign, which featured media 
mogul Rupert Murdoch under the banner, ` [t]his man wants to control the news in 
America', claiming that Murdoch's News Corp, Disney, Viacom, GE and AOL 
Time Warner control 75 per cent of the total television audience and 90 per cent 
of the television news audience for broadcast and cable in the United States. 824 
Under this light it is worrying that the Federal Communications Committee is 
considering scrapping decades old regulation that have kept one or two companies 
from dominating news. 
In the first week of the war, internet traffic ran at twice the usual rate, according 
to ComScore Media Metrix. The at-work audience reached 36.5 million people on 
that particular Wednesday, almost matching the home audience of 37.1 million. 
Yahoo. com was among the places where usage skyrocketed. The volume of 
traffic to its news selection jumped 600 per cent on Thursday and Friday and 
CNN. com had the most traffic of all news sites: 9 million visitors. MSNBC was 
next with 6.8 million. The website of Britain's BBC drew nearly half a million 
visitors from the US alone on the Sunday of the same week, 60 percent more than 
before 
823 McCarthy, K: 'This is the future of online newspapers', posted 9/7/03 
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usual. The BBC site drew a worldwide audience of 3.1 million visitors on Sunday, 
while the top news site, CNN, drew 4.3 million. 25 Traffic also increased rapidly 
on anti-war websites, where on average, three leading protest sites 
(www. antiwar. com, www. unitedforpeace. org; www. stopwar. org. uk) drew 160 per 
cent more traffic than they did four weeks previously. 
826 Also, according to 
Hitwise's media alerts service, which trawls 11,000 articles daily (covering the 
top 300 global news and media sites), 40 per cent of articles that week related to 
the war against Iraq. For the week ending 22 March, news websites accounted for 
a 22.47 per cent share of all web traffic in the UK, an increase of 9 per cent. 827 
Moreover, three-quarters of online Americans (77 per cent) have used the internet 
in connection with the war in Iraq. More than half of the nation's 116 million 
adult internet users have used email to communicate or learn about the war. 828 
According to the Pewlnternet study 17 per cent of online Americans say their 
principal source of news is the internet and in the days before the war broke out, 
37 per cent of internet users got news on a typical day. Interestingly, war 
opponents are slightly more likely than supporters to report intensified internet 
use. 
824 Glasner, J: 'Media more diverse? Not really', wired news 30/5/03 
1123 Walker, L: 'Casting a wider net for world news', Washington Post, 26/3/03 
826 Walker, L: `Web use spikes on news of war', Washington Post, 21/3/03 
827 Europemedia. net: 'War dominates the Web', report 
828Rainie, L, Fox, S and Fallowes, D: 'The Internet and the Iraq war: How online Americans have 
used the Internet to learn war news, understand events and promote their views', Pew Internet and 
American Life Project, www. pewinternet. org 
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Another contribution of the internet to this war was in the form of `blogs'. 
Blogging is an easy and fast way for personal publishing on the web. Some 
examples are indicative of the potential for citizen journalism. During extensive 
flooding, CNN and the BBC and others received powerful firsthand accounts by 
email long before camera crews and correspondents were on the scene. The email 
newsgathering was vivid and also included colour stills which were posted into 
website galleries hours before newspapers published their accounts. 929 To a lesser 
extent, blogging was experienced during the NATO bombing of Belgrade in 
1999. 
In South Korea, OhmyNews, which publishes 200 stories a day, mostly written by 
more than 26,000 registered citizen journalists, has 2 million daily readers and has 
been widely credited as helping elect South Korea's new Prime Minister. 830 By 
some measures, South Korea is the most wired country in the world, with 
broadband connections in nearly 70 percent of households. Around election time 
OhmyNews was registering 20 million page views per day. The service averages 
about 14 million visits daily, in a country of only about 40 million people. 
829 Cramer, C: `How the net will play a key role in this war', The Observer, 9/3/03. Also, there is 
an interesting quote on interactivity of the medium by Nigel Chapman, the deputy director of the 
BBC World service in Lawson, A: `War prompts text message boom', The Guardian: `Suddenly 
text messaging appears to have moved on from personal communication to personal 
statement... New technologies are giving us a level of interaction with our audiences that we have 
never seen before'. According to the same article the volume of text messages to the broadcaster 
has grown tenfold since March to a total of 6,000. Talking point, the show that enables listeners to 
quiz world leaders has received more than 160,000 emails from listeners commenting on the war. 
BBC Arabic version of Talking point in its launching day received 3,000 emails. 830 Kahney, L: `Citizen reporters make the news', www. wired. com, 17/3/03 
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In June 2003, Iranian blogs gave voice to dissidents (www. hoder. com, 
www. iranian. com) while a growing network of Iranian-American media outlets 
have been aiding the student-led protests. In another instance, bloggers reported 
alternative news from a G8 meeting. 831 During the Iraq conflict, a blogger called 
Salam Pax832, blogging from Baghdad (Dear raed. blogspot. com), and Christopher 
Allbriton, A New York based veteran journalist (Back-to-irag. com), have been 
profiled in many news stories. Reporters of Time magazine, the BBC and other 
leading news outlets had their own blogs. Kevin Sites, a CNN correspondent, 
posted pictures, audio and commentary on his website from the Kurdish section of 
Iraq. CNN asked Sites to suspend the blog. 
The effect blogging had on coverage might not have been profound in this war833, 
but it is an indication perhaps of where war coverage might be going. 
For all the saturation coverage of the invasion of Iraq, this has become the first 
true Internet war, with journalists, analysts, soldiers, a British lawmaker, an Iraqi 
exile and a Baghdad resident using the medium's lightning speed to cut the fog of 
g" Theodoulou, M: `Proliferating Iranian weblogs give voice to taboo topics', Christian Science 
monitors, 23/6/03; Dobbs, M: `Iranian exiles sow change via satellite', Washington Post, 25/6/03; 
Curiel, J: `North American media help Iran protests grow', San Francisco Chronicle 20/6/03; 
Batista, E: `Bloggers report alternative news from G8', wired, 4/6/03 
832 The Iraqi blogger was later revealed to be the interpreter of Slate Journalist Peter Maas, White, 
C: `Iraqi blogger revealed', dot journalism, 12/6/03. Salam Pax's site featured in hundreds of news 
stories, including pieces by MSNBC, the BBC, the New York times and the Washington post. The 
bandwidth demands caused by the ensuing stampede of visitors overwhelmed servers, to the 
extent that Taylor Suchan who runs Industrial Death Rock and Pyxz. com out of Texas, said he 
directed the links from the original photos to a parody image out of frustration, after trying 
contacting both Pax and Blogger, but received no response. The images on Suchan's servers are 
being viewed on average at least 140,000 times a day (Delio, M: 'Iraq Blog: Hubbub over a 
headlock', wired, 26/3/03) 
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war. The result is idiosyncratic, passionate and often profane, with the sort of 
intimacy and attitude that are all but impossible in newspapers and on 
television. 834 
Kurtz also cites law professor Glenn Reynolds, whose site, InstaPundit. com, saw 
a surge in traffic as the Iraq crisis has heated up, doubling to 200,000 hits a day. 
The most interesting thing about the blog coverage is how far ahead it is of the 
mainstream media. The first hand stuff is great. It's unfiltered and unspun. That 
doesn't mean it's unbiased. But people feel like they know where the bias is 
coming from. You don't have to spend a lot of time trying to find a hidden 
835 agenda. 
Because of their personal nature, weblogs have served as a great filter for the pro- 
and anti-war lobbies, but apart from the now globally famous Iraqi blogger Salarn 
Pax, very few of these sites actually gives new information. The wire services, 
broadcasts and newspapers have the most journalists close to the fighting and are 
able to fire reports off instantly through TV, radio and the web. And this is 
perhaps where electronic media have made the biggest difference. The BBC's 
very successful rolling weblog of all correspondents in the Gulf and the US 
833 The Pewlnternet survey on how online Americans use the internet and the Iraq war shows that 
blogs are gaining a following, but are not yet a source for the majority of users. Some 4% of 
online Americans report going to blogs for information and opinions. (www. pewintemet. org) 834 Kurtz, H: `Webloggers, signing on as war correspondents', Washington Post, 22/3/03 
835 ibid. 
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carried a mention of the missile hitting the Baghdad marketplace before it made it 
to air. 
836 
However, the global internet audience is still in its earliest stages. Only about 5 
per cent of the world's population can access the internet, according to 
Nielsen/Net Ratings. It is hard to fathom what will happen to world opinion 
should net use reach 50 per cent or more. 837 Notably, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, before the World Electronic Forum, a summit of world leaders in 
December 2003, said that the focus should be on expanding internet use and 
reaffirming media freedoms and the rights of ordinary people to stay informed. 
The information summit centred on whether the United Nations should have more 
control on the internet, since the key decisions are made by a private, US-based 
organisation of technical and business experts known as the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and as well as who will pay for 
getting more poor nations online. The broadcasters asserted that the future is not 
only online, since radio and TV will remain dominant means of mass 
communication in many poor countries for decades. 839 One of the main areas of 
conflict was over who should pay for technology projects in the developing 
world. African nations have been rallying behind a proposal from Senegal to set 
up a new `digital solidarity fund'. Many industrialised nations are wary of 
936 Bell, E: ` The blogs of war', The Observer, 30/3/03 
837 Walker, L: `Web use spikes on news of war', Washington Post, 21/3/03 
838 'Koff Annan: Keep media free! ', wired, 9/12/03 
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creating a new UN fund, instead supporting investment by private companies and 
redirecting existing fund. 
839 
839 
`Discord at digital divide talks', BBC online, 29/9/03 
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6.3 The impact of the war on the internet itself 
The possibility of war with Iraq and the actual war caused cyberattacks between 
pro-islamic/anti-islamic hackers (ethnoreligious cyberconflict) and pro-war/anti- 
war hackers (sociopolitical cyberconflict). 840 Despite the official US government 
warning against patriotic hacking, 841 the most notorious incident occurred when 
the al-Jazeera website was knocked offline by an American web designer. In an 
incident originally thought to be perhaps an inability of the site to deal with 
traffic, 842 the site was disabled by hackers for long periods of time. The Arabic 
news broadcaster's domain name was redirected to patriotic web pages or porn 
sites. 843 According to Ballout, an employee of Network Solutions was tricked into 
giving the culprit a confidential password that allowed the hacker to temporarily 
sao For more on this distinction look at Karatzogianni, A: 'The politics of cyberconflict', Journal 
of Politics February 2004, vol. 24 (1), pp. 46-55 
841 'Government warns "Patriotic hackers" against cyberattacks on Iraqi interests', 12/2/03, 
Associated Press 
842 Knight, W: 'Key Arab news station knocked offline', new scientist. com cites P. Iluggins a 
security expert interpreting as such, which goes to show how problematic internet security 
diagnosis can be. 
843 Users trying to log onto the al-Jazeera website in the US found a message that read 'hacked by 
Patriot, Freedom Cyberforce Militia', beneath the logo of the US flag (Deans, J: 'Hackers divert 
al-Jazeera users to US porn and patriot sites', The Guardian, 28/3/03). According to Bailout, an 
employee of Network Solutions was tricked into giving the culprit a confidential password that 
allowed the hacker to temporarily assume total control of Al Jazeera's domain (Delio, M: 
'Hackers condemn Arab site hack', wired 31/3/03). Despite this social engineering tactic, at the 
time it was also reported that the likely technique was DNS poisoning, which fools traffic- 
directing computers across the Internet, similar to vandalising exit signs on an interstate to 
misdirect travelers. It is relatively difficult to defend against (Associated press: 'hackers beat up 
on al-jazeera', AP, 27/3/03). Finally, in a plea agreement with the US Attorney's office, John 
William Racine, a 24-year old web designer admitted to tricking VeriSign subsidiary Network 
Solutions into giving him ownership of the aljazeera. net domain. He turned himself in to FBI 
agents on 26th of March, according to the plea agreement. Ile could have faced 25 years in prison, but if the judge agrees to the plea he is getting three years of probation and 1,000 hours 
community service (`Al-Jazeera hacker admits guilt awaits sentence', www. silicon. com). 
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assume total control of Al Jazeera's domain. 
844 Al-Jazeera became the internet's 
number one search query for 48 hours, according to web portal Lycos. The reason 
was that people were hunting for video footage that al-Jazeera had aired of dead 
American soldiers and US prisoners being interrogated by their Iraqi captors - 
including gruesome images that American TV networks mostly declined to show. 
Most foreign news sources845 noted that the US media had shown images of Iraqi 
prisoners before demurring on showing the American prisoners of war. 
846 
Yet, this only gives a small taste of what really happened before and during the 
war. Cyberattacks were occurring as early as October 2002, debating virtually the 
situation in Iraq. London-based computer security firm mi2g said October 2002 
was the worst month for digital attacks since its records began in 1995. it 
estimated 16,559 attacks were carried out on computer systems and websites 
during that month. But the computer security firm said the economic damage 
caused by the attacks is decreasing, reflecting a decline in the quality of targets 
chosen. According to mi2g, which monitors the hacking of websites, the number 
of attacks by groups opposed to action in Iraq, as well as Israeli attacks on 
Palestinians, rose tenfold that month. `We have noticed that more and more 
Islamic interest hacking groups are beginning to rally under a common anti-US, 
UK, Australia, anti-India and anti-Israeli agenda. The most active hacking groups 
$44 Delio, M: `War worms inch across internet', wired, 21/3/03 
sas Walker, L: 'Casting a wider net for world news', Washington post, 26/3/03 writes: Typical was 
this report in Australia's Age which said US media `had little hesitation in running graphical 
pictures of surrendering, captured, dead or dying Iraqi soldiers', and concluded: 'It was a powerful 
insight into the enormous sway that the Bush Administration and the Pentagon exert over the 
media's coverage of the Iraq war'. 
846 Walker, L: 'Casting a wider net for world news', Washington post, 26/3/03 
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are USG, with members from Egypt, Morocco and Eastern Europe, and FBH 
which is based in Pakistan'. 847 Unix Security Guards (USG) defaced nearly 400 
websites in a single day with antiwar slogans written in Arabic and English, 
according to iDefense. 849 
When the war actually started, Zone-H, a firm that records and monitors hackings 
reported 20,000 defacements in the first week of the war. Hundreds of US and 
British business, government and municipal websites were defaced with anti-war 
messages, security experts reported. Seemingly within hours, more hawkish 
hackers went on the offensive against Arab sites. Roberto Preatoni, founder of 
Zone-H commented at the time: `[t]his is the future of protest. If you take down 
Al-Jazeera, every body around the world knows it. And you never have to leave 
your house'. 849 
As a result of the escalating conflict, thousands of websites were the target of 
Denial of Service attacks, defacement, worms and viruses. 850 According to F- 
Secure, another security firm, the majority of defacements were from anti-war 
hackers, with anti-war messages or images, including ones comparing the 
847 
`Islamic hackers step up attacks', BBC news, 29/10/03 
848 Krebs, B: `Websites vandalised with antiwar messages', Washington Post, 20/3/03 
849 
`War attacks tit for tat', Reuters, 28/3/03 
850 Delio, M in `War worms inch across internet', 21/3/03 reports that at least three email viruses 
that their authors claim they were released in response to the war made rounds on the Net. Virus 
writers often include messages tied to currents concerns like war, or eternal human urges like lust, 
to get people to open infected attachments. In widest circulation is Ganda, a low security threat by 
most security firms. Once attachments with references to the current military action are opened on 
PCs running Windows, Ganda behaves like many other email worms, emailing itself to all the 
addresses in the affected machine's Outlook contact list. It also scans the machine for security 
software and shuts them down. 
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physical similarity between US president George Bush and a monkey, scrawled 
across various homepages. On the Sunday after the initial bombing, 10 Downing 
Street's website was inaccessible, having been the target of a distributed Denial of 
Service assault851 and then in mid-June hackers put up a picture of President Bush 
carrying his dog, with Prime Minister Tony Blair's head superimposed on it. 852 
`At the moment we are tracking over a thousand such defacements, most with 
anti-war messages', commented Jason Halloway of F-Secure. `I have never seen 
that level of political hacktivism before, nor so many defacements in such a short 
time'. 853 
Defacements and denial of service were accompanied by at least three war-related 
worms 
- 
Ganda, Lisa and Wanor 
- 
which shut down security, delete critical 
system files or erase hard drive data. 854 However, according to Symantec, most 
attacks, including one in October 2002 that brought down nine of the 13 servers 
that support the internet, cannot get around the fact that, when online traffic is 
disrupted or blocked in one place, it tends to flow through thousands of alternate 
channels instead. 855 With most netwarriors wanting the internet up and running, 
such attacks are symbolic and do not aim to bring down the net. Symantec itself 
has been in the centre of controversy a generous amount of times and in different 
cases 
-as mentioned throughout this thesis. In this particular antiwar 
cyberconflict, American online activist David Swanson says ISP Comcast, and 
851 'Iraq invasion leads to massive increase in pro-war, anti-war hacker activity', europemedia. net, 
1/4/03 
852 
`Britain's Labour Party website hit by hackers', Reuters, 16/6/03 
953 ibid. 
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security services company Symantec, blocked emails with 
`www. afterdowningstreet. org' in the body of the email for a week. The emails 
were drawing attention to the so-called Downing Street memo, first published in 
the Times newspaper, which shows that the Iraq war was planned well in 
advance. A spokeswoman for Symantec said that a sparr rule was created due to 
an increase in email traffic, but was later turned off for being too broad. 
856 
Nevertheless, the truth of the story is that such activities are not appreciated by 
hackers, who in many instances have served as scapegoats for script kiddies957 
with moderate computer skills. Oxblood Ruffin, director of Hactivismo, a group 
that develops tools to circumvent censorship, has commented that `the 
individual(s) who did this are committing a computer crime and causing 
censorship'. 858 Robert Ferell, a security researcher, adds that `[m]ost of them 
have no clear grasp of the causes they are supposed to be supporting or fighting 
against. They just want to appear `hacktivists', because that's a cool label to 
have'. 859 And Mark Loveless, a hacker working for US security software 
854 Krebs, B: 'Websites vandalised with antiwar messages', Washington Post, 20/3/03 
sss McMillan, R: `Wartime internet security is business as usual', Washington Post, 27/3/03 
ss6 Symantec itself has been in the centre of controversy a generous amount of times and in 
different cases 
-as mentioned throughout this thesis. In this particular antiwar cyberconllict, 
American online activist David Swanson says ISP Comcast, and security services company 
Symantec, blocked emails with 'www. afterdowningstreet. org' in the body of the email for a week. 
The emails were drawing attention to the so-called Downing Street memo, first published in the 
Times newspaper, which shows that the Iraq war was planned well in advance. A spokeswoman 
for Symantec said that a spam rule was created due to an increase in email traffic, but was later 
turned off for being too broad. (Varghese, S: 'ISP "censored" anti-war email', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27/7/05, accessed 2/8/05. ) 
857 According to the New Hacker's Dictionary script kiddies do mischief with scripts and 
programs written by others, often without understanding the exploit, Delio, M: `l lackers condemn 
Arab site hacked', wired, 31/3/03. 
ass Delio, M: 'Hackers condemn Arab site hacked', wired, 31/3/03. 
859 ibid. 
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company Bindview, put it this way: `[i]n a protest or activist scenario, one would 
hope that one's cause and message were strong enough that `shouting down' the 
opposing viewpoint is considered unnecessary'. 860 
In fact, the US government used the internet for the first time in a campaign 
aimed at Iraqi email addresses, spamming recipients to contact the UN if they 
wanted to defect. Saddam responded by shutting down internet service 
providers. 861 The US action was quite a paradoxical venture, since only 12,000 of 
Iraq's 12 million people were online. Also the US was censoring troops' emails to 
family and friends to prevent leaks of sensitive information. Yet, the real potential 
of cyberwar for the US military probably lies in the military use of a highly secure 
intranet and wireless systems that speed audio, video and other data back to 
command and control systems, as noted by Winn Schwartau, a cyberwar 
expert. 862 
US diplomacy officially entered the electronic age with the completion of a two- 
year project to provide internet access to all US embassies and consulates, with 
some 44,000 foreign service officers and other embassy staffers able to acces the 
web at Washington's more than 260 far-flung diplomatic missions from 
Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. 863 Accordingly, the US Department of State is well 
aware of the information warfare threat, as are the diplomatic departments of the 
860 
`War attacks tit for tat', Reuters, 28/3/03 $61 Cramer, C: `How the Net will play a key role in this war', The Guardian, 9/3/03 
862 Tsuruoka, D: `Internet, wireless to play key role in an Iraq war', yahoonews, 17/03/03 863 
`US cyber-diplomacy now up and running', YahooNews, 29/10/03 
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top industrial nations. However, the extent of knowledge of the average diplomat 
and the staff of embassies and consulates around the world remains questionable. 
It was also the first war `in which thousands of hours of digital imagery will be 
shot of actual combat. A lot will be from unmanned aerial vehicles flying over the 
battlefield' 
. 
864 As Der Derian notes, the Pentagon's current gospel is network- 
centric warfare, 865 an observation also found extensively in the work of Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt 866 As Der Derian graphically puts it: 
Command and control networks, like the air defense networks, will be taken out 
with missiles and possibly even electromagnetic pulse weapons. Prime time/cable 
networks will be red hot with war fever and coverage. NGOS will roll out 
humanitarian networks. Anti-war networks will send out marching orders. 
Soldiers, sailors and airman will email stories back home. This war will be 
started and ended by networks. 67 
864 Kebt Lee, CEO of East View Cartographic, a firm that sells satellite-generated maps and other 
digital imagery, quoted in Tsuruoka, D: `Internet, wireless to play key role in an Iraq war', 
yahoonews, 17/03/03. Also, Associate Press also reported the possibility of the US military using 
`e-bombs', which create a brief pulse of microwaves powerful enough to fry computers, blind 
radar, silence radios, and disable electronic ignitions in vehicles and aircraft. Ilowever, despite the 
e-bombs being classified, military analysts believe their range is a few yards at most ('E-bombs 
aims to stun Iraqi forces', AP, 19/3/03). 
865 McClellan, J: ` War on the Web', The Guardian, 19/2/03 
866 For more look at Arquilla, J and Ronfeldt, D: (2000): Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 
California: Rand. And Arquilla, J and Ronfeldt, D (eds. ): (2001) Networks and Netwars: The 
Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, California: Rand. 
867 McClellan, J: `War on the Web', The Guardian, 19/2/03 
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Conclusion 
Following the integrated theoretical model proposed in section 2.4, we can make 
relevant links with the empirical analysis undertaken above. Interestingly, all the 
components of the framework are represented in this particular conflict. I will not 
get into the first component on the environment of real conflict, because it is 
explained more thoroughly in the theoretical sections, nor into the virtual conflict 
environment, because this is explained in general terms in chapter 3 and, for the 
Iraq War example, in section 6.3. 
If we look for instance at the mobilisation structures (2a), they were greatly 
affected by the internet. The peace groups were organising demonstrations and 
events through the internet, to the effect that 10 million people protested against 
the war globally, with the net speeding up mobilisation remarkably. It helped 
mobilisation in loose coalitions of small groups that organised very quickly, at the 
same time preserving the particularity of distinct groups in network forms of 
organisation. 
Moreover, the framing process (2b) was affected as well, since email lists and 
websites were used to mobilise, changing the framing of the message to suit the 
new medium. The language used to mobilise through the internet differs from 
traditional political discourse (for instance, speeches or texts in traditional media) 
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in that it can combine various technical media (video, satellite images, file- 
sharing) in a way that delivers on the one hand a richer message, but on the 
downside a sometimes hasty and crude, under-analytical political message. The 
political opportunity structure (2c) in this particular case can refer to the rise of 
alternative media (as we see below), but also to an opening of political space, and 
an opening of global politics to people who would not or could not get so 
involved before. In virtual terms, hacktivism (2d) was apparent in anti-war/pro- 
war hacking, anti-Islamic/pro-Islamic hacking and a Virtual March on 
Washington which had an impact on the city's communication infrastructure. 
On the hacking front, the pro-Islamic/anti-Islamic hacking is an example of 
ethnoreligious cyberconflict and we can see the link with ethnoreligious affiliation 
and discourses of exclusion/inclusion (3a, 3b), if we consider the al-Jazeera hack 
from American hackers, and the movement of Islamic hackers united in a 
common anti-US, UK, Australia, anti-Indian and anti-Israeli agenda. Furthermore, 
the use of the internet as a propaganda and mobilisational tool (3c) is common to 
both sides (anti- and pro-war) through a considerable amount of websites 
advocating one view or another and mobilising, countermobilising and anti- 
mobilising against each other. 
On the media front, it is clear that political discourse (4a) is constructed in the 
American mainstream media to mobilise support for the war as analysed above, 
since, for example, more than two-thirds of all sources in news programs were 
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pro-war. Very important is also the issue of alternative sources and censorship 
(4b). Due to the embedded system, journalists having their work jeopardised for 
not being `patriotic' enough, and the American media generally following the 
government line, Americans and the rest of the world went online to find 
alternative news and first-hand eyewitness accounts via emails and blogging. The 
result was the integration of the internet into media coverage and the distribution 
of online material challenging official sources. The Wolfsfeld model (4c) is 
comfortably applied when we consider that the anti-war groups had the ability to 
initiate and control protest events and to mobilise supporters, but were not as 
successful in dominating political discourse. The media effects on policy (4d) are 
more technical than anything else, meaning there was instant 24-hour access to 
the war and the pressure that inevitably puts on any administration, but no actual 
debate or impact on policy, since the American media failed to question any 
decisions being taken by their government. 
In the final analysis, the internet played a distinctive role in the spread of the 
peace movement, on war coverage and on war-related cyberconflicts, in relation 
to which we witnessed the full potential of the new medium in politics. In the 
months preceding the actual war in Iraq, we witnessed a plenitude of phenomena 
on and off the internet that in previous international conflicts were only 
embryonic. Anti-war groups used email lists and websites, group text messages 
and chatrooms to organise protests and in some cases to engage in symbolic 
hacking against the opposite viewpont. The integration of the internet into 
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mainstream media, the effect of online material challenging official government 
sources and the mainstream media, and blogging, are an indication perhaps of 
where war coverage might be going when internet users exceed their present 
numbers. 
The most interesting thing in a brief application of the CC theoretical framework 
is the level of censorship (2b) and the Wolsfeld model (4c). In terms of censorship 
the latest literature supports the idea that journalists were not only censored and 
manipulated (CNN incident), but also targeted in this conflict. Which brings us to 
whether the US could control information. Apparently through psy-ops, they 
could manipulate the conflict and control the media, especially the American 
mainstream ones (almost always submissive to the patriotic/nationalistic discourse 
after the 9/11) 
- 
(4a). Their mentioned inability to control inconsistencies and 
fiascos from 24 hour internet coverage, blogs and US soldiers using the internet to 
send pictures (as in Abu Graib prison incident) or to manipulate the American 
image in the Muslim world is nevertheless another issue. Accordingly, the anti- 
war movement succeeded in that respect at gradually building their own image of 
the Americans and their allies and framing their message (no WMD, dodgy 
dossiers, humanitarian concerns etc) (2b). 
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Conclusion 
This thesis addressed the problem of political conflicts in computer-mediated 
environments (cyberconflicts). Firstly, I questioned how modernist concepts like 
power, participation and democracy fit into a global postmodern medium, the 
internet, in an era of globalisation. Then I argued for and analysed three theories, 
media theory, social movement theory and conflict theory, as a way to understand 
the two kinds of conflict I identified (ethnoreligious and sociopolitical), thereby 
deriving and proposing an integrated analytical framework for cyberconflict. 
Thirdly, I proceeded with an analysis of the cyberconflict environment, by way of 
investigating the historical background for the phenomenon of cyberconflict, 
information warfare, cyberterrorism and internet security analysis. 
In the empirical chapters, I analysed these two types of cyberconflict giving 
examples such as the Israeli-Palestinian, the Indian-Pakistani and the anti-war and 
anti-globalisation cyberconflicts, and including a discussion on cyberdissidents' 
conflicts with governments. The conclusions in the empirical chapters presented a 
possible application of my theoretical framework for cyberconflict to the 
empirical evidence, for an easier understanding of cyberconflict and its 
consequences for our political world. 
Information communication technologies act as a force multiplier, enhancing 
power and enabling social actors to punch above their weight and attain a reach 
and influence previously denied to them. The groups that use the internet are able 
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to communicate messages to a wider audience than that reached by more 
traditional means of political communication. The promise of nearly unlimited 
information delivered to your monitor in mere seconds is a promise for a better 
democracy, since the internet can help to make us more active and more 
knowledgeable about government. However, this availability of unlimited 
information may inspire and indeed has inspired those who are already politically 
active, but it does not necessarily mean that the internet on its own will increase 
the attentive public. 
As far as democracy is concerned, network technologies are increasingly used in 
public and political debates and communications, thus promoting dialogue 
between opposing parties 
- 
one of the elements of true democracy. New 
developments in governance such as deregulation, creating independent agencies, 
privatisation, and governing at a distance are factors resulting from ICTs. New 
uses of technology such as `blogging' are the harbinger of a new interactive 
culture that could potentially change how democracy works, turning voters into 
participants rather than passive consumers. At the same time, however, 
technologies intruding upon privacy, surveillance and censorship may impede 
democratic liberties, due to their catastrophic effect on free speech and freedom of 
expression. 
On the question of participation and the internet, providing greater choice and 
opportunity only solves the technical problems of participation 
- 
for example, that 
related to reducing the cost of involvement. It does not get to the heart of what 
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motivates citizens to move from a state of disengagement to one of salutary 
involvement in civic life. In other words, universal access is not sufficient for 
realising a democratic polity. 
On the question of groups involved pursuing power, the internet offers 
opportunities for breaking down political hierarchies, while subverting the 
national boundaries that have helped in part to control flows of information. There 
is also a growing control of cyberspace by elites who are defined by their 
technical expertise, that is, the ability to alter the `thingness' of technology that 
constructs online life, while the gap between the digital haves and the digital 
have-nots has been growing. Also, cyberspace appears as a place in which 
individuals can put aside many of the inequalities of offline life, simply because 
nobody knows if they are `really' female, old or disabled. In a way, cyberspace 
can redefine problems such as the broadening and democratisation of decision- 
making procedures by removing the constraint of physical presence. 
Furthermore, globalisation brings dramatic changes in the transactions and 
interactions taking place among states, firms and peoples in the world. It involves 
both an increase in cross-border transactions of goods and services and an 
increase in flows of images, ideas and people. In such a terrain, the internet seems 
to be forming a `cybernation', where its initial subculture evolved a set of 
acceptable behaviors, a common history and a common identity of beliefs: free 
speech, protection of civil rights, privacy and freedom of expression, etc. With the 
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spread of the internet, there is scope for a newly international localism, which is 
finding expression in virtual communities, with some people going so far as to 
suggest that a new global cyberstate is forming. 
When considering the postmodern nature of the internet, we would have to 
remind ourselves that the resistance of new media to modernity lies in their 
complication of subjecthood, their denaturalising of the process of subject 
formation, and their putting into question of the interiority of the subject and its 
coherence. The issue of identity is not merely of philosophical importance, but is 
also an issue of immense practical importance for the conduct of states, not to 
mention identifying the lines of flight from the status quo. Moreover, the shift 
from real to hyperreal occurs when we move from mere representation to 
simulation, a movement already existing in our virtual world. Once the internet 
moves closer to total connectivity, this metaphorical cyberspace could become the 
hyperreal 
- 
more real than the place it once simulated. The fact that many people 
believe virtual communities to be real places in which they live real experiences 
makes this blurring of the real and the unreal closer to Baudrillard's postmodern 
moment of hyperreal than to representation. 
Searching for a satisfactory description of empirical cases of cyberconflict led to 
the use of a classification between two types of cyberconflict: sociopolitical and 
ethnoreligious. In order to explain the empirical evidence of `cyberconflict', I 
proposed the integration of elements of social movement, conflict and media 
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theories into a single analytical framework for cyberconflict. I identified elements 
of social movement theory to discuss sociopolitical cyberconflicts, conflict theory 
to address ethnoreligious cyberconflicts and media theory as a component for 
both, deriving a single an integrated analytical framework for understanding 
cyberconflict. 
In the social movement theory chapter, I identified elements of this theory 
relevant to new social movements using the internet to accomplish their goals of 
power, democracy and participation. More specifically, I analysed and used the 
classical resource mobilisation model of mobilising structures, framing processes 
and the political opportunity structure to analyse how these are affected by the use 
of the internet by new social movements. 
New social movements are not new, but rather, are part and parcel of the 
dominant modem culture, which makes it difficult to think of movements as 
flowing as either from `pre-modem' or `postmodem' subcultures. However, the 
structure of NSMs 
- 
open, decentralised, nonhierarchical 
- 
makes them ideal for 
internetted communication. The movement is composed of adverse autonomous 
units that expend an important part of their resources on internal solidarity. A 
network of communication and exchange keeps the cells in contact with each 
other. Information and resources circulate in networks and leadership is not 
concentrated but diffuse. NSMs advocate direct democracy, self-help groups and 
cooperative styles of social organisation. The fewer and weaker the social ties to 
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alternative networks, the greater the structural availability for movement 
participation. Sociopolitical movements, such as the political dissidents in China, 
can test the limits of a system, pushing the system beyond the range of variations 
that it can tolerate without altering its structure. 
Using conflict theory, I analysed the present situation of conflict between 
sociopolitical groups, as well as ethnoreligious ones. Neo-liberal governments and 
institutions face a counter-hegemonic account of globalisation, to which they have 
responded in a confused and often contradictory way. One of the interesting sides 
to the argument is that the information revolution is altering the nature of conflict 
by strengthening network forms of organisation over hierarchical forms. In 
contrast to the closure of space, the violence and identity divide found in 
ethnoreligious discourses, sociopolitical movements seem to rely more on 
networking and rhizomatic structures. 
In media theory, the important questions were how information is released and 
why, how much censorship is taking place and what alternative sources of 
information are available. I asked these questions in my analysis of the anti-Iraq 
war/pro-war cyberconflict. The way the war is communicated is as important as 
the conduct of the war itself. Among many examples, the Moscow LiveJournal 
incident shows that individuals and protagonists can now send stories quicker 
than journalists, indicating that the media will have an independent capability to 
have access to future conflict arenas and to provide real-time visual and audio 
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coverage of battlefield events. This has consequences for news management by 
even very powerful states like the U. S. 
The analyses of these theories led to an integrated theoretical framework with the 
following parameters to be looked at while analysing cyberconflicts. 
1. Environment of Conflict and Conflict Mapping (real and virtual). The world 
system generates an arborescent apparatus, which is haunted by lines of flight, 
emerging through underground networks connected horizontally and lacking a 
hierarchical centre (Deleuze and Guattari). The structure of the internet is ideal 
for network groups (since it is a global network with no central authority) and has 
offered another experience of governance (no governance), time and space 
(compression), ideology (freedom of information and access to it), identity 
(multiplicity) and fundamentally an opposition to surveillance and control, 
boundaries and apparatuses. However, in ethnoreligious cyberconflicts, where the 
groups' systems of belief and organisation aspire to hierarchical apparatuses 
(nation, religion, identification with parties and leaders), this network form is not 
always evident. This is why there is a dual modality of cyberconflict: one 
rhizomatic and one hierarchical. 
2. Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts: The impact of ICTs on: a. Mobilising structures 
(network style of movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, tactics, 
goals), b. Framing Processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of the internet 
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on these processes), c. Political opportunity structure (the internet as a component 
of this structure), d. hacktivism. 
3. Ethnoreligious Cyberconflicts: a. Ethnic/religious affiliation, chauvinism, 
national identity, b. Discourses of inclusion and exclusion, c. Information warfare, 
the use of the internet as a weapon, propaganda and mobilisational resource d. 
Conflict resolution, which depends on the legal and organisational framework, the 
number of parties and issues, the distribution of power, and the content of values 
and beliefs. 
4. The internet as a medium: a. Analysing discourses (representations of the 
world, constructions of social identities and social relations), b. Control of 
information, level of censorship, alternative sources, c. Wolsfeld: Political contest 
model among antagonists: the ability to initiate and control events, dominate 
political discourse, mobilise supporters, d. Media effects on policy (strategic, 
tactical, and representational). 
The political environment of the internet is analysed not in terms of the internet as 
a mass medium in the traditional sense, but rather, as a significant new resource 
used by the opposing parties in a conflict. My approach involves analysing the use 
of the internet by the parties in a conflict (endogenously) and not just theorising 
about how the media influence the political outcome of a conflict (exogenously). 
What was evident from the beginning was that major political and military 
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conflicts are increasingly accompanied by a significant amount of online activity. 
Furthermore, cyberattacks are escalating in volume, sophistication and 
coordination. 
The third chapter of my thesis illustrated the environment of cyberconflict placing 
emphasis on hackers, security experts and internet security analysis. Hacking can 
potentially perform a variety of benevolent services to the security industry 
constantly pushing forward the limits of computer security, being an important 
from of watchdog counter-response to the use of surveillance technology and data 
gathering by the state. At the same time there is a knowledge gap between 
computer security and computer underground. There is a scarcity of theoretical 
knowledge surrounding computer security with various calls for more hands-on 
experience of security to supplement more formal theory. 
A further part of the cyberconflict environment is cyberterrorism: computer-based 
attacks intended to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of 
goals that are political, religious or ideological. According to Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, conflicts increasingly revolve around knowledge and the use of soft 
power. This would come about with the help of information-age ideologies in 
which identities and loyalties shift from the nation-state to the transnational level 
of global civil society. Additionally, netwar is referred to as the low, societal type 
of struggle, while cyberwar refers more to the heavy information warfare type. 
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After introducing the technical environment of cyberconflict, I proceeded to 
describe and analyse specific cases of political conflicts online and link these with 
the integrated analytical framework. Firstly, I looked at sociopolitical 
cyberconflicts. Sociopolitical cyberconflicts could be seen as taking two forms, 
the first being when proper hackers attack virtually chosen political targets, and 
the second occurring when people organise through the internet to protest or carry 
through email a political message. Sociopolitical CCs seem to rely heavily on 
decentralised networks and indicate the use of rhizomatic structure, following the 
structure of NSMs as discussed above. 
Cyberconflicts can act as a `barometer' of real life conflicts and can reveal the 
nature and the conflict of the participating groups. The protagonists in 
sociopolitical cyberconflicts fight for participation, power and democracy. In the 
case of the anti-globalisation and the anti-capitalist movement, what we see is an 
alternative programme for the reform of society, asking for democracy and more 
participation from the `underdogs', be they in the West or in the developing 
world. In the anti-war movement, which is a single-issue movement, the demand 
is for a change in power relations in favor of those that believed the war to be 
unjustified. In new social movements, networking through the internet links 
diverse communities such as labour, feminist, ecological, peace and anti-capitalist 
groups with the aim of challenging public opinion and battle for media access and 
coverage. Groups are being brought together like a parallelogram of forces 
following a swarm logic, indicating a web of horizontal solidarities to which 
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power might be devolved or even dissolved. The internet encourages a version of 
the commons that is ungoverned and ungovernable either by corporate interests or 
by leaders and parties. 
An early example of hacktivism is the Seattle anti-WTO mobilisation at the end 
of November 1999, which was the first to take full advantage of the alternative 
network offered by the internet. The anti-WTO protesters were able to initiate a 
newsworthy event, putting the other side on the defensive. Using the internet, they 
could send stories directly from the street for the whole world to see, rendering 
the flow of information uncontrollable. Thirdly, they were able to mobilise 
support by promoting an alternative frame for the event. 
Dissidents against governments are able to use a variety of internet-based 
techniques (email lists, email spamming, BBS, peer-to-peer and e-magazines) to 
spread alternative frames for events and a possible alternative online democratic 
public sphere. An example of dissidents' use of the internet is spamming e- 
magazines to an unprecedented number of people within China, a method which 
provides recipients with `plausible deniability'. Also, file-trading networks like 
Kazaa and Gnutella can help dissidents communicate, since they have no central 
source and are hard to turn off. 
Ethnoreligious cyberconflicts primarily include hacking enemy sites and creating 
sites for propaganda nd mobilisational purposes. I provided empirical evidence 
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and analysis of such conflicts (Israeli-Palestinian, India-Pakistan, China-US, 
Taiwan-China-Japan, Kosovo, Colombia). In ethnoreligious CC, despite the fact 
that patriotic hackers can network, there is a greater reliance on traditional ideas, 
such as the protecting the nation or fatherland and attacking for nationalist 
reasons. The Other is potrayed as the enemy, through very closed, old and 
primordialist ideas of belonging to an imagined community. 
The brief section on conflict resolution on the internet looks at attempts and 
experiments and concludes that the internet is a helpful tool that fosters 
cooperation and dialogue between opposing sides in a conflict, bringing 
individuals and groups together that would otherwise find it difficult to meet. The 
three examples I examine (MEVic, MEAF and the Project for Arab-Jewish 
Dialogue) place an emphasis on community-based diplomacy, interfaith dialogue, 
and building positive relationship as a platform for resolution. 
In the Israeli-Palestinian cyberconflict, we see the use of national symbols when 
hacking websites, like the Israeli flag, Hebrew text and even a recording of the 
Israeli national anthem on the Hezbollah home page. This explicitly draws 
attention to issues of national identity, nationalism and ethnicity. Also, the 
language used by hackers relies on an `us' and `them' mentality, where Israelis 
and their American supporters, or else Palestinians and Muslims, are portrayed as 
barbaric, reflecting discourses of inclusion and exclusion. The internet in this 
cyberconflict became a battleground and was used as a weapon by both sides, and 
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full-scale action by thousands of Israeli and Palestinian youngsters involved both 
racist emails and circulating instructions for how to crush the enemy's websites. 
Similarly, in the Indian-Pakistani cyberconflict the Indian Army's website was set 
up as a propaganda tool, and hacked pictures of alleged tortures of Kashmiris by 
Indians were placed on the site, in a similar propaganda tactic. Also, the internet 
was used as a weapon, when the worm Yaha was released by Indian hackers. In 
particular disourses, religion is mentioned (religious affiliation), the word 
`brothers' (collective identity and solidarity), and `our country' and a promised 
land. In the rest of the examples, similar links can be made with the proposed 
framework. 
In analysing the March 2003 Iraq conflict, I looked at the internet's role in the 
conflict: its effect on the organisation and spread of the movement, its impact on 
war coverage and war-related cyberconflicts. These last involved hacking 
between anti-war and pro-war hacktivists (sociopolitical CC), but also between 
pro-Islamic and anti-Islamic hackers (ethnoreligious CC). 
If we look for instance at the mobilisation structures, they were greatly affected 
by the internet, since the peace groups were organising demonstrations and events 
through the internet, mobilising in loose coalitions of small groups that organise 
very quickly and preserving the particularity of distinct groups in network forms 
of organisation. Moreover, the framing process was affected as well, since email 
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lists and websites were used to mobilise, changing the framing of the message to 
suit the new medium. The political opportunity structure in this particular case 
refers to alternative media, but also to an opening of political space, or an opening 
of global politics to people who would not or could not get so involved before. 
This thesis identifies a dulity of cyberconflict, where ethnoreligious cyberconflicts 
are mapped as representing/defending loyalties of hierarchical apparatuses and 
sociopolitical cyberconflicts are empowering network forms of organisation. The 
thesis also promotes the argument that actors in ethnoreligious CC need to operate 
in a more network fashion, if they are fighting network forms of terrorism or 
resistance. Actors in sociopolitical CC need to operate in a more organised 
fashion, if they are to constructively engage with the present global political 
system or parts of that system. Conflict resolution will be possible, only when 
hierarchical apparatuses become more networked and rhizomatic groups become 
more conscious of the rest of their hosting network. Ultimately, what this 
`reversal' argument calls for is twofold: Firstly, in sociopolitical cyberconflits, the 
need to strengthen the organisational structures and informal weak connective 
structures these non-hierarchical movements normally have. As Tarrow explains 
the most effective forms of organisation are based on partly autonomous and 
contextually-rooted local units linked by connective structures, and coordinated 
by formal organisations. Secondly, the information revolution is favoring and 
strengthening networked organisational designs, often at the expense of 
hierarchies. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue and the 9/11 demonstrated, states 
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need to wake up to this fact and realise that networks can be fought effectively 
only by flexible network-style responses. 
The impact of information technology on political conflict cannot be ignored. The 
form of the internet itself 
-a global network with no central authority - has 
offered another experience of governance (no governance), time and space 
(compression), ideology (freedom of information and access to it), identity 
(multiplicity) and fundamentally an opposition to surveillance and control, 
boundaries and apparatuses. New information-age ideologies could be easily 
arguing for a transfer of virtual social and political structures to real life world, 
reversing for once the existing process of imitating real life in cyberspace. The 
internet is not a medium. It is `another' place. In this environment, cyberconf icts 
are complex conflicts involving social movement, conflict and media 
components, which in this thesis are combined to derive an integrated 
thereoretical framework to explain this novel and exciting phenomenon. 
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